PUBLIC
SECURITY

SOCIAL DICTIONARIES

Series edited by

Wit Pasierbek and Bogdan Szlachta

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Edited by Tomasz W. Grabowski

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Tomasz W. Grabowski

Minister of Education and Science
Republic of Poland

Contents

Foreword

In 2019, the team members of the Ignatian Social Forum decided to continue the work that was initiated by the publication of the *Social Dictionary* in 2004. Scientists from both Polish and foreign academic centres contributed to this publication, which contains over one hundred extended essays that discuss the findings of recent humanities and social science research.

This new project is more extensive than the original *Social Dictionary*: over twenty volumes present the state of humanistic and social knowledge in the third decade of the 21st century. This knowledge concerns man, who is developing within diverse civilizations, cultures and societies, who adheres to many religions, and who exhibits diverse patterns of behaviour. Like the first four volumes (already published in Polish and in English; electronic versions are also available), each new volume is devoted to a research area that is considered particularly important to the humanities and social sciences: each investigates man and his social environment, political and public affairs, and international relations. The analyses of these areas are undertaken from diverse research perspectives; thus, they lead to a more thorough presentation of the problems typically addressed by only one discipline and substantially broaden the scope of the reflections offered by the Authors of the articles. These Authors look for an 'interpretative key' that will allow them to present the most significant issues related to each of the

volumes' main research areas, which are sometimes controversial or debatable among scientists. These research areas give the titles to the volumes of the new *Social Dictionary*. This 'interpretative key' would not be important if the articles published in each volume resembled succinct encyclopaedic entries; however, it becomes significant because the entries take the form of 20-page articles that follow a uniform pattern. The considerations presented by the Authors focus on the essence of the concepts they analyse, including their history, subject matter, and practical aspects. Written by Polish scientists representing not only different academic centres and scientific disciplines but also different 'research sensibilities', the twenty volumes are based on theoretical reflection accompanied by practical considerations. We also treat Catholic social teaching as an element of the 'interpretative key' because it is impossible to ignore twenty centuries of the legacy and richness of Christianity.

We hope that this volume will satisfy Readers as it offers not only an opportunity to learn about scientific approaches to the vital problems faced by contemporary man, states, and societies, but also an insight into sometimes difficult aspects of modernity as viewed from a Catholic perspective. We also hope that Readers will appreciate the effort of Polish scientists who, while undertaking original reflection on these issues, go beyond the mere presentation of other people's thoughts as they are aware of the importance of the intellectual achievements of Polish science.

Series editors
Wit Pasierbek and Bogdan Szlachta

Introduction

This volume contains twenty articles devoted to the most fundamental issues in public security. Their Authors are Polish researchers who specialise in security in various fields and at various levels of analysis. Although most articles deal with issues of a universal nature and summarise the universal and current state of knowledge, from the very beginning it was the editors' deliberate intention to preserve the Polish perspective due to the conviction that Poland has something important to say in the field of security. As John Mearsheimer wrote, over the past two hundred years, Poland has – along with Korea – been one of the most vulnerable of all countries to foreign aggression. Both countries have powerful neighbours who have repeatedly attempted to dominate or even conquer them. [...] Poland's history should encourage Poles to study international politics so that they can comprehend its brutality and be able to understand why their country has so often fallen prey to superpowers (Mearsheimer, 2013).

Despite the obvious limitations linked to the choice of topics and the word limit, the Authors and editors hope that the volume will contribute to a better understanding of the processes and mechanisms that govern the security of the individual, the state, and the international community. In 2011 in Poland, security studies was granted the status of an independent scientific discipline within the broader field of the social sciences. This is an equivalent status to well-established disciplines such as the political sciences or psychology. This status is a justifiable but also highly original solution with global ramifications: on the one hand, it confirms how much importance is attached to security issues in Poland;

on the other hand, it is a commitment and encouragement to create a specific Polish scientific school of security studies.

Security issues remain extremely topical. The Russian aggression against Ukraine initiated in 2014 became a full-scale war in 2022. This has once again confirmed that security is relative and susceptible to negative changes over time, and that the possibility of the most brutal attack should always be taken into account. Moreover, threats are generated not only by competing states but also by broad natural, economic, social, etc. processes. The remit covered by security is continuously expanding and today we talk of, e.g., environmental security, food security, or cultural security, and in recent decades increasingly new areas of social life have been securitised by states and included in the 'security discourse'.

The first article and the last (twentieth) article in this volume are devoted to the most theoretical and conceptual issues. The author of the first, while openly admitting that security is a predominantly subjective, relative, and in many ways blurred phenomenon, formulates its definition and describes its most fundamental aspects. One of the conclusions of this introductory article states that, on the international level, the phenomena and mechanisms described by realists – e.g., the non-existence of an effective supreme body in international relations, states' egoism, the competition between superpowers for power, and the general conflict-generating nature of relations resulting from the impossibility of building full trust between various actors (especially between superpowers) – are likely to remain for a long time. This description paints a rather pessimistic picture of human nature and the international system, in which the pursuit of security consists in maximising one's own power and influence at the expense of others. A response to this negative picture is provided in the final article, entitled *Security in Catholic social teaching*, in which the author advocates that human endeavours directed at providing security need to be rooted in the spiritual sphere, that broad international cooperation and deep interreligious and intercultural dialogue are necessary, and that effective measures must be taken against the material and social deprivation of disadvantaged individuals and groups. The two approaches presented in the first and final articles are in some ways contradictory. The former is based on the 'logic of the world', while the latter relies on the 'logic of the spirit'. The pursuit of

security, probably like all human activity, is inscribed in the dialectic of these two opposites.

Articles two and three deal with issues that are the broadest in terms of both time and space, i.e., demographic security and environmental security. In the former, people are the object of security, and cultural, economic, social and other types of security depend on the state's population. In the latter, the biosphere is man's natural habitat, and its degradation could have a catastrophic impact on the security of the human species and the entire planet. Articles four and five discuss economic security and social safety, which include issues such as the undisturbed functioning of the economy, access to material livelihoods, and the provision of opportunities for individual development. Article six deals with the trans-sectoral field, i.e., cybersecurity, which, following the IT revolution, has become a pivotal issue in every sphere of social life. Article seven is devoted to a traditional element of national security, namely state border protection, which is gaining renewed importance in the face of hybrid threats and increased migration. Article eight discusses the police as the main actor responsible for internal security; article nine reflects on civil protection under anthropogenic and natural threats, while article ten focuses on safety and the security of public spaces as a factor that very strongly affects the psychological sense of security of 'ordinary residents' in cities and smaller towns. Article eleven presents the concept of surveillance society, the implementation of which is possible thanks to both the existence of new technical tools of surveillance and the self-surveillance that users of modern digital technologies impose on themselves. The next three articles (twelve to fourteen) respectively deal with the following threats to security: 1) crime as the most common form of violation of public order, 2) radicalism as a phenomenon that can pose a problem for political security, and 3) terrorism, which has gained enormous prominence in the age of mass media.

Articles fifteen to seventeen deal with issues of military security (which is of immense gravity during the ongoing war in Ukraine): the armed forces, contemporary armed conflicts, and hybrid threats, which are situated at the intersection of the military and non-military spheres. Finally, articles eighteen and nineteen are dedicated to intelligence and counterintelligence as fundamental areas of activity in the contemporary

special services. As the volume is limited to about 400 pages, it was impossible to describe all the problems related to the sphere of human security here. However, many articles related to security issues can also be found in, for example, the volumes *Geopolitics*, *Public Policies*, *Multiculturalism*, and *Globalisation and Interdependence.*

The editors and Authors of this volume hope that it will be of interest to Readers and will prove useful to students, lecturers, and practitioners alike, providing them with an introduction to the world of academic security studies.

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Volume editor
Tomasz W. Grabowski

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Security

Summary

DEFINITION OF THE TERM: Security is the absence of threats; it guarantees the certainty of existence and the preservation of one's values, and it enables the pursuit of one's goals. This state is achieved through the creative activity of a security actor in his attempts to eliminate threats and to enhance the mechanisms that provide him with a sense of security.

HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE TERM: Modern security systems and systems of social control began to emerge in the 19th century as a result of industrialisation, urbanisation, increased mobility, and the emergence of mass society.

DISCUSSION OF THE TERM: Today, new academic concepts such as securitisation theory, ontological security, and critical security studies are influential within the theoretical dimension of security theories, while in the practical dimension the old freedom-security dilemma is more acute than ever before. Moreover, mastering the tools of social control, which are based on technological developments, is a great contemporary challenge.

SYSTEMATIC REFLECTION WITH CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: The issue of security is currently at the heart of public and private life. In this context, the question that needs to be answered is whether the implication 'the more secure the better' holds true.

Keywords: security, threat, sense of security, history of security, security theory

Definition of the term

Security is the s t a t e of being secure, which is ensured by the absence of threats. This state guarantees the certainty of existence and the preservation of one's values, and it enables one to pursue one's goals. This state is achieved not only as a result of the absence of specific threats but also through the actor's creative activity in his attempts to eliminate threats and to enhance the mechanisms that provide him with a sense of security; in this sense, security is a s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l   p r o c e s s. Given the dynamics and relativity of all phenomena, the total elimination of all threats and the absolute certainty of survival are impossible to guarantee. As a result, security is a continuous u n d e r t a k i n g consisting in the mitigation and avoidance of threats to the values endorsed by an actor, in particular the mitigation of those threats which would put the highest value, i.e., survival, in jeopardy if left unchecked. Because security is of such importance for the realisation of existential goals, it itself becomes of the highest value (although it is better to treat it as a means to achieve the highest goals, i.e., survival, freedom, and development) (Zięba, 2012; Gierszewski, 2021; Williams & McDonald, 2018).

Security is also a p s y c h o l o g i c a l   n e e d that is prioritised in the hierarchy of needs, which is understandable and stems from the primordial attempt of the animate world to free itself from direct threats in its environment. An absence of security leads to anxiety and the feeling of insecurity. Threat precedes security and gives rise to it, as can be seen by looking at the etymology of the Latin word *securitas*, which derives from the phrase *sine cura*, meaning a state without care, worry, anxiety, or change. Cicero wrote "I now call security the freedom from anxiety, on which a happy life depends" (*securitatem nunc appello vacuitatem aegritudinis, in qua vita beata posita est*). The Polish word *bezpieczeństwo* is similarly translated (a state without *piecza* understood as 'concern for something') as is the Russian word *bezopasnost* (a state without *opasnost*, i.e., danger). Staying with linguistic issues, it is worth mentioning that in English there are separate words for 'safety' and 'security', which well reflects the distinction between security as a state and security as a process. 'Safety' refers to a state of being free from danger and threat, but is more closely related to physical conditions, such as the absence

of injury, whereas 'security' covers preventing or responding to external threats (Meerts, 2021).

In the field of security, an a c t o r can be a person (individual), an organisation, a social group, or an organisational structure (institution) that represents people, the best example of which is the state. An 'actor' is an agentive entity that provides security (i.e., *one who provides* security). The *one to whom* security is to be *provided* is called a r e f e r e n t o b j e c t. The actor and the referent object can be identical (e.g., a state provides security to its own structures) or different (e.g., a state provides security to an individual).

Depending on its socio-spatial scope, different s e c u r i t y l e v e l s can be distinguished. The most common division is between the individual, the state, and the international system. According to the traditional view, by far the strongest emphasis is placed on the security of the state as the primary entity that organises social life and has a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence.

Depending on the sphere of human activity, security is divided into s e c t o r s (or categories or types). The most widespread division today was proposed by Barry Buzan (1998), who distinguished between political, military, societal, environmental, and economic security sectors. Military security refers to the armed, offensive, and defensive capabilities of a state and to how states perceive each other's intentions. Political security refers to states' organisational stability, the stability of government systems, and the ideologies that provide legitimacy for these governments. Economic security refers to access to the resources, finances, and markets necessary to maintain adequate levels of state prosperity and power. Societal security refers to the ability of societies to reproduce their traditional patterns of language and culture and to preserve their religious and national identity, their customs, and their capacity for internal cooperation and self-organisation under conditions that allow them to develop further. Environmental security refers to the preservation of the local and planetary biosphere as a key resource on which all human activity depends.

In recent decades, analyses of security issues have become increasingly broader in scope. The set of referent objects is expanding (which includes people, society, civilisations, the planet, etc.), as is the set of values to be protected and the means and methods engaged for this

purpose. This results in the emergence of new areas of security and the implementation of new security technologies (Stańczyk, 2011).

A distinction is made between p u b l i c and p r i v a t e security. Public security is traditionally defined as "a state in which there is an absence of threats to the functioning of a state organisation and the realisation of its interests, which enables its normal and free development" (Misiuk, 2013, p. 18). A related term is 'public order', i.e., "the actually existing system of social relations, which is regulated by a set of legal and other socially accepted norms that guarantees the undisturbed and conflict-free functioning of individuals in society" (Misiuk, 2013, p. 19). As far as private security is concerned, a distinction can be made according to who provides security (who is 'the agentive entity'): if it is a state actor, the activity in question would involve 'public security'; if it is a private actor, it would involve 'private security'. In line with this distinction, private security is thus defined as "the nongovernmental practice of protecting people, property, and information, conducting investigation, and safeguarding an organization's assets" (Lee, 2021, p. 874). However, this division is highly imprecise, since public security entails much more than the activities of state actors (e.g., the administration or the police). It consists, for example, of economic security, which is fostered by the activities undertaken by private actors. In certain places, public order is controlled by private security personnel. Moreover, some actors are difficult to classify according to the public-private criterion, e.g., those involved in the social protection of public order (such as citizen's guards and neighbourhood patrols). Thus, Ian Loader's observation that the term 'private security' is an oxymoron seems correct. After all, security "arises, most fundamentally, from an overall basis of economic and social well-being, a sense of belonging to, or being 'part of', society in ways which instill confidence in the future. Security is also a matter of trust, both in social institutions and inter-subjective relations. It is thus intimately connected with the quality of human association; referring to the degree of social cohesion, the 'thickness' of the social bond. Security, in short, depends upon, and is the product of, a richly textured and inclusive set of social relations" (Loader, 1997, p. 155).

Furthermore, a distinction can be made between n e g a t i v e and p o s i t i v e security; each represents a distinct philosophical approach to security. Negative security is 'security from', i.e., protection from

harm – primarily harm that threatens the individual's free existence. From this perspective, the state and the nation are secure to the extent that they are not threatened by war or do not have to sacrifice their core values in order to avoid war, although security also consists in the capacity to – if necessary – preserve one's values and resources by winning any war that may occur. Similarly, the human individual is secure to the extent that he is not threatened with harm; or, if a threatening situation does arise, he is capable of getting out of it without sacrificing essential values. Thus, negative security stems from the accumulation of power to resist threats. To be secure, an actor must be relatively strong, which is achieved with the accumulation of property, capital, weapons, armies, territory, etc. This perspective of security is sometimes strongly criticised for being closed to the outside world, which is described in terms of alienation, threat, competition, and struggle; thus, it supposedly promotes distrust and confrontational attitudes. Such unequivocal criticism seems unwarranted though, since a state of risk and relative danger is natural and objective, and the neutralisation, mitigation, and avoidance of threats is a necessary precondition for a broader understanding of security.

Positive security is 'security to' (i.e., being free and capable of pursuing one's goals). It is based on the notion of emancipation, justice, human rights, as well as a more optimistic description of the relationships between the various actors, each of which takes responsibility for their own security. From this perspective, states, nations, and individuals are secure if they can exercise their freedoms and are capable of pursuing their developmental opportunities and interests. There may be quarrels and conflicts in the relations between actors, but there is also room for cooperation in dealing with threats. Positive security also implies an attitude in which current and future trends and challenges generated by modern civilisation are recognised and it is possible to manage them in such a way that they do not become threats but are transformed into opportunities.

Another issue is the perception of security, which can be o b j e c - t i v e or s u b j e c t i v e. Objective security can be assessed by means of external and measurable indicators, whereas subjective security (which can be equated with the psychological sense of security) is assessed by non-measurable, individual, and internal factors. Taken together,

the objective and subjective dimensions of security define the state of security of both an actor and a referent object.

Objective and subjective security can be variously correlated. Daniel Frei distinguished four possible options here:

1. The state of an absence of security – when the threat is objectively present and large, and this state is correctly perceived by a security actor.
2. The state of an obsession with danger – when the threat is objectively absent or small but is perceived by an actor as existing or large.
3. The state of a false sense of security – when the threat is objectively present but perceived by an actor as small or not perceived at all (also called a misperception of threat).
4. The state of security – when the threat does not exist or is small and is perceived in the same way by an actor (Frei, 1977).

The correct perception of a threat is fundamental. This perception is the ability to spot harmful phenomena and processes in the environment and to attribute them negative characteristics in accordance with one's knowledge, experience, and ability to analyse incoming information. However, a s u b j e c t i v e f a c t o r is always present in any perception of danger, which is linked to the individual and the deeply psychological nature of the analysed issue. As a contemporary philosopher stated, security is "a negative aim inspired by fear" (Russell, 1995, p. 69). This refers not only to the rather obvious fear of natural threats but also to the fear of social and cultural phenomena. The experiencing of different states (including the interpretation of given factors either as safe or as threatening) depends not only on the information received from the external environment but also on the individual's internal cognitive structures and the knowledge encoded in his long-term memory – acquired in the process of learning and thinking (Marciniak, 2009).

A s e n s e o f s e c u r i t y means "the physical and psychological feelings of peace and certainty created, for example, by the absence of dangerous events or the reduction of risk and uncertainty" (Marciniak, 2009). At the level of the individual, a sense of security is influenced by such determinants as early childhood experiences, the tendency to experience anxiety and fear, risk-taking propensity, self-esteem, neuroticism, emotional balance, and passive egocentrism (low self-esteem and

the criticism of others are conducive to anxious self-centredness). The sense of security itself, on the other hand, consists in a sense of being informed, a sense of certainty and stability, a sense of being anchored in the social environment, and a sense of agency (Marciniak, 2009).

It should be emphasised that the concept of security poses many definitional and analytical difficulties. It is also sometimes considered to be contentious, polysemous, 'slippery', or even 'disorderly' or 'promiscuous'. As Stanisław Sulowski writes, "we are dealing with typical definitional pessimism, since the scope of designators of this concept is not fixed and is constantly changing. It is easy to notice that security is a subjective, relative, and emotional phenomenon" (Sulowski, 2009, p. 12). The continuous deepening and widening of the understanding of security creates a dynamic situation in which it is difficult to analyse it holistically. Analyses of specific security issues undertaken by representatives of different disciplines within the social sciences, humanities, and the technical sciences reveal only particular aspects of the problem and ignore its totality. It is a mistake to both focus too much on detailed aspects and strive for a holistic description and explanation. As Michał Brzeziński rightly observes,

> any simplifications that treat security in a concise and at the same time exhaustive manner are inadequate. It seems most sensible to present the main recurring features and dominant ways of thinking about security [...]. The challenge faced by science is to fully understand security, to be open to different concepts and, above all, to understand that security is not just a fragment of a whole, a distinct problem to be studied in isolation. Nor is it the foundation on which other values are based. Security permeates and binds together everything and goes beyond the physiological (existential) needs of each actor (Brzeziński, 2009, pp. 31–32).

Historical analysis of the term

Just as, by its very nature, threat precedes security, wars precede the state as an entity. According to the tradition of political philosophy initiated by Thomas Hobbes, man in the state of nature lived under conditions of 'the war of all against all' (*bellum omnium contra omnes*). Motivated by fear and hostility, human individuals unleashed their worst behavioural traits in their dealings with other human individuals. Thus, the rational solution was to surrender one's individual freedom – by the instigation of

a social contract – to a sovereign, who in return was obliged to maintain order. However, it is worth emphasising that this view of the state of nature is merely a hypothesis. The most recent scientific findings put the human individual in a much better light. As Francis Fukuyama states,

> [e]verything that modern biology and anthropology tell us about the state of nature suggests the opposite: there was never a period in human evolution when human beings existed as isolated individuals; the primate precursors of the human species had already developed extensive social and indeed political, skills; and the human brain is hardwired with faculties that facilitate many forms of social cooperation (Fukuyama, 2011, p. 30).

The earliest instances of human violence, which can be called a state of war, were therefore perpetrated not by individuals motivated by self-ishness and an instinct for self-preservation but by closely knit groups of people who fought against other groups. Leaving aside questions regarding the extent to which primitive man was driven by selfish-ness and his capacity for natural cooperation, it can be observed that Hobbes's assumption still forms the foundations of the state's authority in the provision of security and public order today. Since Hobbes, poli-tics has been perceived primarily as a sphere of conflict, and man as a confrontational being. According to this tradition, which has also been adopted in democratic societies, the individual surrenders his freedom or part of it to the state and is given protection in return.

Defence against foreign violence and plunder was certainly the moti-vation for the creation of the first socio-political organisations designed to provide – in today's parlance – external or military security. The first war ever recorded in history took place around 2700 BC between the Sumerians and the Elamites. The struggle for farmland between these peoples (which had previously been clans) probably dates to the Neo-lithic Age. With time, it was not only the ways in which armies were assembled (e.g., slave armies, a common army of serfs, fief armies, mercenary armies, national armies, and professional armies) that were perfected but also the ways in which military operations were conducted and the mechanisms of political control over military command (see the article *Armed forces* in this volume).

The history of internal security and the structures of policing were less turbulent and bloody, at least in the pre-modern era. The word

'police' is derived from the Greek word *polis* (πόλις), which primarily means a city-state but also state affairs, government, the art of governing, and public duties. The history of police and policing (understood as the protection of public order) can be divided into three stages. The first stage is the entire history of mankind from its beginnings up to 1829. At this stage there was no institutionalised or centralised state formation for policing. In various countries, various types of officials (constables, guards) performed broad and dispersed functions, which – apart from maintaining public order – included the detention of those arrested, the collection of taxes, the organisation of the army, the control of vagrants, etc. The institutional evolution towards professionalisation and centralisation is well exemplified by England. The Statute of Winchester (1285) obliged townspeople to serve for one year as unpaid night watchmen. Over time, these duties proved incompatible with their day-to-day life, so some of them began to hire watchmen on their behalf and, eventually, their services were established as a new profession (which was still funded by private individuals) (Mulone, 2019). Paris and London, which were the largest cities in the Western world between the 17th and 19th centuries, were the birthplaces of the modern police. As mentioned above, the Greek *polis* also means the art of urban governance. The communities of the sprawling French and English capitals needed the police as a force to maintain order between people who were strangers to one another. Social, bottom-up control mechanisms weakened as people moved from the countryside to towns or cities due to industrialisation. As Massimiliano Mulone (2019) writes, the urbanisation of life is probably the best explanation for the rise of the modern centralised police.

The second phase in the history of the police is the period between in 1829 (when the professional London police force was formed) and the 1960s. In this period, there was a pronounced domination of the state police, which was often organised with the participation of local authorities. Of course, the starting date is symbolic. The police did not come about as a spontaneous invention but was a gradually and slowly created social construct. It is no coincidence that the emergence of the modern police force is associated with the London police rather than the *Lieutenance Générale de Paris* (1667), which had been established more than a century and a half earlier and which is the prototype of the

later political police. The Paris police – particularly between 1697 and 1715 – focused on covert operations, relied on a huge number of informers, used surveillance, and employed denunciation – all to protect political power. The 19th-century London police were uniformed, unarmed, and focused on prevention and cooperation with the population (which is called policing by consent). From France, then, comes the tradition of policing to protect the state and its interests (called high policing), whereas from England comes the tradition of protecting citizens (called low policing) (see the articles *Counterintelligence* and *The police* in this volume). Indeed, all modern public security systems include both these components (Mulone, 2019).

The third phase, from the 1960s to the present day, has seen the pluralisation of security, during which the private security sector has flourished alongside the state police. Widespread commercial services offer physical security (the private protection of persons and property, cash convoys, security at public facilities such as airports and railway stations; and security of commercial buildings and private properties), investigative services (e.g., private detectives and private intelligence), technical security systems (e.g., alarms, CCTV cameras, and cyber security) and even paramilitary services (private military companies) (Meerts, 2021). In physical terms, it is sometimes difficult to separate the public sphere from the private sphere, as there are spaces that can be called 'semi-public', such as shopping malls or amusement parks located on private property. Public-private cooperation, and even the rise of hybrid public-private actors in security, is already a visible trend that will certainly continue to expand.

In the 19th century, in addition to the police, other modern institutions of social control were established. This was necessary and, in a way, natural, as industrialisation, urbanisation and the migrations they triggered gave rise to mass society. Industrialisation led to economic development (which translated into state security), but it also had negative social consequences (which threatened the state's economic development and, consequently, security); hence, the legal and organisational regulations regarding the poor, vagrants, beggars, and practices such as gambling and selling alcohol. The 19th century witnessed the emergence of modern p r i s o n s, r e f o r m a t o r i e s, and w o r k h o u s e s, where residents could work in exchange for their livelihood. This enabled

the control of an excess of potentially dangerous or simply troublesome groups of people (see the article *Crime* in this volume). On the one hand, these were effective solutions, but on the other hand they were far more reactive – based on exclusion, imprisonment and isolation – than what had been known before (Zedner, 2009).

Subsequently, the foundations of social security systems were established. Administrations were set up to combat poverty and disease as well as to provide education, sanitation, and housing. This had implications for state security, since a healthy population meant, among other things, a more numerous reservoir of recruits fit for service in the mass armies of the industrial age. Social statistics were also a new invention through which risks and threats could be identified. States began to organise their systems of social security through networks of universal taxation, social insurance, and wealth redistribution policies. The aim of these measures was to reduce the threats which occurred at particularly vulnerable moments in people's lives (such as childhood, illness, lack of work, impoverishment, or old age). As Lucia Zedner (2009) observes, for the first time it was not so much a matter of protecting against immediate risks but more of i n s u r i n g against abstract risks that might yet occur in the future. While in the 19th century these solutions were intended for the most disciplined and willing groups of workers, in the 20th century they became widespread and typical of welfare states (see the articles *Demographic security*, *Social safety*, and *Economic security* in this volume).

The 20th century brought the incorporation of the concept of security into the military sphere. After the two world wars and during the Cold War period, the notion of national security – understood as the protection of the state, its territory and its population, obtained mainly by means of political and military action – was placed at the centre of theory and practice. In national security, especially according to 20th-century notions, the geographical factor matters, i.e., the protection of the state's borders and territory, as well as the control of migration (see the article *State border protection* in this volume). The two world wars also demonstrated – with tragic acuity – the importance of protecting the civilian population during armed conflicts (see the article *Civil protection* in this volume).

Modern security has been greatly affected by technological developments. An entire new sphere of cyber security has appeared (see the

article *Cybersecurity* in this volume). New tools of social control and the use of big data have also emerged (see the articles: *Surveillance society* and *Public space security* in this volume). In the sphere of military security, the forms and methods of armed struggle have evolved, and asymmetric threats and those that occur below the threshold of war have emerged (see the articles: *Contemporary armed conflicts*; *Terrorism*; *Hybrid threats*; and *Intelligence* in this volume).

Within academia, post-Cold War security studies flourished as a sub-discipline of International Relations. During the Cold War arms race, strategic security studies, being related to various aspects of military force, occupied a special position. Another response to the geopolitical situation at the time was peace studies, as well as various alternative approaches, including the feminist perspective in the assessment of security problems. After the Cold War, a new chapter in security studies began and attention turned to regional, local, and individual levels of security, as well as to environmental issues (see the entry *Environmental security* in this volume), which gave rise to the concept of 'human security'. Currently, security studies have moved far beyond the discipline of international relations and have become a cross-sectional discipline, like gender studies or development studies.

Discussion of the term

S e c u r i t y   t h e o r i e s. The main schools of theoretical thinking on security have grown out of the discipline of International Relations. Within this discipline, at least since the end of the Cold War, heated and in-depth discussions have been held, which have been competently outlined by Tomasz Pawłuszko (2020). The paradigms of thinking about security are based on ontological, epistemological, or methodological assumptions. The opposite poles within ontology are materialism and idealism, while in epistemology they are positivism and post-positivism. As Jacek Czaputowicz (2015) points out, the main dividing line within the security sciences is between the mainstream model and the pluralist model (see Table 1).

Table 1. Models in security sciences

	Mainstream model	Pluralist model
Ontology	Security exists objectively	Security is subjective
Epistemology	Positivism, explaining, disciplinary knowledge of international relations	Pluralism (positivism and post-positivism), understanding, multidisciplinary knowledge
Understanding of security	Negative 'from'	Positive 'to'
Mode of security	Maximising power	Ensuring justice
Methodology	Testing theories through quantitative and qualitative methods	Idiographic studies, various methodological approaches
Occurrence	United States	Europe

Source: (Czaputowicz, 2015, p. 122).

The most classical approach is the r e a l i s t   t h e o r y   o f   i n t e r n a -
t i o n a l   r e l a t i o n s, within which security occupies a central position.
As Anna Wojciuk writes, by "international security, realists understand
a state's capacity to defend its own territorial borders and its capacity
to pursue independent policies" (Kuźniar, Bieńczyk-Misala & Grzebyk
et al., 2020). According to realists, a state of threat is always present
and natural at the level of international relations. In domestic politics,
the maintenance of security is possible thanks to the dominant position
of the state. International relations are anarchic (there is no supreme
authority), so the state can only rely on itself in a crisis situation (self-
help). Hans Morgenthauis was a leading figure in classical realism,
while Kenneth Waltz was a founder of neorealism, which is also called
structural neorealism because it sees the origins of state decision-
making in the anarchic structure of the international system. Defensive
realists argue that in order to maintain security it is necessary to act
with restraint and let go of opportunities to increase one's power so
as not to provoke a dangerous reaction from other states as a form of
balancing, i.e., forming coalitions against a country that gains too much
advantage. Thus, it can be concluded that security is more important
for defensive realists than power. In contrast, offensive realists such as
John Mearshimer claim that states always seek to increase their power
in order to overtake their rivals. The politics of states are inevitably
confrontational, power is paramount, and states should never pass up
the opportunity to expand, as without power there can be no security
(Mearsheimer, 2013).

Another classical theory of international relations is, of course, l i b e r a l i s m. However, this theory does not put the issue of security at the absolute centre of attention. In the arena of international relations, liberalism focuses on how human reason, development, freedom, and individual rights can contribute to peace and security. In this regard, there are three assumptions on which the pillars of classical liberalism rest: 1) democracy reduces armed conflicts; 2) economic interdependence reduces armed conflicts; and 3) international institutions reduce armed conflicts.

C r i t i c a l   s e c u r i t y   s t u d i e s emerged at the end of the Cold War. As Anna Wojciuk observes, "representatives of critical theories differ from representatives of classical approaches in that they want to describe reality in order to change it" (Kuźniar, Bieńczyk-Misala & Grzebyk et al., 2020, p. 527). The aim is to change the entire system in order to liberate the groups that are subject to oppression and exclusion. This liberation, called emancipation, is a school of thought inspired by Marxist and neo-Marxist philosophy. According to Kenneth Booth,

> [s]ecurity means the absence of threats. Emancipation is the freeing of people (as individuals and groups) from those physical and human constraints which stop them carrying out what they would freely choose to do. […] Security and emancipation are two sides of the same coin. Emancipation, not power or order, produces true security. Emancipation, theoretically, is security (as quoted in Kuźniar, Bieńczyk-Misala & Grzebyk et al, 2020, p. 528).

C o n s t r u c t i v i s m is the youngest of the big theories of international relations. As Jacek Czaputowicz writes,

> according to constructivists, security is a social construct – the result of discourse, narrative, and the activities of the state. A sense of security is subjective and depends on the perception of the object of security (what or who security is to be provided for) and the securitising actor (who determines what counts as security). Threats to security and the objects of security are not objective and known *a priori* but are created (constructed) in the social process (Czaputowicz, 2007, p. 322).

Ole Wæver, a representative of the Copenhagen School of security studies, developed t h e   t h e o r y   o f   s e c u r i t i s a t i o n, based on the radical claim that security is a speech act. Wæver distinguishes between a securitising actor (usually the state) and the audience (usually the

public). He also assumes that the public's subjective perception of threats does not correspond to the objective state of (in)security. Moreover, the subjective perception of threats is determined by what state decision-makers choose to regard as a threat. Even a simple statement by those in power that 'X is a threat' creates a new reality in which the audience recognises X as an objective threat and, consequently, agrees to the state's use of extraordinary measures to neutralise it. For full precision, securitisation should be described as follows: through a securitising speech act delivered to a certain audience, a securitising actor designates a certain issue (the 'referent subject') as fundamentally threatening to something (the 'referent object'), which necessitates undertaking extraordinary security (Collins, 2022). Securitisation thus refers to a process in which certain issues can be shifted from the realm of 'ordinary politics' to the 'realm of security', where certain democratic procedures can be bypassed. As Wæver (1995) argues, those in power will always try to use the securitisation of a problem to gain special control over it. Examples of such problems include migration, terrorism (which poses a statistically minimal threat to individual security), household energy consumption, etc.

Ontological security is a concept that grew out of the sociology of Anthony Giddens, who defined it as a person's sense of order and the continuity of events embodied in his possessing the answers to the fundamental existential questions which are posed in all areas of human life. Thus conceived, security is not just about survival per se but is an awareness of the meaning of one's existence. At the level of the individual, ontological security is "an intellectual effort to put the world in order, to bring harmony to it which gives man a sense of mastery over it – control" (Błahut-Prusik, 2012, p. 210). States also seek ontological security. They build their identity in the international arena; they identify specific oppositions (enemies), construct their distinctiveness, their political ideas, and their visions of politics. These foundations give them internal unity and allow them to mobilise resources. It is the ideational factor that gives meaning to the use of the material factor (Kuźniar, Bieńczyk-Misala & Grzebyk et al., 2020; Pawłuszko, 2018).

Practical paradoxes of security. For contemporary man, security is such a fundamental value that it can hardly be questioned. However, the 'practice of security' raises a range of problems and

dilemmas that need attention. Lucia Zedner (Zedner, 2009) has identi-
fied the following six paradoxes in this area:

1. Although the pursuit of security involves the reduction of risk, it
   also presupposes the ever-existing presence of threat. Objective
   security is in practice u n a t t a i n a b l e. The pursuit of security
   never ends because unknown vulnerabilities, new threats, and
   new adversaries will always create a state of danger. The absence
   of threat is an impermanent state, susceptible to change over time.
   The notion of objective security can even be questioned on the
   grounds that the very selection of values to be protected is always
   subjective. There is only one absolute value – survival – while
   the choice of other values depends on the actor's free decision.
   For example, theoretically, questions regarding whether to defend
   one's freedom and protect one's health are bound to be answered
   positively by virtually everyone; however, in reality, people often
   automatically respond negatively to these questions through the
   way that they behave. It should also be observed that the never-
   ending presence of threats provides an opportunity for private ser-
   vice providers to prosper and for the state to conveniently justify
   its actions.
2. The growth of the private security sector is not accompanied
   by a narrowing of the field of action for either the state or public
   actors. On the contrary, states are intensifying their security-
   related efforts: more areas are securitised and they use new tools
   of control and private security infrastructure for their purposes.
3. Although efforts to eliminate risks and threats are intended to
   strengthen individual and collective feelings of security, the pres-
   ence of an extensive security infrastructure paradoxically often
   heightens awareness of the existence of potential threats and
   fuels *fears*. Consequently, it leads to d i s a p p o i n t m e n t and
   r e s i g n a t i o n when, despite all public and private investments,
   risks materialise in the form of threats that have caused harm.
4. Although security is seen as a universal public good to which every-
   body is entitled, its implementation presupposes the e x c l u s i o n
   of those who pose a threat. This is not simply about punishing
   individuals who have committed crimes but also about targeting
   and incapacitating those who potentially create danger. In the

surveillance and control society now evolving based on techno-
logical developments, security relies on techniques to identify,
classify, and manage aggregate suspect populations. Even with-
out committing an offence, some people may be considered sus-
pects because of their gender, age, appearance, political views, or
the decisions they have made about their health (*vide* the recent
conflict over vaccinations).

5. Although security is supposed to guarantee freedom and space
    for self-fulfilment, it is very often associated with violations of indi-
    vidual freedoms. This is usually initially justified by the existence of
    a heightened threat. But, as a state of ongoing crisis is embedded
    in the rhetoric of security, exceptional security measures that were
    intended to be implemented only in exceptional places and at
    exceptional times remain in place long after they were supposed
    to have been removed.

6. While security is recognised as a public good, the way in which it
    is pursued too often leads to the erosion of trust. Many security
    measures are based on a distrust of strangers, and many security
    technologies (e.g., surveillance, data storage, or access control)
    further erode trust by assuming that everyone is a potential source
    of threat. This disturbs and impoverishes social relations.

Systematic reflection with conclusions and recommendations

The issue of security is currently at the heart of public and private life.
This is a paradox because, from a historical perspective, contemporary
man lives in the most secure and comfortable conditions that have ever
existed. Summarising the previous considerations, the following final
conclusions and recommendations can be made:

1. The validity of the assertion of 'the more security, the better' needs
    to be re-considered. The assertion was advocated by, among
    others, Ole Wæver at the end of the Cold War, when his research
    on securitisation and desecuritisation began. Perhaps the right
    direction today would be to desecuritise certain areas, as this

could restore to the individual a space for his autonomous and spontaneous existence and development.

2. The dilemma of 'how much freedom and how much security' should continue to be debated. Moreover, in cases where there is an element of doubt, it should always be resolved by favouring freedom, since modern technological tools of control and surveillance pose a huge threat to the individual. The risks associated with their implementation probably outweigh the possible benefits.

3. Attention should be paid to ontological security, which provides a sense of meaningful existence. The state of physical security, certainty, and the predictability of life, which today requires so much effort, as it turns out, does not necessarily lead to a sense of happiness, but to indifference, to apathy, to exhaustion and carelessness in a negative sense, i.e., to what the ancients called *acedia* (ἀκηδία) and contemporaries call depression. Instead, the aim should be – to stay with ancient concepts – *ataraxia* (ἀταραξία) in the Stoic sense, i.e., an attitude of calmness and the ability to endure the dangers and harm that will inevitably arise over the course of one's life.

4. It is important to reflect on whether security should be absolutized, as is the case today, and posited as an end and a sense 'in itself' in the context of the aforementioned concept of ontological security. Some scholars rightly point out that at the end of the Middle Ages the concept of *securitas* overshadowed or even completely supplanted such concepts as *pax*, *salus*, and *certitudo*. Thus, the need for security provided by the state (as Hobbes advocated) emerged as a result of the waning of faith in the possibility of earthly *peace* (organised on the basis of the spiritual order) and in heavenly *salvation* (as the meaning of human existence) and the disappearance of *certainty* regarding matters beyond the mere predictability of life's events. A pronounced shift in this direction took place after the European religious wars. It would, of course, be unreasonable to call for the restoration of pre-modern notions, but it is possible to draw attention to calls for human action to be grounded in the spiritual sphere (see the article *Security in Catholic social teaching* in this volume). Religion can contribute to human identity by serving as a counterbalance to the ontological and existential insecurity associated with the process of modernisation.

5. The legitimate need for individual security should be satisfied as far as is possible by grassroots initiatives implemented at the local level, based on ties and on trust, on personal participation, and on the voluntariness and involvement of private actors. The inverse of this is widespread state security policies that are increasingly based on far-reaching control programmes and even on social engineering, a foretaste of which is China's notorious Social Credit System. The role of the state should be to combat traditional threats to internal and external security. There should be a renewed emphasis on protecting individual freedoms and rights.

6. Since the mechanisms described by the realists are likely to remain relevant at the international level for a long time to come, attempts should be made to limit as far as possible the extent and consequences of the rivalry and confrontation – which are inherent in the international system – between states. Efforts are needed to limit the military application of emerging disruptive technologies such as artificial intelligence, autonomous combat systems, or biological weapons, as their deployment could have unpredictable consequences.

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Demographic security

Summary

DEFINITION OF THE TERM: Demographic security is the sustainable state of a population in which natural reproduction and population growth are guaranteed, and appropriate relationships are maintained between groups of people who live within a defined territory; these groups have distinct identities and statehood which organises their coexistence. Demographic security is strongly affected by both global demographic trends and by natural and cultural factors which are difficult both to control and to steer through the political process. Nevertheless, states can influence their demographics through social programmes. Improvements in healthcare have reduced infant mortality; prevention programmes help to combat the decline in fertility, and migration policies can have an impact on the size of the reproductive-age population for the next 15–20 years. Demographic security is part of national security as it concerns the 'substance' of a nation, i.e., its population.

HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE TERM: The historical process of changes in the reproduction of the population which is linked with the processes of modernisation of societies is best described by demographic transition theory (DTT).

DISCUSSION OF THE TERM: The theoretical background for the considerations in this section is provided by a study in which Richard P. Cincotta identified eight demographic risk factors. Reference is also made to DTT, as it seems that the risk of internal conflicts during economic and social transition may be much lower in countries which have undergone demographic transition.

SYSTEMATIC REFLECTION WITH CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: In security studies, special emphasis should be placed

on the demographic objectives of the state, changes in the size and age structure of its population, migration, and changes in the proportion of ethnic and religious groups and their physical location.

Definition of the term

In the Polish literature, demographic security is defined by the relationships and interactions between groups of people who live in a defined territory and have distinct identities as well as statehood which defines the relationships between them according to their own interests (Kawalec & Wróbel, 2014, p. 260). Although demographic changes have always affected state security, there are few definitions of demographic security or analyses of this phenomenon. Hence, the historical analysis of the term described in this article is brief and focuses on demographic transition theory (DTT).

The literature emphasises that demographic security is an aspect of broadly understood security and is defined as a sustainable state of the nation, where natural reproduction and population growth is guaranteed and no violent change of self-awareness and national identity is allowed in any form (Kotsarski, 2019).

Demographic security may be the most important element of national security, as it is linked to the nation's 'subject', i.e., the people living in the nation state. Understandably, demographic security is closely aligned with the national security of a country (Kotsarski, 2019). Analysts observe that at the micro level the degradation of the institution of the family is a threat to demographic security, and they postulate, among other things, a restoration of the status of the traditional model of the family and a return to the extended family model (Wasiuta, Klepka & Kopeć, 2018).

Demographic processes should serve as a point of reference for the planning and implementation of the state's developmental policies. Furthermore, these policies should *a priori* be directed towards ensuring that conditions are conductive for the survival of the nation or state. However, restricting demographic security to the territory of a given state does not take into account global demographic changes or the problems and opportunities that these changes entail. Nor do these restrictions account for geopolitical challenges or unexpected game changers, such as pandemics, wars, or the exit of a country from the structures of a community (e.g., the European Union), which would necessarily change the demographic potential of a bloc of states.

Demographic security in the modern world should also be analysed from the perspective of conflicts between large corporations and

nation-states (which have been regaining their authority in recent years). Until now, states have been the guardians of the demographic security of their citizens: they have not only implemented particular public policies but also collected (and still collect) data on, e.g., the demographic structure of their citizens (although, as mentioned below, unfortunately, the collected data is very flawed).

The technological revolution has changed this situation. Today, technological corporations collect huge amounts of data about us at an unprecedented rate. At times, they also come into possession of sensitive personal data, such as the health status or sexual preferences of people. Conflicts between corporations and states, whether artificially fuelled or real, indicate that a sensible solution for Europe would be greater unity and cohesion to combat the demographic challenges it faces.

The literature on the relationship between demography and security emphasises that certain demographic trends can be changed and that nothing is inevitable (Cincotta, 2004). Therefore, demographics should not be viewed only from the perspective of challenges and threats but also in terms of the opportunities and possibilities it offers.

In this article, the theoretical background regarding the sphere of demographic security is provided by a study by Ricardo P. Cincotta of the Wilson Center (Cincotta, 2004). Using the information this study offers about the approach of various countries to demographic risk factors, I refer to the situation of Poland and the solutions applied (or lack thereof) by the Polish state institutions. Referring to DTT, Cincotta analyses data from a number of regions and countries and argues that the risk of internal conflicts (ethnic tensions or wars) during economic and social transition is much lower in countries that have undergone demographic transition. This is particularly evident in certain East Asian countries (especially those from Southeast Asia, i.e., South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Singapore, and Malaysia), where a substantial decline in fertility preceded economic transition and the successful free market reforms.

Historical analysis of the term

The demographic situation should be approached globally through the prism of demographic theory and its most important concept, i.e., demographic transition theory. This theory was formulated in the mid-1940s by F. Notestein, who was the first to describe the historical process of changes in population reproduction associated with the modernisation of societies.

During demographic transition, demographic factors evolve, including the size of the population, its age structure, and geographical differentiation. As a result of this evolution, the proportion of the urban population increases, and the ethnic composition of the population changes. Within DTT, five stages of demographic development are distinguished:

- Stage 1 (high birth rate and high death rate) – some indigenous peoples of Africa and the Amazon are currently in this phase.
- Stage 2 (high birth rate and low death rate; the demographic explosion begins) – the poorest countries in the world in Africa (Niger, Angola, Burkina Faso) are in this phase.
- Stage 3 (declining birth rate and low death rate; the end of demographic explosion) – Asian countries such as India and Pakistan, as well as some North African countries such as Morocco and Egypt, are currently in this phase.
- Stage 4 (low birth rate and low death rate) – some societies in Western Europe (France, Ireland) and Asia (Thailand, China) are in this phase.
- Stage 5 (fertility and mortality both fall significantly; demographic decline) – rich countries in Western Europe such as Germany, Japan in Asia, and Ukraine in the post-Soviet area are in this phase.

DTT describes fundamental changes in populations, i.e., the transition from traditional reproduction, characterised by high fertility and high mortality, to modern reproduction, characterised by low fertility and low mortality. The decline in mortality associated with technological progress and modernisation precedes the decline in fertility. The period in which the decline in mortality is not yet accompanied by a decline in fertility is linked with a rapid increase in population size (called a population explosion). Scientists predict that the demographic transition which began in the societies of western and northern Europe at the end of the 18th century will cease at the end of the 21st century (Okólski, 1990). At

the beginning of the 20th century, ⅓ of the countries were in the early stages of the demographic transition (which, among other things, means four or more children per woman). These included developing countries with a higher proportion of males to females and a higher proportion of younger to older people in their populations (e.g., India, China).

When it comes to demographic security, however, the attention of the media and researchers tends to focus on highly developed countries which are currently in the final stages of demographic transition (stage 4 or 5 of modern reproduction) and face such demographic problems as ageing, depopulation (a population implosion), and immigration. However, this approach narrows the perspective as the effects of the demographic transition on a global scale include rapid population growth, mass migration, an increase in the proportion of the population living in large agglomerations, reduced fertility (in the long term), and significantly longer human lifespans on a global scale.

Demographic security, whether on a global, regional, or state scale, concerns all the aforementioned demographic factors, which evolve during the demographic transition. While analysing security, particular emphasis should be placed on migration, changes in population numbers, changes in the age structure of the population, and changes in the location and proportion of ethnic and religious groups.

Discussion of the term

Cincotta identifies the following demographic risk factors:
1. high proportion of young adults aged 15 to 29 years among the working-age population;
2. rapid urban population growth (associated with the urbanisation process);
3. low levels of per capita cropland and/or water scarcity;
4. high mortality rates among working-age adults (due to HIV/AIDS);
5. differential growth rates among ethnic and religious groups;
6. migration;
7. ageing and population decline;
8. high sex ratios (the disparity in the gender structure of the population related to preferences in the social and economic policies of

countries that promote the birth of boys over girls) (Cincotta, 2004, pp. 25–28).

The first factor, i.e., the high proportion of young adults aged 15 to 29 years among the working-age population in Anglo-Saxon literature, is usually referred to as 'a youth bulge'. This term is used to describe a bulge in the demographic structure in this age group; it is believed that the demographic surplus of these particular age groups can lead to various forms of social unrest. Researchers from York University, Ch. Mesquida and N. Weiner (1996, 1999), have shown that the intensity of armed conflict is positively correlated with the proportion of young people aged 15–29 in the working-age population. However, if demography is not only a threat but also an opportunity, countries, depending on the stage of their development (both demographic and economic) can use various instruments to protect their citizens against the dangers linked to a youth bulge. For example, when a country faces high unemployment and economic stagnation, the recruitment of young people into the army or the internal security services can be such an instrument. Another instrument is the promotion of emigration and the facilitation of money transfers from working abroad. However, when a country experiences economic growth based on investment and innovation, having a surplus of young and educated people is highly profitable for it, thanks both to the possibility of accelerating the pace of reforms and development and in terms of taxation.

After 2004, i.e., after joining the EU, Poland behaved passively towards its young citizens (these were mainly children of the baby boom generation from the early 1980s), which thus followed the model of underdeveloped countries towards a youth bulge, i.e., pushing them abroad within the framework of open labour markets and promoting emigration and money transfers (Iglicka, 2010).

Such a large migration outflow significantly affected the age structure of the Polish population and reduced the number of working-age people in the country; it also resulted in the ageing of the population. The high proportion of young Poles and, particularly, the age structure of Polish women who lived abroad also reduced the reproductive potential of the Polish population. Furthermore, both emigration plans and the very act of actually leaving the country favoured the postponement of decisions related to having children, which could have further reduced the number of births in the country (Kotowska, 2021, p. 18).

Table 1. Estimated data regarding emigration from Poland for temporary residence between 2004 and 2020 (the number of persons who lived abroad at the end of the year)[1]

Country of residence	Number of emigrants in thousands									
	2004	2005	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2020
Total	1000	1450	2000	2060	2130	2196	2320	2397	2515	2239
of which: Europe	770	1200	1685	1754	1816	1891	2013	2098	2214	1973
European Union (27 states)[2]	750	1170	1607	1670	1720	1789	1901	1983	2096	1339
Of which:										
Austria	15	25	29	25	28	31	34	36	39	42
Belgium	13	21	45	47	48	49	49	52	54	52
Cyprus	.	.	3	3	2	1	1	1	1	–
Czech Republic	.	.	7	7	8	8	9	9	9	10
Denmark	.	.	19	21	23	25	28	30	32	34
Finland	0,4	0,7	3	2	2	3	3	3	3	3
France	30	44	60	62	63	63	63	64	64	63
Greece	13	17	16	15	14	12	9	8	8	5
Spain	26	37	48	40	37	34	32	30	29	28
Netherlands	23	43	92	95	97	103	109	112	116	135
Ireland	15	76	133	120	118	115	113	111	112	114
Germany	385	430	440	470	500	560	614	655	687	706
Portugal	0.5	0.6	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	–
Sweden	11	17	33	36	38	40	43	46	49	49
United Kingdom	150	340	580	625	637	642	685	720	788	–
Italy	59	70	92	94	97	96	96	94	93	86
Countries outside the European Union	20	30	78	84	96	102	112	115	118	634
of which:										
Norway	.	.	50	56	65	71	79	84	85	97
United Kingdom										514

Source: GUS, different years. https://stat.gov.pl/obszary-tematyczne/ludnosc/migracje-zagraniczne-ludnowski/informacja-o-rozmiarach-i-kierunkach-czasowej-emigracji-z-polski-w-latach-2004–2020,2,14.html (accessed 10.05.2022).

[1]   Statistics do not include the number of people who lived abroad temporarily: for 2004–2005 – more than 2 months; for 2010–2017 – more than 3 months.

[2]   For 2004–2005: 24 countries; for 2010–2012: 26 countries.

The results of the 2021Census, which did not take into account the impact of the effects of the COVID-2019 pandemic, clearly demonstrated a deepening loss of Poland's population, an acceleration of the ageing process, a decline in the proportion of children and young people in the total number of citizens, and a progressing decline in fertility.

The COVID-2019 pandemic led to reduced life expectancy resulting from a sharp increase in death rates, especially for those aged 65 and over: e(0) fell by 1.1 years for women and 1.5 years for men. In addition, the fertility rate (TFR) fell to 1.30 in 2020 (in 2017 it was 1.45). Other negative trends exposed in the Census results were also exacerbated in 2021–2022.

The second demographic risk factor identified by Cincotta is rapid urban population growth associated with the urbanisation process. In the literature, this is linked to an excess of youth in the population (a youth bulge), as it is the young who migrate to cities in search of work, education, or simply better opportunities than in their home country (in the case of immigrants). The urbanisation process is often associated with the creation of slums, ethnic ghettos, and poor-quality public services. This can lead to increased crime rates and social unrest. However, when city authorities decide to invest in urban infrastructure, its young users make cities an extremely significant source of economic growth.

The third factor is the low levels of per capita cropland and/or water scarcity. This applies to developing countries and can result in an accelerated process of rural-to-urban migration, which, in the absence of investment in urban infrastructure (or its delayed development), can lead to the creation of slums and, consequently, social conflict.

The fourth factor, i.e., high mortality rates among working-age adults (due to HIV/AIDS), also applies to developing countries. Attention is drawn here not only to the mere fact of increased mortality among young people but also to its long-term demographic consequences, such as the rapidly growing number of orphans, as well as the socio-economic consequences.

The fifth factor is differential growth rates in ethnic and religious groups. Here, it is important to consider changes in both regional variation and the proportions of individual ethnic groups in relation to the total population. Threats should be understood as risks to political, cultural, or traditional stability. In addition, the economic dimension in the form of

inefficient infrastructure (in the host country) is important, which is linked to the sixth factor, i.e., migration.

According to Cincotta, states' statistics regarding ethnic and religious groups are incomplete, as states do not collect data on the numbers of ethnic/religious groups in their territory nor on their fertility and mortality levels. A good example here is the statistics in interwar Poland, which were even detailed enough to analyse fertility rates using a variety of factors, such as the religion of the mother, who (at that time) could be Roman Catholic, Jewish, Protestant, Greek Catholic, or other (for more details see Iglicka, 1998). Some states have attempted to mitigate ethnic tensions through the introduction of political changes, such as the election of Kamala Harris (of Indian-Jamaican origin) as Vice President of the United States or, more recently, Rishi Sunak (of Indian origin) as Prime Minister of the United Kingdom.

From the perspective of the DTT, differential growth rates among ethnic or religious groups can also be considered on a global scale, e.g., by continent. Fifty years ago, the European Union's population was around 12% of the world's population; today it is only 6%, and is projected to fall below 4% by 2070. From a demographic perspective, political attempts to expand the EU, i.e., to admit new member states, are thus a good solution.

The sixth factor is migration, which brings together the demographic risks present in both developing and developed countries. However, demographic risks are accompanied by fears related to cultural risks or simply the struggle for survival and jobs.

Immigrants are often feared by host societies, regardless of whether they have a short and a long history of being a host country. The United Kingdom (UK) is an example of a country which has been open to immigrants for a long time. The change in the UK's attitude to immigration was reported as early as in 2003 (i.e., one year before the UK, Ireland, and Sweden opened their labour markets to new EU member states) in a study by L. McLaren and M. Johnson, who analysed the rise in anti-immigrant attitudes among the citizens of the British Isles, particularly those with a higher level of education (see Table 2). Therefore, one of the consequences of the 14-year mass influx of more than two million citizens from the new EU member states and the settlement tendencies of new immigrants (measured, indirectly, by the number of children born

in the host country) (see Table 3) was a vote in favour of the country's exit from the European Union (EU), i.e., Brexit, which may or may not represent the beginning of the territorial disintegration of the EU.

Table 2. Anti-immigrant attitudes and the level of education. Percentage of respondents* who want to reduce the number of immigrants

	1995	2003	Change
Degree	35	56	+21
HE below degree	64	71	+7
A level	65	68	+3
O level or equivalent	71	83	+12
No qualification	82	81	-1

*Respondents who are British citizens and whose parents were also British citizens at the date of birth.
Source: McLaren & Johnson, 2004, p. 194.

Table 3. Births by parents' country of birth, England and Wales, different years.

Mother's country of birth	2015	2016	2017	Father's country of birth	2015	2016	2017
Poland	22928	22382	20779	Pakistan	19131	18513	19236
Pakistan	17342	17367	17099	Poland	16956	15610	17704
India	13780	13883	13476	India	14007	13715	13798
Romania	8734	11721	13717	Romania	10684	12856	7857
Bangladesh	7752	8106	8106	Bangladesh	8876	8286	8699

Source: https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/birthsdeathsand-marriages/livebirths/bulletins/parentscountryofbirthenglandandwales/previous-Releases (accessed 10.05.2022).

The influx of other ethnic or religious groups can lead to citizens of a host country fearing the destruction of their ethnic structure and social cohesion, the loss of their national sense of identity, as well as unrest in the labour market. The vast majority of immigrants simply seek refuge in a host country and want to assimilate, but a small proportion may join separatist movements which seek to overthrow the authorities of their host country.

Demographic trends are not immutable. Certain aspects of population dynamics are clearly more susceptible to intervention. Until recently, policies and programmes had a huge impact on reducing infant mortality and fertility decline, particularly in East Asia and the Caribbean. The COVID-19 pandemic also affected trends in fertility (postponing

having children) and mortality (increases in the oldest age groups) globally, by reducing life expectancy and thus supporting the pension systems of highly developed countries.

Population increases or decreases are no longer as susceptible to intervention as before, which is linked precisely to the dynamics of migration. When migration occurs on a large scale, it determines the size of the reproductive-age population for the next 15–20 years. Hence, presumably, the openness to immigration of many highly developed economies, as well as the closure of economies that had reached their population target before the pandemic and were panicky about immigration from countries in the declining phase of the population explosion, such as Morocco, Egypt, India, and Pakistan. In 2022, Poland joined the list of economies open to immigration.

This willingness to accept migrants in Poland might have been linked to the dramatically unfavourable demographic trends observed during the pandemic. In December 2020 (the first month in which the first births of the first children conceived at the onset of the pandemic, i.e., in March 2020, were recorded,), 25,800 babies were born, i.e., 2,500 fewer than in December 2019.

Thus, analysing the 2002–2020 period in terms of births in Poland, December 2020 was the worst month since 2002. It is estimated that, in 2020, the number of births was about 122,000 lower than the number of deaths. According to the GUS (Central Statistical Office in Poland), the natural increase rate per 1,000 people was -3.2 (compared to -0.9 in 2019).

Negative demographic trends are continuing. Poland's population loss (measured by natural movement, i.e., the difference between the number of births and the number of deaths) was lower than in 2021 but still higher than before the outbreak of the pandemic. In 2022, 448,000 people died (72,000 fewer than the year before). In the same year, however, the number of births was only 305,000 (27,000 fewer than in 2021), the worst result in over 70 years.

Because of the war in Ukraine, the depopulation process of Polish society has been somewhat reversed due to the influx of Ukrainian refugees. In 2022, for the first time in modern history, Poland recorded a population of 41 million (Chmielewska, 2022). The proportion of young people in the population increased by 4% compared to the 2011 Census

data. The proportion of women in the total population also increased. Assuming settlement migration – as was the case in the post-accession migration of Poles (see Table 3 above) – the ageing of the Polish population will not be as rapid as previously forecast.

The emergence of such factors as COVID-19 and the war in Ukraine means that investments that focus mainly on demographic trends (their irreversibility and permanence), especially in the short term, have become incredibly risky.

The seventh demographic risk factor is ageing and population decline. There is no precise data in the literature on the correlation between armed conflict and this particular demographic trend, and Cincotta's report was written before Russia's armed assault on Ukraine. At present, it is an open question whether this war waged by Russia (which is the country with the fastest dynamics of population ageing and depopulation) is related to this factor, or whether it only concerns conflict between different ethnic groups (there are no reliable statistics on immigration by ethnic group and structure by sex for Russia).

The war in Ukraine may make Poland a bi-national country. Ethnic conflicts between young people from different ethnic groups, i.e., Poles and Ukrainians (related to the situation in the labour market, the housing market, or the availability of social benefits), and within the Ukrainian group itself (immigrants from previous years and newer war refugees), may be as inevitable as the rise of nationalisms (see Tables 2 and 3). However host countries have at their disposal instruments that can counteract these negative outcomes, e.g., in the form of a ban on work or deportation.

It is vastly important that any urbanisation process avoids the formation of slums and ethnic ghettos. The strategy adopted by Poland for the reception of Ukrainian war refugees was very judicious: no refugee camps were established; Poland authorities relied mainly on intuition and perhaps on the results of surveys indicating an aversion to sanitary segregation related to the COVID-19 pandemic. Thus, it is possible that the mistakes made by other states regarding the integration of immigrants will be avoided in Poland.

The final factor is the high sex ratios associated with the preference in social and economic policies of countries promoting the birth of boys over girls (e.g., India, China). The high feminisation rate in western

European and some Asian countries (107–120, especially among older births, with the norm being 102–104) is the result of warfare – World War II, and later conflicts. In China, this rate is 94. There is no hard data related to the impact of this factor on conflicts, but in this context one can refer to aforementioned phenomena such as youth bulges, urbanisation, and migration. In the case of Poland, a large influx of female immigrants may offset tensions related to both high sex ratios and potential ethnic conflicts. According to *Strategia Demograficzna 2040* [*The Demographic Strategy 2040*], which analyses Poland's development plans based solely on changes in fertility levels (it neglects trends in mortality and migration, which is a mistake in my opinion),

> Poland is characterised by differences between its regions in terms of the imbalance in the male-female ratio. The average male-to-female ratio per 100 women aged 20–39 was 103% in 2019, which is a natural consequence of the higher number of male new-borns. There is a clear trend towards a higher concentration of women in this age group in large cities and the municipalities surrounding them and in the Opole region, while men are concentrated in rural areas, particularly in eastern Poland. 180 municipalities in Poland are predominantly female in the 20–39 age group, and as many as 2,141 municipalities are predominantly male. Only in 156 municipalities are the number of women and men balanced. Summing up the imbalance in the number of women and men aged 20–39, there are a total of 236,000 more men than women in all regions with a male predominance, and there are 68,000 more women than men in all regions with a female predominance, with a total imbalance of 304,000 people (*Strategia Demograficzna 2040*, p. 45).

However, it is important to keep in mind the results of earlier studies on women's migration conducted by K. Slany (2008), who used the trauma of social change theory proposed by Piotr Sztompka as the methodological basis for her analyses. According to Sztompka:

> there was a time when social change was idealised. It was believed that every change brings some level of good, progress [...]. Every social change has its flip side, which is associated with enormous costs, sacrifices, and suffering. The discourse on crisis, of which the notion of cultural trauma is an element, is becoming widespread (Sztompka, 2000, p. 15).

An 'army' of transnational, physically hard-working, poorly paid women is sweeping through the global world. The phenomenon of the 'global woman' shows that the labour market is changing. Indeed, there

is a huge demand for cheap and fluid labour in the family, in social care, in small industrial firms, and in the sex and entertainment industries (Kontos, 2004).

So, how do we prevent social exclusion, ghettoization, and the inability to rise from the lowest rungs on the employment ladder? Is this even possible? What is certainly needed, as Slany (2008) suggests, is a migration governance model based on the active role of the state that combats illegal migration and the victimisation of women and implements adequate security policies. On the global scale, Cincotta (2004) proposes increasing the role of women in government, especially in negotiations related to ending armed conflicts. The presence of significant numbers of qualified women, particularly in developing countries, in prestigious diplomatic and military roles could contribute to a change in attitudes towards their position in highly developed host countries.

Systematic reflection with conclusions and recommendations

Security refers to all the factors that evolve during any demographic transition, i.e., the size of the population, its structure by age and gender, its geographical diversity, and its ethnic composition. It also concerns changes in these factors over time and the interactions between them. Particular emphasis should be placed on migration, population growth, changes in age structure, and changes in the location and proportion of ethnic and religious groups.

The article has analysed (on a global scale) such demographic risk factors as 1) the high proportion of young adults ages 15 to 29 years among the working-age population, called a youth bulge; 2) rapid urban population growth (associated with the urbanisation process); 3) low levels of per capita cropland and/or water scarcity; 4) high mortality rates among working-age adults (due to HIV/AIDS); 5) differential growth rates among ethnic and religious groups; 6) migration; 7) ageing and population decline; and 8) high sex ratios (the disparity in the gender structure of the population related to the preference in social and economic policies of countries which promote the birth of boys over girls).

Not each of these factors is of equal importance for Poland. From the point of view of Poland's demographic security, it should be mentioned that:

1. After 2004, it followed the model of underdeveloped countries towards a youth bulge by promoting emigration and transfers instead of focusing on the innovation of young cohorts and investment.
2. This policy accelerated the ageing of the Polish population.
3. It also lowered the country's demographic potential (emigration of young female cohorts).
4. The COVID-19 pandemic exacerbated negative demographic trends (depopulation and population ageing).
5. The war in Ukraine has set in motion processes by which the depopulation of Poland can be halted. Assuming the temporary migration of Ukrainian war refugees transforms into settlement migration, this process will not be as rapid as predicted.
6. As a result of the war, Poland may become a bi-national country. Ethnic conflicts related to this are probably inevitable. Avoiding the formation of slums and ethnic ghettos in the process of urbanisation may be of great importance in mitigating them.

Poland, it should be stressed again, has played its part in the reception of war refugees from Ukraine very well. Therefore, it is possible that the mistakes made by other countries in the integration of immigrants are avoidable here. I leave it to analysts and statisticians to ask what Poland's ultimate population target is.

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Environmental security

Summary

DEFINITION OF THE TERM: The concept of environmental (ecological) security is variously defined. It refers to the protection and promotion of safe external conditions for human life, development, and survival.

HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE TERM: Concepts such as 'sustainable development' and 'human security' have contributed to the international development of the concept of 'environmental security', which, from the perspective of security studies, has been developed by representatives of the Copenhagen School, critical studies, and feminist studies. In practice, as a sector of national security, environmental security is realised both externally and internally.

DISCUSSION OF THE TERM: The specificity of environmental security is reflected in being analysed both subjectively and objectively and in the different levels of analyses: global, national, local, and individual. The article emphasises the interdependencies that exist between factors such as the environment, war, peace, justice, human well-being, and climate change.

SYSTEMATIC REFLECTION WITH CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: A successful security policy consists in responding to complex environmental threats; so, in order to implement one, the state requires adequate resources and high organisational efficiency at different levels of governance. Specific determinants of environmental security, especially the complex nature of threats in this area, do not make it easy to decide on a course of action. Analyses of environmental security reveal the need for systematic and in-depth reflection in this area.

Keywords: environmental security, ecological security, climate security, environmental threats, human security

Definition of the term

Environmental (also called ecological) security is becoming an increasingly important area of interdisciplinary analyses. According to J. Barnett (2009), the concept of environmental security is understood in various ways because it combines the powerful but ambiguous concepts of environment and security, and it encompasses various scientific disciplines and research schools within which these concepts are studied. Given that the term 'environment' includes the biological, physical, and chemical components of life-supporting systems, and that its protection consists in taking or ceasing to take actions that enable the maintenance or restoration of natural equilibrium, this results in a multi-criteria research area. In this respect, environmental security is "linked with the maintenance of the local and planetary biosphere as an essential support system on which all other human endeavours depend" (Regina-Zacharski, 2021, p. 91).

As a result of increased consumption and pollution, especially in modern societies with high levels of energy use, environmental problems are now major policy issues. This gives rise to a wide range of problems of different scales ranging from local to global: the greenhouse effect, air pollution, the loss of biodiversity and food resources, deforestation, the scarcity of drinking water, pollution of the seas and oceans, soil degradation, chemical contamination, litter, and population growth, etc. Security can refer to a state of affairs, a territory, a process, and different types of threats (war, famine, flood, etc.). However, national security risks are the main axis of the discourse devoted to security in two main dimensions: external (international) and internal. The proper identification of threats is crucial for safeguarding the existence and development of the state and the nation (territorially and ideologically). Increased environmental awareness has contributed to the recognition of environmental problems as serious at the global level, and growing international interdependence has broadened and deepened the scope of security. Multi-level interactions have led to the emergence of new areas (sectors) of security, including environmental security, as reflected in 1972 at the first United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, which introduced the modern understanding of the concept of environmental security and was consolidated by the idea of sustainable

development in 1987. The subsequent UN conferences closely tied the issues of environmental security with climate change and biodiversity protection (1992), human security (1994), and human development (Millennium Goals 2002, Agenda 2030). M. Pietraś defines environmental security as

> a state of social relations, including the content, forms, and ways of organising international relations, which not only reduces and eliminates environmental threats but also promotes positive actions, thus enabling the realisation of values that are important for the existence and development of nations and states (Pietraś, 2000, p. 85).

Environmental security is a relatively new and dynamically developing concept which has been incorporated into broader analyses of security. It relates to national security and is included in its strategic framework. In this context, two levels of action are important: internal, i.e., national, which is largely based on crisis management and response to security threats of a natural and anthropogenic nature; external, i.e., international, which primarily relates to responding to conflicts over resources and transborder threats. The international dimension is an area of great developmental potential but is hardly addressed by national security policies, which still lack adequate measures in this area. This is because environmental security at this level concerns environmental problems resulting from climate change, which changes the characteristics of security policy, e.g., responses that take a long-term view versus one-off actions (this direction of security development, however, stems from the pressure exerted by some countries on the UN Security Council). The issue of environmental security has been sporadically addressed by the Council's forum since 2006, but pro-environmental projects are an integral component of peacekeeping missions.

The term 'environmental security' has been undergoing dynamic transformation since it was coined. It is evolving from a systems approach, linked to existential risks and the increase in global threats, including the functioning and stability of the ecosystem (Earth's homeostasis), to environmental security, which concerns the interactions between humans and the environment from the perspective of the protection of the environment by humans and the protection of humans against natural and anthropogenic disasters. Due to the increasing role played

in international politics by climate change, climate security intersects with energy security and raw materials security. S. Dalby observes that

> ecological security is concerned with maintaining the integrity of natural systems on which humanity is dependent, an especially complicated and difficult matter now that humanity is effectively changing the planet's ecology in the Anthropocene. Climate security, insofar as it aims to keep the planet's temperature close to what civilization has so far known, is now obviously a key to ecological security (Dalby, 2013, p. 315).

Given the findings of the 2021 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, climate change is an existential threat to the security of states and is currently the most significant threat to humanity. It refers to natural or anthropogenic events that are dangerous to life, the environment, and property, or to events that facilitate the destruction of the potential and prosperity of societies. Climate security is therefore considered to be

> the coordinated and sustained implementation of prevention, mitigation, and resilience measures necessary to permit the responsible management of risks inherent to climate change throughout all levels of (…) governance (Comiskey, Larranaga, & Carlson, 2022, p. 429).

The boundaries between the definitions of ecological, environmental, and climate security are not clear-cut, and each type of security can be analysed from local, state, and international perspectives. In the author's opinion, the most adequate concept of environmental security is that in which interactions between elements within an ecosystem (ecological security) and protective measures implemented by humans are equally valid, as this allows a broad interpretation to be undertaken. Given that the term 'ecological security' is most widely used in Poland, the term 'environmental security' will be considered synonymous with it in this article. Climate security, on the other hand, may suggest narrowing this perspective to the currently recognised consequences of climate change, but it should be borne in mind that their scope is very broad and the scale may have global implications. The response in such a case must be continuous (not one-off), adaptive and mitigative, which is a big challenge to traditional security measures.

Today, the effects of climate change have become more extreme and perceptible, which amplifies the risk of threats that traverse state borders.

The changing operational environment is a challenge to any long-term strategy adopted by states and to the stability of the international order. The example of the melting Arctic ice is telling here and reveals rivalries between several state actors in this area. In environmental security, it thus becomes crucial to reduce the risk of the negative consequences of climate change on a state and its society. This is because it has been concluded that national security will be affected by disruptions of the existing world order, in which weak states will become more vulnerable and thus susceptible to rivalry and the impact of the superpowers, while threats to the internal order will be less specific, transboundary, difficult to assess clearly, and will require different responses according to needs.

Using the definition developed by the UN Environment Programme, environmental security policy can be described as consisting of "measures taken or policies instituted to protect and promote the safety of external conditions affecting the life, development and survival of an organism. Environmental security examines threats posed by environmental events and trends to individuals, communities or nations. It may focus on the impact of human conflict and international relations on the environment, or on how environmental problems cross state borders. Environmental security is comprised of three sub-elements: 1) preventing or repairing military damage to the environment; 2) preventing or responding to environmentally caused conflicts; and 3) protecting the environment due to its inherent moral value" and the potential negative consequences of its absence. It is worth emphasising that the shift from viewing the environment solely as a threat to viewing it as a resource to be protected creates new opportunities for security studies. If the increasing environmental stresses (such as droughts, lack of clean drinking water, and access to arable land) and the varying ability to combat them are taken into account, a new approach becomes indispensable in view of the need to fully analyse conflicts and apply different prevention, response, and recovery mechanisms.

Historical analysis of the term

While the need to protect the environment from human-induced degradation began to be articulated in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the concept of environmental security emerged later, during the late 1980s

and early 1990s, as a response to growing concerns about the impact of the degradation of ecosystems and resource depletion on national and global security. Reflections on environmental security are often formulated from the UN perspective. The adoption in 1987 of the concept of sustainable development, which was to be implemented by states that took into account the needs of socio-economic progress, the protection of the environment, and the non-disruption of the development of present and future generations, was of great importance in the evolution and deepening of this approach. Environmental security became the responsibility of states and regions to manage their natural resources to ensure sustainable development. The gradual securitisation of environmental problems occurred alongside our increasing knowledge about the impact of humans on the environment. While the effects of the natural disasters had long been a concern for various disciplines of the natural, engineering, and technological sciences, the issue of the impact of humans on the environment was slow to register in the realms of politics and security, which undoubtedly contributed to events such as the environmental consequences of the chemical plant disaster in Seveso in Italy in 1976, the pesticide plant tragedy in Bhopal in India in 1984, the Chernobyl nuclear power plant accident in 1986, and the devastation in the wake of the Gulf War. This perspective of real dangers to concentrations of people and critical infrastructure meant that, at the turn of the 1990s, environmental security was mainly expressed in terms of the threats posed by environmental degradation and resource depletion to national and global security. This was reflected in the work of Homer-Dixion (1999), who saw the environment as a source of conflict and violence; this fostered the consolidation of a narrow approach to security studies in which national security was traditionally associated with the protection of states' borders against external aggression. Researching environmental security from a realists' perspective thus implies that environmental protection is subordinated to the logic of state interests, while possible environmental problems are solved by force.

An alternative view on security and the development of its environmental sector emerged with the concept of human security, formulated in 1994 in the UN Human Development Programme Report. Human security shifted the focus from states to individuals and emphasised human rights, protection from violence, sustainable development, and

the protection of people against critical pervasive threats. This entailed a rethinking of the relationship between demilitarised security and development. In the context of environmental security, the human security perspective focuses on the impact of environmental degradation on human well-being and the cascading cause-and-effect links between the scarcity of natural resources, underdevelopment, and concurrent conflicts.

Researchers from the Copenhagen School, who represented the constructivist approach, described the mechanisms that explained the creation of social discourses on security and the (de)securitisation of 'traditional' problems (Szulecka & Szulecki, 2011, pp. 210–211). This presented an opportunity to redefine what was previously considered a threat and assign greater attention to interdependence and bond-building, all of which was conductive to the consolidation of the concept of environmental security, especially as it had not always been based on material evidence but rather on scientific evidence provided by knowledge brokers. Recognising that the environment is a security sector makes it possible to focus on the vulnerabilities and threats that arise from the interdependence of different sectors. Within the constructivist approach, it is also assumed that environmental security issues can be constructed as existential threats through speech acts and discourse.

Simon Dalby's works indicated that the environmental factor is a critical issue for global security and that there is a clear link between environmental change and security. He argued that environmental security should be seen as a mechanism of global governance and that there should be a move away from a militarised approach to security towards more sustainable and equitable forms of development.

At the beginning of the 21st century, the focus was placed on the institutional dimension of addressing environmental security issues, including the role played by international institutions in countering climate change and in the discourse in environmental security. Within critical security studies the role played by non-state actors and the need to address the underlying causes of conflict were emphasised. In this context, environmental degradation is treated as a product of unequal power relations and neoliberal economic policies, e.g., the extraction of natural resources by corporations in developing countries, which leads to environmental degradation and social conflict. Feminist security

studies emphasises the need to include the perspectives of women and other marginalised groups in security discourse. The 2013 monograph *Environmental Security. Approaches and Issues* (Floyd & Matthew, 2013) helps to better understand the contemporary debate on security, in which issues such as conflicts over resources or the effects of climate change are increasingly considered by decision-makers engaged in planning security strategies. The theoretical part of the book presents research concepts and methods, while the practical part includes analyses of the relationship between environmental policy, conflict and peace studies, the role of population growth for national security, sustainable development in states' national security strategy, food security, energy security from the perspective of unequal access to resources, and social justice philosophy. The subject literature has evolved over time to cover an ever-widening range of issues and perspectives: from threats linked to environmental degradation to the role of institutions and governance in addressing these problems.

Despite the diversity of perspectives on environmental security, they all share the conviction that it is a key area for national and global security. Effective problem solving in this area will require interdisciplinary cooperation and effective coordination, as is evidenced by, e.g., the provisions of the 2022 US National Security Strategy, in which the point is made that climate change is the greatest of all common threats, and the possibility of finding a solution for it is drastically narrowing, thus making the climate crisis an existential challenge for today.

In Poland, after the political transformation of the 1990s, the security environment was redefined. It was dominated by the traditional approach based on territorial integrity, border protection, and sovereignty, as well as efforts to join international organisations and alliances. Few researchers mentioned the threats posed to the international system by global environmental problems, such as climate warming, the ozone hole, deforestation, the loss of biodiversity, dwindling drinking water supplies, and soil degradation. The Rio de Janeiro Conference in 1992 and the conventions adopted by the UN on the protection of the Earth's climate and biodiversity marked a shift towards a more holistic and multidimensional understanding of environmental protection, although state security was still linked to social, economic, and political factors rather than to environmental factors.

In Poland in the 1990s, essential research studies in the area of environmental security began; their primary aim was to explain the essence of transborder problems and conflicts and environmental degradation, as well as to incorporate global environmental threats into the theory of international relations. Particularly noteworthy here is M. Pietraś's (2000) study, in which he explained the essence of environmental security and presented the international discourse of academics worldwide. The literature emphasises the great importance of interdisciplinary sozological studies. Introduced into scientific circulation in 1965 by W. Goetel, the concept of sozology refers to the search for ways to minimise or exclude the negative effects of human impact on the environment. This concept, however, has failed to excite the interest of security scientists so far. Research studies devoted to environmental security were conducted within the engineering sciences in the 1980s and 1990s in military and firefighting schools, where such topics as chemical and radioactive contamination, forest fires, etc. were addressed. Within the political sciences, studies on global environmental problems and state policy were rare in Poland in the 1990s. In the 21st century, the issue of Poland's security was subordinated to its participation in a coalition to fight international terrorism, while environmental security and the political consequences of climate change were linked to energy security. This area dominated both political and scholarly discussions in Poland related to the environmental foundations of security; within the discipline of security studies, which was established in 2011, systematic studies on the relationships between environmental protection and state security policy were generally not undertaken. These gaps were also evident in the assumptions made for national security strategies, despite increasing international pressure to undertake measures for mitigating and adapting to climate change. Although the repeated experience of weather anomalies which resulted in natural disasters (floods, hurricanes, and droughts) prompted the dynamic development of the crisis management sector at all levels, this failed to translate into either a wider inclusion of environmental issues in security strategies, or Poland having any real international ambitions, involvement, or better inter-institutional coordination. For example, the strategic document on adaptation to climate change of vulnerable sectors drafted under the auspices of the Minister for the Environment was not integrated within the

national security strategy. However, it is worth mentioning here several academic textbooks which systematised environmental security issues (Korcz, 2010; Żuber, 2013) as well as studies on selected environmental problems. A valuable monograph on environmental security from the perspective of the legal sciences was written by P. Korzeniowski (2012), who extensively discussed its constitutional dimension. In the second decade of the 21st century, a team of researchers from the University of Siedlce conducted an extensive study on environmental security. D. Trzcińska and J.S. Kierzkowska (2020) analysed selected issues of environmental security implemented by public authorities at different levels of administration. These examples paint a picture of young but multi-discipline studies on environmental security undertaken in Poland, which, however, still lack clear-cut definitions or any holistic review of the subject. General references to environmental issues included in the National Security Strategy of Poland are not conducive to in-depth empirical studies in this area, even though the vast majority of threats and risks to society's existence listed in national crisis management plans concern natural phenomena or anthropogenic pressures on the environment. The reason for this state of affairs in Poland is the domination of the traditional, state-oriented perspective on national security over an individual-oriented human security perspective. Recent studies on the security of local communities, as well as increasingly frequent studies on civil protection and the protection of quality of life and health, should contribute to the furthering of environmental security studies.

Discussion of the term

Traditional security threats are usually defined as threats to national security in the external and internal dimensions and are related to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the state. They are often related to the use of diplomacy, deterrence, and military force in response to interstate conflicts, terrorism, and aggression. Non-traditional security threats – such as climate change, pandemics, natural disasters, transnational crime, and cyberattacks – although not military in nature, can have a significant impact on the state's security and prosperity. Such threats require a broader spectrum of responses, including international

cooperation, multilateral agreements, economic sanctions, and the implementation of environmental policies. This corresponds to a more liberal approach in which environmental security is seen as a problem necessitating collective action. In the constructivist approach, environmental security produces new norms and values that shape the identities of societies, which in turn translates into state politics. Changes in politics which introduce non-military critical issues into the discourse (e.g., climate change) require a new way of thinking about security and countering threats to security.

Within the epistemological approach, four central debates can be distinguished: 1. the debate over the causes of conflict (i.e., whether scarcity, abundance, or political factors lead to violent environmental conflict); 2. the debate over whether security studies should be devoted to violent conflict only or also to reductions in human choice, welfare, and well-being; 3. the debate over the resource scarcity and conflict thesis; 4. the debate over whether, under conditions of environmental stress, cooperation or conflict is more likely (Floyd & Matthew, 2013, pp. 1-10).

From the perspective of security studies, environmental threats (being non-traditional threats) add an interdisciplinary element to the notion of security. The recognition of environmental risks as being correlated with economic and social factors and thus relevant to the security of states and populations enables decision-makers to integrate environmental issues into national security policies and strategies.

The complexity of environmental security is expressed in the ways in which it is analysed. For example, environmental factors can play a role in triggering or exacerbating conflicts and wars in the form of competition for scarce natural resources such as water, raw materials, or land, which can lead to tensions between communities. Environmental degradation caused by military operations (e.g., the Gulf War or the war in Ukraine) can have long-lasting and detrimental effects on human health and the environment, leading to threats to the survival of large groups (due to missiles with nuclear warheads or damaged nuclear power plants). Hence, traditional studies on war and peace must take environmental factors into account when analysing and predicting conflicts and their consequences.

Peace studies, as a sub-field of security studies, focuses on the causes of conflict, the nature of peace, and the conditions necessary

to maintain peace. Studying the conditions and nature of peace from an environmental perspective can provide insights into the links between environmental degradation, resource scarcity, and conflict, notable examples being the conflicts in the Nile basin over water resources, or those in Darfur over drought. Learning about the causes of conflicts can in turn facilitate the development of strategies to prevent or mitigate them.

There are numerous environmental threats that can trigger conflict. Apart from the aforementioned water scarcity, which leads to hunger, increased mortality, and disease, natural disasters also contribute – often in violent ways – to a loss of security. Floods, hurricanes, and earthquakes cause economic damage, casualties, crime, and displacement. Long-lasting air, soil, or water pollution significantly affects human health and causes diseases and food insecurity. The last factor is also related to resource scarcity, which results from biodiversity loss; such scarcity results in instability in ecosystems, food ,and production chains, which in turn leads to socio-political conflicts. Climate change is such a complex threat that it combines all the above and can lead to cataclysms both on a global scale, e.g., sea levels rise, and locally in the form of more frequent, extreme, and destructive weather events.

Effectively countering the aforementioned threats requires the identification of concrete problems. However, given their multifaceted and cascading nature as well as the geographical and temporal scale, this is a very difficult task which requires a coordinated and interdisciplinary approach. Therefore, analyses of environmental threats include such issues as vulnerability, environmental exposure and sensitivity, and environmental risks. The Polish National Disaster Management Plan of 2020 establishes a rating level for the likelihood of the occurrence of a threat that is scaled from very probable, to probable, possible, rare, or very rare, and for its impact on national security, rated on a scale from negligible to small, medium, large, or catastrophic.

The importance of environmental security is increasing. It is a means of preventing conflicts over environmental degradation and competition for natural resources that often lead to the destruction of these resources. Therefore, the protection of such resources as forests, waters, and wildlife is essential for the survival and maintenance of human prosperity by means of preventing negative economic or cultural outcomes.

Environmental security is crucial in protecting human health against the harmful effects of pollution, hazardous waste, and other anthropogenic threats, where exposure leads to a range of health problems, especially civilisation diseases. Mitigating climate change will therefore be crucial for the maintenance of sustainable development and requires coordinated international, national, and local action.

The Paris Agreement was adopted internationally in 2015 with the goal of limiting the increase in the Earth's average temperature to 2° Celsius, and preferably stopping it at 1.5°. This voluntary action establishes a critical benchmark for policies and strategies for responding to environmental challenges. This Agreement promotes biodiversity conservation and seeks to prevent acts of its unlawful violation, e.g., within the framework of the protection of endangered species and combating poaching. At the regional level, countries are taking coordinated action of a binding nature (e.g., European Union climate law) or employing soft laws (e.g., the African Union Agenda 2063). Near-border and trans-border measures, as well as those undertaken at the national level (which are usually linked to the legal, institutional, educational, or investment spheres and cover energy, agriculture, and other economic sectors) are important. Locally, the foundations for environmental security measures are laid by actions undertaken by communities and individuals which address local determinants, such as waste management, urbanisation, or resource conservation.

The key stakeholders in environmental security policy are governments, which have the relevant authority and resources to develop and implement environmental security policies to counter threats (security strategies, adaptation and mitigation strategies, and sustainable development plans). The role of international organisations is to help coordinate and facilitate the measures taken to address global environmental security challenges. NGOs, academic institutions, and expert groups can influence policy through research, advocacy, and public education. The private sector, including businesses and corporations, can also contribute to addressing the aforementioned threats by adopting sustainable practices and investing in environmentally friendly technologies. Local communities are often on the front line of potential environmental threats and can therefore play a key role in identifying and addressing specific problems.

Given the importance of the UN Security Council's role in global security, it is worth mentioning at this point that it increasingly acknowledges the links between environmental issues and international peace and security. Action in this direction began in the 21st century but failed to achieve a full agreement among its members to deal with environmental issues. In recent years, the Security Council has held several debates and issued resolutions (e.g., No. 2349 of 2017) that included recognition that environmental degradation and resource scarcity can exacerbate conflicts, pose a threat to stability, and even lead to an increase in terrorism and violent extremism. The Council emphasises the need for international cooperation to address the underlying causes of environmental degradation and to support communities affected by it. This is especially true in areas afflicted by drought, desertification, and water scarcity, such as the Sahel and the Horn of Africa. In 2009, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) adopted an environmental policy that acknowledges the potential impact of environmental degradation on military operations and security. NATO also researches and analyses the relationship between climate change and security, including analysing the impact of its operations on the environment in terms of the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions and the management of hazardous waste. In its 2022 Strategic Concept, NATO sought to integrate climate change, human security, feminist approaches, and the peace agenda into its key activities. The European Union (EU) is strongly committed to addressing environmental security issues, as it recognises that environmental degradation and climate change can exert a significant impact on human security and global stability. Environmental security is expressed through the notion of the greening of European security and defence, as manifested by the adoption of the 2020 Climate Change and Defence Roadmap guidelines. EUAM CAR and EUCAP Sahel civilian missions have employed environmental advisors to ensure that negative impacts on nature and other resources, including energy consumption, are reduced (e.g., the 'smart camp' pilot study in Mali). Similarly, the concept of energy optimisation and environmental protection in EU military operations has been in place since 2021. The European External Action Service has started to draft binding documents in which climate change and environmental issues will be integrated into the Service's operational tasks. The EU Council conclusions of 25 January 2021

recognised climate change as an existential threat to humanity (Fiott & Cullman, 2023, pp. 177–178).

Systematic reflection with conclusions and recommendations

The paradox in understanding the essence of environmental security stems from the very nature of the threats involved, which means that its inclusion in security studies most often goes beyond the traditional (i.e., realist) research approaches, in which researchers focus on rivalries, conflicts, and their militarisation. While environmental threats may be a cause of conflict and pro-environmental measures are a means of building a sustainable environment (local, regional), even peace studies are embedded in the logic of the game of interests. In this sense, environmental security is also present in this realist approach within security studies. However, ensuring environmental security and the problem-solving related to it requires a much greater interdependence of actors and far more cooperation in order to jointly overcome environmental threats than is assumed in the traditional approach.

Today, the negative consequences of environmental change – climate change in particular – are increasingly frequently researched, visible, and empirically experienced. As a result, they are treated as a threat multiplier which affects security at all levels: the individual level, the state level, and the global system. Particularly in the last of these, it becomes necessary to act comprehensively using the latest knowledge and technology, as only this offers hope for solving the escalating problems and for saving the planet. Despite attempts to counter global climate change under the 2015 Paris Agreement, the issue of responding to environmental change has not become a security policy priority. Even given the IPCC scenarios and awareness of the potential catastrophic consequences of deregulating the Earth's climate system, states and international organisations seem incapable of accepting effective responsibility for countering and financing climate change mitigation.

An important argument in this discussion is the lack of (effective) security policy measures with which state actors are capable of responding to multi-factor and trans-border threats that extend over time. Multi-level

networked coordination involving individuals, local governments, central institutions, and international organisations is indispensable here.

Environmental security is closely linked to national security policy as environmental risks and threats can undermine the state's security and stability. Environmental degradation, climate change, and resource scarcity can contribute to social, economic, and political instability. There are several challenges that states face when implementing environmental security policies: first, they need to be able to balance competing priorities between the environment and economic growth; second, there must be the will to act politically, which is difficult to arouse in the presence of other pressing problems; third, environmental security policies require substantial resources (including funds, personnel, technology, and knowledge); fourth, opportunities for cooperation are limited when environmental problems cross borders and the interests of states are divergent; and fifth, threats to environmental security can be complex and unpredictable, which makes it difficult to design effective policies. Uncertainty about the nature and extent of threats, including scientific uncertainty, is not conducive to the development of environmental security.

Another problem lies in the nature of environmental threats. The complexity of the issue also concerns the basic function of security policy, which is to provide the conditions conducive to the development of the state and its society. The question of how environmental protection serves human security is certainly crucial for further studies on security and the conceptualisation of state security policy. Sudden events and disasters, both natural and anthropogenic, trigger corrective measures in a reactive manner. Relevant services and guards are engaged, and crisis management systems are set up and maintained. However, knowledge of the intensification of weather and climate anomalies and their destructive impact on human resources and the environment should trigger preventive measures, especially because it has been repeatedly proven that the costs of inaction exceed the costs of disaster recovery.

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Economic security

Summary

DEFINITION OF THE TERM: Economic security ensures the undisturbed functioning of a state's economy and the maintenance of a comparative balance with the economies of other states.

HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE TERM: Economic security can be situated within national security economics, which evolved from war economics and defence economics. The origins of war economics can be traced back to the First World War, when the need for studies dedicated to defence and the economy arose. Today, the research area of defence and economic studies has increased significantly due to numerous threats in the non-military sphere.

DISCUSSION OF THE TERM: Economic security gained in importance with the end of the Cold War and the intensification of globalisation processes. The use of economic pressure sometimes allows important political objectives to be achieved without engaging military force.

SYSTEMATIC REFLECTION WITH CONCLUSIONS AND RECOM-MENDATIONS: There is a real need for scientific knowledge related to the political economy of national security: the political component of this sphere would take into account the state's activities as well as human communities and their needs, while the economic component would introduce elements of rationality of choice to a situation in which resources are limited.

Keywords: economic security, state, security policy

Definition of the term

Economic security is of interest to economics and the other social sciences due to both the interdisciplinary nature of economic security and the different research perspectives involved. Economic, social, and political realities dictate that security be treated as an overriding necessity for both the individual and the collective; here, security is understood as providing the conditions for the individual's preservation of "life, development, and maintenance of his social role" (Stachowiak, 2012, p. 38).

Security is an example of a non-rival public good, and no member of the collectivity can be excluded from its consumption. Decisions regarding the provision of public goods are the result of public choices and political decisions (Stachowiak, 2012). Security, being a public good, shares certain characteristics with other goods in this category, including utility as a measure of satisfaction from consumption. The provision of security requires adequate resources and inputs over time. Security as a public good also determines the consumption of other goods and services; it is a basic good and at the same time a good that is complementary to the values covered by the scope of security. In its institutional dimension, the state is responsible for providing and ensuring security, including economic security (Stachowiak, 2012).

A condition for the effective formation of economic security is the sovereignty of the subject, in this case the state.

> Despite the progressive integration and the dynamics of creating integrated groups, sovereignty remains an exclusive attribute of states and constitutes the essence of statehood. The intensification of globalisation and fragmentation processes has raised questions about the possibilities and ways of responding to new challenges and threats in international relations, including state sovereignty. This dilemma relates mainly to the continued functioning of the international system, which is based on nation-states and their ability to operate effectively in a globalising world and in the conditions of turbo-capitalism (Grącik-Zajączkowski, 2011, p. 234).

From the perspective of economic security analyses, it is important to define the economic sovereignty of the state. The inability to effectively influence the trajectory of economic processes or maintain public order is interpreted as a loss of sovereignty. Economic sovereignty is understood as a control exercised by public authorities over transnational

flows of goods, capital, people, and ideas (Grącik-Zajączkowski, 2011). The nation-state continues to be the main actor in the creation of security, including economic security, although its role is changing due to the intensifying processes of globalisation, which is transforming into hyper-globalisation. The state's sovereignty may be restricted in the name of higher objectives, such as defending the lives and health of threatened populations in failed states or in non-democratic regimes. Today, new and atypical economic phenomena and processes that threaten the state's stability are emerging. These concern areas such as the capability of the economic system to configure interrelated internal economic factors with one another so that they ensure the state's stability; the resultant factors that guarantee the stability and development of the national economy and those that are disruptive in nature; the balance of needs that ensure the economy's stability and development and the possibility of satisfying these needs; the level of development of the economy and its structures to effectively counteract negative factors that undermine the economy and the stability of the state's socio-political system and its defence capability; perceptions of actual and potential threats to the state's economic structures; the degree of vulnerability of a state to activities which aim to undermine its security and stability and are directed at the economic domain, with outcomes that are subsequently transmitted into the political domain (Ciszek, 2013).

Księżopolski (2012) defines economic security as the undisturbed functioning of the state's economy, namely maintaining basic developmental indicators and ensuring comparative balance with the economies of other states. He identifies four dimensions of economic security that are logically interrelated and interdependent: finances, raw materials and energy, food, and access to clean water. The notion of economic security reflects not only the congruence (harmony) of given economic macro and micro quantities but also numerous challenges and threats that require the efforts of all society to overcome. Challenges and threats have their source in the state's internal system (called systemic efficiency or inefficiency) and increasingly often in the development and functioning of the global economy (Stachowiak, 2012).

> The economic security of the state is a relatively endogenously and exogenously balanced state of the functioning of the national economy in which the risk of disruptions to this balance is contained within the planned and acceptable

organisational and legal norms and rules of social coexistence (Raczkowski & Solarz, 2015, p. 81).

According to Żukrowska, economic security means

> the conditions of harmonious development which allows the sustainable prosperity of the citizens of the state to be built. (...) In macroeconomic terms, security is stable employment, a low level of unemployment, and predictable prospects for economic development characterised by financial liquidity; on the other hand, in microeconomic terms it is the solvency of a household or a company. In both cases, it is the capability to balance liabilities against needs over an average time period (Żukrowska, 2013, p. 35).

Economic security is also defined as the net result of the factors of economic development and the barriers that constrain it; the state of the economy and its structure and economic relations that make it possible to effectively resist negative external activities that may affect the stability of the state system, disrupt the state's economic development, or reduce its defence potential; the general state of economic dependence which affects the degree of effectiveness of any external economic interference in internal economic development; an expression of the degree of vulnerability of the state to the transfer through the economic dimension – mainly through transmission through channels and mechanisms of economic dependence – of actions of a political nature aimed to weaken the security of the state (e.g., energy blackmail or speculation on the currency and capital markets); and the balance of developmental needs and the possibilities of satisfying them (Stachowiak, 2012). The last of these definitions most fully captures the essence of economic security as an area of a state's economic policy and the sphere of international relations.

Historical analysis of the term

State economic security became of interest to scientists as a result of the evolution of the perception of security and the gradual expansion of its domain. This coincided with political and economic changes in Central and Eastern Europe and created a specific demand for scientific research into new areas of security. The response to this demand was

the emergence in the 1920s (through an evolutionary process) of a new sub-discipline called national security economics – originally called war economics – included within the ideas of the art of war and later within military science. War economics focused on, e.g., the use of economic resources for warfare and the search for interdependences between the national economy and war. The nature of the First World War, associated with technological advances and a new way of warfare, served as a catalyst for the development of war economics research. The findings of war economics were used in preparations for the Second World War. The new security architecture which emerged after the Second World War emphasised the value of peace and the need to maintain it. During this period, the name 'defence economics' was frequently used instead of 'war economics', thus emphasising economic and defence aspects and the issue of converting resources to cater for the needs of national defence. Since the mid-1990s, the term 'national security economics' has been used, which can be explained as a sub-discipline that studies the relationships between the national security system and the economy. It defines the directions of the state's economic and defence policies and lays the foundations for optimising the use of resources for national security purposes. This sub-discipline is located between economics and the security sciences; it researches security, while its research methods and techniques are drawn from economics and other social sciences. Research problems analysed within national security economics include the economic security of the state (in the dimensions of, e.g., energy and raw materials security, financial security, food security), strategic resources and strategic reserves, the potential of the defence industry, and human resources for security (Płaczek, 2014).

Discussion of the term

Economic security became of particular interest to academics, policy-makers, and the public after the Cold War, when globalisation processes intensified and led to, among other things, dynamic changes in the system of international relations, the emergence of new economic superpowers, the fragmentation of power (the bipolar system was replaced by multipolarity or even non-polarity), and the growing importance of the economy

as the basis of the state's power. Economic pressure sometimes makes it possible to achieve important political goals without engaging military forces (Płaczek, 2015). Due to the specificity of security as a social need, it is of interest to many scientific disciplines. In economic research, it is treated as a public good provided by the state. Security is of particular interest to representatives of the neo-institutional approach and public choice theory (new political economy). The Copenhagen School of International Relations (Buzan et al., 1998) has identified five main areas of contemporary security: economic security, societal security, environmental security, political security, and military security. Setting new paradigms and trajectories of development becomes particularly important in times of high uncertainty and a lack of consensus among the main actors of world politics about the future shape of the security system (in this context, humanity is threatened by a large number of diverse conflicts, including armed conflicts). This makes the task of the security sciences – within which the military, economic, and political areas intersect – all the greater. The desire to respond to the challenges of a changing security environment has prompted the search for solutions to key problems in the area of economic security, which is a new research area and sphere of practical activities within national security.

Building the foundations of national security requires a set of activities that will rationally foster the use of resources at the state's disposal for the achievement of strategic objectives and the realisation of the national interest. A specific mission of national security is to ensure economic security by creating the material and financial conditions necessary for the survival, prosperity, and sustainable development of society, as well as the smooth operation of the state and its institutions (Kitler, 2018). The area of economic security is one of the key pillars of national security (alongside military security and political security). The shaping of economic security faces objective difficulties related to the direct possibilities of the state's apparatus to influence the size of the economic base. In the conditions of the market economy and globalisation, the nation state has at its disposal a decreasing number of real instruments for influencing and shaping both the structure of its branches and industries and the use of capital, labour, land, and knowledge resources. The dynamics of the changes taking place in the modern world, including the high mobility of production factors, translate

into increasing influence within the framework of alliance systems rather than within the framework of narrowly understood national interest. A necessary condition for strengthening the overall level of security is to take action with the aim of improving economic security. The selection of appropriate methods and measures that lead to the desired state of economic security requires the state to implement adequate policies based on a realistic assessment of its external situation, and strategic and normative documents should be based on rational decisions made as a result of in-depth public debate with the key opinions of experts and specialists.

The current National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland [*Strategia Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego*] of 2020 identifies the following national interests (*Strategia Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego RP 2020*, BBN):

1. Guarding independence, territorial integrity, sovereignty and security of the state and its citizens.
2. Shaping international order, based on solidarity and respect for international law, which guarantees the safe and secure development of Poland.
3. Strengthening national identity and guarding the national heritage.
4. Ensuring conditions for sustainable and balanced social and economic development and environment protection.

This strategy also discusses activities in the economic area that are intended to strengthen economic security and implement strategic objectives in the national interest. A lot of space is devoted to financial security and energy security. Strengthening economic security, including financial security, is to be achieved through, e.g., supporting measures to increase resilience to international financial crises by, in particular, strengthening the stability of the system of public finances while ensuring conditions for stable and balanced economic growth. The authors of the Strategy also recommend increased resources for development-oriented activities, which stimulates the accumulation of national capital and expands the national production base and the state's property resources. The state's measures directed at the improvement of general conditions for investment will result in closing the development gap with respect to better-developed economies. Poland should maintain its resilience and capacity to respond flexibly to turbulence in

world markets. In this context, it is of particular importance to strengthen the supervisory capacity and competence to counter threats related to the destabilisation of financial markets, speculative attack on the Polish currency, or capital drain.

In the area of energy security, it is key to expand and modernise generation capacities and electricity transmission and distribution networks to ensure the continuity of supplies, including the prevention of unexpected power cuts as well as to develop dispersed electric energy sources in a sustainable manner, ensuring the adaptation of the National Power System to the operation characteristics of these sources. In the context of the international situation, it is necessary to increase diversification of oil and gas supply sources, and, most urgently, to continue diplomatic, legal and administrative efforts to halt the construction of the transmission infrastructure increasing the dependence of Central Europe on gas supplies from the Russian Federation (*Strategia Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego RP 2020*, BBN). Russia's aggression against Ukraine in February 2022 demonstrated its urgency (the ultimate aim is to become totally independent of Russian hydrocarbons).

In the context of the provisions of its National Security Strategy, Poland should create new approaches that serve to preserve the state's influence on shaping economic security and its openness to the dynamics of processes in the global economy.

Maintaining economic security is one of the main objectives of states' domestic and foreign policies. In the coming years, it is in this dimension that rivalry between states will take place. This rivalry will increase in intensity and thus will lead to tensions in the international arena. States and social groups perceive a territory not only in political terms, but increasingly often in economic terms, i.e., as an economic space consisting of markets for goods and investments. This gives rise to new areas of conflict and changes their geography. State and private actors mingle in the sphere of economic security (Kiężopolski, 2012). For citizens, the maintenance of economic security means stable interest rates and exchange rates, certainty of employment, and security of banked savings, while for the state it enables the free pursuit of internal and external political goals within the sphere of macroeconomic policy, social policy, and foreign policy. Thanks to economic security, it is possible to

take advantage of globalisation processes to further the development of states and to neutralise threats linked to the functioning of the world economy (Drabik, 2013).

Threats to state security can come from other state organs as well as from actors in international relations: transnational corporations, investment funds, banks, and the functioning of the market itself (Stachowiak, 2012).

> In the most general sense, security can be defined as the certainty of a subject's existence and survival, their property, and their functioning and development. Certainty is the result not only of the absence of threats (their non-existence or elimination) but also arises as a result of the creative activity of a given entity and is variable over time, i.e., it has the nature of a social process (Zięba, 2012, p. 8).

Systematic reflection with conclusions and recommendations

The state's efforts in the area of economic security should be directed towards shaping the state's economic potential. Economic potential is measured by the natural, property, and human resources that are at the state's disposal at any given time. The achievable level of production depends on the factors of production at one's disposal according to market conditions and the use of available technologies. Excessive use of resources may result not in increased production and welfare but in increased prices. If production is kept below the threshold allowed by resources, waste occurs as the economy operates below its optimum production capacity. According to systemic determinants, the maximum output of a state is defined as the potential gross national product, although in reality it is the actual gross national product (GNP). The difference between potential and actual gross national product is a GNP gap, which is a normal phenomenon for the market economies present in the vast majority of peaceful economies. The complete disappearance of the GNP gap can happen in a war economy when the entire production potential is used. At the same time, it must be emphasised that a large GNP gap is indicative of untapped productive potential, i.e., of the state's poor management of economic resources; this leads to a situation in which a large part of the productive assets are not working,

high unemployment persists, and the land is not used agriculturally (i.e., it is not cultivated). For society, this means low incomes, low levels of consumption, and too little investment. The gap between potential GNP and real GNP can also result from the state's ineffective economic policy, including making structural errors or the too early withdrawal from protection, e.g., industries of strategic importance such as energy, shipbuilding, public transport, telecommunications, or agriculture.

From the perspective of economic security (understood both as striving for the continuous improvement of the state's economic position and taking care of the living standards of its citizens), a high level of production and its growth – achieved by full utilisation and continuous expansion of its economic potential – must be considered the primary task of a state's economic policy (Winiarski, 2001). It is in the national interest to ensure a high level of employment, reduce unemployment, and stimulate measures to permanently raise the income and living standards of the population. The impact of these variables also indirectly affects the demographic situation, with the result that Poland is now a rapidly ageing society. In the next decade, this may be a significant barrier to increasing the country's wealth and to wealth creation. The impact of economic policy on the national economy must always take into account the possibility of disturbances in the system of independent variables, such as weather conditions, raw material supply markets, global economic downturns, wars, social unrest, or terrorist attacks.

Shaping the foundations of the state's economic security now faces objective difficulties related to the process of globalisation, which has reduced the real possibilities of the state influencing its economy quickly and effectively. Globalisation has changed capitalism and the functioning of markets, and a number of processes have been set in motion that had not occurred on such a large scale in previous decades. These include:

- the marketisation of many areas of social life (e.g., education, health, and the environment),
- the expansion of the banking and financial sector – the transition from corporate capitalism to financial capitalism,
- the 'financialisation' of social structures and the decline in social security (Tomczak, 2015).

As Z. Sadowski (2014) argues, at the turn of the 21st century the market system underwent fundamental changes that can be described

as degeneration manifested by financialisation. The freedom of move-ment and the investment of financial capital created thanks to the neoliberal paradigm, which has at its disposal highly efficient means of communication linked with the information revolution, led very rap-idly to the emergence of derivatives that compete with one another in identifying attractive forms of investment for the multiplication of capital. The volume of capital flows reached a volume in which trade no longer played an important role. The stock exchange game, with its large and growing monetary capital, became the main form of economic activity. Extensive financial consultancy became a new activity, and rating com-panies emerged which – consciously or not – participated in the process of shaping the behaviours of entities and institutions. The real sphere related to production and services did not disappear, but its role weak-ened and it became dependent on the financial supply system, which is steered by speculative games (Sadowski, 2014).

Rapid development and globalisation of the financial market in the last thirty years changed the relationships between the institutions of this market. These changes included the introduction of a number of 'innovative' financial products to the market, which encouraged specu-lation and fostered the creation of 'speculative bubbles'. Speculative funds appeared on the market that were registered in tax havens and specialised in buying debts on the secondary market, usually far below their nominal value, with the aim of making the maximum profit from them. They are not subject to any public controls. These funds buy old government bonds (issued by indebted countries) on the secondary market at a significantly reduced price. Later, through lawsuits which last many years, they demand repayment of the claims at 100% of their value (Zigler, 2021).

Another phenomenon associated with globalisation was very rapid deindustrialisation. Rapid mergers and hostile takeovers, frequent changes in the location of production, and new forms of work organisa-tion and management resulted in the decline of an industrial and cor-porate culture in which the manager was responsible for the condition of a company and its employees, and the corporation guaranteed them an adequate level of financial security. Expansion in the form of the creation of transnational corporations, the pursuit of high turnover and profits, and aspirations for economic omnipotence and political influence

have weakened the state's capacity to shape economic determinants. The growth of corporations and the elongation of production chains and supply chains have in fact not only reduced the real influence of nation-states on the economy but also increased the risk of crises and economic tensions. Through the rapid and uncontrolled flow of capital, the massive and equally rapid flow of information, the deregulation of the labour market, and the 'financialisation' of social life, globalisation has changed the institution of the state and reduced the capacity of politics to influence economic and social processes. The lifting of restrictions on capital flows in the late 1980s and early 1990s lies at the root of these phenomena, although this process began earlier with the pressure of the markets to free the financial world from the control of democratic governments in the 1960s in the United States. At the corporate level, financialisation manifests primarily in the increased involvement of non-financial companies in financial operations (Śleszyńska, 2021). Non-financial companies, which made their profits through the production and sale of goods and services, began to derive an increasing share of their revenues from financial sources. Since the mid-1970s, the ratio of capital income (interests, dividends, and retained earnings from investments) of companies to their total cash flow has been steadily increasing.

Financialisation has been the subject of in-depth analysis for more than three decades. Depending on their authors' ideological affiliation, three views on the genesis of this phenomenon can be identified. One is proposed by advocates of political economy based on Marxism who believe that finance capitalism emerged as an alternative regime of capital accumulation by rentiers in the face of stagnation in mature industrial capitalism. They argue that the lack of any mechanism for the redistribution of wealth in advanced industrial capitalism led to a gap between income-limited consumption and the unleashed productive capacity of oligopolistic corporations. In other words, demand did not keep pace with supply, so rentiers turned to the financial sphere to maintain the existing rate of wealth accumulation.

The second view is linked with economic sociology. Researchers from this area attribute the causes of financialisation to the net results of many factors: the wave of mergers and take-overs against the backdrop of disappointing corporate performance in the 1970s, the deregulation

of the US financial sector by the Reagan administration, and the emergence of financial innovations, such as junk bonds. The reign of the equity conglomerates that had characterised the corporate landscape of the 1960s was coming to an end, and the era of concentrated industry companies was setting in, with executive remuneration more closely linked to stock market performance, i.e., with the value for shareholders. The use of leveraged buyouts (based on financial leverage) promoted the concentration of ownership in the hands of institutional investors, who enforced extensive restructurisation, i.e., job cuts and the exclusion from the company structure of those functions that were either unrelated to the core business or could be performed more cheaply by external contractors (the beginnings of outsourcing). Within a decade, almost a third of industrial companies from the Fortune 500 list had been taken over or merged, the result being that US corporations were far less diversified in 1990 than they had been a decade earlier.

The third view is offered by political sociologists, who emphasise the role (blame?) of the state and see financialisation as an unintended consequence of the political response to the crises of the 1970s. At the end of the era of post-war prosperity, there were, in their opinion, three crises: social (growing conflict between social groups), fiscal (the gap between the state's spending and revenue), and a crisis of confidence in the government. In the US, the Reagan administration adroitly overcame these crises by shifting responsibility for meeting social needs to the market. The liberalisation of regulations on capital transactions resulted in the increased availability of loans and an influx of foreign capital. As if by magic, the government turned scarcity into fertility and created a false sense of the abundance of resources. The momentous consequence of this was the rapid growth of the financial sector, which initiated an era of structurally unstable financial capitalism.

In the US, between 1960 and 2014, the share of finance in gross value added more than doubled, from 3.7 to 8.4 %. Over the same period, the share of industry halved from 25% to 12%. The same process took place in other highly developed countries. During the three decades of deregulation, the financial sector far outpaced the real economy. When regulations began to be abolished in the early 1980s, the profits of the US financial corporations, calculated as a percentage of total private corporate profits – which had stayed at 10–15% for forty years after the

Second World War – rose to 20% and then peaked at 40% in the early 21st century (Mazzucato, 2021).

On the one hand, this has resulted in dynamic economic growth in many countries through new investments, the modernisation of infrastructure, technology flows, and better uses of local resources. However, the positive effects of freeing up capital flows have entailed significant costs, including hostile takeovers of assets – sometimes at rock-bottom prices – massive privatisation of national assets (which had been acquired over generations), and takeovers of competing companies in order to liquidate them or acquire attractive land. Portfolio flows are a big problem of the free capital market, as the rapid inflow and outflow of large sums of currency for purely speculative purposes destabilises the economy through significant changes in money market liquidity and exchange rate fluctuations (Tomczak, 2015). Financial capitalism is a new invention and the process of shaping this system is not complete. It should be thoughtfully oriented to the needs of the future and aimed to democratise and 'socialise' financial institutions so that they have a positive impact on quality of life (Shiller, 2016). In addition, social security standards for those employed in middle- and high-income countries have declined significantly. The purchasing power of households whose members are in gainful employment has decreased compared to the 1960s and 1970s, while there has been a dynamic increase in wealth among the owners of large corporations and technology companies. The model of a minimal state, which was widely advocated, has contributed significantly to the escalation of social inequality (Leszczyński, 2020). The majority of people in the world earn their living from income provided by gainful employment, while the imbalance between the manufacturing and financial sectors has resulted in a drop in this income and forced a great proportion of the working population who wished to maintain or increase their consumption levels to take out loans and credit. Consumption is rising, but household debt is increasing. The financial sector has grown beyond its means and disturbed consumers' rational decision-making based on the real value of income at their disposal. Some experts and analysts have reported pressure from societies for greater control over markets – called deglobalisation – and abandonment of the idea of the free movement of capital (sometimes even a rejection of the very idea of a free market).

The problem of unequal income distribution in financial capitalism has become a central topic of extensive discussion. Growing inequalities are a concern for state politics, and the search for effective solutions in the form of designing appropriate wealth-distribution systems without over-draining the resources of human capital will be a task for public authorities in the coming years. In fact, increasing wealth resources serves to meet multiple human needs. In the context of economic security, the needs of individuals and societies should not be underestimated. The state is not an abstract entity – it must have social and institutional fabric. In order to create a sustainable basis for the state's economic security, it must be recognised that it is necessary to restore the significance of politics and the political, understood as a practical activity on the one hand, and as a carrier of values acceptable to the general public on the other. The separation of economics from politics and political motivation is not only fruitless but also a deliberately created cover for real economic power and motivation. It is also a major source of false assessments and errors in economic policy. Thus, there is a real need for scientific knowledge that fits into the area of the political economy of national security; its political component would take into account both the domain of the state's activity and human communities and their needs, while the economic component would introduce elements of rationality of choice into a situation in which resources are limited. Research devoted to the political economy of national security opens up new research areas for political scientists, economists, and sociologists, i.e., representatives of the disciplines that make up the triad of social sciences, which have recently become much too separated from one another.

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Social safety

Summary

DEFINITION OF THE TERM: The concept of social safety entails providing both the sufficient material means of subsistence (social security) and opportunities for individual development (developmental security).

HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE TERM: Reflections on social safety can be situated within the framework of national security studies and analyses of social policy, including social welfare policy. The origins of systemic thinking on social safety can be traced back and linked with the concept of human security, which – unlike the traditional approach – emphasises the needs of individuals and communities and allows researchers to adopt a more comprehensive approach to social safety issues.

DISCUSSION OF THE TERM: The state, in its role as the primary guarantor of social safety, implements the different strategies it has at its disposal whilst simultaneously attempting to solve the dilemma of "how much freedom versus how much security" to allow in its undertakings.

SYSTEMATIC REFLECTION WITH CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: Compared with the traditional welfare model, which primarily focused on providing social security through financial transfers, modern welfare states are faced with new challenges and problems. Globalisation, technological and demographic changes, and increasing social diversity have rendered the traditional approach inadequate and states have begun to modify their active social policies so that they support citizens in acquiring the skills and qualifications needed for the labour market. The focus has been placed on preventing social exclusion by helping people find jobs, improving their vocational skills and education, and offering support for entrepreneurship. The state has become an active partner for citizens and has thus been able to provide more sustainable

solutions for the disadvantaged as well as improve its ability to adapt to economic and social change.

Definition of the term

Social safety is one of the areas of security that are treated as both a research category and an area of interest for the state, which meets social needs through social policy instruments.

Primarily due to the two different understandings of the problems that underlie the state's intervention in this area, the term 'social safety' is defined in various ways in the literature. Researchers focus mainly on social security and developmental security, which together form social safety, although the former is studied and analysed more frequently than the latter.

The term 'social security' is defined by, among others, Kirosław Księżopolski, who treats it as "a state of freedom from threats caused by a lack or insufficiency of means of subsistence" (Księżopolski, 2001, p. 20). These threats arise as a result of a number of factors that are covered by the umbrella term 'social issues' and encompass "critical states and situations in the lives of individuals and entire communities" (Dziewięcka-Bokun, 1999, p. 34) that restrict or totally "block any possibility of satisfying life's basic needs" (Rysz-Kowalczyk, 2007, p. 182). Unsatisfied needs result in a perceptible state of want which – if it increases – leads to difficult life situations and thus threatens the sense of social security, in turn giving rise to further threats. The threats listed in the definition of social security imply social risk, i.e., "the threat of an event the occurrence of which will cause a loss in household resources" (Szumlicz, 2005, p. 45).

Barbara Szatur-Jaworska and Grażyna Firlit-Fesnak link social policy with social security. They argue that social policy is

> the purposeful activity of the state and other organisations in the shaping of social relations and the living and working conditions of the population with the aim of, among other things, ensuring social security, satisfying higher-order needs, and ensuring social order (Szatur-Jaworska & Firlit-Fesnak, 1994, p. 3).

In the approach proposed by L. Dziewięcka-Bokun, social security also constitutes the basis of social peace. Like Antoni Rajkiewicz, she sees the essence of social security in the guarantee of obtaining external (outside the family) assistance in certain situations specified by law or contracts. Defined in this way, social security is one of the most important

social values and social needs and has found a place among the most fundamental civil rights in democratic systems (Dziewięcka-Bokun, 2009, p. 131).

Ryszard Szarfenberg proposes a different way of defining social safety. Referring to M. Księżopolski's definition, he postulates distinguishing between social security and developmental security, both of which are components of social safety (Szarfenberg, 2003), therefore it is a broader concept than social security as it goes beyond the economic sphere. Social safety denotes "a state of freedom from material deprivation of means of subsistence and the existence of real guarantees for the full development of individuals" (Księżopolski, 2001, p. 20). The social aspect of social safety is expressed in the provision of real guarantees of a minimum sufficient means of subsistence that offers individuals both formal and actual access to a social security system which realises the idea of social rights.

Szarfenberg's position is also shared by Marek Leszczyński, who defines social safety as

> the totality of legal and organisational measures implemented by governmental (national and international) actors, non-governmental actors, and citizens with the aim of providing a certain standard of living for individuals, families, and social groups and preventing their marginalisation and social exclusion (Leszczyński, 2009, p. 37).

According to M. Leszczyński, the second component of the concept refers to the creation of developmental conditions that support the active participation of individuals and social groups in generating income, mainly through their participation in the labour market and gaining economic independence.

Aleksandra Skrabacz sees social safety as an area strongly inscribed in the concept of national security and defines it as the protection of the existential foundations of human life, the capacity to satisfy the individual's needs (both material and spiritual), and the realisation of spiritual aspirations through the creation of conditions for work and education, health protection, and guarantees of retirement benefits (Skrabacz, 2012, p. 38).

The contemporary state is a fundamental guarantor of social safety and entails the creation of a developmental framework for citizens through, among other things, adequate social policy. The activities of

the state bodies should aim to develop a canon of social safety which, on the one hand, provides a system for supporting the development of the individual and the realisation of his life aspirations and, on the other hand, guarantees him protection against poverty and its consequences, as critical situations in the lives of individuals and families can lead to their inability to satisfy basic needs and thus create insecurity and a loss of social safety.

Historical analysis of the term

The increasing number of contexts in which security exists means that it encompasses not only traditional military or political issues but also social issues. In the context of these considerations, it should also be emphasised that security is a particular value that permeates and determines many areas of social life, which is why many new forms of security are emerging nowadays.

However, these new types of security are usually vague and poorly defined, thus resulting in terminological confusion, which translates into difficulties in understanding them clearly. One method that allows various types of security to be clearly ordered is to assign them to dimensions within which security can be studied in a systematic manner. One such dimension defines the type of security of a subject. As Marian Cieślarczyk points out, "the object of security is located in both the sphere of values endorsed by a subject as well as in the sphere of a subject's activity" (Cieślarczyk, 2009, p. 73). Thus, the following types of security can be listed: environmental, health, economic, political, and social.

A systemic approach to defining security which took into account both military and non-military perspectives was presented by Bary Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde, 1998), who opened up new fields of exploration by distinguishing between the horizontal and vertical dimensions of security studies. The horizontal direction of the extension of the concept of security was expressed by extending the responsibility for security to include other actors, not just the state. The vertical direction of security studies shifted the emphasis from only the military dimension to a broader problem area. Taking these extensions into account, these authors identified five security sectors:

1. the military sector, which covers issues related to national and international security, including military and political threats, armed conflict, terrorism, and weapons of mass destruction.
2. the political sector, which focuses on the security of the political system, the functioning of the state, institutions of governance, and the protection of human rights. Threats linked to political terrorism, corruption, disinformation, and cyberattacks, among other things, are considered within this sector.
3. the economic sector, which covers economic security issues, e.g., financial stability, energy security, trade, and industry. Within this sector, such threats as cyberattacks on financial institutions or the use of natural resources by states as foreign policy tools are analysed.
4. the societal sector, which focuses on issues related to social and cultural safety, such as threats to community identity, organised crime, migration, and health and education issues.
5. the environmental sector, which covers environmental security, e.g., soil, water, and air degradation, climate change, and threats from the chemical and energy industries.

These security sectors correspond to five types of security: military, political, economic, societal, and environmental (Marczuk, 2009, pp. 68–69). The broadening of the approach to security, i.e., moving beyond the state and its international environment, is thus the result of the 'broad approach' to security. The concept of B. Buzan's school was the starting point in the process of conducting in-depth studies on the nature of security, which led to the development of the concept of human security, i.e., the security of the human person. The source of this idea can undoubtedly be found in the *Four Freedoms Speech*, delivered by US President Franklin D. Roosevelt during his annual address to Congress on 6 January 1941, when he announced that the United States is fighting for the essential 'four freedoms': freedom of speech, freedom of worship, freedom from want, and freedom from fear (Roosevelt, 1941).

The notion of 'freedom from fear and want' was also enshrined in the principles of the Atlantic Charter, signed by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill on 14 August 1941. Point six states that

after the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny they hope to see established a peace which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries, and which will afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want (Okubo, 2007, p. 5).

The idea of freedom from fear and want was concretised in a Human Development Report published in 1994 by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), entitled *New dimensions of human security*. In this document, it was emphasised that

[f]or too long, the concept of security has been shaped by the potential for conflict between states. For too long, security has been equated with the threats to a country's borders. For too long, nations have sought arms to protect their security. For most people today, a feeling of insecurity arises more from worries about daily life than from the dread of a cataclysmic world event. Job security, income security, health security, environmental security, security from crime – these are the emerging concerns of human security all over the world (United Nations Development Program, 1994).

The UNDP report also identified security sectors which address threats in the following seven areas (B. Buzan's expanded concept): 1) economic security; 2) food security; 3) health security; 4) environmental security; 5) personal security; 6) community security; and 7) political security.

The sectoral approach to analysing security which first appeared in Buzan's concept offers insight into the complexity of security issues and more effective identification of the areas that require intervention and management in order to ensure security. The sectoral approach allows diverse aspects of security to be analysed: from military operations to political and economic relations to social and environmental issues. It thus provides a comprehensive picture of security and enables more effective implementation and management of activities that aim to prevent and minimise threats.

Discussion of the term

One of the most significant issues in social safety concerns the balance between freedom and security, which is a key challenge faced by states and societies in the modern world. Freedom and security are

fundamental values which, however, often clash. The role of the state – which must simultaneously protect the freedom of the individual and ensure security to society – is to find the right balance between them. In its role as the primary guarantor of social safety, the state can adopt different strategies for ensuring it.

The first solution the state can implement to ensure social safety is to encourage the development of a social insurance system which offers a natural buffer against excessive loss of income for individuals if such risks as unemployment or illness occur. Public activities in social safety provide protection for the owners of capital against the negative effects of the free play of market forces and contribute to the maintenance of social peace. In the liberal model, the development of a social safety system by state institutions alone is considered inappropriate as it reduces the individual's incentive to work and transfers responsibility for social security to the state. According to this concept, individuals should take care of themselves through individual foresight, e.g., by purchasing insurance or having savings for old age. Support for those who are unable to meet their basic living needs is minimal, and having more than the bare minimum is possible only by taking part in the free market.

This approach is typical of the neo-liberal understanding of social issues, within which markets that are free of state regulation are considered the best way to ensure freedom, prosperity, and economic efficiency for individuals. However, the neo-liberal model does not take into account the fact that not every individual is able to secure social security for themselves through private insurance or savings. People on a low income or with disabilities, the elderly, or families with lots of children can find it difficult to obtain sufficient financial resources to provide an adequate level of security for themselves. In such cases, it is the state that should step in as their guarantor and provide a minimum standard of living for those who are unable to achieve this by themselves.

The second solution entails the government's provision of a minimum income for all citizens, which would form the basis of social security and actualise the idea of an equal opportunities society. The emergence of the social security system was in response to the imbalance between economic freedom and political equality in the capitalist system, in which the social subsystem became a stabiliser. The effectiveness of the social security system lies in the fact that it balances social conflict,

which is mitigated by compensating for losses suffered by individuals as a result of life's misfortunes. This compensation sets in motion its own dynamic, which transforms a welfare state into a social security state.

According to Niklas Luhmann, there are three areas that point to differences between different forms of the state: environmental problems, the increasing costs of the social security system, and the changing attitudes of the recipients of social security benefits in modern society (Luhmann, 1990, pp. 21–22). The social security system shapes the social structure, including social citizenship, which expresses fundamental changes in egalitarian principles regarding the status of the citizen. The social component of citizenship provides a guarantee of security against the negative consequences resulting from the free market by providing protection in the societal, health, and educational spheres; such protection complements the freedom of individuals. By implementing political inclusion, the social security system ensures minimum social standards; this system also acknowledges that it is the obligation of state institutions to assist citizens who face particular life problems. The expanding catalogue of citizens' needs affects further transformations in the system of social safety and social policy.

The third social safety strategy is based on ensuring equal opportunities for individuals' development by levelling their living conditions, which realizes the idea of a social welfare state. The activities of state institutions are planned to meet the essential needs for a reasonable standard of living. Social policy has a redistributive function which ensures the appropriate level of social welfare and social security. Social justice has become an important value guaranteed by the political system which ensures that mechanisms of social inequality are corrected when they are unjustified. Social solidarity is a fundamental principle in this approach which reduces socio-economic exclusion and its reproduction in subsequent generations. Redistribution is vertical in nature, which means that it satisfies basic social needs and fosters raising the level of social cohesion and a sense of social safety.

Systematic reflection with conclusions and recommendations

Researchers often analyse social safety in the broader context of the functioning of a welfare state. They describe various concepts whose aim is to improve the level of social safety, including:

1. *Workfare state* – this concept assumes that the main objective of social policy should be to stimulate its citizens' participation in the labour market. The state should offer support to those seeking employment while also requiring that they actively participate in the labour market.
2. *Welfare society* – this concept assumes that society should participate in the development of social policy, and the state should be its representative in this field. Society should be open and tolerant, and people should have equal opportunities for development and for meeting their needs.
3. *Welfare pluralism* (multi-sectoralism of the social sphere) – this concept implies that social policy should be implemented by different sectors, such as the state, private organisations, NGOs, and society. In this way, greater efficiency and adaptation to different needs can be achieved.
4. *Welfare mix* (using mixed forms in social policy) – this concept assumes that social policy should be based on different forms of support, such as social benefits, public services, private insurance, and voluntary work. In this way, a balance between efficiency and social justice can be achieved.

These assumptions suggest that the functioning of the traditional model of a welfare state is associated with serious difficulties. The high costs of such a system lead to budget deficits and economic imbalances, which can have a negative impact on a country's international competitiveness. A state's extensive welfare system can lead to negative social effects, such as a lack of motivation to save and invest, which can affect a country's economic development. Also, the weakening of traditional social ties, such as the family, can have a negative impact on society. At the same time, the institutions of a welfare state may not be well suited to meeting the new social challenges that are emerging in the post-industrial era. Consequently, there is a need to reform them

and to seek new solutions that are better suited to these new social challenges.

The contemporary state is confronted with various problems related to socio-economic changes, which affect its guarantee of social safety. The progressive ageing of the population and negative population growth are challenges for the social insurance system and social assistance system. Modifications to the family protection system may be necessary to respond to these challenges. Changes at the macro level, such as the transition from industrial to post-industrial societies, also affect the guarantee of social safety. Along with these, societal values are also changing, which may affect the social protection system and the ways in which the state provides social safety. Furthermore, social problems such as long-term unemployment, poverty, and the social exclusion of marginalised groups are obstacles to social peace and social security. Appropriate solutions must therefore be implemented in order to effectively counteract the aforementioned problems and ensure social safety for all citizens (Gierszewski, 2013, p. 132).

Today, when a welfare state faces a crisis, elements of various ideological traditions interpenetrate each other, and the resulting model of social safety resembles the aforementioned welfare mix, which is based on several guiding ideas.

The idea of decentralisation and the increased importance of local government assumes that decisions should be taken closer to citizens and that local authorities should have greater autonomy in executing their tasks.

The principle of the subsidiarity of the state and the rise of the third sector implies that the state should only take action when it is not possible for other actors to do so. The third sector, i.e., NGOs and community-based organisations, should be treated as equal partners of the state in undertakings for the public good.

The state's acknowledgement of the subjectivity of local communities and the importance of social ties for building social capital implies that social groups have their own identities and needs that must be respected, and that integration and trust-building between different social groups is crucial for achieving social and economic stability.

Acceptance of the neo-liberal demand for maintaining the sustainability of public finances and the associated acceptance of the reduction

of the redistributive function of social programmes assumes that they should be designed to be effective, i.e., not only to help in the short term but also to contribute to quality of life in the long term.

The importance of collective bargaining – with traditional tripartite pacts being complemented by civil dialogue in which social organisations also participate – acknowledges that it is important that different groups in society have a say in decision-making and that dialogue is conducted based on the principle of partnership and with mutual respect.

The role of education, including the public education system, as an instrument for investing in human capital and building a 'knowledge society' assumes that education is crucial for social and economic development. Investing in education should contribute to increasing people's knowledge and skills and to building a society based on such values as tolerance, respect, and solidarity.

The idea of counteracting social exclusion by helping people find employment or participate in integration programmes is an important element of contemporary social policy. As part of this idea, measures are taken to prevent and reduce social exclusion by enabling people at risk of exclusion to participate in the labour market or integration programmes.

At the same time, as part of this idea, it is also important to fully recognise the value of volunteering as a form of socially useful work and a way of acquiring skills and qualifications useful for gainful employment. Volunteering can be seen as a way to increase social capital and social inclusion.

Another important element of this idea includes initiatives that activate not only individuals but also entire local communities. Within these activities, attempts are made to stimulate local and social development and support activities initiated by residents themselves, which is linked to the renaissance of community work as a method used in social work.

The model of an active welfare state implies that it should act proactively and preventively to prevent various forms of social risks, especially unemployment, which continues to be a key problem in the process of reforming this model. To this end, active labour market policies that are tailored to individual needs should be introduced, and the state's activities should be extended to cover new areas of risk, such as single-parent parenting or lack of qualifications. Finally, an active welfare state should

act preventively to prevent social risks from occurring, in contrast to the traditional welfare state, which acted passively and only intervened when a problem occurred.

Contemporary welfare states are thus faced with new challenges and problems, such as rising social inequality, the risk of social exclusion, and a lack of adequate adaptation to economic change. Consequently, the model of such a state has shifted towards an active social policy that focuses on supporting citizens to acquire the skills and qualifications needed for the labour market, rather than simply providing social security in the event of the loss of employment.

At the same time, the new social policy model covers a wider range of problems, such as childcare or long-term unemployment, and it uses preventive instruments and selective support programmes rather than relying on redistributive programmes of a universal nature. Consequently, modern welfare states have to compromise between providing broader social support and increasing individuals' social participation and responsibility.

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Cybersecurity

Summary

DEFINITION OF THE TERM: Cybersecurity is protection against threats that appear in cyberspace, i.e., in the new environment of human interactions. The term 'cybersecurity' denotes a state in which the risk of threats to digital assets in this domain is low and there exists the ability to protect against them. It is also a process whose aim is to ensure that the ICT infrastructure in use, including all its elements and everything it controls, is fully protected.

HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE TERM: The first problems in cybersecurity originated from the processes of the IT revolution, which began in the middle of the 20th century, although the first serious threats to cybersecurity appeared in the 1980s with the emergence of hackers. The professionalisation of various forms of computer crime occurred at the beginning of the 21st century.

DISCUSSION OF THE TERM: ICT security threats are a direct result of the characteristics of cyberspace as a new sphere of human activity. Their emergence is fostered by, among other things, the difficulty in detecting perpetrators of cyberattacks, the relatively low cost of committing cybercrime, and the lack of strategic intelligence in this domain.

SYSTEMATIC REFLECTION WITH CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: Improving cybersecurity requires organisational, legal, and technological measures. Unfortunately, it is impossible to fully counter threats in this dimension due to, on the one hand, the specific nature of cyberspace, and on the other hand, the fact that the level of international cooperation in this area is insufficient. Most often, raising the level of cybersecurity most frequently focuses on broadly understood

prevention, which is manifested by, e.g., maintaining good practices in the use of ICT devices.

Definition of the term

Cybersecurity (ICT security) appeared in the scientific realm as a result of the IT revolution in the mid-20th century, which resulted in the emergence of computers and computer networks. The term refers to a state in which there are no threats in cyberspace (also called ICT space, which is a new domain of human activity) or in which threats can be successfully counteracted. The term 'cyberspace' is used by researchers and stakeholders as an umbrella term to describe a new and unique domain of human activity that is based on the use of computers, computer networks, and the electromagnetic spectrum (Schmitt, 2013, p. 211). In practice, cyberspace is the domain of processing, storing, and transmitting digital information. It functions on the basis of a broadly defined ICT infrastructure, which includes computers, smartphones, routers, other devices that are part of the Internet of Things, as well as everything that connects them to one another (copper cables, optical fibres, etc.). Due to the increasing dependence of states and societies on cyberspace, it is defined as a new security environment with unique threats specific to it (Lakomy, 2015, pp. 83–88).

The direct link between cybersecurity and cyberspace is indicated by the prefix 'cyber', which they both share. According to Myriam Dunn-Cavelty, this prefix is most frequently used as a synonym for the phrase "through the use of a computer" (Dunn-Cavelty, 2008, 16). Although it derives from the ancient Greek word *kubernetes*, which means a pilot, helmsman, or navigator, when used with reference to information and communication technology (ICT), the prefix 'cyber' is related to cybernetics, i.e., the scientific discipline focused on the transmission of information. Nevertheless, as some researchers rightly observe, this term seems to be overused in public discourse dedicated to threats to computers and computer networks (Lakomy, 2015, pp. 73–75).

There is no consensus in the subject literature on how to view security problems in cyberspace. Alongside the notion of cybersecurity, researchers, practitioners, and stakeholders use various other terms, e.g., ICT security, computer security, or information security. The last term, however, has a broader scope as it refers not only to issues related explicitly to computers and computer networks but also to the notion of information, which can take various forms, not necessarily of a digital nature. In this

context, the term 'cybersecurity' (ICT security) is by far the most popular in discussing protection against threats that occur in cyberspace.

In the academic discourse, the term 'cybersecurity' is defined in a number of ways. For example, for James Andrew Lewis, "[c]ybersecurity entails the safeguarding of computer networks and the information they contain from penetration and from malicious damage or disruption" (Lewis, 2006, p. 1). Morten Bay describes it as a widely used term meaning protection against malware and hacking attacks (Bay, 2016). According to the US Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency, it is

> the art of protecting networks, devices, and data from unauthorized access or criminal use and the practice of ensuring confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information (Security Tip, https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/tips/ST04–001).

Other authors and institutions define cybersecurity as the ability to protect or defend the use of cyberspace from cyberattacks, or the state of being protected against criminal or unauthorised use of electronic data, and the measures taken to achieve this (Craigen, Diakun-Thibault & Purse, 2014, p. 15). Many definitions refer to the intentional, harmful use of ICT in the form of cyberattacks. A cyberattack is sometimes defined in the subject literature as any unauthorised action directed at a breach of security in cyberspace. The effects of cyberattacks can involve both ICT infrastructure and the information which it stores, processes, or transmits. Cyberattacks can lead to blocking, disrupting, destroying, or obtaining information in cyberspace as well as to blocking, disrupting, destroying, or taking control of its components (e.g., computers).

Thus, in the most general terms, cybersecurity refers to protection against threats that arise in cyberspace. It should be understood as a state in which the risk of threats to digital assets in this domain is low and there exists the ability to protect against them. It can also be understood as a process whose aim is to ensure that the ICT infrastructure in use, including all its elements and everything it controls, is fully protected. It is worth emphasising that the concept of cybersecurity is interdisciplinary as it covers issues not only from the exact and engineering sciences (i.e., computer science, mathematics, automation, electronics, telecommunications), but also from the social sciences. The problems within cybersecurity are analysed at various levels, ranging from the individual, to the state, to the international level. At the last of these

levels, cyberspace is of interest to, e.g., the political and administrative sciences, legal sciences, and security sciences.

Cybersecurity is concerned with protection against a broad spectrum of threats specific to the ICT space, of which the subject literature offers several classifications. From an IT perspective, these mainly focus on the methods and means of carrying out cyberattacks, which include common techniques such as Man in the Middle (MITM), brute force, Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS), the use of malicious software (malware), including computer viruses, worms and Trojans, or methods based on social engineering, including phishing (Bendovschi, 2015, p. 25). From the perspective of the social sciences, the typologies of ICT threats are usually based on the motives of the perpetrators and how these activities are carried out. For example, they can be structured or unstructured: structured threats include the harmful activities of highly organised actors in cyberspace, such as states, terrorist organisations, or transnational criminal groups; unstructured threats include lowly organised actors, such as criminals, hackers, vandals, or frustrated individuals (Lakomy, 2015, p. 119). According to Piotr Sienkiewicz, cybersecurity threats can also be divided accordingly: technical (the reliability of technical systems), social (political, random, deliberate actions, e.g., hacking), and natural (floods, fires, etc.) (Sienkiewicz, 2017, p. 253).

In this context, the most common cybersecurity threats analysed within the social sciences include hacking, hacktivism, cybercrime, cyberterrorism, cyber espionage, and the use of cyberspace for military operations. In its traditional form, hacking primarily refers to breaking into ICT systems and networks to test one's skills and to gain recognition within the hacking community. This community is usually divided into three subgroups which differ in their attitudes to ethical values and compliance with the law: white hat hackers, grey hat hackers, and black hat hackers. White hat hackers are law-abiding and their aim is to improve computer security. Grey hat hackers are characterised by a similar ethical stance, although they may occasionally violate existing legal norms. Black hat hackers not only act illegally but also commit unjustified damage to the systems they attack.

What distinguishes hacktivists from hackers is their motives. Hacktivists aim to promote concrete ideologies, slogans, or political values. Hacktivism is a combination of hacking techniques and specifically

understood activism. As such, it uses specific methods of cyberattack, the main aim of which is to attract public attention. In its broad understanding, cybercrime is any act of law-breaking by means of computers or other ICT devices, while in its narrow sense it is illegal activity in cyberspace in order to obtain personal or financial gains.

Cyberterrorism is a broad spectrum of activities of terrorist organisations in cyberspace, which range from launching attacks on ICT systems and networks to raising funds and disseminating propaganda. However, it should be noted that the term 'cyberterrorism' is often overused in public discourse to describe phenomena that have nothing to do with it.

In principle, cyber espionage is not difficult to define as it concerns the transfer of intelligence activities to cyberspace in order for states and their services to illegally gather classified information.

The 21st century has begun to be termed the fifth theatre of warfare due to the wide range of military operations that can be carried out. The aim of these operations might be to disrupt information resources, destroy or block infrastructure, or to directly support warfare in other domains (air, land, sea, space) (Lakomy, 2015, pp. 133–168).

Historical analysis of the term

The first attempts at breaking or bypassing computer security were of an experimental nature, and some were made by members of the scientific community. The first serious ICT incidents took place in the early 1980s and were linked to the popularisation of personal computers in Western countries. Their perpetrators were representatives of the emerging hacker community, which developed from the activity of phreakers. The hacker groups and collectivities that formed at the time (e.g., Legion of Doom and 414s) treated cyberattacks primarily as a way to obtain new knowledge and test their skills. Initially, ideological issues played a marginal role in the hackers' movement, although they emphasised the importance of freedom of speech and software freedom on the internet. Early hackers frequently broke into the computers of influential government, financial, and scientific institutions, including Los Alamos National Laboratory, Security Pacific National Bank, and Telecom Gold. Over time, hackers' activities were noticed by broader society, thus helping

to popularise their movement. From the perspective of cybersecurity, a breakthrough in hackers' activity took place in 1988 with the appearance of the Morris worm – the first malicious program to spread over the internet. This worm caused major disruptions of the global network and led to an increased awareness of threats in the ICT space and the establishment of the Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT).

New types of threats emerged in the second half of the 1980s, including cyberattacks that aimed to promote political slogans or ideas. One of the first acts of hacktivism took place in 1989, when US government computers were attacked with the Worms Against Nuclear Killers (WANK), which was an attempt to protest against the US nuclear testing at the time. Another example of hacktivism was the Intervasion of the UK, which consisted of a series of DDoS (Distributed Denial of Service) attacks against government computers in the UK. Moreover, hacking skills were increasingly being employed for strictly criminal purposes. For example, the first major cyberattack on a bank took place in 1994, as a result of which over $10 million was stolen.

Over time, states and organised non-state actors also become interested in the potential for offensive cyber operations. The first experiments in this area took place as early as in the 1980s, as evidenced by the activities of Markus Hess, who was responsible for hacking into the computers of a number of American and Western European institutions, including the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and the United States Air Force Systems Command. He then sold the classified information he obtained to the Russian KGB. However, state activity in this area did not develop on a larger scale until a decade later. In 1999, the first of a series of state-sponsored cyberattacks in the United States, code-named Moonlight Maze, was revealed, resulting in a massive leak of classified information. Allegedly, these cyberattacks had been ongoing since 1996 and involved, among others, the Pentagon and NASA; their source was revealed to be the Russian Federation. ICT incidents also occurred during the intervention of North Atlantic Alliance forces in Kosovo in 1999 (Jordan, 2011, pp. 97–103). However, the 1990s was transitional in nature, and various forms of ICT threats were still being developed at that time.

The professionalisation of cybersecurity threats, as well as their substantial growth in scale, occurred at the beginning of the 21st century.

States became increasingly interested in employing the potential of cyberspace to pursue their interests in the international arena. Manifestations of this trend included a series of cyberattacks that began in 2003 and targeted the United States, the source of which was probably the armed forces of the People's Republic of China. This operation, called Titan Rain in the subject literature, mainly targeted the US defence and scientific sectors and resulted in the hacking of Lockheed Martin, Redstone Arsenal, and NASA computers, among others. However, the events in Estonia in 2007 are considered a breakthrough in the state-sanctioned use of cyberspace as a 'weapon'. At that time, mass cyberattacks against Estonia (which lasted weeks at a time) were being triggered by a dispute with the Russian Federation over the removal of a monument of the Bronze Soldier of Tallinn. As a result, large numbers of Russian government-inspired hacktivists and amateurs launched computer attacks against Estonian websites belonging to the government, financial institutions, and businesses, among others. In most cases, these cyberattacks took the form of DDoS attacks, which made it possible to block access to selected websites and services for long periods of time. In addition, some Estonian websites were defaced and Russian propaganda materials were posted on them (Jordan, 2011, pp. 97–103). These events increased the awareness that cyberspace had become a new arena of state rivalry, as was confirmed by the subsequent cases of computer attacks launched by states, e.g., during the 2008 war in Georgia and in US–China relations. With the outbreak of the War on Terror in 2001, the potential of cyberspace became of greater interest to terrorist organisations which focused mainly on propaganda activities.

At the same time, cybercrime developed rapidly and on a large scale. One of its forms was a black market for illegal online services, including the sale of drugs, weapons, prohibited content, and money laundering. Cybercriminals, who used increasingly sophisticated means and methods of cyberattacks, attacked financial institutions and their customers and engaged in identity theft and database leaks. With time, malware became professionalised, and worms and Trojans were created that were specifically designed to gain illegal access to electronic banking systems. New social engineering methods and new ways of infecting ICT devices via the internet also emerged that were based, for example,

on websites and e-mail, as exemplified by the I Love You network worm of 2000, which spread via e-mail, copying itself to every contact in an address book. The first decade of the 21st century saw a breakthrough in hacktivist activity, symbolised by the group Anonymous, which was created in 2003. Anonymous attacked organisations and institutions that, in their opinion, were responsible for violations of human rights and freedom of expression on the internet; for example, it supported social protests during the Arab Spring.

Summarising, the 1980s and 1990s were characterised by a low level of professionalism and the relatively small scale of cybersecurity threats. Although there were problems on a global scale (e.g., the Michelangelo virus in 1992), there were a few instances of high-impact attacks during this period. This changed in the 21st century, following the rapid development of many forms of ICT threats, including strictly cyber-criminal activity, hacktivism, and cyberterrorism. States took a much greater interest in the use of cyberspace and in securing their resources in this domain, which began to be treated as the fifth theatre of warfare – alongside land, sea, air, and space. The establishment of the United States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) in 2009 was evidence of the transformation in this area.

Discussion of the term

The emergence and evolution of cybersecurity threats are a direct result of the characteristics of IT. In today's world, an increasing number of areas of human life are dependent on the use of electronics. This creates a paradoxical situation because mankind, while enjoying the multidimensional benefits of the IT revolution, is at the same time increasingly exposed to an unprecedented level of threats. E-banking, for example, has certainly brought enormous economic benefits, has enhanced the quality of life of internet users, and has enabled the development of e-commerce, but it has also led to the emergence of new ways of stealing money from bank accounts. This relationship is also seen in the case of other technologies, such as the Internet of Things. In other words, the more dependent societies are on the use of ICT, the greater the risks they are exposed to. Furthermore, because ICT use is so widespread,

cyberspace abounds with potential targets. Cyber threats also arise from the specific nature of computer technologies, including the occurrence of faulty hardware and errors in the software development process. According to statistics, a programmer makes a mistake on average about 70 times per 1,000 lines of code, of which about 15 go undetected during testing and eventually reach the market. It is worth noting that some programs consist of hundreds of millions or even billions of lines of code. Each of these bugs can constitute a potential computer security vulnerability (The Battle of Bugs, 2020). In other words, the challenges in this area arise from the very nature of ICT systems.

The emergence of cybersecurity threats is also fostered by the characteristics of the ICT space itself, which is a domain in which the constraints that apply in traditional theatres of warfare do not always exist, such as temporal and spatial constraints. On the internet, geographical distance is irrelevant and the time required to communicate with even the most remote servers is counted in seconds. Moreover, cyberspace is ageographical and aterritorial, and such notions as national territory and borders do not apply in it. These features make it difficult to apply traditional security policy measures to the phenomena inherent in cyberspace, primarily because the mechanisms of states' cooperation in this field often do not cover problems specific to ICT security, which opens up the field for their free interpretation. One exception in this respect is the North Atlantic Alliance, which, in response to the cyberattacks against Estonia in 2007, developed advanced solutions to counter ICT threats.

The emergence of such threats is also fostered by the fact that cyberspace is a domain in which actions are more often offensive than defensive. First, this is due to the relatively low cost of orchestrating cyberattacks, especially when compared to traditional armed combat measures. The simplest intrusions can be executed on a simple computer with access to the internet and free tools that are widely available on the web. Second, cyberspace makes it easier for perpetrators of cyberattacks to stay anonymous, and the attribution problem makes responding to ICT incidents significantly more difficult. Third, cyberspace does not have early-warning systems to provide advance notice of an impending attack, which means that attacked entities must respond to computer intrusions in real time, although often even detection is

a big problem. Fourth, for similar reasons, it is also difficult to deter potential attackers because they may not depend on the use of ICT infrastructure (non-state actors such as terrorist organisations), or they may be difficult to identify. Fifth, an interesting feature of cyberspace is the ease of disseminating disinformation through it. This feature makes it possible to influence political processes (Lakomy, 2015, pp. 93–102), as evidenced by the cyberattacks that occurred during the 2016 US presidential campaign that were used to influence (although it is unclear how successfully) public opinion in the United States during this sensitive period (Russia & 2016 Election, 2017). Sixth, the costs of protecting ICT infrastructure are usually very high, in contrast with the costs of orchestrating cyberattacks.

In this context, the importance of cybersecurity in the activities of governments has definitely increased over the past few years. Major cyberattacks perpetrated by the armed forces or secret services of certain countries have had a fundamental impact on this process. One of the first and most serious ICT attacks was the use of the Stuxnet worm against the Iranian nuclear programme in 2009–2010, which led to the physical damage of affected systems. It infected, among other things, the computers that controlled industrial processes at the Natanz plant, leading to the destruction of thousands of Iranian centrifuges used for uranium enrichment. The worm was probably produced by the United States and Israel (Wasiuta, Klepka, 2020, pp. 514–517). Another serious ICT security threat was the long-standing cyber espionage activities of the People's Republic of China, which primarily targeted the United States. Similar activities were undertaken by North Korea and the Russian Federation, as demonstrated by the aforementioned cyberattacks during the 2016 US election campaign. Moreover, during this period, cyberspace was also increasingly perceived as a new theatre of warfare. Indeed, offensive operations in cyberspace were conducted before and during the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Offensive military operations in cyberspace were also undertaken by the United States, which, e.g., carried out a series of cyberattacks codenamed Glowing Symphony against the digital assets of the so-called Islamic State in 2016.

The growing importance of cybersecurity issues in recent years has been evidenced by the intensification of computer crimes, many of which have reached global proportions and generated losses running

into billions of dollars. The malicious program called WannaCry is a good example here: in 2017 it infected over 200,000 computers in 150 countries and caused losses of about four billion dollars. Four years earlier, a similar program called CryptoLocker infected as many as 250,000 computers. Attacks targeting components of critical infrastructure also became increasingly common: in 2021, for example, a cyberattack paralysed the operation of a US pipeline and led to a temporary increase in fuel prices in the US (Dossett, 2021). The rapidly increasing scale of cybercriminal activities is evidenced by statistics: in 2007, a computer attack occurred on average every 39 seconds, while by 2020 this had risen to every 1.12 seconds. In 2014, about 62% of analysed organisations had been victims of cyberattacks at least once, and in 2021 this figure was over 86%. Moreover, between March 2021 and February 2022 alone, more than 150 million new types of malware emerged (Zaharia, 2022).

Finally, in recent years cyberspace has been widely and professionally used by terrorist organisations to, among other things, disseminate propaganda, finance their activities, gather information, and prepare terrorist attacks. A fundamental breakthrough in this area was the online campaign of the so-called Islamic State, launched in 2014. Terrorist organisations have also attempted to carry out cyberattacks, albeit not very successfully.

Systematic reflection with conclusions and recommendations

There is no doubt that cybersecurity has become one of the most important forms of security. Its importance is growing in direct proportion to the dynamics of the development of computer technologies and the extent to which societies are dependent on their use. The more information and communication technologies that are in widespread use, both on an individual and collective level, the greater the risk of their misuse.

To counter ICT security threats, three main types of measures are used. The first is organisational in nature and includes measures which ensure that only authorised personnel in an organisation have access to digital resources. The second includes technical solutions and thus

concerns the implementation of the highest security standards in software and hardware. Such measures may include the use of anti-virus software, hardware firewalls, and changing passwords on a regular basis. The last group of measures consists of those of a legal nature: these are the legislative measures aimed to better adapt national and international standards to the specific nature of harmful phenomena occurring in cyberspace and the regulations and ordinances implemented inside institutions which are at risk of cyberattacks. Obviously, different methods are used to identify and punish perpetrators of cyberattacks; these are primarily based on digital forensics techniques.

Countering threats to ICT security is often of limited effectiveness, not only because of the rapid advances being made in the methods and techniques of cyberattacks, but also because computer crime is global in scope. Consequently, countering it is generally not possible without real cooperation between all members of the international community. However, there are not many examples of such cooperation in this field as the countries with the greatest potential in cyberspace, i.e., the USA, Russia, and China, have for years been differing in their opinions on how to counter these problems.

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State border protection

Summary

DEFINITION OF THE TERM: The role of a border is to establish the territory of a state in order for it to exercise its sovereign power and maintain its sovereignty. The protection of the state border is an element of the state's security and is a multifaceted task involving the organisation of the administrative, political, and military activities that the state undertakes in order to protect its sovereignty.

HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE TERM: A fundamental element that is integral to any state is its territory, which is the space within which a population exists and can develop. Over the centuries, the increase in the number of states has resulted in an increase in the number of borders between them, which has led to the need to define both the new structure and new functions of borders.

DISCUSSION OF THE TERM: The article describes the typologies of borders, presents the border protection system and external border management of the European Union, and discusses the role of migration in the contemporary world.

SYSTEMATIC REFLECTION WITH CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: One of the measures undertaken by the state to guarantee the highest values – including independence, freedom, the security of the citizens, and the protection of public health – is a well-functioning system of border protection which is capable of adapting to and coping with the changing security environment and emerging threats. Analysis of the concept of border protection confirms how complex a process it is. Today's borders function in a different way and to a different extent than in the recent past, and current perceptions

are related to changes in the ideas of citizenship, national identity, and the protection of sovereignty.

Definition of the term

The protection of the state border is one of the basic functions of the state. The most important element of any state is its territory and population. The territory of a state defines the land area within its borders, the coastal and territorial waters, and the airspace above it. The existence of state borders derives from the attribution of particular territories to specific states and the instinct of territoriality inherent in human communities, which is manifested in the desire to control events and general rules of behaviour in a settled area. The term 'border' has numerous semantic meanings related to such concepts as 'end' and 'limit'. A border is an ambiguous term and is used both in colloquial and scientific contexts. In its basic meaning, a border is a space that is essentially open and accessible from different sides. In colloquial language, this term is used in such collocations as natural and artificial border, historical border, natural border, administrative border, cultural border, economic border, political border, and many others. The dictionary of the Polish language defines a border as a line that separates or encloses a certain area, or a line that separates the territory of one state from another (Szymczak, 1993, p. 694). In spatial terms, a border is defined as a line of demarcation between areas of different affiliations, e.g., in administrative, political, social, cultural, or environmental contexts. Hence, borders can be analysed in terms of each of these aspects, among which the state border plays the most significant role in the geopolitical dimension. Various, often different, definitions of a state border can be found in the literature. A state border can be defined as a one-dimensional geometric line within which the territory of a state is located (Ehrlich, 1958, p. 507). It is also defined as "an imaginary curtain, running at 90 degrees to the surface of the earth, which separates states and areas without a defined affiliation" (Baczwarow & Suliborski, 2002, p. 72). According to other definitions, a state border is "a vertical surface that passes through a border line marked on the earth's surface and separates the territory of one state from other states or from no-man's land" (Nowa Encyklopedia Powszechna PWN, 1995, p. 457); or, it is a line where the territories of different states come into contact, or a line that marks the end of a state's authority (Klafkowski, 1969, p. 116). A more general understanding of this term is provided by J. Barbag, who defines borders as

"the lines where two sovereign states meet which also separate them from each other" (Barbag, 1987, p. 61). The role of a border thus refers to the delimitation of the territory of a state in order for it to exercise its sovereign power and maintain its sovereignty. Consequently, the protection of a state border is an element of the state's security. This task that has been given special importance in Poland: Article 5 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland states that "the Republic of Poland shall safeguard the independence and integrity of its territory" (Constitution of the Republic of Poland, 1997, Article 5). As a general rule, delimitating state borders is done through international treaties and agreements. This applies primarily to land borders due to the importance of considering both ethnographic (population) and economic factors. The first element in the process of delimitating a state border is its technical determination based on a given international treaty. Once the details of its course have been established, its exact description must be detailed in an act of international law, which is called delimitation. The final stage is demarcation, which involves the precise marking of the border on the ground and the plotting of its course and signs on a map. International agreements describe in detail the location, dimensions, shape, and colour of border signs as well as the rules for their maintenance (Ustawa o ochronie granicy państwowej [*Law on the Protection of the State Border*], 1990, Article 4).

In order to properly explain the term 'border protection', apart from analysing the term 'border', it is also necessary to discuss the terms 'protection' and 'defence'. According to the definition provided in the *Wielki Słownik Języka Polskiego* [*Extended Dictionary of the Polish Language*] (2018, p. 143), protection is "action whose aim is to remove threats". The term can also be defined as "protection against something unfavourable, bad, or dangerous", "something that protects against something", and "a person or group of people who watch over someone's safety" (Szymczak, 1993). The term 'defence' is defined as "fending off an attack, usually with a weapon in hand", "standing up for someone, refuting an accusation, justifying someone or something", and "the person who defends or protects someone or something" (Szymczak, 1993). National defence is the special task of the state in the area of ensuring national security, which is related to its survival and sustainability – especially in the context of territory, sovereignty, and society. It is closely linked to the uninterrupted

functioning and development of the state and the society living on its territory. Within the framework of national defence, countering threats is realised, among other things, through the protection of the state border.

The aim of measures employed for the protection of state borders is to ensure their integrity and security. Each state establishes its own procedures and rules for the protection of its borders, which are usually influenced by relations with neighbouring states. The protection of a state border can also be considered in the context of its functions, which stem from the national interests of states as well as the threats that may affect them. Hence, protection can be divided into economic, political, military and environmental protection. State border protection is the totality of the activities undertaken by a state – inside as well as outside its borders – and especially by its constitutional organs in order to preserve its sovereignty and to counter threats and various other phenomena that may hinder its functioning and development. The protection of state borders covers the political, economic, and environmental concerns of the functioning of the state. Each state precisely defines how its borders are protected, and the rules of their protection and defence have a direct impact on the internal and external security of the state. The protection of the state border is a multifaceted task, which consists in the organisation of the administrative, political, and military measures that each sovereign state undertakes in order to prevent illegal border crossings, the transportation of specific goods across the border, and the infiltration of infectious diseases. In analyses of state border protection, it is important to identify potential threats in this area; these include illegal migration, terrorist threats and the activities of international criminal groups (Mróz, 2016, p. 311).

State border protection tasks are performed by a number of entities and institutions. In Poland, these tasks are entrusted, in accordance with their competences, primarily to the Border Guard [*Straż Graniczna*], the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland [*Siły Zbrojne RP*], and the Tax and Customs Service [*Służba Celno-Skarbowa*]. It should be noted that due to the multifaceted nature and complexity of tasks in state border protection, it is necessary to develop comprehensive rules of cooperation between all entities responsible and co-responsible for their implementation, as well as with other bodies from the national security system.

Historical analysis of the term

The functioning of state borders as they exist today is the result of a long developmental process. In antiquity, when the first state structures were formed, state borders were border belts that ran along natural landforms, such as rivers or mountain ridges. As such, a border belt was often wide and its function was to separate societies and to form a natural line of defence. It should be noted that the development and migration of societies led to the evolution of the border belt from its function as a natural defensive boundary to a linear political boundary. Moreover, the development of states led to the shrinking of border areas; consequently, the border belt evolved into a demarcated border line. These changes resulted in the artificial demarcation of state borders. Thus, rather than being a reflection of physical, linguistic, or cultural borders, it can be assumed that a state border is a political concept within which this border is demarcated, established, or imposed by political bodies. This can contribute to growing political tensions and, consequently, to conflicts and wars. Additionally, armed conflicts can lead to the mass migration of populations or the resettlement of selected ethnic and national groups, for example the change of the Curzon line, the plebiscites after the First World War, and the change of state borders in Central Europe after the Second World War.

The traditional approach to the protection of state borders was associated with the preparation of states for war, the mobilisation of an opponent's armed forces, or the violation by one state of the land, air, or sea territory of another state. In simple terms, it can be assumed that in the past a state border had three basic functions:

- military – it provided a barrier to foreign military invasion;
- social – it was a barrier to the free movement of people;
- economic – it acted as a barrier to the movement of goods.

At different times, these functions were fulfilled with varying degrees of intensity. From the perspective of its historical development, a state border is not a category that is constant in time or linear in form. The 20th century saw significant changes to the political world map. The disintegration of colonial empires led to the emergence of new states, particularly in Asia and Africa, and the process of demarcating new borders was of paramount importance as their delimitation was frequently an

arbitrary process that failed to take into account actual national, tribal, and ethnic affiliations. Also, the fall of the Berlin Wall, which acted as a border between two blocs, triggered huge geopolitical changes. The collapse of the Soviet Union resulted in the creation of many new state borders in both Europe and Asia.

The increase in the number of states led to an increase in the number of borders between them. As a result, territories neighboured new territories, and both the structure and function of their borders had to be redefined. During this time, the role of communication between states increased and new possibilities for cooperation between nations emerged, although this also gave rise to new border disputes. Examples of conflict over the control of independent territories include the disputes between Ethiopia and Eritrea, between Serbia, Bosnia and Croatia, between Israel and Lebanon, and separatist movements among the Kurds, Chechens, the Irish, and the Basques. Ethnic conflicts include those of Burundi and Rwanda, Ireland and the UK, Palestine and Israel. Border disputes are also frequent between neighbouring states that have not legally settled the course of their borders, e.g., between China and India. Thus, it should be emphasised that, despite strong integrative tendencies observed in the contemporary world, there are still borders that significantly divide nations.

Discussion of the term

Typology of borders. The evolution of the understanding of state borders and their protective role makes it possible to classify them according to a number of different criteria. The most basic distinction is between natural and artificial borders. Natural borders derive from naturally differentiating geographical spaces; they are physical borders that follow natural terrain, such as along a river or a mountain range. Artificial borders are established through agreements between neighbours or are the result of external pressure imposed by other states.

Another distinction was proposed by R. Hartshorne, who used the term 'boundaries' and distinguished between 'antecedent' and 'subsequent' boundaries. 'Antecedent boundaries' are those that existed before human involvement (i.e., before man began to cultivate land and

develop a cultural landscape). A characteristic feature of these bound-aries is that they have often remained intact despite the development of human activity. 'Subsequent boundaries' are established between mature linguistic, cultural, territorial, etc. communities, i.e., after human settlement and interaction with the landscape. Hartshorne also described 'relict boundaries', which are present in the cultural landscape but have lost their former political function, as well as superimposed boundaries, which do not take into account the ethnic and cultural elements of a ter-ritory (Hartshorne, 1936, pp. 195–227).

Moreover, borders can be divided into formal and informal ones, following legal and administrative criteria. Formal borders are almost all linear borders that demarcate territories with the same legal, politi-cal, and administrative norms, such as political borders (which indicate which country we live in and what laws apply to us) and administrative borders (which indicate the territory in which particular local laws apply). Informal borders are primarily linked to various zones, i.e., they separate territories established by extra-legal criteria, such as suburban zones, climate zones, or the presence of a particular type of grain in a given area.

Today, in the area of border typologies, the integrated approach (which covers genetic distinctions between borders *sensu stricto*, his-torical borders, and national borders) dominates. Borders *sensu stricto* are created by the laws of nature and take into account coastlines, rivers, swamps, mountain ranges, fault lines, etc. Historical borders and national borders are – to varying degrees – the product of man, but the former are based on issues derived from tradition, while the latter correspond to the extent to which the language, race, and culture of an ethnic group within an inhabited area are shared. Importantly, especially today, borders based on the natural elements of nature are also the result of a social contract and political arrangements and, in this context, are the product of man. Natural features are helpful in the process of delimitating state borders.

The progression of integration in Europe is conductive to a differ-ent typology of borders. Under conditions of development and cross-border cooperation, new premises for their delimitation are emerging: borders as bridges, borders as barriers, borders as symbols of identity, and borders as resources (O'Dowd & Wilson, 1996, pp. 3–18). An even

more contemporary approach to the classification of borders focuses on political borders, borders in politics and international relations, and the policies of border creation. Political borders take into account changes in the course of borders, understood as lines that separate states. Borders in politics and international relations form a new approach to these lines and to the governance of political structures, and they are seen as a consequence of increasing globalisation. The policies of border formation focus on the creation and reconstitution of borders in the spatial dimension as a response to changes between states, international relations, and national identity (Paasi, 1998, pp. 71–82).

State border protection systems. While state borders are still capable of performing their traditional function as a barrier, it should be noted that contemporary borders, in the context of the existence of many states, function in a totally different way than they did only two decades ago. The development of states and the transformation of their structures affect the evolution of borders and their protection. International bodies with strong integration structures, such as the European Union, are an example of these changes. Globalisation and integration have resulted in the opening of borders, leading to the free movement of people, capital, goods, and ideas. This completely new and different reality begs questions about the relevance of borders in the future. A change in national borders results in a change in the perception of national identity. Integration processes in politics, the economy, and social migration affect people's sense of citizenship, national identity, and sovereignty. Globalisation has led to changes in the meaning of state sovereignty and the blurring of the border between foreign and domestic. Thus, it can be assumed that integration processes will lead to the disappearance of the political and economic dimensions of sovereignty in statehood, while the power of supranational institutions will increase. The disappearance of the European Union's internal borders results in the reconfiguration and redefinition of statehood, which is a consequence of states' adaptation to changes in the international environment.

It should be noted that although the opening of state borders has created the opportunity for greater cooperation between states and has led to the free movement of people, goods, capital, and ideas, it has also given rise to the emergence of new threats which may affect the national security of both member states and the European Union as a whole.

Thus, it is vital to identify these new threats and develop procedures and principles of action to effectively prevent and counteract them. Nowadays, the tasks of state border protection are much broader than merely protection of a physical border. In Poland, the strategy of activities undertaken in this area is multifaceted and includes protection of the territory against the illegal movement of persons and goods (such as prohibited substances and hazardous materials), protection of the EU customs territory, combating cross-border crime, including that involving foreigners, and the protection of airspace. The implementation of these tasks is entrusted to the Border Guard [*Straż Graniczna*], the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland [*Siły Zbrojne RP*], and the Tax and Customs Service [*Służba Celno-Skarbowa*]; these tasks are performed within the framework of the state border protection system in Poland.

The body performing all these tasks in Poland is the Border Guard, which primarily provides border traffic control, protects borders on land and sea, and prevents and counteracts illegal migration. As part of the border protection system, it also carries out other activities and actions through the implementation of assigned tasks (Ustawa o Straży Granicznej [*Border Guard Act*], 1990, Art. 1). The Border Guard plays a leading role in the prevention of illegal migration, while migration policy is implemented by the Office for Foreigners, which functions within the government administration and is responsible for, among other things, coordinating activities related to the admission of foreigners to the territory of Poland and taking decisions on granting them international protection or refusing to grant them legal refugee status (Ustawa o cudzoziemcach [*Act on foreigners*], 2013, Art. 21). With regard to the protection of the economic interests of Poland, as well as of the European Union, an important function is performed by the Tax and Customs Service, which is a department within the National Revenue Administration [*Krajowa Administracja Skarbowa*]. This department performs tasks linked to the implementation of customs policy, such as the import and export of goods, assigning them a customs destination, and identifying and investigating fiscal or other offences (Ustawa o Krajowej Administracji Skarbowej [*Act on National Fiscal Administration*], 2016, Art. 2). With regard to border protection in airspace, the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland play a key role here in conjunction with the Operational Commander of Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland

through the Air Operations Centre – Air Forces Component Command (Ustawa o ochronie granicy państwowej [*State Border Protection Act*], 1990, Art. 18b). The protection and defence of airspace is ensured by 24-hour combat duties, radar reconnaissance, monitoring the situation in the air, alerting and notifying of air threats, and much more.

T h e   E u r o p e a n   U n i o n   e x t e r n a l   b o r d e r   m a n a g e m e n t s y s t e m. Analyses of the system of state border protection within the EU should pay particular attention to the existence of internal and external state and EU borders. The internal borders are those shared by the member states within the Schengen area, i.e., the area within which border control has been abolished. The external borders of the EU are shared with countries that are not members of either the Community or the Schengen area. As there is an area without border control among the member states (except in special cases, such as increased risk of migratory pressure or specific events during which there is a heightened security risk, such as World Youth Days or a pandemic), it is extremely important that countries that border third countries (those outside the EU and the Schengen area) effectively ensure the protection of external borders to guarantee the security of all EU members by introducing common standards, rules, and procedures for the control and protection of external borders for all countries with this type of border. In order to implement these measures, a specialised body called the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) was created to assist in the protection of the external borders of the EU, within which the free movement of people and goods operates. Frontex staff can be divided into three main categories:

- those employed by the Agency on a permanent basis;
- officers of police forces responsible for border protection of individual EU member states, deployed for a long-term period (minimum 2 years);
- officers of the police forces responsible for border protection of individual EU member states, deployed for a short-term period (between 1 and 6 months).

The Agency provides assistance in areas of the external borders that need additional support, including special forces with the means to assist with border control. The operational activities of this formation also include search and rescue operations, security control, maritime security tasks, and environmental protection.

The common standards for control and protection at the external borders implemented by the European Union are enforced with the use of information technologies and information systems. The Schengen Information System (SIS) is an electronic database common to all member states that ensures the exchange of information between actors responsible for security. This system provides data on, e.g., persons wanted in connection with criminal activities, persons who are not allowed to enter the Schengen area, and missing persons. The Visa Information System (VIS) is responsible for executing tasks related to the common visa policy. This system ensures the exchange of visa data between member states and enables those authorised to enter and update this data. The VIS complements the Schengen Information System and helps to perform such tasks as the identification of persons who do not meet with the entry conditions for the territory of the Union. Another system that supports border protection and checks is EURODAC (European Automated Fingerprint Identification System), which is an IT system designed to compare fingerprints of asylum seekers. It facilitates the efficient identification of which state is responsible for processing a particular asylum application. The last system is EUROSUR (European Border Surveillance System), which links national border control systems to a European network managed by Frontex. This system ensures the exchange of information and continuous cooperation between member states and Frontex. Its task is to provide up-to-date information regarding the situation at external borders, thus enhancing the capacity to respond to situations appropriately. It is used to detect and combat illegal migration and cross-border crime by identifying, tracking, and intercepting persons who attempt to cross the border illegally.

In addition to the systems used by Frontex, states protect their borders with the use of other modern technologies, such as a perimeter security system, i.e., a system of seismic sensors and cameras that allow borders to be monitored around the clock. Moreover, unmanned aerial vehicles, which are used for reconnaissance and surveillance missions, are becoming increasingly common, as are anti-drone systems that can identify and neutralise foreign unmanned aerial vehicles. In the context of the use of modern technologies that assist in the protection of national borders, attention should also be drawn to the growing tendency to build walls and barriers, which are supposed to serve

as an effective physical barrier to contemporary threats, primarily to prevent illegal migration.

M i g r a t i o n. The word "migration" comes from the Latin word *migratio* and means 'change of abode' or 'move'. Migrations have accompanied mankind since the very beginning of existence and are a universal and common phenomenon that takes place in almost all societies. Mass migrations of peoples or individual or family relocations in search of better living conditions are a feature of every community and provide opportunities for its development. The Dictionary of the Polish Language defines migration as "wandering, a movement of population aimed to change its place of residence permanently or temporarily, either within the same country or from one country to another" (Szymczak, 1993, p. 169). Migration can be analysed from either a narrow or a broad perspective. Its simplest representation in the narrow sense relates to the area controlled by national and international governmental institutions which control the movement of people from one area to another. In this context, migration means the movement of people from one region to settle in another (Hollingshead, 1939, p. 131). A broad understanding of migration also covers such phenomena as flight, exile, isolation, or alienation. In this context, migration is understood not only from the perspective of spatial transfer but also psychological transfer and cultural transfer. The origins of migration can be sought in both internal and external factors. The former are linked to the individual's psychological motivation, while the latter concern the rules which govern the functioning of the social system of both the community migrants leave and the community they enter.

Numerous typologies of migration can be found in the literature based on such criteria as the direction of movement, its duration, its causes, the way migration is organised, its trajectory, and its legal status. Migration is most frequently divided into emigration (the outflow of people from one country to another, i.e., leaving one's native homeland) and immigration (the inflow of people into a country that is not their homeland).

Migration has taken place over many centuries in both the national and international arenas. It should be analysed together with the terms 'border' and 'security'. The latter is considered in two aspects: as a state and as a process. As a state it means the sense of security achieved by an individual, while as a process it is linked to dynamic changes that ensure this security.

In 2021, 5.3% of the total EU population were non-EU citizens, and 8.4% of the total population were not born in the EU. In the same year, less than 10% of all refugees worldwide lived in the EU. Their percentage in relation to the total population was 0.6%. At that time, 2.95 million first residence permits were issued in the Union (compared to 2.3 million in 2020, the difference being caused by travel restrictions introduced in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic). These asylum seekers came from around 140 countries. In addition, since the start of Russia's military aggression against Ukraine (i.e., since February 2022), the number of people fleeing war and seeking refuge in the EU is the highest recorded since World War II. Moreover, 199,900 people were found to have crossed the EU's borders using irregular means during the analysed period. This figure shows an increase of 58% compared to 2020. Over 112,000 of these migrants crossed the borders by sea and over 87,000 by land. In 2021, the greatest number of those who applied for asylum were from Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey, Bangladesh, and Venezuela (EC, 2021).

While analysing the issue of border protection, it is worth asking about the significance of migration for the security of the state that is the country of destination. In answering this question, it is worth remembering that one of the objectives of any security-conscious state is to ensure internal tranquillity, which is understood as the prevention and elimination of threats that may affect the constitutional order, internal order, and peaceful existence of the nation. This makes it possible to protect both the public interest and every citizen. Migrations become a threat and a challenge when they occur contrary to the laws binding in a state. Their general consequences (in legal and illegal forms) are threats to society, the economy, the environment, to culture, and to security.

Systematic reflection with conclusions and recommendations

National security is analysed in the context of a state's capacity to provide opportunities for development and adequate living standards for its citizens, which is manifested in the prevention and counteraction of threats. One of the measures taken by the state to guarantee the

highest values – including independence, freedom, the security of the citizens, and the protection of public health – is a well-functioning system of state border protection to respond to the constantly changing security environment and combat constantly emerging threats. The approaches to the concept of state border protection discussed in this article confirm that this is a complex and multifaceted process. Comprehensive state border protection is a multifaceted task that requires proper legal grounding and the cooperation of many actors, at both national and international levels.

It is important to pay attention to a particularly significant change in the perception of state borders. Today, they function in a different way and to a different extent than in the recent past, and although they currently still function as barriers, increasing inter-state integration that takes place in the contemporary world results in their opening. Consequently, border control is weakened and no longer acts as a barrier to the movement of people, goods, and capital. Thus, the contemporary perception of state borders refers to changes in the sense of citizenship, national identity, and the protection of sovereignty. A state border, while separating the territory of one state from another, also fulfils another function: it defines the extent of the state's power. The future existence of a nation-state is inextricably linked to the preservation of this power and to national identity. In the context of scientific discussion, it is worth considering whether this power and identity will be undermined if the state's function as a provider of state border protection disappears or diminishes. In times of globalisation, and thus the influence of foreign cultures on local communities, increasingly more people perceive their identity from within the dimension of a transnational community. Since the dawn of history, however, the capacity to ensure security has been paramount; in both state and international contexts, a sense of security gives citizens the chance to develop and live a decent life. Hence, state border protection has not lost its importance, and the only change that has occurred with the opening up of certain borders is the increased need to adapt standards and control procedures to successfully combat the current and constantly emerging threats.

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The police

Summary

DEFINITION OF THE TERM: The police is closely related to the institution of the state and supports its regulatory and repressive functions. It is usually a uniformed and armed formation based on a military model and its task is to protect the security of people and property and maintain public order.

HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE TERM: The perception of security and its functions have changed along with the political evolution of the state and its system. In the 18th century, when the foundations of the modern state administration were being formed, security issues were dealt with by the Ministry of the Interior. The foundations of modern policing were laid in the first half of the 19th century.

DISCUSSION OF THE TERM: Nowadays, the police generally deal with specialised areas of public security or with specific categories of threats. Thus, police services can be divided into, e.g., those dealing with organised crime, road safety, counter-terrorism, or cybercrime.

SYSTEMATIC REFLECTION WITH CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: Policing in Europe and worldwide performs two basic functions: preventive and repressive (fighting against both crime and public order offences). The internal organisational structure, entitlements, and status of the police are closely linked to the performance of particular functions. An important characteristic of modern police forces is the level of socialisation, i.e., the impact of society on the nature of policing.

Keywords: police, militia, public order and security, crime, prevention

Police who are ashamed of themselves are normal;
Police with a mission are a disease of societies…
Stefan Kisielewski

Definition of the term

Nowadays, police forces are a uniformed and armed formation tasked with ensuring the security of people and property and maintaining public order. The nature of a police force is determined by its entitlements, which, within the limits of the law, allow them to restrict citizens' rights and freedoms through the use of direct coercive measures, firearms, and operational activities. The police can be organised along military lines and have a specialised profile. Military police forces that perform tasks for civilian security services operate in France (under the name *Gendarmerie nationale*), in Italy (the *Arma dei Carabinieri*), and in Spain (the *Guardia Civil*). Specialised police forces deal with particular areas of public security or specific categories of threat, which is reflected in the names of their various branches, e.g., medical police, sanitary police, mining police, forest police, postal police, etc., which today are usually referred to with terms such as 'inspection' or 'guard'.

Historical analysis of the term

According to the Gospel of St. John, in the beginning was the Word, and later came violence, crime, and terror. In the Old Testament, there are many examples of violations of existing rules and laws, such as looting, murder, and misdeeds. Strict laws and institutions responsible for security were necessary because, as Celsus the Younger used to say, the law is the art of goodness and equity. According to Henry Louis Mencken, most people want security in this world, not liberty. The issue of security has always been an important element of individual human needs, internal relations within a state, and international relations between states. Historically, the origins of security can be traced to man's sense of imminent threat in an unfamiliar natural environment and to perceived dangers. In this original understanding, security had an individual character and

reflected the individual's mental state. The formation of social relationships, such as family, lineage, or tribe, contributed to the perception of security as a social phenomenon. Assuming that the state is an advanced form of social development, the issue of security is an integral part of the functions performed by the state. According to the traditional view of the role of the state, it performs two basic functions: internal and external. The former includes ensuring security and order throughout the state's jurisdiction. In the opinion of Leon Petrażycki, a well-known sociologist of law from the first half of the 20th century, the main function of the state is to satisfy its citizens' psychological needs, including their sense of security (Petrażycki, 2002). Perhaps this is too radical a view, but in the initial stages of the organisation of a state, in which institutions and legal regulations are formulated, the focus is mostly on security. In its traditional form, the state administration performed law enforcement and regulatory functions. The saying that "security is not everything, but without security everything is nothing" confirms that the essence and the imperative of the state – understood as a coercive organisation equipped with the attributes of supreme power – is to ensure order for the community, which consists of interdependent groups with diverse interests that inhabit its territory; the protection of this order covers both external and internal threats. The second essential task of the state is to provide this community with the conditions of existence that are beneficial to its economic position and political influence (Gulczyński, 2007).

The perception of security and its functions have changed with the political evolution of the state and its system. Ensuring security meant different things at various stages of the feudal state (from patrimonialism to absolute monarchy) and in the 19th century concept of the liberal rule of law. In the 18th century, when the foundations of modern state administration were taking shape, security issues were dealt with by the Ministry of the Interior. For a long time, the head of this ministry was the highest official in the central administration responsible for security in the state. Police science, i.e., the theory of police law and the police state, was developed based on the experience gained during a period of absolute monarchy. It emerged as an independent discipline in the 18th century and covered a wide range of issues of state administration, including the economic and financial spheres. Its development is primarily associated with German and French thought, and the greatest contributions

to the independence of police science were made by Johann Heinrich von Justi, the author of *Grundsätze der Polizeywissenschaft* [*Principles of police science*] (1756), Joseph von Sonnenfels, and Christian Wolff. They described the role of a monarch who ensures public safety for the benefit of his own interests and those of his subjects whilst creating the means and opportunities to satisfy the life needs and higher needs of the population, through which he performs the role of the welfare police. In the first half of the 19th century, traditional police science began to develop into a science of administrative law (or the science of administration), whose founders included Robert von Mohl and Lorenz von Stein, who is the author of the eight-volume work *Verwaltungslehre* [*Administrative sciences*]. Both were professors from German universities who were proponents of the theory of the rule of law. The birth of administrative law was closely linked to the implementation of the rule of law in practice, which meant that not only did citizens have to abide by the law in force but also that the administration was forced to act within the framework of a certain order and to follow its rules. The areas of administrative interference were limited by the state's laws, and – in instances where such interference was permitted (i.e., within regulatory administration) – it had to be grounded in law.

The term 'police' is derived from the Greek word *politeia* and the Latin word *politia*. In the modern world, the term first appeared around 1500 in France as the word *police*. In the 16th and 17th centuries, the term 'police' covered the entire internal administration, with the exception of the judiciary, military, and treasury (a police state). The word 'police' was then understood more broadly than it is today; today it covers areas related to the protection of public order and security and the fight against crime. At that time, policing was basically synonymous with state administration. It was not until the first half of the 19th century that views on security were subjected to scientific and critical reflection and linked to practice. In 1829, Sir Richard Mayne, the founder of the Metropolitan Police in London, wrote:

> The primary object of an efficient police is the prevention of crime: the next that of detection and punishment of offenders if crime is committed. To these ends all the efforts by police must be directed. The protection of life and property, the preservation of public tranquillity, and the absence of crime will alone prove whether those efforts have been successful (Misiuk et al., 2012, p. 124).

At around the same time, Robert Peel, the English Prime Minister and Home Secretary, formulated his nine points of policing (also known as the Peelian Principles):

1. The basic mission for which the police exist is to prevent crime and disorder.
2. The ability of the police to perform their duties is dependent upon public approval of police actions.
3. Police must secure the willing co-operation of the public in voluntary observance of the law to be able to secure and maintain the respect of the public.
4. The degree of co-operation of the public that can be secured diminishes proportionately to the necessity of the use of physical force.
5. Police seek and preserve public favour not by catering to public opinion but by constantly demonstrating absolute impartial service to the law.
6. Police use physical force to the extent necessary to secure observance of the law or to restore order only when the exercise of persuasion, advice and warning is found to be insufficient.
7. Police, at all times, should maintain a relationship with the public that gives reality to the historic tradition that the police are the public and the public are the police; the police being only members of the public who are paid to give full-time attention to duties which are incumbent on every citizen in the interests of community welfare and existence.
8. Police should always direct their action strictly towards their functions and never appear to usurp the powers of the judiciary.
9. The test of police efficiency is the absence of crime and disorder, not the visible evidence of police action in dealing with it (Misiuk et al., 2012, p. 126, as quoted in *The Principles of Policing*).

During the liberal period, as citizens became more independent of the state, the scope of the term 'police' narrowed and came to mean the prevention of all dangers arising from the coexistence of people and the restriction of citizens' freedom of action for the sake of the state. In a liberal state, police activity was preventive, i.e., negative. Previous extensive coercive measures applied by the welfare police (*Wohlfartpolizei*) in the area of upholding the interests of society receded into the

background. On top of this, within the framework of the emerging rule of law, police activities ceased to be free and instead required statutory authorisation.

In the 19th century, following the formation of the institutional concept of the police, its narrower material understanding – as an entity tasked with combating threats – was gradually developed. This narrowing was the result of the emerging liberal constitutional state governed by the rule of law, in which all state power was subordinated to the binding force of law. Laws regulated a variety of administrative competences, with the police left to combat threats, which limited the scope of their power in the state. This understanding of the scope of policing activity was reflected in the Prussian Police Administrative Law of 1 July 1931, which stated that

> the police authorities are obliged to conduct, within the scope established for them, the necessary measures within the framework of the laws in force to prevent both general and individual threats that violate public order or security (Misiuk, 2008, p. 122).

The understanding of the word 'police' also changed along with the prevailing views on the nature of the state and its attitude towards its citizens. In the second half of the 20th century, the activities of police institutions in totalitarian, fascist, and communist states took on a specific character. Their function was reduced to protecting the hegemonic position of the ruling political party. The role of the police increased substantially, and it became the main pillar of the political system.

The contemporary world is not devoid of perceived and real threats stemming from political and economic tensions, nationalism, and ethnic and religious antagonisms. The contradictory and diversity of interests generate dangers of many kinds: from armed conflicts and terrorist attacks to common and organised crime, hooligan excesses, cybercrime, and corruption. In addition to the dangers caused by human attitudes and behaviours, natural disasters are also of considerable importance for security. The globalisation process means that international threats are fast becoming a factor that destabilises national or local security. Thus, specialised state institutions should always be ready to prevent such threats and, when they do occur, to take preventive and repressive action. Law enforcement services have gone through a long evolution:

from entities with a very broad scope of operations to narrowly special-ised ones. Modern states have an elaborate public administration that largely performs the tasks of maintaining order, ensuring the security of its citizens, protecting the existing legal and constitutional order, and safeguarding against external threats.

Discussion of the term

Allowing for a certain methodological simplification, the protection of public order and security boils down to two basic organisational and legal solutions:
1. centralised,
2. decentralised.

However, this division is only a starting point for further considerations, as the contemporary reality of policing falls between these two poles. It is a reality that is subject to constant change and transformation, thus identifying the objective and subjective trends in the development of law enforcement systems in European countries is a challenge.

Factors that influence both the nature of and the changes in a state's policing model include:
1. The political system of a state and its legal framework (democratic or totalitarian);
2. Social control over policing;
3. The role played by local governments in the protection of public order;
4. The quantitative and qualitative indicators of crime;
5. Changes in the scope of policing resulting from technological and social developments;
6. Historical determinants (Misiuk, 1996).

The collapse of the communist system in Central and Eastern Europe led to numerous unpredicted social consequences. On the one hand, structural and organisational changes in law enforcement systems in the countries from this part of Europe were natural. On the other hand, common and economic crimes increased considerably. Freedom of movement, hopes for general prosperity (enjoyed by citizens of non-communist countries), and the introduction of free market principles

into economic life resulted in a surge in crime and the emergence of new forms and phenomena of social pathology. At the same time, this free movement of the criminal world had serious consequences for the police services in the countries of Western Europe and North America, which were not always able to cope with new forms of crime, especially organised crime. This gave rise to the need for structural changes in the law enforcement systems in these countries and for adaptation to new social conditions.

In the 20th century, a crisis of values and turbulent economic, social, and national changes led to the emergence of totalitarian states. First, in post-revolutionary Soviet Russia, then in fascist states such as Hitler's Germany and Mussolini's Italy, and, finally, after the Second World War, in the form of a bloc of communist states headed by the USSR. Totalitarian states had extremely centralised and bureaucratic police systems, which facilitated their ability to control public life and curb civil liberties. The fight against crime was considered in political terms.

At the same time, by the middle of the 20th century, with the progress of civilisation and the turbulent development of new threats and crimes, it became indispensable to create both specialised police services and, within individual divisions, centralised structures that would ensure the rapid flow of information, efficient organisation in the fight against crime, and professionalism.

From this perspective, the following classification of systems of public order and security are proposed:

1. Single-subject, which can be further divided into:
   a. a state system (which, depending on the specifics of the country, can be a more or less centralised system with a social factor and the precisely defined participation of local authorities);
   b. a local government system (now no longer in existence);
   c. a political system (extremely centralised, mainly in non-democratically governed countries).
2. Multi-subject:
   a. centralised – which assumes the existence of many types of police services that differ in origin (including those that come from local governments), subordination, the territorial scope of their operation, competences, and functionality;
   b. decentralised (Misiuk, 1996).

Economic development, technological and cultural progress as well as the social, political, and legal specificity of individual states mean that in practice these systems rarely appear in pure form. More often, there is simply a continuous evolution of police systems, which involves a process of centralisation or decentralisation of the protection of public order and security. Services that combat common and economic crimes are constantly improving their methods and organisation of work, which is increasingly taking the form of centralised structures. This tendency is much more clearly visible in the case of police formations that deal with serious crime, i.e., international organised crime, terrorism, or drug trafficking. In the preventive sphere, where more active participation in crime prevention is expected from the public, there is a progressive decentralisation of the activities of law enforcement services.

As mentioned above, in the majority of contemporary countries, the traditional form of local government policing has disappeared. Nowadays, social influence on policing practices is exercised in the form of control and various forms of non-formalised civic activity for the protection of public order. The implications of increased threats to the personal safety of citizens and the development of new forms of crime, e.g., organised, international, mafia, etc., cannot be overlooked either. These new phenomena place increased demands on police officers and require professionalisation of the organisation and methods of operation of the police as an institution. There is a slowly spreading awareness, even in less-developed countries, that there can now be no room for amateurism in any field of policing. In order for the police to operate effectively and efficiently, a number of organisational, substantive, and financial conditions must be met. When analysing the various police systems operating in different countries, it is necessary to take into account their social determinants, historical traditions, as well as political, legal, and constitutional solutions. Summing up, it is important to consider the developmental trends in public order and security systems in Western European and North American countries. For objective reasons (such as specialisation, the professionalisation of operations, and the increasing costs of fighting crime), local governments have withdrawn from direct participation in the protection of public order and security, while new forms of supervision and social control over state police services are being introduced.

The model of an extremely decentralised police force, with the dominant participation of local government in the protection of public order and security, no longer exists in the contemporary world, with Switzerland being the only exception. Due to the nature of its political and legal system – it is a federal state made up of 26 cantons, six of which are semi-cantons – a particular system of policing applies there. It lacks the centralised and uniform corps of state police. The size of the policing institutions and the rules of their operation are determined by the individual local cantonal authorities. Therefore, there are large differences in the organisation of police services between cantons. In total, Switzerland has 26 cantonal police corps and more than 100 municipal police bodies. In spite of this decentralisation, which has been taken to the extreme, Switzerland has developed rather efficient forms of communication and principles of regional cooperation between the various police units in the form of the Conference of Cantonal Police Commanders of Switzerland and the Swiss Association of Municipal Police Chiefs. These institutions make it possible to address serious problems in fighting crime. Based on the results of polls, it can be concluded that the Swiss have a high degree of confidence in their police. Leadership positions in police units are democratically elected and held for a fixed time period of four years (Polizei-Schweiz, 2017).

State monopolies can be reinforced, depending on the regime, by adherence to one of to two models: they can be centralised (such a model was common in communist countries governed in a totalitarian manner) or they can be decentralised (e.g., in the Federal Republic of Germany), but with limited impact or participation in the protection of public order by the general public. West Germany was a federal republic from its foundation in 1949, which had a decisive influence on the structure of German policing. In Germany, a distinction is made between the federal police forces and the forces of its individual states (Länder). In order to improve the system of public order and security, an intermediate level was created that performs a liaison function between federal offices and those operating within the borders of individual states. It is made up of the Polizei Führungsakademie in Munster-Hiltrup (transformed in 2006 into the German Police University, which is a main training centre for executives of the German police (Hiltrup, 2011)), and the Standing Conference of federal interior ministers (which is a working group of

representatives from the federal criminal offices and the Federal Criminal Police Office of Germany (BKA)).

The German federal police forces are divided into the following specialised corps:

1. Protection Police (*Schutzpolizei*);
2. Criminal Investigation Department (*Kriminalpolizei*);
3. Water Protection Police (*Wasserschutzpolizei*);
4. Readiness Police (also called Riot Police) (*Bereitschaftspolizei*);
5. Police Administration (*Polizeiverwaltung*).

The structure of these corps differs in each federal state and depends on various factors: traditions, historical conditions, financial possibilities, and social situation.

The rather sharp (for Germany) increase in common crime (especially in the eastern federal states, where the Russian mafia operates), the brutalisation of social life, and the closely related perception of personal threat felt by Germans have recently provoked criticism of the current system of German policing. German police officers deal with matters that are not directly related to public safety, such as investigating undeclared workers, parking offences, or accompanying bailiffs when seizing property. The police are increasingly compromised when it comes to fighting organised crime (e.g., from Eastern European) and the mafia. It appears that German police officers are not adequately prepared or trained. An increase in the number of unexplained robberies, rapes, and murders is causing public concern and a decline in the authority of the police. The model of the German policeman as friend and protector, which had been in place since Prussian times, meant that German society was not particularly active in the field of the protection of public order. However, there are now increasing proposals in the press and in the statements of politicians that call for real public participation in the protection of public order, e.g., in the form of civic self-defence. The opinions of government representatives, including the Saxon Minister of the Interior Heinz Eggert, are evidence that the government – despite signs of discontent – is still in favour of retaining the state's monopoly on the use of coercion to ensure internal security. Only some members of national authorities have accepted the need to create communal security forums where citizens and representatives of institutions which deal with the protection of order can debate the search for appropriate solutions and measures in the fight against common crime.

A system of policing in which all police forces were run by local government was widespread in Scandinavian countries until the middle of the 20th century. Today, however, these countries have a state monopoly in policing matters. Unlike Germany, their police forces are centralised and subject to a high degree of control by municipal authorities and general public. This is the result of a process of policing that has evolved over many years in Scandinavia, which moved from a model of dominant municipal services, through a period of coexistence between local government and state police, to the full nationalisation of the system of policing. Despite this, some forms of social control over the activities of state policing services have been preserved.

There is no shortage of similar experiences in Great Britain, which is regarded as the birthplace of modern policing. Many years of practice have led to the development of mechanisms that effectively ensure that citizens influence how policing bodies operate. Despite the existence of one single state police formation, a decentralised model of police organisation has emerged in the UK. The Home Secretary, who is formally responsible for the protection of order and internal security in the UK, does not have the power to direct the activities of the police. It should be added that the 1964 Act began a process of slow centralisation of management of police affairs by granting the Home Secretary the power to oversee policing at the local level and to remove unsuitable individuals from the position of chief constable. However, in the organisational system of the English police there is still no equivalent of a national police headquarters. On behalf of the Home Secretary, the police are overseen by a seven-member team of His Majesty's inspectors. In addition, at the central level, the Home Secretary liaises with a special advisory body on policing – the Police Advisory Board.

In England and Wales, the Constabulary, which is headed by a chief constable, is the highest organisational unit of the police. It covers an area of between 1 and 3 counties (the largest is the Metropolitan Police). Additionally, each county has a local police authority, which is a collegiate body that is part of the local government structure. Its members are elected (2/3 are representatives of local authorities, and 1/3 are magistrates). The powers of this council include deciding on the county's police budget, staffing structure, directions of action, and putting forward candidates for the post of chief constable. There are

parallel community advisory committees, made up of representatives from various social and professional backgrounds, which are also very active. These fulfil the complementary function of identifying community needs for the protection of public order. Significantly, the impact of local authorities on the police can be measured by the fact that the funds they provide amount to as much as 49% of the police budget.

The activity of the UK police has been controversial for years. Some believe that it is still the best organised body for defending law and order in the world. Others argue that UK policing needs to be reformed because of its lack of efficiency and perceived identity crisis. Conservative governments, which have privatised almost all areas of the economy and social life, sought to reform police structures. In 1994, Home Secretary Michael Howard presented a Criminal Justice and Public Order Bill which proposed, among other things, reducing police ranks from nine levels to six, a new remuneration system, and fixed employment terms of up to 10 years, subject to renewal every five years. This last proposal was truly revolutionary. The brutality of life and the sharp rise in crime on the British Isles has resulted in the increased use of direct coercive measures by law enforcement officers (Cohen, 1994). In the late 1990s, London police officers used firearms 200–250 times in a year. The British public, therefore, although still cherishing the traditional image of the unarmed police officer – the friendly and gentle 'Bobby' – is increasingly willing to accept that the police themselves now require increased protection. It seems that the gradual 'Americanisation' of the British police is an inevitable phenomenon. In 1994, the commissioner of the Metropolitan Police in London, Paul Condon, decided to equip some officers with firearms.

The multi-subject model of the protection of internal order is widespread in many Southern and South-Western European countries. This involves the involvement of multiple departments of the government administration alongside substantial institutional participation of local governments (in municipal police services) in policing matters. Another feature of this system is that some police formations in these countries are formally and practically militarised (e.g., the gendarmerie). France is a good example here: in this country, police functions are performed by the following institutions:
1. the National Police, subordinated to the Minister of the Interior and operating in towns with more than 10,000 inhabitants;

2. the Gendarmerie, subordinated to the Minister of Defence and operating in municipalities with up to 10,000 inhabitants;
3. the Municipal Police, subordinated to the municipal authorities (mayors) and operating in towns with up to 10,000 inhabitants (7,000 units), with its functions gradually being taken over by the Gendarmerie;
4. the National Traffic Information Centre (Carrot, 1992).

In terms of the number of police officers, France ranks among the top in Europe (271 inhabitants per 1 police officer, Belgium – 303, Germany – 332, the Netherlands – 385, Sweden – 400, the United Kingdom – 454; data from 1991). The number of officers in France increased from 95,000 in 1975 to 140,000 in 1994 (excluding gendarmerie and the municipal police). At the same time, the number of crimes (above all, those involving firearms) increased by 25 per cent between 1989 and 1993. At that time, the crime rate in France was 6,900 per 100,000 inhabitants. This state of affairs was blamed on the Socialists, who held executive power in the 1980s and placed emphasis on preventive functions in French police activity. On the continent, France became the infamous forerunner in the emergence of 'lawless zones' in the suburbs of large cities, where the police do not go at all.

The French police are known to be one of the most centralised forces in Europe. Reform attempts are currently being made to decentralise some of its functions. This includes matters related to the organisation and operation of anti-gang units, and there are plans to create special units to coordinate police work in those departments with the highest crime rates.

Similar organisational and systemic solutions are in place in Belgium, Portugal, Spain, and Italy. All these countries have common roots that date back to the Napoleonic period. Following reforms prompted by the identity crisis of the Belgian police service after the Marc Dutroux paedophile affair, the municipal police were merged with the gendarmerie, and the new institution was split into two levels: the federal police (which operated at the national level) and the local police (divided into 185 zones). The police system in Italy is very elaborate. It is formed by the following services:

1. State Police;
2. Carabinieri;

3. Financial Guard;
4. Prison Guards;
5. Municipality Police;
6. Provincial Police.

The division adopted in Italy is functional and subjective. The heads of the ministries of the interior, defence, finance, justice, even agriculture and forestry are to some extent responsible for the public order and security of the state. The most extensive competences are granted to the carabinieri, who perform preventive and administrative functions, fight against organised crime, and act as the military police. The municipal police exists only in large urban municipalities that can afford to maintain a police force, where it mostly performs law enforcement functions. Its activities are centrally coordinated by the Minister of the Interior and by the State Police Quaestor. In Italy, due to the diversity of police services, a coordination body in the form of a provincial committee for public security has been set up at the provincial level.

Spain and Portugal have a similar model for the protection of public order and security. In the former, there are the National Police, the Civil Guard, and the Municipal Police and, due to the specificity of the administrative division of the state, autonomous police corps. In the latter, there are the Public Security Police, the National Guard, the Criminal Police, and the Treasury Guard. Formations run by local governments do not exist here.

The Dutch police deserve a special mention. In 1945, in addition to the reactivation of the Royal Military Police, established in 1814 and derived from the French Gendarmerie, two types of police forces were created in the Netherlands: the State Police and the Municipal Police. According to the 1957 law, the municipal police – a decentralised formation operating in municipalities with a population of more than 25,000 – performed both preventive and repressive activities and was subordinated to the Ministers of the Interior and Justice. The state police operated only in those municipalities that did not have a municipal police force, was fully subordinated to the Minister of Justice, and performed the tasks of local authorities in terms of law enforcement. Under these conditions, it fulfilled a complementary role in the Dutch system of public order protection. In 1994, a major reorganisation of the Dutch police was completed: the municipal and state police were

merged into one integrated institutional body. The reformed police force was divided into 25 regional corps, which were further subdivided into districts. The regional corps are managed by the mayor of the largest municipal district and the public prosecutor. Practical management rests in the hands of the regional commandant. The police are subordinated to the Ministers of Interior and Justice and are maintained from the state budget. It is important to pay attention to the high independence of the regional police corps. Thus, the unified police formation retains many of the characteristics of decentralised systems. It can be concluded that, despite many systemic, political, and legal differences, the Dutch police force is evolving towards the solutions applied by its closest neighbour, Germany. Article 2 of the Police Law states that the Dutch police are subject to 'competent authorities'. Depending on the nature of the task, decisions rest with the mayor of the municipality concerned, the public prosecutor, or the Queen's Commissioner. Thus, a plurality of authority takes place, which ensures that many actors, including the local government, have a say in matters connected with the protection of public order.

The Polish police was confronted with similar problems when it was established in 1990. The late 1980s and early 1990s saw profound and thoroughly revolutionary economic and political changes in Poland, and subsequently also in other Central and Eastern European countries. At the same time as free market and private enterprise principles were being introduced, full democratisation of the political and legal systems was also taking place. There were numerous reforms that covered public order and security bodies. Characteristic features of law enforcement institutions in communist states were their lack of the capacity to fulfil their functions and the politicisation of their activities. However, it must be observed that in Poland, compared to other Eastern European countries, the socio-political situation was extremely liberal. As a result, the Civic Militia, in spite of its many limitations, tried to focus its efforts on the fight against crime, and the effects of this fight were measurable and substantial, which was one of the reasons why the transformation of law enforcement services initiated in 1989 followed an evolutionary path (Misiuk, 2013).

In the new situation, Polish society expected a caring and humanitarian police force, which is why the Police Act of 1990 emphasised the

duty of police officers to respect the dignity of citizens and to respect and protect human rights. In view of the infamous experiences of the past, the authors of the Act drastically limited the powers of the police. The functions of the police as a 'public utility' and a 'trustworthy custodian' were particularly emphasised, as was the need to firmly 'embed' the police within the community at the lowest level, i.e., the residential area. Consequently, it was decided to establish local police forces. It is a reasonable assumption that the long-standing brutality in interactions between the police and citizens stemmed not only the social alienation of the police in society, but also from their feelings of helplessness in the face of widespread threats. However, the 'brutal reality', i.e., a sharp increase in common crime, revised the idealistic plans to create a pro-social police force. It was not until the late 1990s, as part of the reform of the local administration, that the police were integrated into a system of combined administration and closely linked to local government. The establishment of an investigation service (Central Investigation Bureau) was an important stage in the creation of a modern and effective police force that was equipped with the adequate legal and organisational tools to effectively fight organised crime. The establishment of other specialised autonomous services within the police force in subsequent years, e.g., those that combat terrorism and cybercrime, testifies to a systemic response to new threats in the social and international space.

Systematic reflection with conclusions and recommendations

Leaving aside political and systemic determinants, contemporary policing in Europe and around the world performs two basic functions: preventive (deterring crime) and repressive (fighting crime and violations of public order). The internal organisation, powers, and status of the police are closely linked to the implementation of their specific functions, which has led to some states implementing separate police services dedicated to preventive tasks, such as the Garda Sioch na in Ireland (McNiffe, 1997), and criminal police forces. An important characteristic of modern police forces is the level of their socialisation, i.e., the impact of their activities on the general public (especially on local communities).

This is realised through citizens' participation in the management of police units, such as in the UK and the US (Terrill, 2015), or with the help of local governments. Recently, due to frequent criticism of police operations, the view that police officers should focus on one primary duty – law enforcement – is gaining popularity. Another challenge is the need to specialise police services to adequately respond to new threats. This is why autonomous or organisationally separate entities have been created to deal with organised crime or cybercrime.

When assessing over thirty years of Polish policing, its sixteen chiefs and dozens of amendments to the Police Act, it is valid to question the direction in which it is heading. Analyses of the statements of the highest representatives of the police force justify the conclusion that so far they have been constantly reforming without reflection on the achievements of their predecessors. Their decisions have not been guided by reflection or by distancing themselves from the situation. Basic principles of modern management recommend learning from predecessors' mistakes and continuing to develop the given institution. It is puzzling that many detailed issues, such as the role of the district policeman, simplified criminal procedures, or more fundamental ones, such as relations with local government, the police financing system, and the civilianisation of logistics, have been repeated like a mantra since 1990 but have not been resolved to this day. Why is this the case? Gabriel Laub's aphorism seems to provide a good answer to this question: "We pay so dearly for new experiences because we do not make use of the old ones".

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Civil protection

Summary

DEFINITION OF THE TERM: Civil protection encompasses all the measures undertaken by public administration bodies, non-governmental organisations, economic actors, and other institutions to secure the life, health, and property of society, the natural environment, and all related conditions necessary for man's survival in the face of threats – both natural and those resulting from human activity, including armed conflicts and acts prohibited by law. Civil protection measures include those that are preventative (before the occurrence of a threat) and those that are responsive (after the occurrence of a threat).

HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE TERM: The obligation of civil protection is an elementary task of the state. Initially, this task related almost exclusively to military threats; however, with the development of civilisation, civil protection started to be considered more broadly and expanded its remit to include other areas according to the circumstances a state might encounter.

DISCUSSION OF THE TERM: The issue of civil protection is very complex. There is no consensus among researchers on how to explain the term, which stems from the existence of different scientific assumptions and experiences gained while working in different security institutions.

SYSTEMATIC REFLECTION WITH CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: The contemporary security field confirms the validity of adopting a holistic approach to civil protection as being necessary to ensure the security of the population in times of peace, in crisis, during war, and in the event of occupation. Civil protection during armed conflicts is a major challenge, thus a holistic terminological approach is imperative.

Keywords: civil protection, security, protection, society, threats

Definition of the term

Explaining the term 'civil protection' from an etymological perspective first requires defining its constituent components (the words 'civil' and 'protection'); also, as 'threat' and 'risk' directly affect civil protection, these terms should also be defined. Threats are a continual and natural part of human existence. They have accompanied man's life for centuries, and their number is increasing proportionally with the pace of techno-logical development. The term 'threat' can be defined as all phenomena that stem from random events or intentional activities and always exert a negative impact on the subject and lead to losses (biological, mate-rial, or spiritual). Depending on the type of threat, they can negatively affect the macro or micro spheres. The concept of 'risk' is closely related to 'threat': risk is defined as the likelihood that a given phenomenon, i.e., a threat in this context, will occur. Protection means safeguarding something against negative activity. The word 'civil' denotes the total population in a given area. Civil protection can therefore be most simply explained as the safeguarding of people against various forms of threats.

However, this definition does not exhaust all possible aspects and shades of meaning of the term 'civil protection' and should be extended to take into account obligations of the state towards its citizens that are related to its efforts to guarantee their security in times of peace, crisis, war, and occupation, thus protecting the area inhabited by its population. Indeed, society has the right to state protection, which is guaranteed by the most important legal acts of democratic states and is ratified by international laws. The state is further obliged to strive to prevent the negative effects of environmental degradation, which has a significant impact on the health of the population because it is directly linked to ensuring the conditions necessary for biological survival.

In order to achieve effective protection, the full potential of the state should be employed. Thus, the notion of civil protection encompasses all the measures undertaken by public administration bodies, non-governmental organisations, economic actors, and other institutions to secure the life, health, and property of society, the natural environment, and all related conditions necessary for man's survival in the face of threats – both natural and those resulting from human activity, including armed conflicts and acts prohibited by law. Civil protection measures

include those that are preventative (before the occurrence of a threat) and those that are responsive (after the occurrence of a threat).

Historical analysis of the term

Security has been a basic human need for centuries (Maslow, 1954, p. 39). It enables sustainable and undisturbed development accompanied by the sense of there being no risk of losing something highly valued (life, health, family, love, material possessions, etc.). Over the centuries, the state became the prime provider of security to its society and is formally responsible for organising civil protection (Zwęgliński, Gromek, Gikiewicz & Prędecka, 2015, p. 146). There are various theories that explain the origins of the formation of the state, but none of them explains the formation of the state's organisation in a neutral and decisive manner. Nevertheless, it must be emphatically acknowledged that a primary factor in the formation of any state is the need for security and civil protection because individuals are unable to guarantee this sense of security for themselves.

Conflict has been present in human life as a natural part of the human psyche since the dawn of time. The large-scale activities that have accompanied conflict in the name of certain ideas have led to many wars in which people have died. In view of this, the civil protection offered by the state was originally linked mainly to military threats, but the methods of military operations changed with the passing of the years and technological advancement. Until the outbreak of the First World War, those who took part in armed conflicts were almost exclusively soldiers, as was reflected in the 10:1 ratio of soldiers to civilians killed. Conclusions drawn from historical analyses of armed conflicts led to a correlation becoming visible between the duration of wars and the mood of the civilian population, which is why armed conflicts after the First World War increasingly targeted the civilian population in order to hasten the opponent's surrender. Arguably, this strategy was initiated by the German bombing raids on London and Paris using 'Zeppelin' airships in 1915 (Trocha, 2020, p. 120), which was a turning point that demonstrated to the states involved in the war that a deliberate attack targeting civilians could happen at any stage of military operations.

The First World War was a period in which the first civil protection systems took shape. Germany, France, and the United Kingdom are considered forerunners in this area. However, the measures implemented at the time were primarily based around air defence, which had become of crucial importance due to the threat of aerial bombings. In Poland, the beginnings of the formation of civil protection date back to the early 1920s, but the intensification of activities in this area took place in 1928, when the Air and Chemical Defence League [*Liga Obrony Powietrznej i Przeciwgazowej*] was established as a result of the merging of the State Air Defence League [*Liga Obrony Powietrznej Państwa*] and the Gas Defence Society [*Towarzystwo Obrony Przeciwgazowej*]. One of the tasks of this organisation was to prepare the population for gas defence and to conduct research into chemical defence measures (Berbecki, 1938, p. 28). The League, due to the profile of its activities and despite being an association, was closely linked to the organs of the state. It organised gas defence exercises for employees of state institutions, schools, and industrial plants; it also performed an observation and reporting service for the state, consisting in the early detection of foreign aircraft that violated the country's airspace. In 1933, the organisation conducted a total of 6,500 informative and elementary courses for over 180,000 citizens, and about 80,000 young people attended the lectures it held. The League was an organisation whose task was to prepare the civilian population to protect society during armed conflict. It is widely acknowledged that thanks to the activities of the League during the campaign in September 1939, the Poles had an effective air raid warning system, which reduced the number of casualties in the 1939 defensive war.

After the Second World War, the risk of another global conflict was high. However, the League was disbanded and replaced by a new organisation called the Terrain Anti-Aircraft Defence [*Terenowa Obrona Przeciwlotnicza*], which was fundamentally different from the pre-war League. It had militarised medical and sanitary units and military units, and the range of its tasks was extended to include civil protection against the effects of weapons of mass destruction, which led to the need to build shelters and adapt public facilities to serve as shelters.

Given the toll exacted by both world wars, measures were taken internationally after WW2 to ensure civil protection during armed conflicts. At

a 1949 meeting in Geneva of 149 representatives of different countries of the world, a convention was drafted which defined the conditions for the creation of neutralised zones in times of war, taking into account the protection of civilians as well as issues of sanitary areas and security (Suwart, 1986, p. 47).

In 1964 in Poland, the Terrain Anti-Aircraft Defence [*Terenowa Obrona Przeciwlotnicza*] was incorporated into the structure of the State Territorial Defence [*Obrona Terytorialna Kraju*] under the new name of General Civil Self-Defence [*Powszechna Samoobrona*]. After the previous forms and standards of the functioning of civil protection were tested during a nationwide military exercise called "Kraj-73" [*"Country-73"*], a decision was made to thoroughly change the system. On 18 May 1973, the Council of Ministers decided to establish Civil Defence [*Obrona Cywilna*] in place of General Self-Defence as a response to the need to concentrate all protective measures against armed action, including the effects of nuclear weapons, into one unified system based on the state's resources. The newly created Civil Defence had an unusually wide range of protections, which covered the population as well as workplaces, livestock, food, and water. Moreover, its activities were not limited to armed conflicts but were extended to include disaster prevention and mitigation. During the Cold War, the Civil Defence became a multifunctional system which, combined with the armed forces, comprised the key elements of Poland's defence structure.

In 1977, Protocols additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 were drawn up in Geneva. Protocol I dealt with the protection of victims of international armed conflicts, while Protocol II dealt with the protection of victims of local armed conflicts. Although representatives of Poland participated in the creation of these documents, they were adopted in Poland as late as in 1991, after its political transformation. By ratifying these documents, Poland undertook to carry out humanitarian tasks during threats caused by armed action or natural disasters. A number of internal legal acts that regulated the scope of obligations of the Civil Defence were also issued.

Currently, civil protection in Poland is the legal, institutional, and organisational responsibility of crisis management, the National Rescue and Firefighting System [*Krajowy System Ratowniczo-Gaśniczy*], the Rescue Notification System [*System Powiadamiania Ratunkowego*], and the

State Medical Rescue Service [*Państwowe Ratownictwo Medyczne*]. As a result of repealing many key legal acts, the Civil Defence is essentially defunct, even though it is demanded by international laws which Poland has agreed to implement. The need for civil protection applies as much in times of peace and crisis as in times of war and occupation, as threats of a mass nature do not only occur during armed conflicts.

Discussion of the term

Despite the passage of years, researchers from the security sciences have failed to agree on how to explain the term 'civil protection'. This lack of consensus is primarily caused by different assumptions and different experiences gained while working in different security institutions. To date, it has proved impossible to develop a legally binding definition of this term at either the national or international level. It is worth mentioning that several attempts to clarify it in legal terms have already been made in civil protection bills which aimed to resolve the current dispute over competences between the systems established to fulfil the state's obligation to protect its citizens. However, so far no bill has successfully gone through the full legislative path in the Polish Parliament.

The issue of civil protection is very complex. As has already been shown, the state is obliged to ensure the security of its citizens and thus to protect the population against all kinds of threats. This obligation is reflected in the appropriate protection systems, which consist of actors that undertake specific security tasks according to their competences and specialisation; these actors are in various relationships and dependencies with each other. One of the problems with precisely defining the term 'civil protection' is the target group to which it applies. Researchers disagree on whether it should refer exclusively to ensuring the security of civilians. 'Civil' is a very broad concept; thus, soldiers, whose status during wartime is quite different from that of civilians, should not be excluded from it. After all, soldiers, unlike civilians, are the direct target of attacks during armed conflict. However, the English term 'civil protection' seems to dispel any doubts about the protected group as the word 'civil' refers to persons who have no connection with the military, which seems to settle the dispute.

Another obstacle to researchers arriving at a single agreed definition of civil protection is linked with differences in their professional experience. Representatives of different services, including guards, the fire service, inspectorates, and the army, perceive civil protection differently. In the understanding of the State Fire Service, it is manifested primarily in rescue activities in the medical, water, search, chemical, high-altitude and technical dimensions, as well as in firefighting activities. For representatives of the Police, it is related to ensuring public order and compliance with the law. From the perspective of the Prison Service, civil protection is realised by separating dangerous persons who break the law from society and striving for effective rehabilitation of prisoners who can be reintegrated into society after serving their sentences. Other actors, such as the Border Guard [*Straż Graniczna*], the General Inspectorate of Road Transport [*Główny Inspektorat Transportu Drogowego*], and the Armed Forces, also undertake various civil protection activities. The professional experience of security science researchers influences their definition of civil protection. In order to unify this definition, it should be looked at holistically: the tasks of all services, guards, inspectorates, the armed forces, non-governmental organisations and companies which can also be engaged to support civil protection measures should be taken into account.

Another area which contributes to problems with arriving at a single definition of the term is linked with the scope of measures within the remit of civil protection. In the 20th century, the division of tasks within this provision between those carried out in peacetime and those in wartime was well established. However, this approach, built on diverse experiences and needs, does not seem to meet the contemporary criterion of a holistic solution to the problem of civil protection. Threats to the public that require rescue operations occur in both peacetime and wartime, and – although they might differ in scale – they require the same measures to be taken. At present, it seems reasonable to move away from the division of tasks into wartime and peacetime tasks. The state's activities directed at civil protection should aim to fulfil both protective and humanitarian tasks during both war and peace. Indeed, the civilian population has a right to security regardless of the circumstances that the state might find itself in. It is also worth mentioning that the consequences of natural or technical disasters or terrorist attacks can have far more

serious consequences than armed conflict. The 1986 Chernobyl nuclear power plant disaster is a case in point. This disaster proved that it is not necessary to use nuclear weapons as a militarily force in order for strong radioactive contamination to occur, killing many more over the following decades than at the time of the explosion. Given the growing interest in nuclear power in European countries and the plans to build a power plant in Poland, the risk of danger still exists, whether through human error, terrorist attack, or sabotage. In the face of contemporary asymmetric and hybrid threats, moreover, the division of tasks into peacetime and wartime seems archaic, so the basic idea should be civil protection regardless of the source and circumstances of the threat.

Systematic reflection with conclusions and recommendations

Counteracting the threats of modern times in both the structural and personal dimensions of security depends on the effectiveness of the operations of security actors. These actors are responsible for civil protection in various areas of the state's activities in which the fundamental goals are security, public order, the protection of the life, health, and property of the population, as well as the creation of conditions that enable the economic development of the state (Kośmider, 2021).

Analyses of civil protection reveal great changes that have taken place in this area worldwide. Efforts made at both the national and international levels to increase the security of the population were particularly intensive in the 20th century. It is worth focusing here on the international law of civil protection. This law is closely related to humanitarian law and regulations which address the safety of people during disasters and natural catastrophes. The international regulations of the humanitarian law of armed conflict can be divided into the following areas: laws for the prevention of war, laws for restricting armed conflict, laws for the protection of war casualties and cultural property, and laws for violations of humanitarian law (Kitler, Czuryk & Karpiuk, 2013).

From a purely theoretical perspective, the voluntary ratification of international law by a state imposes on it an obligation to act in accordance with its provisions and thus to adapt its domestic laws to the

requirements contained therein. However, past experiences show that there is a very high probability of non-compliance with the provisions of international law for the protection of civilian persons in time of war, despite its ratification. An armed conflict is a highly specific situation in which the pursuit of victory, often at any cost, leads to non-compliance with the rights of civilians, who do not participate in the fighting. Moreover, some soldiers who occupy the territory of a foreign state can act in an insubordinate manner and – taking advantage of their superiority – commit unlawful acts on civilians, such as robberies and worse.

At this point it is legitimate to ask whether International Humanitarian Law is a sufficient guarantee of the safety of civilians during military operations. It is prohibited to attack either civilians or the infrastructure they use, such as hospitals, residential buildings, or schools. Nevertheless, given the contemporary determinants of urban development, in which the vast majority of objects are civilian objects, it is practically impossible to conduct military operations without losses to civilians or the civilian infrastructure. For this reason, another question arises: is it possible to do more in the international arena to protect civilians from the effects of war? Effective diplomacy focused on arbitration, i.e., the peaceful settlement of disputes, seems to be the only option, although even this does not guarantee the total prevention of armed conflicts.

In conclusion, it should be emphasised that the idea of a holistic approach to civil protection has not become obsolete. The contemporary security environment confirms the validity of a holistic approach to civil protection. A comprehensive understanding of the legal and practical aspects related to civil protection leads to the conclusion that there is a lack of consensus among security science researchers regarding terminology. However, on the basis of in-depth analysis, it seems reasonable to define the term 'civil protection' by pointing to all protective measures against possible threats to the civilian population in times of peace, crisis, war, and occupation. Problems that arise from the difficulty in ensuring the security of the population are further complicated by the unbridled development of civilisation, which gives rise to an ever-increasing number of security threats. The number of dilemmas concerning civil protection will continue to grow, so it is essential that the search for responses to the ever-newer challenges of the contemporary world is continued.

To meet the need to systematise security knowledge, a holistic approach related to the explanation of the term 'civil protection' should be pursued. It is important to understand how wide the range of activities within contemporary efforts in this area is. This is confirmed by many years of analyses, reflections, studies, and research, as well as current and planned changes in the international security environment. An example of such an approach is civil protection in Sweden, where all sectors of the operations of the state, regional and local governments, and society are employed to ensure the safety of civilians (Bakken & Rhinard, 2013). Additionally, the high degree of decentralisation offered by the Swedish administrative model enables the involvement in these activities of numerous security actors, including organisations from different branches of the country's economy. In line with the principles of responsibility, parity, and proximity, this is significant in the operational dimension. For Sweden, the effects of the Second World War were the main stimulus for nationwide constitutional and political debates related to the protection of civilians and the operation of the government under extreme conditions. This country did not join the armed conflict, but the experience gained from an observer's position was a valuable source of information. Other significant events of the 20th century, including the aggressive policies of the Soviet Union, the Chernobyl nuclear power plant disaster, and the end of the Cold War also influenced the shape of the current Swedish system that is responsible for protecting society from threats (Trocha, 2017). It is widely acknowledged that the Swedish model of civil protection is highly effective and serves as a model for solutions implemented in this area in many countries.

History and the lessons learned from past threats affect the formulation of internal and external security policies, as confirmed by the Scandinavian countries. Both Norway and Sweden declared neutrality during the Second World War, but they drew different conclusions from it. Norway, due to having its neutral status violated by the Third Reich and being under German occupation for five years, subsequently rejected the ineffective policy of neutrality. The effect of this change in Norway's security doctrine was to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Sweden, on the other hand, remained a neutral country after the war, although certain assumptions of this neutrality were modified following changes in the international arena. The beginnings of Swedish neutrality are linked

with this country's unsuccessful attempts to become a European military power in the period between the 16th and 18th centuries; consequently, from 1815 onwards, it chose to adopt the status of a non-belligerent state. It is only recently, as a result of the Russian Federation's ongoing military aggression against Ukraine since February 2022, that Sweden's attempts to abandon its policy of neutrality and join the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation have become visible. Throughout the duration of its neutrality policy, Sweden has developed and refined its system of civil protection against various threats, not just those of a military nature. Given these circumstances, following the terrorist attack carried out by Anders Breivik in 2011, Norway tightened its cooperation with Sweden and introduced similar solutions. It was recognised that the form of civil protection in this country before the second decade of the 21st century was not effective in the face of all possible mass threats to the civilian population, as evidenced by the aforementioned attack. After the end of the Second World War, Norway's main focus was on providing military security for its society. Therefore, after the tragedy of the terrorist attack, the authorities drew the right conclusions and took advantage of the country's cooperation with Sweden within the Nordic Council.

In the coming years in Poland, the legal standards of civil protection will be a major objective challenge for experts. The experience of the Scandinavian countries, from which it is worth drawing, may be helpful. Thus, the author of this article hopes that it will be critically appraised and that the terminological proposal presented herein will allow a broad perspective on the issue of civil protection that will enrich the discussion in an area that is vital for the proper functioning of man, namely security.

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Safety and security of public spaces

Summary

DEFINITION OF THE TERM: Safety and security in public space is the capacity to create optimal conditions to meet the needs and developmental opportunities of residents through the appropriate design, creation, maintenance, and transformation of urban space.

HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE TERM: The notion of safety and security in public space was first discussed in the 1970s by American researchers. In response to the threats posed by the process of transforming residential areas, a new branch of science emerged – environmental psychology – which combined knowledge from many disciplines related to urban planning with various psychological sub-disciplines.

DISCUSSION OF THE TERM: Designing a safe public space involves the use of specific physical features and the proper organisation of space to reduce crime. It also entails enhancing residents' sense of safety and strengthening their sense of community, engagement, and responsibility. The design of safe public spaces has environmental, technological, psychological, and social dimensions.

SYSTEMATIC REFLECTION WITH CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: In any reflection on safety and security in public space, the most common dilemma to address is how much freedom and how much security is the right balance? Initiatives undertaken by authorities to increase security are generally met with public support. However, the fact that ubiquitous information systems can be used to restrict civil rights and freedoms and for the surveillance of political opponents is a cause for concern.

Keywords: threats, defensive space, Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED), situational crime prevention, freedom

Definition of the term

Within academia, safe public space is of interest to many scientific disciplines: architecture, urban planning, psychology, sociology, legal sciences, and security studies. It is closely related to the concept of public space, which is defined as a publicly accessible

> area of particular importance in meeting residents' needs, improving their quality of life, and facilitating social contact due to specific locational, functional, and spatial characteristics (*Ustawa o planowaniu i zagospodarowaniu przestrzennym* [Spatial Planning and Development Act], Art. 2, para. 6).

Attractive public spaces play a significant role in building a modern society based on creativity and knowledge. Given the importance of public spaces in the life of cities and the development of the societies that inhabit them, it is vital to ensure an adequate level of order, harmony, and safety (Rogowska, 2016, p. 163). Safety and security in public space is understood as the capacity to create optimal conditions to ensure residents' needs and developmental opportunities are met through the appropriate design, creation, maintenance, and transformation of urban space. Thus, safety and security in public space consists in the elimination of potential threats and the reduction of conditions that are conducive to crime, which involves, primarily, the creation of a safe social space, i.e., one that facilitates the establishment of positive relations between people and the formation of social bonds (Kowalczyk, 2020, p. 8).

Historical analysis of the term

The relationship between space and safety was identified by researchers from the Chicago School, who are known for their attempts to include ecological orientation into social studies at the beginning of the 20th century (Kowalczyk, 2020, p. 8). The process of social degradation that affected American cities in the 1960s and 1970s was described by Jane Jacobs in her 1961 book entitled *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*. She wrote about the relationship between the spatial design

of urban spaces and the level of safety they offered. She argued that safety was ensured by bustling streets in the city centre, full of people, in cities with compact and mixed-use developments, which, she believed, would restore their vitality and ensure the safety of their inhabitants, guaranteed by local, neighbourhood communities (Jacobs, 1961).

The issue of safety was subsequently addressed by other American researchers: psychologists, sociologists, architects, and urban planners. In response to the threats posed by the dynamic process of transformation of residential areas and concerns about rising criminal activity, a new branch of science emerged – environmental psychology. This combined the knowledge of many disciplines related to urban planning with psychological sub-disciplines. Researchers began to analyse specific facets of residential areas, including the ways in which urban space is organised, safety of public spaces, and crime rates. One of the first and key ideas to reduce crime through urban planning was the concept of 'defensible space' put forward by the American architect Oscar Newman in his book *Defensible Space. Crime Prevention through Urban Design* (1972). As part of a university research programme on safety in urban residential areas, he drew on a study conducted in New York's Brownsville and Van Dyke neighbourhoods and analyses of crime statistics in these neighbourhoods which demonstrated the relationships between the scale and nature of development and the crime rate. He also described how certain design solutions and spatial manipulations can integrate the local community and allow it to control its territory, thus increasing its safety.

Newman's ideas were mainly concerned with residential areas. A year earlier, a more general work by the American criminologist C. Ray Jeffrey entitled *Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design* had been published. In it, he outlined the psychological and environmental determinants of crime and identified the links between a criminal's behaviour and the environment, which may increase or curb his readiness to commit crime (Jeffrey, 1971). He believed that a more effective method than rehabilitation and attempts to reform an established criminal would be to influence his behaviour by making the environment one in which he was discouraged from committing crime, criminal activity was made more difficult, and his conviction that it was risky and would likely lead to punishment was reinforced. Jeffrey's work, being highly theoretical,

initially went unnoticed, but over time it became the foundation of what is now called situational crime prevention.

The terrorist attacks perpetrated on the US at the turn of the 21st century – the 1995 bombing of a government building in Oklahoma City and, in particular, the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001, in which passenger aircraft were used as flying bombs – led to renewed interest in the issue of defensible space. These attacks led to the militarisation and fortification of urban spaces, which is now particularly evident on the streets of American cities. A number of programmes based on principles of territoriality, control, and surveillance and the radical 'hardening' of urban space were undertaken. Cameras, sensors, and various electronic devices are used on a large scale. Extensive socio-technological systems of management, control, and surveillance are being created, which, on the one hand, increase the systemic resilience of urban organisms and enhance the effectiveness of the emergency services; however, they also increase the degree of surveillance of citizens and raise concerns about the infringement of civil rights (Jasiński, 2013).

The COVID-19 pandemic has had a significant impact on the functioning of public spaces and has transformed all aspects of public life and changed spatial relations. During the pandemic, street life froze, buses and trams were deserted, and restaurants, cafes, and service establishments were closed. The need to adhere to personal security measures and social isolation meant that the traditional hierarchy of space was reversed: urban public space became a threat, and domestic private space a luxury. This situation challenged certain rules of contemporary urban design, such as the desire to increase population density and the concentration of buildings, the preference for mass public transport, and the promotion of a metropolitan model of life rich in attractions, festivals, and large events. New patterns and preferences emerged, including the desire to escape to the suburbs, the abandonment of public transport and the increased use of private cars and individual means of transport, and the increased importance of large and open urban spaces: waterfronts, promenades, and parks, which provide conditions for safe rest and recreation in times of pandemics (Jasiński, 2021).

Discussion of the term

Designing a safe public space involves the use of specific physical features and the proper organisation of space to eliminate or reduce crime. It also entails enhancing residents' sense of safety and strengthening their sense of community, engagement, and responsibility. The design of safe public spaces has environmental, technological, psychological, and social dimensions.

In the introduction to his book, Oskar Newman wrote:

> The crime problems facing urban America will not be answered through increased police force or firepower. We are witnessing a breakdown of the social mechanisms that once kept crime in check and gave direction and support to police activity. The small-town environments, rural or urban, which once framed and enforced their own moral codes, have virtually disappeared. We have become strangers sharing the largest collective habitats in human history (Newman, 1972, p. 1).

His key achievement was to capture the essence of the breakdown of social ties and anonymity, which were characteristic features of large buildings and residential complexes that led to a sense of indifference and being lost and to an absence of personal responsibility. The larger the spatial structure was, the looser the ties between its residents, who commonly did not know each other at all. The higher the level of anonymity, the higher the level of indifference and crime. Newman thus advocated limiting the scale and size of developments in order to restore neighbourly ties. He argued that the key to increasing safety was close neighbourly and interpersonal relationships and the precise demarcation and definition of private, semi-private, and public territories. Newman did not, however, deny the effectiveness of solid technological safety measures, such as walls, gates, and fences, but he considered more subtle solutions to be more appropriate for social and spatial reasons; these solutions created a system of symbolic barriers, strongly defined areas of influence, and improved opportunities for surveillance (Newman, 1972, p. 3). In his opinion, the best guarantors of safety were people who watched passers-by from the windows of their homes; moreover, he associated small neighbourhood units, where everyone knows one another, where transit traffic is restricted, and where every

fragment of space has its own administrator, with an increase in both social activity and the level of overall safety. He called his concept of space organisation 'defensible space', and other authors used the terms 'defence space' (Czarnecki & Siemiński, 2004, p. 98), or 'safe space' (Wyżykowski & Kwiatkowski, 2004, p. 11).

According to Newman, defensible space is a model for residential environments that inhibits crime

> by creating the physical expression of a social fabric that defends itself. All the different elements which combine to make a defensible space have a common goal – an environment in which latent territoriality and sense of community in the inhabitants can be translated into responsibility for ensuring a safe, productive, and well-maintained living space (Newman, 1972, p. 3).

Newman believed that a secure residential environment is a psychological and physical phenomenon in which good design plays a large part in providing residents with a sense of ownership, control, community, and safety, thereby removing the grounds on which crime could develop. A potential criminal feels less safe in a well-kept and controlled environment. For Newman, an important feature of a defensible space was its proper hierarchy, built up progressively from the private threshold of a house, through the neighbourhood space of a particular habitat or group of houses, the semi-private space of a local street or quarter, to the public space of a transit street.

Newman defined four key factors that shape defensible space. These are territoriality, natural surveillance, image, and milieu (Newman, 1972, pp. 51–117). He saw territory as an eternal and natural feature which offers protection and safety, linked primarily to the properties of the human place of residence. The "My home is my castle" proverb captures the essence of Western culture and the fabric of its social organisation. Our civilisation is based on the right to residential ownership and to the land on which one's house is built. In many cases, civil rights and belonging to a local community are dependent on owning your own home in a particular town or area. Often, one's house and piece of land become a testament to one's maturity, foresight, and they are a measure of success. In his studies, Newman found a strong link between perceiving territory as one's own and caring for it and the safety of the area. The basic and natural edge of one's private territory is the boundary

of the plot around one's house, which is most often clearly marked, sometimes by a symbolic fence or hedge line, sometimes by a massive wall or gate. The section of the street adjacent to a house is usually controlled and supervised by its residents, e.g., through the kitchen window, porch, bench, and lighting in front of the entrance. Semi-private areas are demarcated neighbourhood areas: interiors of blocks of flats, common spaces belonging to clusters of houses, or dead-end streets and neighbourhood footpaths.

The denser the development and the closer to the city centre, the more difficult it is to separate private and semi-private neighbourhood spaces. Often, a person's private territory ends at the threshold of their flat, and from there it becomes a no-man's land, usually anonymous or hostile. Responsibility for the local neighbourhood has shifted from the residents to others: the administration, local authorities, or public authorities. However, Newman observed that – whether designing groups of detached family houses or multi-family housing complexes – architects create hierarchies and define the boundaries of space by means of physical or symbolic demarcations so as to assign them to specific groups of residents. He postulated that in buildings with a large number of flats on each floor, entrance halls should be created that are shared by only a few flats, and the space around individual buildings should be divided by symbolic or physical partitions, thus creating areas that are easier to identify, manage, and control by particular groups of residents. Newman gave positive examples of introducing inter-block playgrounds and squares, where landscaping and landscaping elements encourage children to play and adults to meet. He also recommended dividing transit streets and car parks with pedestrian areas – squares and street play areas – and freeing pavements from cars by creating a one-way traffic system and blocking parking spaces in the axis of the roadway, which makes it possible to create a lively and pleasant forecourt in front of the building facades, with greenery, benches, and café gardens. Developing, ordering, and defining the ownership of front-of-house areas promotes neighbourhood activities and the building of interpersonal relations, while also pushing outsiders, including potential villains, out of the territory.

Newman used natural and symbolic barriers to define the boundaries that separate areas, paying particular attention to the language of symbols. Barriers can be elements such as portals and gates, changes

in the texture of the pavement, steps and stairs, hedges, differences in lighting, or signs. The point is to give a clear signal to passers-by: you are leaving the public and anonymous space of the street and entering a different, private or semi-private territory. Natural physical barriers are also used for this purpose: walls, locked gates and wickets. Many behaviours that are considered normal in public spaces, such as loud talking, standing on street corners, intrusiveness, or begging, are not allowed in semi-private neighbourhood spaces – it is their inhabitants who make the rules about their standards. An intruder who enters a private or semi-private space must face the consequences: he is exposed to attentive and prying eyes, arouses suspicion, and may face intervention from residents, police or the security services if he behaves inappropriately. Several considerations determine whether a symbolic or physical barrier is sufficient to ensure the safety of an enclosed space: two of the most important are the extent to which a signal about the intentions of a symbolic barrier reaches an intruder's consciousness, and the effectiveness of the residents – or services acting on their behalf – in reacting to inappropriate behaviour.

Another factor which has a huge impact on the safety of an area is the possibility of establishing permanent neighbourhood surveillance. This ensures that all parts of the area in question are clearly visible from the windows of neighbouring buildings and creates the conviction in those who enter the neighbourhood that they are under constant surveillance. Newman noted that the mere sighting of a crime does not automatically trigger a reaction in the observer; it is also necessary for the observer to identify with the territory and recognise that he is responsible for it. Equally important is the link the observer feels with the potential victim of the crime. The conclusion that Newman drew concerns the size of the neighbourhood unit, which should create a neighbourly bond and a sense of belonging and identification as well as elicit a spontaneous reflex of solidarity with the victim.

Newman also observed that most crimes that are committed in buildings or neighbourhoods occur in places hidden from the view of residents, such as lifts, stairwells, unlit alleys, or street corners. Not all neighbourhood streets and pavements are accessible to police patrols, and many residents are too afraid to venture outside after dark. The opposite of the neighbourhood backstreet is a typical street with a string

of detached houses, which is considered by both residents and the police as a relatively safe space. Their front gardens are usually well-maintained and well-lit and many of their windows face the street, which can be easily monitored by vehicle patrols. According to the New York Police Department, a front entrance is always safer than one located on the side or in the garden. The modernist principle of scattering residential buildings (such as blocks of flats or high-rise buildings) in an open space means that the paths leading to them are full of corners and often run through bushes, trees, shrubs, and other coverings behind which an attacker can hide. Elements that enable neighbourhood surveillance and enhance safety include access to buildings that are brightly lit and free of corners and concealment, entrances to buildings that are clearly visible from the windows of neighbouring dwellings, lift halls and stairwells that have windows. In Newman's opinion, any form of opening dwellings up and combining private and public space – in which there is an expectation that residents will adhere to a moral code, even a minimal one – enhances the safety of the residential environment. In particular, families with children and the elderly would be willing to sacrifice some of their privacy for better safety (Newman, 1972, pp. 100–101).

Newman also commented on the image and milieu of the housing developments he studied. Most social housing built in American cities differs in scale and character from traditional residential developments, which distinguishes them negatively and stigmatises their residents, exposes them to isolation, and marks them as potentially easy targets. He recognised the need to counter typical social housing vandalism, where residents do not identify with their environment and damage or vandalise it, which ultimately reinforces their frustration and sense of social exclusion. Newman observed that in every city there are spaces that are generally considered safe because of their traffic and the level of surveillance in operation. These typically include inner-city thoroughfares, full of vehicles and pedestrians, busy commercial streets, the surroundings of government offices, and supervised areas of offices and various public institutions. Such neighbourhoods increase the safety of residential areas located nearby. There is also an opposite phenomenon of a paradoxical nature: a generally desirable neighbourhood with parks or schools will have a higher rate of crime, especially petty crime, such as hooliganism and vandalism.

Box 1. Elements of a defensible space in Newman's theory

1. *Reinforcing a sense of ownership and belonging* in the local neighbourhood community through the demarcation and marking of boundaries between public and neighbourhood spaces (territoriality), which can be achieved both symbolically (through signs and plaques) and literally (through barriers and walls).
2. *Natural surveillance* through appropriate design elements and use of environmental features.
3. The *image* of the project should be shaped so that it does not have the stigma of an inferior, social housing development.
4. Favourable *milieu* is mainly provided by the multifunctionality of the city; particularly favourable is the combination of residential complexes with those parts of the city that are considered safe.

Source: own elaboration.

Newman also analysed the potential use of video surveillance techniques based on an experimental programme carried out at the Bronxdale Houses housing estate in New York, where cameras were used to observe hidden places in and around a building (car park, playground, entrance hall, and lifts), and the images were beamed to all the flats. A neighbourhood patrol was also established to ensure that the camera images were continuously monitored at peak times of crime threat. The flats were provided with a direct telephone connection not only to the local police station, but also to the police officer who patrolled the neighbourhood, and with local intercoms and an audio system to listen to voices in the lifts and corridors.

The concept of a defensible space presented by Oscar Newman became very popular, and its creator devoted 30 years of his life to this issue, as was reflected in his various projects, studies, and publications. Many of his insights and conclusions, such as the hierarchisation of space or limiting transit traffic in residential areas, entered into the canons of contemporary urban planning, and his ideas were implemented in the USA, the UK, and other Western European countries until the late 1980s (Czarnecki & Siemiński, 2004). The notion of a defensible

space is still used as one of the strategies in situational crime preven-
tion, where the design of a space and the way of securing it through
access control devices, barriers, and territorial reinforcements (delimi-
tations) are considered the main crime prevention measure (Awtuch,
2005, pp. 152–153). The criminological 'broken windows' theory, popu-
larised in the 1980s by the Mayor of New York City Rudolph Giuliani,
probably also derived from Newman's observations. This was based on
an assumption that an effective method of fighting crime is rigorous care
for built environments, manifested, among other things, in the immedi-
ate repair of vandalised benches or broken windows.

Newman's concept was also criticised. Opponents argued that its
effectiveness was not fully proved and that emphasising the role of safe-
guards, boundaries, and barriers results in 'defensive urban design' and
excessive fortification of architecture (Awtuch, 2005, p. 152). Moreover,
it is worth mentioning distinctive differences in the perception of safety
related to strangers in Jane Jacobs' and Oscar Newman's theories.
Jacobs believed that safety lay in a bustling inner-city street full of
strangers, whereas for Newman, strangers were a threat and potential
evil. The former approach treats strangers as a guarantor of safety,
the latter as a source of danger. Hence, a safe model promoted by the
former was a classic, two-sided enclosed urban street; by the latter,
a structure of internal 'defensive' enclaves such as cul-de-sacs and
courtyards with limited accessibility for strangers. Over the years, many
of the insights of both theorists have been critically revised, while others
have been developed and incorporated into contemporary situational
prevention strategies. Crime and insecurity are complex phenomena. It
is also worth mentioning that it is difficult to scientifically test the effec-
tiveness of theoretical models or solutions to crime reduction applied in
practice in planning measures, as these involve dynamic socio-spatial
structures, influenced by many complex and multidimensional social
processes. This means that the spatial determinants of crime can never
be analysed without examining its social and economic determinants
(Czarnecki & Siemiński, 2004, p. 34).

In its contemporary form, the Crime Prevention Through Environmen-
tal Design programme (CPTED) has become a multidimensional synthe-
sis of the insights of Jane Jacobs and the thoughts and studies of Oscar
Newman and C. Ray Jeffrey, which were supplemented by insights from

psychology, forensic science, and years of practical experience of the US police. The CPTED concept (whose aim was the design of coherent and safe spaces free of crime) has evolved over time and – apart from the milieu of the physical environment – has included social interactions in maintaining the safety of the neighbourhood. In the 1980s, the role of the social context was recognised in the CPTED, which gave rise to the second generation of the CPTED. In addition to environmental characteristics, its authors emphasised the social features inherent in a defended space, such as local social dynamics, the cultural and ethnic structure and diversity, and other factors of a social nature. The essence of the second generation of the CPTED is the slogan that 'it is not buildings that commit crime'. In order to effectively combat crime, it is not enough to analyse the characteristics of a place: other circumstances concerning both the perpetrator and the aim of the crime must also be considered (Głowacki, Łojek & Urban, 2008, pp. 10–11).

At the core of the CPTED is the belief that the way in which a built environment is designed and organised determines its vulnerability to crime. The CPTED programme is based on the use of basic environmental features: social control, accessibility, natural surveillance, and territorial status. By implementing the programme's recommendations, local communities and authorities can effectively improve public safety. The effectiveness of the CPTED largely depends on cooperation between state and local government agencies, police, public safety agencies, planners, architects, businesses, and local communities in designing built environments in such a way as to reduce their vulnerability to crime – before the crime is committed. The CPTED can be applied at the stage of designing new developments or redeveloping or upgrading existing parts of the city, or it can be implemented to improve conditions in areas affected by the plague of crime. It can be applied in designing residential, commercial, retail, educational, and public areas. Training in the use of the CPTED is provided in the USA by the National Crime Prevention Institute. The main textbook is Timothy D. Crowe's work, *Crime Prevention through Environmental Design* (1991), published by this institution. The principles of the CPTED can also be found in most manuals and publications on planning and architectural methods of combating crime and terrorist threats.

The most distinctive feature of the CPTED is that it seeks not so much to protect against threats as to prevent threats through a range

of preventive measures in which the hard security of the potential target (gates, bars, locks, alarms, etc.) is only one element of the local security system. It must be accompanied by a structural partnership of people and institutions interested in the safety of an area and attention to the proper maintenance of the physical space. A poor state of repair or a conspicuous lack of concern for maintenance is indicative of a lack of proper surveillance of the space in question and may encourage crime. The use of good-quality materials and construction and a transparent and easily supervised space not only discourages potential villains but also facilitates earlier detection of threats and a prompt defensive response. A characteristic feature of the most successful designs built according to the CPTED principles is a multidisciplinary approach enlisting the active cooperation of local communities.

Box 2. Guiding principles of the CPTED programme

1. Supporting interpersonal contacts, increasing people's vigilance, and supporting initiatives for territorial delimitation and neighbourhood surveillance (*territoriality*).
2. Maximising the possibility of locating suspicious people and/or activities (*lookout points*).
3. Supporting thoughtful uses of space by residents (*activity support*).
4. Identifying owners of private and public spaces and the real or symbolic demarcation of these spaces (*hierarchy of spaces*).
5. Using barriers, fences, and other ways to limit freedom of access (*access control*).
6. Minimising the potential for conflicts by designing the appropriate location of user groups (*environment*).
7. Taking care of the cleanliness and condition of the environment, buildings, and areas (*maintenance*).

Source: own elaboration.

Successful CPTED strategies also include cooperation and integration activities within local communities through direct contact, promotional action, the media, leaflets and websites, e.g., help in organising neighbourhood patrols, inclusive neighbourhood events, festivals and

street celebrations; information and education programmes in schools; protecting potential targets; organising clean-ups; installing television, alarm, and security systems; creating community gardens and local playgrounds; caring for outdoor lighting; introducing appropriate traffic regulations and organisation systems; reducing speed limits and transit traffic; cordoning off and closing streets; regular monitoring; an active real-estate policy (building on or developing unoccupied or dilapidated buildings and wasteland; revitalisation of post-industrial sites).

Although the CPTED is mainly used to prevent crime, with some modifications many of its strategies are also used today as tools to reduce terrorist threats. If it is correct to assume that certain conditions increase the risk of a terrorist attack, then the reverse is also true: threats can be reduced or eliminated by changing the situational determinants. The primary objective of the measures taken in this area is to shape the environment in such a way as to reduce the likelihood of a terrorist attack and limit its possible consequences. Although terrorists have a diverse arsenal of potential weapons at their disposal, their use requires the involvement of expertise, good organisation, and plentiful resources. Therefore, most terrorist attacks are based on the use of the most accessible weapons, which are home-made explosives. Most terrorist attacks are bombings. Explosive charges are most often concealed in portable containers or vehicles. Rubbish bins or other available hiding places are also used to conceal bombs: sewer manholes, road culverts, etc. Therefore, the designer's primary objective when it comes to securing public facilities and spaces against the risk of a terrorist attack is to create security zones around them. The primary design task is to shape the environment in such a way that it provides a safe buffer zone (stand-off in military terminology, or setback in civilian terminology) between the potential target and the nearest bomb launching point (Hopper & Droge, 2005, pp. 23–24). In addition, security planning takes into account the fact that terrorist attacks require long and meticulous preparation. They are preceded by a thorough analysis of selected potential targets. Therefore, a good design should discourage potential attackers, highlight that a potential target is well protected, and make it more difficult for a terrorist to observe and access a place to execute an attack so that he abandons the attack or chooses another, less important, less protected and 'softer' target (Hopper & Droge, 2005, pp. 50–51).

Box 3. The CPTED counter-terrorism strategies

1. *Access control* – reducing the threat of attack by means of various access control strategies: physical protection (guards/ wardens); mechanical (gates and locks); electronic (intrusion detectors, sirens, access cards, and biometric devices). Designating a hierarchy of zones in the facility to which only authorised persons have access in order to limit access for a potential attacker.
2. *Surveillance* – facilitating the observation by users and security services of the interior and the area around the facility, access points, and entrances by means of optical and electronic devices (night vision devices, CCTV). The aim is to deter potential attackers and to detect and neutralise an attacker early.
3. *Territorial reinforcement* – creating protected zones (fences, walls, barriers, and patrols) around threatened buildings and safety zones to lessen the impact of bombings, mainly car bombings. Changes in traffic organisation and landscaping elements can serve this purpose: retaining walls, flowerbeds, bollards. The aim is to make an attack more difficult and limit its impact.
4. *Target hardening* – protecting potential attack targets from the effects of an attack by planning, architectural and technical means (appropriate shaping and zoning of the building's functions, strengthening the structure and facades, using armoured or secure glazing, securing openings, ducts, and underground installations, creating shelters and secure rooms, duplicating the building's installations) in order to limit the loss and damage caused by a possible attack.

Source: own elaboration.

The CPTED programme has now become the global standard for situational and community-based crime prevention and counter-terrorism. On a global scale, the implementation of the CPTED is the responsibility of the International CPTED Association (ICA), founded in 1996 and based in Strathmore, Canada.

Systematic reflection with conclusions and recommendations

The need for safety is one of the most fundamental existential human needs. It is one of the main drivers in the creation of cities and determines their spatial development. Urban planning has an indisputable impact on public and personal safety, and a sense of safety is still one of the most important factors that affects the assessment of the attractiveness of a city and the living standards of its inhabitants (Czarnecki & Siemiński, 2004, p. 8). The public space of contemporary cities is subject to rapid changes which stem from both international processes (e.g., globalisation, urbanisation, commercialisation, and privatisation) and local processes (e.g., modernisation and gentrification). Increasingly more people live in cities. The density and diversity of the population of ever-larger and rapidly expanding cities leads to tensions and conflicts; crime is on the rise, as is the risk of riots, rebellions, and terrorist attacks. In response to these and other contemporary threats, a variety of planning, organisational, and technological measures are implemented to strengthen the level of safety and control of urban public spaces (Wantuch-Matla, 2016, p. 108). The examples of Western metropolises prove that holistically conceived and comprehensively implemented security systems, integrated into the urban landscape and cooperating with other urban infrastructure systems, are an important link in the overall public safety system as they strengthen the systemic resilience of urban organisms to natural disasters and other threats posed by civilisation (Coaffee, Wood & Rogers, 2009). Multifaceted yet invisible security systems can also help reduce traffic and revitalise inner city zones, thus improving the living and working conditions of residents, as well as facilitating economic revival and tourism (Jasiński, 2013, p. 251).

Reflecting on safety and security in public space, the most common dilemma is how much freedom and how much security is the right balance? Initiatives undertaken by authorities to increase safety are generally met with public support, as was proven by the COVID-19 pandemic: in most cities around the world, the mobility of residents and the availability of public services were severely restricted. Sometimes, total lockdowns were imposed, during which people remained isolated

for a period of time in their flats and homes. However, defenders of civil rights and freedoms are concerned that security systems and technologies, in particular smart city surveillance and IT data mining systems, can also be used for the surveillance of political opponents. A perfect example here is China and the IT systems implemented there for the total and permanent regulation of citizens' behaviour in public places.

Due to the specific nature of digital security systems, it is difficult to ensure public control over the services that use these tools. The effectiveness and efficiency of a country's democratic mechanisms will determine whether adequate control is maintained and whether the basic values of an open society (the balance between civil liberties and public safety) and the sense of freedom, mutual tolerance and anonymity that a traditional city – the cradle of our civilisation – should provide for its inhabitants, are preserved.

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Surveillance society

Summary

DEFINITION OF THE TERM: Surveillance society is a term used to describe a new type of society characterised by the extensive use of intrusive surveillance techniques. Although such control is most often associated with the activities of public authorities, in reality the emergence of surveillance society should be associated with decisions made by individuals. From this perspective, control is not an externally imposed measure but the result of the individual choices of users of online services.

HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE TERM: The conceptualisation of the notion of surveillance society is linked to the works of Michel Foucault on panopticism and governmentality, as well as to the more contemporary studies of David Lyon, who embeds the absolute visibility of the individual in the contemporary world of modern technology.

DISCUSSION OF THE TERM: The impact of surveillance society on personal rights and freedoms, particularly those related to the protection of privacy, is central to understanding the dangers associated with this type of society. It is also vital to recognise that a surveillance society does not come about without the voluntary cooperation of the individual, who makes choices that entrust important decisions to others.

SYSTEMATIC REFLECTION WITH CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: The progression of digital transformation not only creates threats to the effective protection of individual rights but also exposes the challenges that civil societies face.

Keywords: privacy paradox, information autonomy, panopticism, governmentality, surveillance

Definition of the term

One of the leading topics of public debate in the first decades of the 21st century is the issue of protecting individual rights in the context of the rapidly expanding global market for online services. Repeated reports of the misuse of intrusive data collection techniques have catalysed legislative initiatives, leading to the introduction of a new generation of data protection legislation. At the same time, pressure from both public opinion and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to establish clear boundaries for the use of surveillance mechanisms in horizontal relationships – i.e., those used by private actors (most often large IT service providers known as Big Tech) – continues to grow.

However, the well-documented risks linked to mass profiling, which have been increasingly well communicated to the public, have not significantly contributed to changing users' behaviours and preferences. Although Latanya Sweeney (2000) demonstrated almost 30 years ago that information on peoples' dates of birth, gender, and postal code is sufficient to uniquely identify over 85% of the US population, hundreds of millions of users now voluntarily disclose far more sensitive information than this in public spaces. This kind of 'digital exhibitionism' is particularly noticeable (and worrying) in the case of young people, for whom electronic media is becoming the primary form of contact and relationship-building between their peer groups (Madden et al., 2013).

The dissonance between users' declared need for privacy and their actual behaviour, which *en masse* seems to contradict the need for dedicated protective measures, is a phenomenon that has been recognised and studied for years and is known in the literature as the privacy paradox. Thus, some researchers postulate redefining the right to data protection, in terms of both its subject and its object. In their opinion, despite the multitude of existing regulations and the amount of detail they include, they focus either on protecting information that users are not concerned about, or on effective protection of information, but this is practically impossible in an era of global services and modern forms of data processing.

However, against the background of these considerations, more far-reaching conclusions can also be drawn: the gradual acceptance of intrusive forms of monitoring is not caused by users' lack of knowledge

or attention but is evidence of much deeper changes which lead to the emergence of a new type of society that is referred to in the literature as the surveillance society. This can be defined as a society that functions thanks to extensive surveillance mechanisms. Surveillance here is not only a means of collecting information about individuals or groups: it is also a two-way process of regulating social interactions. Here, surveillance becomes synonymous with control and becomes part of normal social relations, which furthermore means that a community without it will cease to function properly.

Although the origins of the term can be traced back to the works of Zygmunt Baumann (2000) or Michel Foucault (1995), it was most thoroughly discussed by David Lyon (2002). Today, the term is defined in two substantially different contexts. First, it is used to describe states in which extensive means of electronic surveillance used on a massive scale grant the authorities uninterrupted monitoring of large social groups. In this sense, modern China, the Arab states, but also the United Kingdom and the United States are called 'surveillance societies'. From this perspective, a closely related measure (almost a *sine qua non* condition) for the emergence of a surveillance society is the use of untargeted forms of surveillance (usually called mass surveillance). The form of political system (whether democratic or authoritarian) and the purpose of using surveillance are irrelevant. Its ubiquitous nature, which permeates various areas of life and forms of individual activity, means that the individual is under permanent observation and thus shifts from being the subject of regulation to being its object.

The second meaning of the term 'surveillance society' is closer to the thought of Baumann and Foucault as it emphasises not only the mass character of surveillance but also its source. This source is the individual himself, his conscious choices and decisions. Here, surveillance is not an external activity that is applied in an oppressive manner and imposed by an external authority. It is, in Foucault's words, the exercise of power by the individual himself, a mechanism of his self-control through which the individual voluntarily establishes constraints to which he then submits. Thus, it is not the mass nature of surveillance that is the constituting factor of a surveillance society but the voluntariness of its application. So, a surveillance society is not so much a society subjected to mass and external surveillance but one in which measures of individual surveillance

are applied on a massive scale. From this perspective, surveillance is not a measure imposed on the individual because his possible reason for disobedience disappears and surveillance itself becomes a consequence of his own decisions. This leads to the conclusion that surveillance society is not a term to be associated exclusively with non-democratic states. In fact, the political system is secondary here because the aim of techniques which lead to the emergence of a surveillance society is not to collect (acquire) information about the individual but to control their decisions. Thus, concepts closely related to this surveillance society concept are the restriction of choice, absolute visibility, a chilling effect, and self-control (or, as Foucault called it, self-mastery).

Historical analysis of the term

The starting point for detailed considerations on the origins of the concept of supervised society should be Jeremy Bentham's vision of a modern prison – the Panopticon (Bentham, 2010). His work aimed to provide a solution to a specific problem that intersected architecture, engineering, and social relations: how to make the penitentiary system function more effectively with limited resources and staff. The answer was a prison designed in such a way that prison wardens are invisible to prisoners and are positioned at a central point in the prison complex in order to keep a constant eye on all prisoners, who are housed in cylindrically arranged cells. In this way, a small number of observers are able to supervise a much larger group of prisoners. Although today the Panopticon is almost universally described as the model of an ideal prison, it should be remembered that Bentham's idea did not actually find widespread practical application. Only a few facilities have been built worldwide that are – to a greater or lesser extent – based on the Panopticon concept. For this reason alone, the constantly repeated belief in this being the 'ideal prison' must be regarded as unsupported by empirical evidence. The Panopticon, in solving some of the problems linked to the control of prisoners, generated new challenges which often outweighed the obtained benefits (Semple, 1993).

The present-day popularity of Bentham's idea should be linked primarily to Foucault's work, in particular to his concept of panopticism.

This French philosopher linked the conclusions of his study of the Panopticon to a model of the functioning of contemporary society. He saw that the idea of the Panopticon was not, in fact, to actually observe but to create the impression that one is under constant observation: by creating the impression and conviction of the absolute visibility of the individual, those in power can thus influence the individual's behaviours and control his actions.

In Foucault's proposal, the physical presence of guards (observers) is not a necessary condition for the success of the surveillance model. What is crucial is the individuals' conviction that such surveillance exists and that the actions they take can be subject to constant scrutiny. The concept of panopticism also explains the real potential of modern surveillance measures: it is not the mass collection of information which reveals new knowledge to observers, but the change in the individual's behaviour resulting from his fear that all his actions are being monitored.

Although monitoring is nowadays mostly linked to the use of electronic surveillance means, past experiences demonstrate that even without modern technological tools, those in power were capable of creating a system of social surveillance similar to the one described by Foucault. This led to the growing role of international human rights systems in the post-WW2 period as a safeguard mechanism against the over-reaching interference of public authorities in individual rights.

Although not legally binding, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights has recognised the need to safeguard the individual not only against actions directly targeting his integrity and physical safety but also against unjustified restrictions on the fundamental freedoms – including freedom of expression and the right to privacy – that determine his proper development in society. Privacy as a category of a legally protected value deserves special mention in this regard, because while respect for freedom of expression has for centuries been included among the fundamental rights of the individual, discussions on the need for the legal protection of privacy only began at the turn of the 20th century. However, it was the tragic experience of the world wars and subsequent reflection on the mechanisms which had led to the emergence and consolidation of totalitarian regimes that gave rise to the inclusion of the right to privacy in the catalogue of fundamental rights. In this context, the legal protection of privacy was intended to serve not only

the individual, but above all society as a whole, by securing the proper functioning of a state based on liberal values (Westin, 2015).

However, the purpose of international systems of human rights was, in principle, to counter violations by states rather than by private actors. Threats from the latter were not regarded as crucial or as requiring specific measures beyond the general principles of liability under civil law. This perception stemmed from the prevailing opinion at the time that private actors did not have the capacity to establish measures that would be capable of interfering with the rights of individuals to a similar degree of intrusiveness and scale as public authorities. Suffice to say that in the 1950s (when the European Convention on Human Rights was opened for signing), the computers we know today did not exist, nor did global information services, mass user profiling, and transnational technological companies.

The progressive digitalisation of communication services made it possible in the early 20th century to implement untargeted programmes (i.e., for all users of given services) that made it possible for them to intercept and analyse the communications of large groups of users. In most cases, the introduction of such programs was motivated by the pursuit of general security objectives. With the increase in terrorist threats, these measures were also increasingly used to intercept and monitor domestic traffic, i.e., an area that clearly poses significant risks of abuse of power and the creation of an undemocratic system of surveillance.

Another reason for the progressive spread of elaborate forms of monitoring users' activity is the increasing availability of the technology required for this purpose. As recently as twenty years ago, building a system for the wholesale interception of electronic communications required not only extensive technical competences but was also very expensive. These economic factors meant that states often chose to achieve their objectives (e.g., the identification of extreme groups) by traditional means, such as targeted surveillance. Increasing digitalisation and the associated decrease in the cost of acquiring computing power meant that ten years ago the cost of running an untargeted surveillance programme for the average European state was about €40 million per year. This is relatively cheap for financial resources spent on defence or the budgets of law enforcement bodies. Today, the economic barrier to conducting untargeted programmes has virtually disappeared,

which means that the main and often only constraint on the introduction of such measures by public authorities is legal regulations.

However, the discussion on risk linked to panopticism has taken on a new dimension, partly as a result of technological transformations, but also because of the conclusions drawn from watching users adapt to new technical possibilities. The modern legal system offers a number of far-reaching safeguards related to privacy protection. However, these safeguards are offered up as choices, not obligations for the individual; it is ultimately up to the individual to decide whether and to what extent he wants to protect this sphere of his private life. Furthermore, while the risks associated with the mass profiling of users have been known for years – mainly thanks to educational campaigns directed at drawing attention to various aspects of cyber security – the results of studies indicate that users relatively freely share different types of private information via online services (Barnes, 2006).

Hundreds of millions of users currently use such services (e.g., Facebook is used by almost 3 billion people). Given that each of them leaves more electronic footprints than those discussed in Sweeney's study, a significant proportion of the global population – knowingly and voluntarily – allows their behaviour to be profiled and, consequently, to have their decisions influenced.

This is a phenomenon that lies at the heart of the contemporary discussion on the surveillance society: why do a significant proportion of people utilise online services in a way that limits or removes their privacy guarantees? Does this observation indicate that the definition of the right to privacy, which entered the catalogue of fundamental human rights over seventy years ago, has become obsolete – that is, it introduces protections that modern society no longer expects? If so, does this change stem from societal changes or rather from the illusory nature of the existing legal protection? In other words, does its source lie in an archaic legal definition of privacy that is ill-suited to the requirements of modern times, or is the evolution of social expectations shifting privacy protection further down in the hierarchy of individual needs.

Discussion of the term

Explaining the phenomenon of surveillance society first requires a more detailed account of the very essence of privacy protection: informational self-determination. Its analysis will offer a better understanding of how an individual's behaviour can limit his freedom of decision-making by creating a model of self-control to which he voluntarily submits. As a result, it is possible to explain the difference between the traditional view of panopticism and governmentality and to present the relationships between these concepts and the concept of the surveillance society. The final section will discuss the impact on the binding legal standards of the decreasing need to protect one's privacy, which ultimately leads to a weakening of the guarantees that protect those individuals who do not accept the use of highly intrusive surveillance measures.

Informational self-determination. A key concept for understanding the limits of permissible intrusions into private life is informational self-determination, which means that individuals are granted the right to decide independently and freely whether to disclose personal information to others and to decide what happens to their personal data, including deciding who can use the data (e.g., Judgment of the Polish Constitutional Court of 20.06.2005, K 4/04, OTK-A 2005, no. 6, item 64). Informational self-determination thus expresses the right of the individual to decide who has access to his personal data and the way in which this information is used. The protection of informational self-determination thus protects the individual's decision-making about the processing of personal data as a condition for proper personal development. This protection also creates a barrier to the free collection and circulation of sets of personal data without the acceptance or even knowledge of those whom this data concern.

Initially, informational self-determination was mostly associated with control over the direct transmission or use of information concerning an individual. One of the forms of this self-determination is the individual's right not to be of interest to the outside world.

However, even today, informational self-determination is primarily linked to the right not to disclose personal information. An example is Article 51(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, which stipulates that no one may be obliged, except on the basis of statute,

to disclose information concerning his person. In practice, however, this measure provides only limited protection against the risks associated with the mass collection and processing of personal data.

Most of today's profiling systems (i.e., the bulk processing of personal data) rely on information previously divulged and collected from public sources; often this is data from social media or collected as a digital footprint of the individual's activity in online services. Big data banks are also increasingly fed information generated by algorithmic systems; thus, this is not information provided (d i s c l o s e d) by the individual but information derived from analyses of previous data. This process of identifying links (relationships) between available information in order to generate new knowledge is called data mining. Entities that profile individuals (called data brokers) only partially use information that was originally obtained from the individuals being profiled. Profiling is increasing based on data that has been produced by other entities or has been obtained through big data algorithms.

Hence it can be legitimately claimed that legal mechanisms meant to protect the individual's informational self-determination create an illusion of control but are not an effective privacy protection tool. Indeed, it is unlikely that the average user is informed enough to understand how algorithms used in profiling processes work. Thus, he is unable to foresee the consequences of him divulging not only detailed but also general information. Furthermore, even if the individual consciously opts out of certain types of services – wanting to avoid extensive monitoring of his activities – he may still be effectively profiled solely based on statements and information obtained from other users.

Therefore, rather than equating informational self-determination with the process of d i s c l o s i n g information, it should be linked with control over its processing. Hence, under EU law one of the basic principles of the processing of personal data is the purpose limitation principle, according to which data must be processed for the purpose for which it was lawfully obtained. In principle, this excludes the processor's freedom to decide on the purpose of processing personal data.

Unfortunately, there is also a lot of controversy in this case. The main problem is related to the increasing use of machine learning systems, which rely heavily on the processing of large amounts of – often redundant – data. However, the concept of redundant data is difficult to define

because at the time of data collection it is impossible to know which data will prove to be redundant (unnecessary) for the identification of previously unknown links between information. Since there is no way to decide which data are redundant, there is also no way to ensure that the purpose limitation principle is respected (it is impossible to demonstrate that the data collected is necessary for a specific purpose).

Thus, it appears that nowadays the individual is, in many cases, incapable of effectively limiting the scope of information about him being possessed by third parties. Legal mechanisms related to the protection of informational self-determination are not enough to ensure control over the fair processing of information. Hence, the need for a new category of legal regulations directly concerning the operation of the data broker market is being increasingly advocated. These regulations would, in the opinion of the proponents of this concept, complement the existing legal framework of data protection by introducing specific measures for the rationing and supervision of business activities for the mass profiling of users.

Control versus self-control. As a general rule, in democratic states the way in which personal rights and freedoms are exercised depends on the individual decision of each person and is not imposed from above. In other words, the individual is not obliged to exercise his right. Hence, freedom of expression is not an obligation to voice one's opinions or views, which also leads to the conclusion that one way to exercise freedom of expression is to remain silent. Similarly, the right to privacy does not imply an obligation to protect one's privacy, in particular by refraining from disclosing information concerning one's private life.

An indispensable condition for the respect of a particular right or freedom is the freedom of decision, but this, of course, is limited by the need to respect the rights of others. The role of the state in such a model is mainly to create conditions for the exercising of a particular right, which is also understood as refraining from establishing measures that lead to a 'chilling effect'. This term is used to refer to mechanisms (which stem not only from existing laws but also from their application) that discourage people from exercising their right for fear of negative consequences. By the end of the first decade of the 21st century, Sunny Skye Hughes (2012) had noticed the existence of another chilling effect in relation to bulk electronic surveillance programmes. The individual

who is convinced of the full visibility of his actions refrains from behaving in any way that the authorities may consider unfavourable.

China is an example of a state where extensive surveillance measures are used to control society (Strittmatter, 2020). Together with the Arab states, China is most often given as an example of a surveillance society. The (in)famous social credit system (SCS) is the first widely used mechanism for assessing the individual based on distributed data collected while monitoring his behaviour. Leaving aside the actual role of the SCS in achieving general security objectives and (obviously very serious) doubts about the use of such mechanisms by non-democratic governments, what must attract particular attention in the functioning of the SCS is the process of arriving at an assessment of the individual based on the opinions of others who are themselves being assessed. Thus, in the case of the SCS there is no apparent division between the assessors and the assessed. Since everyone is assessed at the same time, everyone is considering how their participation in the SCS will ultimately affect their own position within this system.

The panoptic intention of the creators of the SCS is clearly visible in the functioning of this system. Rather than serving the purpose of acquiring knowledge, surveillance is about the transparency of the individual: the visibility of his actions ultimately leads to the establishment of mechanisms for his self-control. In essence, then, as in Foucault's conception of panopticism, a surveillance society is controlled by the power of the decisions its members take rather than by the agency of external authorities.

This observation leads to the key question of the applicability of an SCS-like system in other societies, particularly those built on liberal values (Mac Síthigh & Siems, 2019). The success of global online services, which are used by billions of users and make extensive use of features aimed at building environmental indicators and ratings (such as the likes mechanism on social media), may indicate that the effectiveness of SCS does not depend on cultural patterns and can easily be replicated in other social models.

The mechanism of self-control (self-limitation) is also empirically observed today among users of modern online services. This thesis is confirmed by the gigantic popularity of applications based on user profiling, whereby users use a service precisely because they are

being profiled (monitored). Modern streaming services, e.g., those that provide on-demand music (such as Spotify or Tidal), can serve as an example here. These services collect extensive information about their users' music preferences, the decisions they make, how they use the service, etc., so that they can best tailor the music they offer to the users' expectations. By collecting this type of information, service providers can profile their customers in detail. As a result, rather than users listening to what they themselves have chosen, they listen to the music others 'similar' to themselves are listening to (taking into account very elaborate criteria based on hundreds of automatically generated parameters). This is a practical example of the restriction of one's choice which is not imposed from the outside but results from the individual himself.

Against this background, Marek Czyżewski (2009) contrasts Foucault's notion of governmentality with traditionally understood panoptical power. He emphasises that while panopticism should be linked to the external tracking of subjects, governmentality is an expression of voluntary self-control and thus is a mechanism of choice restriction used by the individual on his own initiative. This approach highlights a broad definition of power that encompasses not only traditional public authority bodies (rulers) but also any external decision-maker that influences the behaviour of the individual. In this perspective, governmentality can be defined as a behaviour in accordance with external expectations (which can also be communicated through recommendations of mobile applications).

It turns out, then, that at the core of the concept of surveillance society lies not only external control but also – or even primarily – self-control, i.e., the voluntary surrendering of one's rights and freedoms.

Informational self-determination (in the same way as freedom of expression) not only protects the individual but also safeguards the functioning of a society based on liberal values. Thus, exercising this self-determination should not threaten the systemic values on which it is founded. Therefore, there needs to be a discussion on restricting the right to freely share and process certain personal data as a necessary measure to counter the threats posed by the global data market.

Reasonable expectation of privacy. Understanding the impact of individual decision-making and informational self-determination on the creation of conditions that lead to the emergence of a surveillance

society requires the discussion of another concept, namely the reasonable expectation of privacy (Solove, 2008).

The perception of privacy is highly subjective. Undoubtedly, the individual's ability to understand and his privacy have it respected by others is dependent not only on his personal characteristics but also on social or cultural determinants. The lack of objectivised criteria for establishing the limits of the spheres of life or activity in which privacy is important means that it is usually defined by listing a broad catalogue of protected goods, including reputation and good name, family life, and home inviolability. The open-ended definition of privacy, on the one hand, facilitates the extension of protection to new fields of activity that were not originally explicitly included in its legal definition; on the other hand, it creates the risk of an excessive expansion of the concept because it does not set any boundaries for the broad definition of private life.

As a result, when assessing whether an individual's privacy has been violated in a particular situation, the courts apply settled case law which make it is possible to balance the expectations of the individual with the proper patterns of behaviour in real situations in a given community. An example of such a standard is the test of a reasonable expectation of privacy that is most often used within US jurisprudence, although it is also present in judgements of European courts (including the European Court of Human Rights). It was first applied by the US Supreme Court in Katz v. United States case (389 U.S. 347 [1967]) to confirm that the application of the Fourth Amendment to the US Constitution – which forbids a search and seizure without a warrant – applies to any place in relation to which an individual may have a 'reasonable expectation of privacy'. As a general rule, this test is conducted in two stages: in the first, it must be established whether, in the individual's opinion, the event under examination constituted an invasion of his privacy. If the answer is 'yes', the next step is to assess whether the individual's expectation is in line with the social norm and thus whether "society is prepared to recognise it as reasonable". Only when the answer to both questions is 'yes' should it be assumed that the expectation of privacy in a given situation was, according to objective criteria, r e a s o n a b l e.

The reasonable expectation of privacy test is of particular relevance when examining new forms of interference with privacy as it also makes it possible to ensure legal protection against threats that were

not previously subject to jurisprudential assessment. By taking into account not only the complainant's feelings but also the binding social norms, it is possible to indicate which (subjective) expectations of the individual deserve to be taken into account and consequently require legal protection.

An important feature of this instrument, however, is the search for a generally acceptable pattern of behaviour, which, after all, does not have to be in line with the individual's perception of privacy. As a result, although the individual may claim that certain actions concerning him have unlawfully invaded his sphere of privacy, analysis of the broader context of a given case may reveal that the expectation of privacy in a given situation was unreasonable. This issue is particularly pertinent in cases investigating whether the monitoring of online activity or the creation of elaborate analyses on the basis of data disclosed by the individual may violate the individual's sense of privacy.

According to the principle of a reasonable expectation of privacy, the answer to the above depends not only on the expectations of the individual but also on the binding social norms (patterns of behaviour). As a result, if a certain type of intrusion is tolerated *en masse*, it is more difficult for the individual who objects to this to obtain legal protection. In other words, the progressive informational 'exhibitionism' manifested by the publication of a large amount of detailed information about the private lives of a significant proportion of society 'pushes' the boundaries of what, according to the test of a reasonable expectation of privacy, should be considered unacceptable. Importantly, however, this alters the standard of assessment not only for those who have confirmed by their behaviour that they accept extensive intrusion into their private life but also for those who, while in the minority, do not accept such intrusion.

In this way, social acceptance of the widespread use of surveillance mechanisms, used not only by public authorities but also by private actors, has the effect of undermining the guarantees associated with the right to privacy of the entire society and thus contributes to the emergence of universal self-control, which is a necessary component of the surveillance society.

Systematic reflection with conclusions and recommendations

Surveillance society is a concept that, although of growing interest to academic communities in recent years, in fact developed decades ago within scientific 'pre-technological' philosophical concepts. Given the increasing technological capabilities at the disposal of public actors and global technology companies, the discussion on surveillance society has recently focused on the use of intrusive forms of surveillance.

According to this view, all activities undertaken in a surveillance society are constantly observed and monitored by means of various forms of control, and the information thus obtained is transmitted to external observers (governments or technology companies). Such a restrictive definition naturally links surveillance society to non-democratic forms of government and treats it as an oppressive form of control imposed from the outside. From this perspective, surveillance society would be nothing more than a variant of authoritarian rule, in which those in power (political or technological) make use of informational asymmetry to build their advantage and coerce obedience.

In reality, however, the transformations associated with surveillance society are also taking place in liberal democracies and can be explained as a natural consequence of a libertarian view of the individual's position and freedom to exercise his fundamental rights. In particular, the individual has the right to self-limit his freedom to make decisions; instead, he entrusts these matters and decisions to others. Hence, the growing popularity of services and mobile applications that offer 'more efficient' management possibilities for specific areas of life, from taking care of one's physical condition to selecting interesting news items to watch. Here, control is not an externally imposed measure but the result of the individual's choices, and this broad approach to surveillance society is closer to the currently observed trends of social change.

It is worth mentioning that the risks associated with the absolute visibility of the individual which stems from the increasing information asymmetry in the data market were analysed even before the era of mass digitalisation and before the emergence of global online services. An example is David Brin's (1998) concept of transparent society, which

is a kind of response to the vision of the surveillance society, in which the author proposed the use of far-reaching accountability mechanisms to protect against the misuse of personal data. Leaving aside the feasibility of the practical implementation of such postulates and the fact that they were put forward as long ago as the end of the 20th century, this proposal continues to inspire by indicating possible alternatives to counteract or limit the negative effects of the spread of the surveillance society model.

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Crime in Poland as a social phenomenon

Summary

DEFINITION OF THE TERM: Crime is a dynamic social phenomenon which exerts a negative impact on man's existential needs. It is difficult to define crime precisely as it is a structurally complex phenomenon that causes harm in various spheres of human life.

HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE TERM: From a historical perspective, there have been various methods over the centuries aimed at countering threats in different ways. The scientific foundations for analysing and countering crime – which is a pathological behaviour – were laid in the middle of the 19th century. One of the methods used to analyse crime is statistics.

DISCUSSION OF THE TERM: The term 'crime' is not defined by law but, to varying degrees, in forensic science, criminology, psychology, sociology, the security sciences, and other scientific disciplines. The causes of crime and its prevention are complex issues which are linked to an essential part of any state's policy, namely the need to protect life, health, and public order.

SYSTEMATIC REFLECTION WITH CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: As a social phenomenon, crime is constantly changing in terms of its structure, dynamics, and geography. Furthermore, the ways in which crimes are committed are also evolving, which entails continuously updating our understanding of crime. Given the existential needs of human beings, this knowledge is also useful as a tool and a signpost towards a deeper understanding of the determinants and social costs of crime.

Keywords: dark figure of crime, punishment, public order, crime, crime statistics

Definition of the term

A crime is a socially dangerous act prohibited by law under threat of punishment (Słownik języka polskiego PWN, 2008, p. 778). This is the broadest possible definition of this term. According to Tadeusz Bojarski, today there are three different meanings ascribed to the word 'crime':

1. As an assertion of a certain social fact that we ourselves observe or one that is described by someone else; it is a historical event that occurred at a specific place and a specific time.
2. As a statutory type of offence which is defined in a legal act, e.g., in the Penal Code or in the criminal provisions of other laws.
3. As a general concept which encompasses the sum of the conditions necessary to consider a particular human behaviour the basis of criminal liability (Bojarski, 2003, p. 78).

There is no definition of the concept of crime in the Polish Penal Code. However, according to the legal regulations, crime is a legally defined way of human behaviour which may take the form of act or an omission; such behaviour is considered socially harmful; it is prohibited at the place and time in which the law describing its elements is legally binding. Social harm is a non-statutory assessment of a specific act; if this harm is considered negligible, it is not classified as a crime, even if it fits the description of the elements of a prohibited act and its perpetrator can be found guilty.

In criminal law, the absence of a legal definition of crime is replaced by its doctrinal definitions. In this approach, a crime is the action of a person that is prohibited by statute under threat of punishment as a crime or a misdemeanour which is unlawful, culpable, and socially harmful to a degree higher than negligible (Gardocki, 2000, p. 46). A crime as defined in the Polish Penal Code cannot be equated with its colloquial understanding, in which, e.g., homicide is sometimes called a crime or murder. The Code stipulates that a crime is any prohibited act punishable by imprisonment for a term of not less than three years or by a more severe penalty. A misdemeanour is a prohibited act (crime) which is punishable by a fine exceeding 30 day-fine units, the restriction of liberty, or imprisonment exceeding one month. Mention should be made of offences, which are sometimes colloquially called misdemeanours. Offences are also prohibited acts whose features meet all the elements

of the definition of a crime (i.e., a person's action that is unlawful, culpable, prohibited by the law in force at the time of its commission, and socially harmful) but that are punishable by other penalties: a reprimand, restriction of freedom for up to one month, or imprisonment for 5 to 30 days. To put it simply, it can be assumed that the criminal sanction (the statutory penalty range) and the social harm define the boundaries between a crime and an offence.

Historical analysis of the term

Crime was defined differently in different periods of Polish history. The available sources reveal that in the past it was defined in a material way. During the Middle Ages and later, the spiritual element inherent in the notion of crime was emphasised: it was an act that violated God's prohibitions and was thus a sin (Borkowska-Bagieńska & Lesiński,1995, p. 157). It was only at the end of the 18th century that a formal definition of crime was formulated according to which a crime was any act prohibited by law. This was defined by the principle "there is no crime without culpability". In the modern Polish language, after earlier ambiguities, the division between a crime and a misdemeanour was introduced (Maciejewski, 2017, p. 151).

The accounts of Jewish travellers and merchants who traded with Slavic peoples in the 10th century contain fragmentary mentions of Polish law which refer to the moral and legal sphere (such as the buying of wives or the burning of widows at the stake after the death of a husband in pagan Poland). The traders wrote about cruel punishments administered in Christian times in the case of adultery, debauchery, and breaking the fast. During the reign of Bolesław I the Brave (Bolesław Chrobry) (992–1025), for example, breaking the fast was punished by having the offender's teeth knocked out, and an adulterer was sentenced to self-mutilation by amputation of his reproductive parts (Borkowska-Bagieńska & Lesiński, 1995, p. 166).

The legal system in medieval Poland was based on customary law. From the 13th century, as Polish villages and towns gained civic rights under German law, the expansion of Germanic law began, and this formed the basis for the development of the estate law system. There

were three estate systems in Poland: land law, town law, and village law. The first applied to relations between noble landowners; town law applied to relations between townspeople; and village law regulated relations between peasants (Borkowska-Bagieńska & Lesiński,1995, p. 114). As estates differed in terms of their economic, social, political and legal position, a characteristic feature of estatehood was that each estate was governed by different laws (Maciejewski, 2017, pp. 87–88).

Any act that caused harm to an individual or to society or violated security or the social order was considered a crime. The earliest Polish land law provided for liability for criminal acts within very broad terms. Originally, no attention was paid to ensuring that criminal liability was based on the establishment of a causal link between an offender's conduct and its effects. As a result, in the early period, punishment was given equally for intentional, unintentional, and accidental crimes (Borkowska-Bagieńska & Lesiński, 1995, p. 157). In the later period, acts not considered a crime included:

- 'self-help' – killing a criminal caught in the act (such as a night thief stealing grain in the field or an adulterer) would go unpunished in some cases.
- 'beginning' – provocation in the form of a verbal or other taunt.
- 'necessary defence' – broadly understood as an act of retorsion. In town law, an act committed in necessary defence was treated as a circumstance which was not punishable.
- 'a state of necessity' – it was permissible to sacrifice one good in order to remove a threat to another good.

Acts that went unpunished included the theft of food in small quantities in order to save oneself from starvation; adultery following the prolonged absence of one's spouse; the killing of outlaws (i.e., persons deprived of legal protection) or persons sentenced to the loss of honour and civil rights or banishment. Also, and rather strangely, the killing of a woman who was a vagrant and a prostitute – and thus deprived of the protection of the law – also went unpunished (Borkowska-Bagieńska & Lesiński,1995, pp. 160–161). Other circumstances that excluded criminal punishment included the perpetrator and victim settling the matter between themselves, the murder of a deserter in times of war, the beating of a person who ran a brothel (on its premises), and in the process of carrying out the orders of one's superior. The statute

of limitations, which prevented the prosecution of private offenders, changed as a result of changes in the law. For example, the town law of Tczew (1599) stipulated that the city would not pursue justice in any case against citizens after 31 years. *The Collection of Court Laws* [*Zbiór praw sądowych*] (1778), which came into being two centuries later, ruled out the statute of limitations for murder (Maciejewski, 2017, p. 157).

Crimes were divided into private and public. In the former, justice was sought on the basis of a victim's private (or his family's) complaint, as these crimes mainly infringed the interest of an individual or a family (or in earlier times, of a clan). Public crimes were those that infringed the general interest, based on the assumption that such acts did harm to the established public order (called *mir* in Polish), at the head of which was the monarch. Local order consisted in the provision of legal protection to particular places, e.g., public roads, marketplaces, and churches. Personal order protected particular persons, e.g., the clergy, officials, women, and orphans. Mixed order protected a person and his place of residence. Public crimes were prosecuted *ex officio* by the state authorities. Among the most serious of these were lèse-majesté, treason against the state, crimes against the official religion, villainy, crimes against the treasury, crimes against morals and good manners, crimes against life and health, crimes against property, crimes against honour, and rape (Borkowska-Bagieńska & Lesiński, 1995, pp. 162–165).

Since the distant past, committing a crime has required justice in the form of punishment, which is society's reaction to an act committed by a perpetrator. Penal punishment varied as it largely depended on estate law. Some forms of punishments would be regarded as cruel today, but according to legal historians, penal punishment in Poland was much milder than in the rest of Europe (Borkowska-Bagieńska & Lesiński,1995, p. 165).The practice of witchcraft and fortune divination was considered a crime against religion and was commonly prosecuted in Europe. For example, the French thinker and jurist Jean Bodin was a zealous 16th-century persecutor of 'witches', while the German jurist Benedict Carpzov (17th century) boasted that, as a judge, he handed down 20,000 death sentences for witchcraft, which was initially punished by burning or drowning, but later also by beheading. After 1659, witchcraft was no longer considered a crime in Gdańsk. In Poland, 14 witches were convicted in the last witchcraft trial (1775), and this

type of crime was officially abolished in 1776 (Borkowska-Bagieńska & Lesiński,1995, p. 165; Maciejewski, 2017, p. 161).

At first, unrestricted bloody revenge was the only method of applying justice. From the mid-14th century onwards, an intention of bloody revenge had to be formally announced by public proclamation. An absolute ban on this form of punishment was introduced in the 16th century, which led to the development of personal fines for murder in the form of weregild (*głowszczyna*) and a 'composition' agreement (*nawiązka*) as a fine for bodily harm. The amount of the weregild depended on a victim's estate, sex, and age. A double amount was paid for a killing committed with a firearm, the killing of a soldier, or the killing of a person who was working in the fields.

The death penalty was considered an effective tool in the fight against crime. It excluded the possibility of recidivism and did not impose on society the costs of maintaining a perpetrator and protecting any future potential victims. This punishment also served as a deterrent as it discouraged others from committing crimes. Throughout the 16th and 17th centuries, capital punishment was most commonly imposed under town law. There were two types of capital punishment: ordinary and qualified. Beheading with a sword (or axe) and hanging were ordinary death punishments, beheading being a privileged punishment for both noblemen and plebeians. The highest punishment was handed down for murder, crimes against the city, aggravated theft, incest, and arson. Hanging was a dishonourable punishment for theft, murder, etc. The execution of a qualified death penalty was preceded with torment and cruelty before the actual execution. Torture was inflicted by, e.g., burning, tearing off chunks of skin, and the mutilation of body parts. The forms of qualified death punishment included breaking with a wheel, quartering, drowning, burning, starving, impaling, and hanging on a hook.

Mention should also be made of other forms of punishment, such as mutilation punishments, which consisted in cutting off, e.g., ears, nose, hand, or testicles; corporal punishment (flogging); honour punishments (being pilloried, caged, or stigmatised); pecuniary punishments (the most severe of which was the confiscation of all assets); honour and honour-related punishments (outlawry, infamy, banishment, or exile); and imprisonment (lower or upper tower punishment). Referring to the latter, the first prison was built in Gdańsk in 1604. In the 17th century,

the first houses of correction and forced labour were established in various Polish cities. The modern prison established in Warsaw at the end of the First Republic (1767), which was aimed at the rehabilitation of criminals, was funded entirely by the state (Maciejewski, 2017, pp. 165–170).

From a historical perspective, the types of crime and forms of punishment were determined by a number of internal and external factors, regardless of the form of government and political system of the state, which is still the case today. Under the influence of various factors, human behaviours that violate norms and values are distinguished from other forms of behaviour and designated as either a crime or an offence. Depending on the social objectives, the social harm of the behaviour is defined, specialised terms are assigned to it, social campaigns are run to stigmatise undesirable attitudes, and so on.

In the interwar period, the crime rate was reflected in police statistics and, to a lesser extent, in court statistics. In 1934, economic crimes accounted for 79% of all recorded incidents, which means that for every 10 crimes committed in Poland, 8 had an economic basis. At that time, petty 'occasional theft' accounted for 45% of economic offences. Today, apart from economic crimes, statistics also identify criminal offences (in 2000, 89.4% of the total number of recorded offences) and road traffic offences (1.6% of the total). This is the simplest division used in periodic evaluations made by, for example, the police. It also appears in descriptions of crime in the literature. The historical background means that criminal offences are understood intuitively. Logically speaking, the adjective 'criminal' implies the existence of 'non-criminal' offences, which, as we know, do not exist. 'Ordinary' crimes include theft but also murder. Social considerations should determine the use of appropriate and precise terms, which should be comprehensible to everybody. The generic object of protection, which is the basis for the of the Criminal Code division into chapters, seems to be easier to understand.

The concept of an act of social harm is difficult to understand according to the criteria of social assessment. Relatively recently, the Polish legislator decided that treating cycling when drunk as a crime would improve road safety (perhaps other social considerations also supported the need to criminalise this particular behaviour). However, when it became apparent that crime rates had increased and prison cells were

being occupied by such "offenders" – which meant that this type of prevention was ineffective – the legislation was changed. Hence, today, it is no longer a criminal offence, but it is still socially harmful.

Referring to social harm from a different perspective, the right of pardon should be mentioned, which in Poland is an unquestionable presidential entitlement with a long tradition. Between 1924 and 1929, as many as 223 convicts sentenced by the courts in summary proceedings avoided the gallows on humanitarian grounds. Today, many people who have been convicted of murder or incitement to murder, robbery, bank robbery, drug trafficking, or participation in organised crime groups have benefited from the right of pardon. Although the decision to commute a sentence demonstrates the pardoners' humanity or noble intentions, it should not take place when the crime is the consequence of a perpetrator's deliberate act. Currently, on occasion, people of high social, economic, and political status avoid adequate punishment (Wójcik, 2014, p. 108), and corruption is easier when such decisions are based on personal relationships. Corruption, i.e., the abuse of an entrusted function to gain undue advantage, is manifested in the form of bribery, cronyism, and nepotism. For centuries, political corruption has been a tool for gaining favours and supporting various undertakings, including those that are socially useful. However, the requirement in any democratic system for transparency in the actions of representatives and equality before the law requires that corruption be curbed. In order to avoid abuses and curb unwanted interference at the heart of the democratic system, it is recommended that criminologists and economists study this issue in depth. It is clear that the social costs of corruption are borne by citizens, e.g., in increased waiting times, poorer-quality public services, and raised prices (Hankiss, 1986, pp. 89–91). Equal treatment is not fostered by the increasing economic stratification of society.

The exposure of compromising excesses used to be the task of the press, which was sometimes called the 'fourth power' because of its reach. Today, the popular press and other means of social communication often manipulate information or present socially damaging events solely in a sensationalist-political context, thereby narrowing the perspective of the given issue. The language used in the media is primarily based on its emotive and persuasive functions, which does not help people understand the mechanisms used by businessmen or interest

groups to control the state. In this era of cognitive capitalism and the fourth industrial revolution based on the value of information, learning about these processes becomes an important social challenge.

Discussion of the term

Crime occurs on a global scale, regardless of the political system and the socio-economic conditions. It is a product of human social activity, an undesirable phenomenon; it manifests in many ways as a set of events of a dynamic nature. For crime to exist, it is necessary for a special category of legal norms, namely criminal law, to exist (Błachut, 2007, pp. 33–34). Crime, like many other social phenomena, is not subject to direct observation, which is why, on scientific and practical grounds, various ways to obtain information about its scale and related phenomena have been developed.

Crime is not part of legal language nor is it defined by law. In criminology, it is understood as a set of acts prohibited by law under threat of punishment. These are acts committed at a specific time and in a specific area (Hołyst, 2009, p. 95). Information on crime is drawn from statistical data and surveys targeting specific aspects of crime. As a science, statistics is a method for studying mass phenomena which systematises their quantitative and qualitative characteristics. From the 19th century onwards, practical considerations determined the dynamic development of statistical analysis. For the purposes of forensic statistics, the first data were published in France, where the first crime statistics (for 1825) were published in 1827 (Swół, 2013, p. 197). Guerry de Champneuf contributed to their publication by suggesting that such statistics would help to identify the circumstances that would lead to an increase or decrease in the number of crimes reported. According to Paweł Horszowski, shortly after Guerry's speech, a number of authors, including the Belgian mathematician Quételet, became interested in methods of establishing the relationship between various factors, especially environmental factors, and crime and the development of statistical materials (Horoszowski,1965, p. 44).

The main source of information on crime in Poland was crime statistics which provided information on preparatory, juridical, and executive

proceedings and their efficiency. Currently, there are four types of crime statistics: police, prosecution, court, and prison statistics. Without these, it is impossible to imagine the science of criminology, which investigates, among other things, the correlates of crime. Such statistics are not just a simple quantitative reflection on crime: interpreting statistical indicators and making assessments on their basis is not an easy task, as is reflected in practice. The data collection process in official crime statistics goes beyond the mechanical recording of events. It is, in fact, a very complex social process that takes place within the law enforcement system and the justice system; hence the existence of a separate branch of knowledge oriented towards crime statistics and their interpretation (Błachut, Gaberle & Krajewski, 2007, p. 189).

The cognitive value of crime statistics varies as each of these statistics serves different purposes. No crime statistics reflect the actual scale of crime, which makes it legitimate to assume that they only facilitate learning about the processes and changes that take place. The causes that hinder such cognition are complex, as pointed out by authors researching the subject (Horoszowski, 1965, pp. 49–52; Błachut, Gaberle & Krajewski, 2007, pp. 189–192). Despite this, crime statistics continue to be collected in order to facilitate the more efficient task performance of law enforcement agencies, prosecutions, courts, and prisons. In other words, statistics reflect the numerical data (information) entered into the IT systems of these institutions, which makes it is possible to form an idea of crime as a social phenomenon, albeit to a limited extent. The main obstacle in this process is the different units of calculations used in these statistics; thus, data are not necessarily compatible. Moreover, 'statistical delay' means that a crime is reported late for statistical purposes, or sometimes it is not reported for several years. In the detection process, the stage at which it is decided whether an event constitutes a crime is significant (Błachut, 2007, p. 64). If these and other obstacles are not taken into account, if determinants which affect the effectiveness of criminal proceedings are not analysed, and if the use of the detection potential is not assessed, the problem becomes even more acute. (Swół, 2013, p. 205). The police or prosecution service, like any other organised institution, has a certain ceiling on its capacity to fulfil its statutory tasks. Although it is difficult to measure this with quantitative indicators, an excess of tasks has an adverse effect

on the level of their performance and encourages improvisation and erratically performed tasks, which affects the accuracy of the findings related to a crime or its perpetrator and is also harmful from the victim's perspective.

When attempting to describe a phenomenon using statistics, an analyst should pay attention to the issues that affect the accuracy of such an assessment. First, the interpretation of statistical indicators does not sufficiently account for, e.g., the factors that influence police statistics (such as changes in the law or structural changes) or the role of society in the disclosure of crimes and their perpetrators. In 1993, 38.4% of the total number of suspects were reported to law enforcement authorities at the same time as the crime was reported. Twenty years later (2013), there were 11.2% fewer such cases. There may be many reasons for this, but primarily it relates to the fact that police statistics, by failing to take such situations into account, give a false account of the effectiveness of the police's actions, which are measured by the crime detection rate. In incidents of this type, it is not about detecting the perpetrator but about proving a causal link to the crime. The police boast of high detection rates, when in fact their results are lower.

The second issue is related to another inaccuracy in police statistics. In the interwar period, Leon Radzinowicz wrote: "Four factors influence the manner and method of recording crime: 1) the police personnel who prepare the statistics; 2) the list of crimes in the statistical sheets; 3) the method of recording the crime; 4) the method of legal qualification of the reported crime" (Radzinowicz, 1935, p. 13). This opinion is still valid and is reinforced by the observation that some of these inaccuracies should be analysed as non-intentional, i.e., as errors or inaccuracies that arise in the working process. They should be treated as examples of the dark figure of crime and the dark 'internal' figure of crime. As there is not enough space here to analyse them in depth, it is necessary to refer to logic. When information about any crime reaches the police, they know about it. If, following opportunistic practices, they do not verify that a crime has actually been committed, it cannot be classified as an ascertained crime. Law enforcement agencies are not always ignorant of a crime, but if they do not include it in their statistics, this contributes to the dark figure of crime. To an outside observer, there is no crime because it has not been registered statistically. Creative statistics,

where in order to demonstrate a reduction in crime or an increase in efficiency in the execution of official tasks data are sometimes manipulated, is another major flaw in police crime statistics. (Wójcik, 2014, pp. 117–128). The reasons for this can be traced back to systemic errors related to the assessment criteria. Most often, any numerical increase in crime is interpreted to the disadvantage of law enforcement agencies, whereas an increase in ascertained crimes may actually be caused by an increase in the effectiveness of police activities.

From a forensic or criminological perspective, crime statistics are only one source of information about crime. Crime statistics have an advantage in that they "give [illustrate – J.S.] the crime figures that most closely approximate the actual crime rate in a country" (Radzinowicz, 1935, p. 1), which is why – despite being criticised for decades – these statistics still prove useful. However, this usefulness is limited due to factors such as a lack of knowledge about the principles or stages of the compilation of the data or the lack of analytical skills of the compiler.

Thanks to the availability of crime statistics, it is possible to gather information about crime in Poland from 1919 onwards. Since then, irrespective of the current political system, the police have collected information on crime and other socially undesirable behaviours for practical purposes and used the data as a tool to assist law enforcement agencies in combating crimes, offences, and other phenomena of interest legally, which is still the case today. Statistics present crime by type, time, place, age of offenders, sentences imposed, number of persons serving prison sentences, etc.

There are many unreported or hardly detectable illegal activities which go unaccounted for in crime statistics, including domestic violence and (more recently) the unauthorised use of other people's intellectual property, which is exemplified by the growing market for such services, by plagiarism, and by flaws in proceedings in granting doctoral degrees.

Knowledge, which is a capital in a healthy market economy, has little value when party goals and political alignments are involved. Political-economic plots and political-financial agreements concealed from the public, lobbying, and public procurement are just some of the spaces and phenomena that breed pathology and impunity as soon as state control is weakened. As a rule, the police pursue conventional criminals and often tolerate criminal activities carried out by representatives of the

privileged classes, which is of interest to criminologists (Wójcik, 2014, p. 114).

In his monographic study, Jerzy W. Wójcik was the first to clearly emphasise the scale of the problem of tampering with Polish crime statistics. His analyses reveal that statistics continued to be falsified after 2001 (Wójcik, 2014, pp. 102–133).

Cases where the law was modified *ad hoc* to subordinate it to the current needs of interest groups have been known for a very long time. In this way, the apolitical nature enshrined in police law is widely regarded as being fictional, which is also a social problem. The reformist *perpetuum mobile* included police structures and more. Laws and structures were changed instead of changing people's way of thinking and taking steps towards a more effective use of the potential accumulated in personnel resources. The introduction of more severe punishments – and the constant drive voiced by politicians to increase this severity – means that the legal order is heading back to the Middle Ages.

The creation of the police structures in Poland in 1990 was accompanied by optimism. Decisions on the size of the organisational units were taken based on statistics that used to be adjusted to meet changing political needs. When, after the 1991 reporting year, it became apparent that the structures were inefficient and could not efficiently address emerging needs, statistics became 'improved'. In 1994, the system for the statistical recording of crime was changed. After Order No. 42/93 of the Chief of Police came into force, police efficiency increased from year to year. When there were doubts about the correctness of the statistics in question, the public was told that this crime rate was a not a high price for the systemic transformation. And when these arguments also raised doubts, other arguments were used (e.g., compared to other countries, there is much less crime in Poland and it is safer here). These more optimistic statistics were used by police decision-makers and politicians to make decisions of social and economic importance to Poles. The cost of the 1999 police reform was calculated at 220 million zlotys. Ultimately, this figure turned out to be much higher when the budget outlay and the efficiency of the structures, etc., were factored in.

The overall cost of any reform should include everything that has to change as a result of this reform. A look at the significant changes and consequences linked to crime is facilitated by statistical indicators. In

1980, a total of 337,935 crimes were committed; in 1990, 883,346; in 2000, 1,266,910; in 2010, 1,138,523; and in 2020, 765,408. The statistically highest number of crimes was recorded in 2003 (1,466,643). This means that since then there has been a numerically varying decrease from year to year. It can be assumed that the police structures have been stable since the 2000s and this could be one of the factors behind the decrease in the number of crimes.

The process of arriving at this decrease in crime numbers (which is a Polish phenomenon) remains unexplored and offers space for scientific analyses by criminologists, economists, management specialists, etc.

Another phenomenon which also requires attention in this context is juvenile delinquency. By the 1990s, the increase in detection of juvenile 'criminals' inflated the police detection rate, which also gave positive indicators for the effectiveness of their operational work. This had not changed by 2012, although it had decreased in scale (Swół, 2015, pp. 86–92). When the data collection rules changed after the Ombudsman's speech (2013), the phenomenon of juvenile delinquency became far less of a 'problem'. The rate of juvenile offences in the total number of offences decreased from 8.7% (2010) to 3.4% (2017). The percentage of juveniles in the total number of offenders also reveals a decreasing trend from 9.9% (2010) to 4% (in 2015) and 4.2% in 2016.

The Police Act has not changed the tasks of the police related to this age group. It can be said that there is currently a lack of information about police operations, assessments, conclusions and forecasts. The tragic consequences of misunderstandings between minors, occurring, e.g., in 2023, point to this need as well.

Offence statistics in Poland are not published; hence, it can be argued that they are marginalised in criminological analyses. The police also have a lot of catching up to do in this area. In 1926, there were 3.4 offences per crime, the following year 4.4% (Radzinowicz, 1935/1937, p. 361). The report on the state of security in Poland in 2016 reveals that there were 10.9 offences per one statistically ascertained crime. Adding to this the sum of collective violations of the law (249) and hooligan incidents related to the organisation of mass events (31) would make this ratio even more unfavourable. This simplistic comparison demonstrates the weakening of social control and the need for in-depth analyses of offences.

In 2016, 24 entities in Poland were entitled to impose administrative fines, which they did 8,058,549 times. Fiscalism improves the state budget but does not solve the social problems related to the risks discussed. Shoplifting is increasingly discussed and written about, but the statistical scale of this phenomenon is unknown. It is time to look at this social problem in a slightly different way. Statistics paint a rather pessimistic picture: according to the National Police Headquarters (*Komenda Główna Policji, KGP*), 8,133,434 offences were revealed in 2022, while there were 856,846 in 2021 (public information).

Systematic reflection with conclusions and recommendations

Crime prevention must be directed towards the future. Observations, remarks, or conclusions based on anecdotal examples cannot be the reference point for a holistic view of crime as a social phenomenon. Selectively chosen data cannot be treated with optimism as the way in which they are obtained and processed may be inconsistent with the expectations of the researcher or analyst. Anyone who uses crime statistics should be aware that the more accurately its causes are diagnosed, the easier it is to follow the path which most successfully achieves the goals set. Ensuring familiarity with current affairs and up-to-date information is imperative. Although the Polish system of preventive measures – which covers people of all ages – is functional, it is not perfect. Much more can be done within the framework of the existing system, if only through appropriate cooperation and the coordination of the tasks performed by the institutions that form the macro-system.

It has long been known that neither torture, nor a police state, nor harsh court sentences will eradicate crime. It is worth restoring science to its rightful place; and by returning to the path of reliable education, the law will regain its value and fulfil its socially useful role. Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn wrote that totalitarianisms persist because individuals are afraid to tell the truth. They live in the midst of a lie that is known to all and by their passivity they create and sustain the hell in which they live. A similar mechanism shapes the attitude of many of us to the state's

criminal policy, the changing faces of crime, and its ever-new forms. In the forty years since the political changes that took place in Poland (1989) – and under the banner of necessity and social justice – successive amendments to the law have been introduced. More are planned. But the mechanisms which create public space and social control of pathological behaviour still fall short of expectations and emerging needs. No statistics reflect this, but the number of criminals is increasing, as is the amount of harm caused. Although criminology as a science is oriented towards dealing with conventional crime (which does not seem to be the best approach) (Wójcik, 2014, pp. 114–155), the picture of the analysed phenomenon reveals the need for a broader view of the problem (Jasiński, 2015, pp. 149–176). This is the most appropriate action to take to reduce the social costs incurred from the misconception that pathological behaviour is beyond our control. It is also a step in the right direction, although, unfortunately, it is a difficult step to take. Sometimes, it is enough to calmly and carefully weigh up the pros and cons to see more. Overcoming fear and passivity and lifting the veil on certain phenomena is an urgent necessity. It is worth being aware that no law can replace good manners.

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Radicalism

Summary

DEFINITION OF THE TERM: Radicalism is an ambiguous and non-conclusive concept. As an intellectual stance, it is a characteristic feature of philosophers and other scientists who search for knowledge and truth as it entails the search for what is fundamental, rooted (*radix*), and necessary for understanding humans. The nature and origins of these foundations, however, are uncertain, which is why radicalism inevitably changes its claims and form. As a social and political phenomenon, it is closely embedded in context.

HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE TERM: Since the late 17th century, radicalism expressed ideas of social emancipation and democratisation and was thus originally an important synonym for progress. Radicalism was attributed to the Puritans and other reform movements that sought to renew the purity of faith. Gradually, it came to be used to describe all kinds of utopian and retrotopian extremism, and its meliorative and pejorative interpretations were formulated.

DISCUSSION OF THE TERM: Radicalism can be both utopian and retrotopian, progressive and conservative, left-wing and right-wing, and it means different things in different cultures at different times. It can be found in the imperative of social movements to bring to light the first principles. The logic behind radicalism and the processes of radicalisation is best explained by the theories of social movements.

SYSTEMATIC REFLECTION WITH CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: The plethora of competing philosophies and lifestyles seems to confirm that radicalism embodies the spirit of our times and is a particularly modern phenomenon. In today's world, however, nothing

seems radical anymore, except violence itself. It is therefore necessary to search for new dimensions of radicalism.

Definition of the term

The word 'radical' comes from the Latin word *radix*, which means 'root'. In an etymological sense, radicalism therefore implies the existence of broadly understood roots of things that are believed to be the first and fundamental principles. More broadly, it is a concept, an intellectual attitude, a character trait, but also a social and political phenomenon that – in various ways – expresses an uncompromising, fundamental need to access the very foundations of thinking, acting, and the principles that organise human life. Radicalism has a socially arbitrary and relative nature, which sometimes makes its interpretations contradictory (e.g., it is equated both with what is progressive and utopian and with what is reactionary and dangerous). In both cases it entails a critique of the existing *status quo*. The concept of radicalism belongs to those issues within the history of ideas that have been shaped by the processes of democratisation and modernisation, as well as by the rules of critical thinking. Its genealogy and history can be found primarily in the development of European intellectual thought and intellectual culture, and in the specific determinants of the societies that belong to this culture. The adjective 'radical' was in use as early as in the 14th century in England and, according to the *Oxford English Dictionary*, for several centuries it expressed that which was basic, primordial and belonged to the essence of things. In the meaning of 'deeply rooted', the term appeared, for example, in Immanuel Kant's discussion of 'radical evil'. It was not until the 17th century that this word was used to describe social changes. As a doctrine of political reform, radicalism developed in the late 18th century in Britain within religious Puritanism and the philosophical radicalism of the Wigs, who demanded the democratisation of social life. The Enlightenment philosopher and one of the founders of utilitarianism, Jeremy Bentham, played a key role among them. A more aristocratic and romantic conception of radicalism was expressed in Friedrich Nietzsche's philosophical project. In the second half of the 19th century, the word began to be used to describe extreme left-wing and right-wing political ideologies.

Radicalism should be interpreted in relation to existing meanings and images, and thus in relation to a context. This applies not only to the political sphere but also to science, art, and religion. Within science, Charles

Darwin's evolutionism and Nicolaus Copernicus' heliocentrism – once seen as radical ideas – have become the basis of our understanding of the world and today are almost taken for granted. The works of radical religious reformers were often institutionalised over time: what was originally seen as a departure from a doctrine became the accepted norm. Thus, radicalism defies established canons and introduces new ones, which in time will also be contested and radically criticised. In Catholic social teaching, the term 'radical' is used ambivalently: as a synonym for what is fundamental and advisable (e.g., 'radical questions', 'radical resistance', 'radical renewal'); for what is objective (e.g., 'radical transformations'); and also for what is extreme and undesirable (e.g., 'radical negation'). Even the notion of religious radicalism itself is sometimes contentious, as, on the one hand, it means a rigorous and uncompromising adherence to the principles and norms set by a particular religion and, on the other hand, a dogmatic fundamentalism that can lead to violence.

In the age of the decline of the legal-natural doctrine, the metaphor of 'roots' is a variation of the notion of human 'nature': reaching for the roots (of the 'tree of life') is meant to bring out what is most natural and characteristic of man. In his *A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right* (1843), Karl Marx wrote that to be radical is to grasp the root of the matter, namely man himself. Since the essence of humanity can be interpreted in many critical ways, it is impossible to reduce radicalism to a set of ideas. What is more, it has multiple and often mutually exclusive meanings, and its content is constantly becoming outdated and being renewed.

Radicalism is not only a concept but also a feature of social movements and political ideologies that go against dominant beliefs, principles, and ideas. Ideas are reflections of the commonsensical and thus superficial and often harmful opinions of citizens. Radicalism expresses optimism and an unshakeable confidence in enlightenment and progress (left-wing radicalism) as much as it expresses anxious trepidation in the face of decadence and decay. It calls for rescue efforts to restore the 'good old world' as well as the original principles that governed it (e.g., right-wing radicalism). Radicalism embodies bold visions of the future and innovation but also puts forward the most conservative postulates for a return to nature, tradition, or religious values. In this 'symmetry',

radicalism takes on ahistorical characteristics and resembles a system of faith or a mental or spiritual disposition. This can lead to its more substantive and ahistorical interpretations (Rakusa-Suszczewski, 2016; Żurkowska, 2015).

In everyday language, radicalism is at the same time a threatening and an appealing label. On the one hand, it is synonymous with fanaticism and dangerous practices that defy cultural and social norms, thus it is ultimately a source of anarchy and violence. Since the attacks on the skyscrapers of the World Trade Centre (WTC) in 2011, the process of 'radicalisation' has very often been equated with religious (Islamic) fundamentalism, especially in the United States. On the other hand, 'radicalisation' implies positive reinforcement and constructive mobilisation in the pursuit of realising the 'right' values. This kind of thinking about radicalism as an attitude is present in the UK. It is also important to remember that any argument can be taken to an absurd extreme, which means that any logical reasoning applied with ironclad consistency can potentially lead to radicalism. Anthony Giddens believes that this can be seen in ultra-modern societies, in which radicalism is a consequence of 'heightened reflexivity'. Radicalism can also be a direct cause of deepening social polarisation and increasingly violent rhetoric and communicative discourse, both of which can lead to radicalisation.

Historical analysis of the term

Outlining the history of radicalism poses a number of difficulties. F i r s t, the very definition of radicalism as a return to roots is not unambiguous as it is not clear what these roots (*radix*) to which radicalism refers are, or whether they have yet been revealed. Hence, at the very least, the dual character of radicalism can be both utopian and retrotopian: it can mean a turn to the future or a return to the past. S e c o n d, it is necessary to clearly establish the area and the object of radicalism as it can denote both an intellectual phenomenon (the radicalism of truth) and a socio-political phenomenon (the radicalism of freedom). In the first case, radicalism is linked to, e.g., the development of science, religion, or art and thus requires idealistic thinking. In the second case, it takes the form of radical social movements and political radicalism and thus

requires a realist and historical approach. It is also difficult not to notice that these two dimensions are interlinked: the world of ideas is the engine of change, while the dynamics of life produce new ideas. T h i r d, the question arises whether radicalism should be defined by its name alone; in other words, can we separate the phenomenon and history of the idea of radicalism from its concept?

Radicalism as a doctrine of political reform developed from the philosophical activities of the Wigs in the late 18th century. According to the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, the concept of radicalism was first used in a political sense in 1797 by the left-wing MP Charles James Fox when he called for progressive reforms of the parliamentary system in the United Kingdom. His calls were probably linked to calls for the 'purification' of the church from the rudiments of Catholicism that had been formulated earlier by the British Puritans, who were also called 'radicals'. Political radicalism was also a manifestation of disputes over the significance of the French Revolution and of republican values. The key intellectual figures of this reformist and democratic parliamentary radicalism were the founders of the "Westminster Review", who were referred to as 'philosophical radicals': Jeremy Bentham and James Mill, and later, William Molesworth, Francis Place, George Grote and others.

The essence of projects of radical reforms was a critical view of the sophisms that sanctioned the political order. The most important of these were the notions of 'nature' and the 'Law of Nature', which, according to Bentham, were a kind of 'contrivance', as were the 'Law of Reason', the 'Right Reason', 'Natural Justice', 'Natural Equity', Good Order', and 'God's will' (Bentham, 2007). In his opinion, using these terms was a means to maintain power and unjust social relations. The new social philosophy required radical changes, simplification, and clarity, and especially the abandonment of, as he wrote, "obscurantist metaphysics". Bentham and other radicals treated reflections on natural law as dangerous and idle talk which served only to preserve the traditional order, while radicalism, according to Bentham, expressed the spirit of the Enlightenment and pro-democratic reforms and embodied a social critique aimed at countering superstition, injustice, and corruption. Radicalism was supposed to make life pleasanter and more useful, and therefore good; it was based on the affirmation of what is basic and rooted, i.e., the equality of all people.

Bentham and his followers came mainly from small bourgeois circles, and their radicalism was a form of legitimising the new bourgeois culture that was reflected in the democratic changes introduced by the Reform Act of 1832. The popular radicals movement, led by Thomas Spence, who sympathised with communist ideas, and William Cobbett, were more democratic in their demands. They were the first to recognise the need for political representation and thus for the empowerment of the entire working class. At the beginning of the 19th century, radical slogans from this circle were formulated by Henry Hunt, William Hone, and Thomas Jonathan Wooler, among others, which ultimately led to the Scottish Insurrection in 1820, also called the 'radical war'. In the first half of the 19th century in France, the label of political radicals was given to those liberal and left-wing republicans who referred to the legacy of the Great French Revolution (such as Alexandre-Auguste Ledru-Rollin, Armand Marrast, and Ferdinand Flocon). They advocated the democratisation of life, the fight against poverty and stratification, universal welfare, and universal education. Another important and characteristic feature of political radicalism was anticlericalism.

A completely different and rather undemocratic understanding of radicalism stemmed from the romantic thought of Friedrich Nietzsche, who argued that Europe was in a deep spiritual crisis, the source of which was slavish Judeo-Christian morality. The aim of his radical project was to restore lost Dionysian instincts embodied in the value of life itself. This would be accomplished by a few 'aristocrats of the spirit' capable of the 'revaluation of all values' and the restoration of the Dionysian instincts of spontaneity and vitality. Unlike the philosophical radicalism of Bentham and other Wigs, which was democratic and progressive, Nietzsche's radicalism was elitist and past-directed (retrotopian), which resulted from the fact that he saw the roots and the proper model of life and intellectual attitude somewhere in Presocratic Greece, i.e., in the roots and prehistory of European culture untainted by 'slave morality'.

In Germany, radicalism originally referred to religious movements that postulated the fundamental reform of the Church, such as the Anabaptists, Trinitarians, or Hutterites. In the name of freedom and equality, these movements called for a renewal of the original Christian communities and for various forms of religious isolationism. They advocated u t o p i a n and emancipatory social projects that would lead to salvation,

but they also based their absolutism and lack of compromise on past events and the purity of their faith. This radicalism was therefore also r e t r o t o p i a n in nature. The idea of a return to what is most rooted in order to achieve salvation became a source of ambivalence for the radical attitude, for what was – in theology – most human and fundamental was both good and bad at the same time. Secularised images of radicalism always refer to what is destructive (original sin) or salvific (graces).

In Poland, the idea of 'integral radicalism' as a secularised theological concept in the spirit of Carl Schmitt is presented by Andrzej Gniazdowski (2016). His basic idea is the conviction that the source and goal of this radicalism concept is the existence of man himself (individual, as in Nietzsche, or social, as in Marx), which ultimately leads to the rejection of all transcendent orders of the sense and the truth, including religion. The condition for radical emancipation was the rejection of not only its presence in the political order but the *tout court* rejection of all tamed superstitions. According to Gniazdowski, Marx's ideas and his project of a social revolution reaching down to the foundations of human life are an example of such integral and secularised radicalism.

At the end of the 18th century, Immanuel Kant used the phrase 'radical evil' to describe the deep-rooted, primordial human tendency to violate the moral principles that derive from nature. The use of this adjective as an attribute of evil in 19th-century German socio-political thought reflected the perception of radicalism as something bad or 'sinful' (Gniazdowski, 2015, pp. 392–393). The 19th-century German philosopher and politician, Friedrich Rohmer, attributed political radicalism to young people because of their characteristic impulsiveness and uncompromising nature. Similarly, Johann Caspar Bluntschli's idealistic interpretation linked radicalism to immaturity, cosmopolitanism, and the tendency towards abstraction that was typical of French revolutionaries. This conservative politician argued that radicalism defended false and illusory values and that its dismissive attitude towards history made it completely irrational (Bötticher, 2017, pp. 78–83). Thus, during the 19th century, there was an ongoing process of pejoration of the notion of radicalism by equating it with liberal and democratic culture, and especially with the Jacobin revolutionary movement. The libertarian and subversive contents of radicalism probably attracted Nietzsche's sympathies, just as the anti-systemic but pro-democratic dimension of the notion of

radicalism inspired the left-wing Young Hegelians, who demanded civil liberties, religious freedom, the abolition of the monarchy, and the abolition of social privileges. For them, radicalism meant fighting against all forms of political, economic, and cultural repression.

In 1906, the American thinker James E. Shea observed the changing nature of radicalism. Old radicalism was based on unambiguous and universal understandings of the laws of nature which led to the realisation of concrete and coherent projects; it was unyielding and harsh. According to Shea, new radicalism carried a feverish vision of development and impatiently churned out solutions that it believed would heal humanity and make life lighter and more pleasant; it had lost its idealism and focused instead on form; it was hasty and reckless, naive, intolerant, and authoritarian (Shea, 1906, p. 161). In a similar vein, Ellery F. Reed argued that radical opposition to the norms of the public sphere was unreasonable, was a manifestation of the irrational passions of the mob, stirred up by biased propaganda, and was an expression of the unreflective 'popular mind' (Reed, 1926, p. 38). This tendency to demonise radicalism was quite common in the US, but contrary opinions were also voiced there. In 1921, psychologist Albert B. Wolfe argued that radicalism expresses a conscious need for social change that stems from perceived deficiencies and inadequacies in the public sphere. Discomfort, helplessness, and anxiety can lead either to withdrawal and conformity or to an invaluable radicalism that can bring about real and desirable change. William Thomas Root claimed that the offensive image of the radical as an anarchist, a destroyer, and merely a neurasthenic with a low threshold of tolerance is unfair. 'The questioning disbelief' that characterises the radical is a predilection of philosophical and scientific minds, which is why Root argued that radicalism is creative and grows out of the spirit of the avant-garde, which sheds light on reality and sets out new tropes of thought (Root, 1924, p. 353).

In his book *The Limits of Community: A Critique of Social Radicalism*, the German philosopher Helmuth Plessner described radicalism as an expression of the deep human need to create an illusory 'region of purity' (Plessner, 1999, p. 107), which is expressed in two forms of communist ethos: 'blood-based community' (*Blutgemeinschaft*) and 'ideal-based community' (*Sachgemeinschaft*). Radicalism in the first form declares a return to the roots of humanity through the restoration of community

and the harmony of souls. 'Blood-based community' is based on emotions, especially towards a leader who unites within himself all the rays of love (Plessner, 1999, p. 90). This radicalism characterises national and religious movements in particular. Radicalism linked with the 'ideal-based community' is rational and intellectual: it flows from a belief in the power of consciousness, self-sufficiency, autonomy, and individualism. It is functional and impersonal and leads to the progress of liberalism and enlightenment: "not warm, thick atmosphere, but cold, thin air blows here – the breath of the spirit" (Plessner, 1999, p. 95). According to Plessner, both forms of radicalism are destructive to man and society: 'blood-based community' forces one to give up intimacy, while 'ideal-based community' demands the renunciation of one's character. Neither the familiarity nor the objectivity that stem from radicalism make it possible to create the optimum conditions for human social and political life (the public sphere, very originally conceived by Plessner, serves this purpose). A similar interpretation was proposed by the German sociologist and Plessner's peer, Alfred Meusel, who argued that radicalism expresses an 'apolitical' attitude that rejects compromise, for it characterises people who are fanatically opposed to existing orders and are prone to resentment. Thus, radicalism resembles a political religion in that it demands full devotion and uncritical 'blind faith' from its adherents (Bötticher, 2017, pp. 78–83). For Vladimir Lenin, who considered radicalism to be a childhood disease of communism, it is an expression of doctrinairism and immaturity.

Summarising, at the beginning of the 20th century, two ways of thinking about radicalism had been established: *meliorative* and *pejorative*. Some thinkers even speak of good radicalism and bad radicalism, or, as Maciej Zięba OP called it, the radicalism of pain and anger. This ambivalence has persisted to this day. Both approaches are used interchangeably to refer to both left-wing and progressive attitudes, and right-wing and conservative attitudes; thus, they are simultaneously in favour of and against various forms of social welfare. A meliorative understanding of radicalism is based on an assumption of its innovative and visionary character, whereas pejorative thinking assumes that radicalism inevitably leads to social chaos. Advocates of the revitalisation of natural communities and the restoration of hierarchies and stable institutions think in a pejorative way; however, such an attitude can also lead to fanatical and militant radicalism.

Discussion of the term

The 20th century was a century of unrest: Bolshevism, Nazism, and fascism, for example, but also decolonisation, nation-building and independence movements, the human rights movement, countless emancipation movements, new religious movements, and many others. One of the fundamental issues that concerned both scholars and the general public alike was the assessment criteria for radicalism. Various scientific disciplines and sub-disciplines have brought new interpretations to the description of its nature, causes, and consequences. These interpretations will be briefly reviewed in this section from the perspective of theories of social movements, but a legitimate and practical question needs to be answered first: do we need radicalism as an intellectual and social attitude at all? It is almost synonymous with modern times, but today its meaning is even more ambivalent than in the past. It seems that increasingly more and increasingly fewer things embody radicalism today: modern contradictions mean that alternative ways of thinking are multiplying and new lifestyles which are supposed to protect one against anomie and confusion are emerging. The market of ideas is constantly expanding. At the same time, radicalism is strikingly general and imprecise – it has lost its power to reach out to the fundamentals of human existence. Increasingly frequently, it expresses only temporary moods of suffering and anger, and – in its extreme form – transforms into various kinds of extremism.

The American philosopher and Zionist, Horace M. Kallen, argued that radicalism always includes an agenda for institutional change and thus questions the current shape and nature of the public sphere (Kallen, 1948). He claimed that it originally had a democratic and humanitarian character, but in his contemporary world it had begun to express, primarily, indignation, a sense of injustice, and moral condemnation. All ideologies – from Bolshevism to syndicalism to liberalism to fascism – have this emotional character, which is indicative of a high concentration of destructive emotions. Kallen argued that radicalism in this form was part of phenomena that is characteristic of mass society, which in the post-war period was almost universally regarded as a potential source of violence and destruction. This line of interpretation of social radicalism as a nascent product of the 'new bad times' prevailed in the first half of the 20th century until the countercultural revolution began.

In the 1960s, Egon Bittner approached radicalism from a more liberal position. This American sociologist saw radicalism as a 'pure type of social event' that could occur in any area, be it politics, religion, or the economy (Bittner, 1963, p. 928). Although the most important feature of radicalism is the rejection of a commonsensical view of the world, Bittner argued that this rebellion is also always reflexive and constructive because radicalism is close to scientific criticism. This analogy between radicalism and science was founded on the conviction that both "[...] seek a unified and internally consistent interpretation of the meaning of the world" (Bittner, 1963, p. 932). At the same time, its attempts to capture a 'meaningful order' mean that radicalism carries something of a quasi-religious message based on an all-embracing and unambiguous premise.

These two perspectives represented by Bittner and Kallen – the pejorative and the meliorative – persisted throughout the 20th century. At the time, reflections on radicalism remained closely linked to a range of g e n e r a l   i s s u e s (including democracy, capitalism, and modernity), as well as s p e c i f i c ones related, for example, to the logic of social movements. This direction is particularly noteworthy because it makes it possible to concretise radicalism and to point to its manifold sources, dynamics, and functions.

Thanks to Gustav Le Bon, and more broadly to the growing popularity of psychology, the operations of social movements and their radicalism were linked to the destructive influence of mass society. Social movements were interpreted as a dangerous deviation, an effect of the collective unconscious, and of various irrational elements. Consequently, they were a form of intoxication and elation that threatened both moral independence and social ties. It was argued that social movements bring a decline of affective life, which results in explosions of discontent and social radicalism. This could also be seen in the deprecating nomenclature that equated social movements with, for example, a 'mob', a 'horde', or a 'pack'.

A change in the understanding of social movements, as well as in the understanding of their radicalism, was brought about by the work of Herbert Blumer. Although for him the 'masses' still were an aggregate of alienated individuals, they also formed a division for taming 'social unrest'. In the theory of collective behaviour, these intuitions transformed

into the belief that social movements generate new norms. Here, radicalism was the proof of intense communicative processes and a sign of social changes that would ameliorate situations of confusion and doubt. Neil Smelser regarded radicalism ('social convulsions') as a safety valve which gives vent to social tensions; thus, he acknowledged its functional character.

Thelma McCormack observed that interpretations of radicalism are biased: "[...] if anyone's thinking can be said to have influenced the theoretical orientation of these studies, it is Freud rather than Marx" (McCormack, 1950, p. 78). Whereas psychological interpretations tended to reduce social phenomena to various irrational forces that governed people, social radicalism reduced them to something that escaped political pragmatics and was unreasonable and threatening. An example of this psychological approach is the studies on right-wing radicalism conducted by Theodor W. Adorno and colleagues, presented in his famous 1950 book *The Authoritarian Personality*.

The optics demanded by the American feminist McCormack appeared in, for example, the deprivation theory formulated in the 1950s, which was considered a Golden Age of prosperity, awakened possibilities and aspirations, and cultural changes increasingly marked by individualism. Deprivation described the mental state of an individual or a group who, when comparing themselves with 'significant others', perceived themselves as deprived of essential goods. It is precisely these perceived differences between the individual and the reference group – rather than objective differences – that lead to frustration, polarisation, and even violence. Radicalism interpreted from this perspective stems from a subjective need for justice, while a return to the roots here means the realisation of economic equality for all those close to us. Radicalism, as a rationalisation of anger and an indicator of social expectations, emerges in a period of sudden downturns after a long period of prosperity and development. For example, the Bolshevik Revolution, which concluded a brief period of downturn following decades of prosperity after the abolition of serfdom in 1861, was explained in this way.

In the 1970s, an alternative approach called rational choice theory was formulated. This analysed radicalism not as a psychological dysfunction but as the result of conscious actions and calculations and the short- and long-term benefits that people expected. From this perspective, social

radicalism became the expression of, among other things, very concrete hopes for a better life, social position, prestige, or mere publicity; at the same time, it was a perfectly rational reaction – as Mancur Olson argued – to the various selective stimuli that the individual receives from a group. This 'economy of radicalism' assumed an agenda that took into account the calculus of losses and gains. This also applied to various forms of political violence and risky extremist actions, which – from this perspective – seemed much more realistic and in line with the logic of the 'rationality of irrationality'.

The resource mobilisation theory was somewhat similar: it interpreted social movements as a manifestation of the rational management of material and immaterial social resources in response to objective dys-functions in political and social structures, including social injustice. From this perspective, radicalism was interpreted as being an instrumentally mobilised 'resource'. The accumulated resources of radicalism are not only indicative of the need to change the *status quo* but also of the fact that the status quo has already disintegrated. The roots of radicalism here are thus closely linked to the wider context of crisis.

This link is even more clearly visible in theories that describe the structure of political determinants or circumstances in the development of social movements. These are external factors that strengthen or weaken the possibilities for social mobilisation, including the attractive-ness of radical demands and the effectiveness of particular strategies and tactics. According to these theories, the direct conditions for the development of social radicalism are related to the degree of openness and the stability of the political system. It is usually emphasised that radi-cal attitudes are born more often under conditions of political centralisa-tion than under liberal systems. However, if it is assumed that radicalism originates from bold and far-reaching projects (intellectual radicalism) and thus anticipates fundamental transformations of the public sphere, then the relative comfort provided by 'open' governance and the uni-versal freedom to formulate one's conceptions of life will create better conditions for the development of radicalism than an oppressive system. Consequently, it can be argued that in places where liberalism is more abundant and favours reflection, freedom of expression, and other forms of individual and social expression, there is more radicalism, understood also as disobedience to the idea of freedom itself. This line of reasoning

may explain why the Western world (modern, liberal, and capitalist, i.e., more diverse and dynamic) produces the greatest diversity in radical attitudes.

The popularisation of constructivism in the social sciences changed sociologists' opinions on the nature of various phenomena, including the phenomenon of social radicalism. The new perspective assumed that people are meaning-makers who constantly try to make sense of their own actions and search for values which justify the meanings they make. Within social movement theories, this process is called 'ramification' and is closely linked not only to the establishment of new identities but also to the *struggle* that this entails. Radicalism is part of this struggle as it bases the master frames on the most fundamental issues, such as class struggle, human rights, or environmental protection. However, this process is arbitrary and ad hoc as constructivism assumes that the process of meaning-making and social transformation never ends.

Today, this leads to the proliferation of different forms of radicalism that express various groups' identity claims. Radicalism has become part of the culture of modern emancipation and rejection, and 'new social movements' have become its embodiment. The spiritual leader of the urban and counter-cultural movements, Saul Alinsky, argued in his 1946 book *Reveille for Radicals*, that the radical is a reformer and a humanist who anticipates a better world and an altruist who defends the human soul by fighting the surrounding evils: wars, fear, misery, and mindless, dehumanising rationalisation. The radical does not succumb to appearances and always searches for the most important things – the very essence of problems, which is a manifestation of his sincerity and a kind of 'youthfulness'. As Alinsky argues, the radical fights for freedom – not only political and economic, but also social freedom – which is why he fights for decent living conditions, equal rights, universal education, and work. Radicalism breaks with the privileges of the few, all forms of caste systems, and the hypocrisy so characteristic, he argues, of liberals. Saul Alinsky is a perfect example of the impact of the understanding of radicalism as a left-wing attitude that is still present today (especially in Anglo-Saxon culture).

In this vein, Herbert Marcuse similarly argued that overcoming typically modern pathologies such as alienation, objectification, inauthenticity, and various forms of violence in the public sphere can only be

achieved through a critical 'radical subjectivity' capable of transforming the world. His theory inspired an entire generation of global counterculturals, whose representatives were convinced that a radical spiritual and moral transformation was needed because the world was heading in the wrong direction. In the sociology of social movements, the phenomenon of post-material and cross-class radicalism was expressed by the theory of new social movements in which radicalism was defined with reference to new values such as gender, sexuality, race, peace, or health. At the same time, it seems that as modern individualism spread, radicalism increasingly became a feature of the middle class. The middle class is the most susceptible to social status disruptions but is also the most self-reflective, critical, and creative, capable of dialogue and risk. The urban middle class is a class of both emancipatory and reactionary radicalism, of aspiration and resistance, harnessed in the struggle for the public sphere.

Finally, one of the manifestations of the fundamental debate held in the second half of the 20th century concerning the limits of rationality and truth, and the effect of the massive confrontation brought about by globalisation, was a cultural reorientation of social theories. This in turn brought new reference points into the theories of social movements, which then became increasingly oriented towards the specificity and diversity of cultures. Cultures were interpreted in two ways: the traditional way, as a stable normative and symbolic order; and the modern way, as a labile and conflictual process of meaning-making. Within theories oriented towards the analysis of culture, radicalism is usually linked to the particularism of different identities and the presence of alternative sets of values and emotions.

The relativisation and pluralisation of the concept of culture has led to a situation in which increasingly more and at the same time increasingly fewer things seem to be manifestations of radicalism. Any point of view, even a subjective one, or any kind of opposition seems to be a concretisation of the values of some culture. In a homogeneous world dominated by capitalism, radicalism can be an attractive and desirable product. Any process of reclaiming and establishing identity – and the emotions that accompany it – can seem radical. The more feelings and emotional interactions are involved, the stronger the impression of radicalism. At the same time, in the multiplicity of these expressions

of culture and emotion, nothing but violence – which threatens biological survival – gets to the root of things, which is presumably why radicalism is increasingly identified with life-threatening violence, aggression, rape, and terrorism.

Systematic reflection with conclusions and recommendations

Radicalism is an ambivalent phenomenon: desirable and inadvisable, it can be a source of hope and a source of fear. In its intellectual and social form, it challenges the existing *status quo*, e.g., the consensus on basic principles, norms, and values, the logic of the scientific method, cultural patterns, religious dogmas, and political systems. Radicalism, like social movements, is capable of criticism and of a diagnosis of reality that leads to change. As a feature of rational action, radicalism can be meaningful and socially useful. But it also seeks to subvert the order of things, and its rationale for action sometimes seems inadequate and irrational. Radicalism also leads to the distortion of reality, the spreading of nonsensical prophecies and conspiracy theories, and even violence. Radicalism can also, sometimes, be the trait of fanatics obsessed with a charismatic leader for whom compromise is a manifestation of decadence and philistinism. Such a split opinion on radicalism is indicative of its arbitrary and conventional nature. Does this mean, however, that substantive interpretations of radicalism are impossible?

The Polish philosopher Grażyna Żurkowska attempts to answer this question. From the position of speculative realism, she argues that the essence of humanity is 'to transcend the patterns of helplessness produced by tradition'. Paradoxically, it is the stubborn adherence to tradition that is the source of scepticism, pessimism and, consequently, also nihilism and necroticism. Żurkowska contrasts models of helplessness with metaphors of agency that stem from mutiny, rebellion, and radicalism (Żurkowska, 2015, p. 47). This attitude emanates from dormancy, passivity, and conformity, thus it is synonymous with vigilance and strenuous attention. She argues that radicalism is a 'betrayal of orthodoxy', i.e., a rejection of available ways of knowing and responding. It is a thought process, a return to an 'embryonic state' in which

nothing has yet been decided (Żurkowska, 2015, p. 62). Radicalism does not necessarily mean anarchism and irresponsibility. It is a leap into the future and the unknown: "it is the ability to invent a better world than the one that actually is" (Żurkowska, 2015, p. 69). Ultimately, it is synonymous with creative powers, in spite of the impressions of the end of possibilities and the nagging limitations that flow from the excessive economisation, technologisation, and rationalisation of life. From this position, she praises radical democracy, which will prevent the atrophy of agentive powers and will unleash individual creativity.

Radicalism is interpreted in a similar vein by the author of this article (Rakusa-Suszczewski, 2016). The basic premise of his interpretation is the need to conceptually separate radicalism from extremism and other related concepts that have contributed to its pejorativisation. In this approach, radicalism expresses the integrity-deprived, existential condition of the seeking man, who is characterised not only by a simultaneous sense of inadequacy and awakened hopes, an attitude of rebellion, and a tendency to risk, but also by an enduring predilection to seek, and therefore by an attitude – contrary to conventional depictions – that is open to the unknown and alien. As a social phenomenon, it usually characterises social movements that demand a redefinition of the most important cognitive and normative orders. Conceived in this way, radicalism is a neutral attitude which tries to but never actually manages to transform into an attitude and worldview that is definitively complete.

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Terrorism

Summary

DEFINITION OF THE TERM: Terrorism is a diversely motivated form of political and social violence (or the threat thereof), committed in violation of the binding legal order by individuals, groups, or even states who resort to various means and methods which result in the infliction of physical, psychological, or material damage. This violence is aimed at direct or indirect targets in order to achieve a specific outcome.

HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE TERM: Terrorism has been present in different historical periods: from antiquity, through the Middle Ages, the colonial conquests, the French and Russian Revolutions, the First and Second World Wars, the Cold War, to the events of 11 September 2001 and contemporary attacks generated by state actors and non-state actors.

DISCUSSION OF THE TERM: Terrorism is the sum total of many different determinants: it is perpetrated in both physical and virtual dimensions and includes such diverse elements as the profile of the perpetrator, the forms and methods of the operation, the sources, causes, and motives of behaviour, the targets of the attacks, their consequences, and the role of counteracting and combating terrorism. Moreover, the multiplicity as well as the diversity of the various forms of terrorism should be taken into account.

SYSTEMATIC REFLECTION WITH CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: Terrorism is a timeless and global challenge that is continually evolving. It concerns many different aspects, including the tactics or strategies of terrorists' operations and covers their use of increasingly sophisticated and state-of-the-art technologies. Thus, what is required is

not only the continuous monitoring and predicting of terrorist threats but also the development of ever-new and more effective methods of combatting it.

Definition of the term

The word 'terrorism' is among the most frequently used terms in the field of security and threats related to security. At the same time, however, it is often misunderstood and confused with, e.g., terror, violence, fundamentalism, radicalism, or other forms or manifestations of the use of force or pressure. One reason for this confusion is the fact that, contrary to popular belief, terrorism is not easy to define. Despite numerous attempts, one universally accepted definition of this term has not yet been agreed on, which has complex and varied causes and consequences.

Historical analysis of the term

The word 'terrorism' originates from Sanskrit. At its root lies the Old Indian word *tras*, subsequently transformed into the Greek word *tereo* and Latin *ters* or *tres*, which meant to frighten, cause fear, horror, apprehension, etc. In later periods it was assimilated into and used in modern languages and probably came into common use during the French Revolution. At that time, however, it had a slightly different meaning as it was primarily associated with terror aimed at political opponents or employed in the establishment of a new political and social order. Before the 19th century, the term 'terrorism' was also associated with a form of government based on widespread intimidation and the use of physical force against citizens. This changed in the 19th century when terrorism was increasingly used by political movements or organisations, e.g., extreme left-wing, right-wing, or national liberation movements. Once again, the meaning of the word changed in the 1930s, when it was used to describe, on the one hand, the repressions of totalitarian states and, on the other (less frequently), the activities of revolutionary movements and the violence directed against states and their leaders (Hoffman, 2006, p. 1 ff). After World War II, terrorism was primarily associated with the revolutions taking place in, e.g., Asia, Africa, and the Middle East; in the 1960s and 1970s, it became associated with the activities of various extreme radical organisations. Another evolution within the perception of terrorism was linked with the escalation of Islamic fundamentalism

that occurred at the end of the 20th century. Since then, terrorism and fundamentalism have often been erroneously equated. The reasons for the changing perception of terrorism can be traced back to political, social, cultural, and worldview determinants.

Despite an increase in both the threat of and interest in terrorism, particularly following the attacks of 11 September 2001, no universal and widely used definition of this term has yet been developed. It is estimated that there are currently several hundred definitions of terrorism, and this number is increasing all the time, despite the efforts undertaken by academics, experts, states, and international organisations. The lack of a universally understood definition is caused by various factors. The first is the inability or impossibility to distinguish between terrorism and the issues related to it, such as terror. As a consequence, the same event can be interpreted either as a war of independence or as a manifestation of terrorism, as evidenced by the cases of Palestine, the Basque Country, Chechnya, etc. The second important reason concerns situations in which decision-making centres (e.g., politicians) or opinion-forming centres (e.g., the media) deliberately use the terms 'terrorism', 'terrorist', etc., in order to influence public opinion, discredit a person or a group, justify an action, seek to cause a distraction, or to gain popularity. A third factor that makes it difficult to develop a definition of terrorism is the attitude of some states, which frequently take advantage of the lack of a definition in order to pursue their own objectives or undertake specific actions employing terrorist methods. Another difficulty is the multiplicity of forms of terrorism and their evolution, including the formation of new types of terrorism, such as ecoterrorism or cyberterrorism. The aspirations of individuals, institutions, states, and organisations interested in promoting only their own definition and deriving various benefits – linked to their image, policies, or prestige – from it should also be mentioned here.

Analyses of existing definitions reveal their great diversity, in terms of both content and form (Wojciechowski, 2013, pp. 53–68). Summarising the most important of their shared elements, it should be emphasised that people resort to terrorism for various reasons, but in all cases terrorism is a form of political and social violence (or the threat thereof) that is committed in violation of the binding legal order by individuals, groups, or even states who resort to various means and methods which

result in the infliction of physical, psychological, or material damage. This violence is aimed at direct or indirect targets in order to achieve a specific outcome. This description highlights several important and universal characteristic features of terrorism. First, it reveals the diversity of causes (motives) which together encompass a broad spectrum of factors that generate and escalate this phenomenon. Second, it highlights the fact that these activities violate laws and lead to a broad range of consequences. Third, it underlines the fact that terrorism involves not only the activities of groups (as is often mistakenly assumed) but also of individuals (e.g., 'lone wolf' terrorism) and even states (state terrorism). Fourth, it points to the multiplicity and diversity of means and methods that can be employed by terrorists: from explosives and firearms, through speeding cars and knives, to weapons of mass destruction or attacks carried out in cyberspace.

Metaphorically speaking, terrorism can be compared to an ever-mutating virus that has a global dimension and attacks in successive waves. Such an image at the time of COVID-19 is not only timely but also highly suggestive. Years before the pandemic, this comparison was aptly expressed by Jean Baudrillard in his book entitled *The Spirit of Terrorism and Requiem for the Twin Towers*:

> Terrorism, like viruses, is everywhere. There is a global perfusion of terrorism, which accompanies any system of domination as though it were its shadow, ready to activate itself anywhere (Baudrillard, 2002, p. 10).

The question of the origins of terrorism has been the subject of numerous studies (Weinberg, 2019; Chaliand & Blin, 2016), including analysis of how it has featured in different historical periods, from antiquity, through the Middle Ages, the colonial conquests, the French and Russian Revolutions, the First and Second World Wars, and the Cold War, to the attacks of 11 September 2001, and the war on terror declared after these events.

Among numerous categorisations of terrorism, the one proposed by David C. Rapoport (2004, p. 47) is worth mentioning. He distinguished four partly overlapping stages in the history of terrorism, which he called waves. The first, the Anarchist Wave, was initiated in Russia in 1879 and ended with the outbreak of the First World War. During this period, terrorism was motivated primarily by anarchists with nationalist ideas,

with the revolution, and with the crisis of the great empires (especially the Ottoman, Habsburg, and Russian empires). The second wave, the Anti-Colonial Wave, began after the First World War in Northern Ireland and reached its climax after the Second World War. Its fundamental premise was the idea of self-determination and the process of decolonisation. The third wave, the New Left Wave, began in the second half of the 1960s and lasted till the 1990s. During this period, terrorism was closely linked to left-wing and nationalist ideas, and to the Cold War and its accompanying events. The fourth wave, the Religious Wave (sometimes also called the Jihad era), began in 1979 and culminated after the Cold War. It continues to this day and is characterised by the dominance of religious and anti-globalisation approaches. These waves do not cover the entire history of terrorism, e.g., they omit the events before 1879 in which terror/terrorism was used in different parts of the world; nor can any of them be analysed without taking into account the major processes taking place during given historical periods.

Identifying the beginnings of the stage of modern (post-modern) terrorism is also problematic (Bolechow, 2007). According to some authors it began in the early 1970s, but others say it was much earlier, i.e., in the 19th century, following the proliferation and accessibility of explosives. There are also researchers who claim that the beginning of this stage can be traced back to, e.g., the end of the Second World War, the decolonisation processes, the collapse of the communist system, the events of 11 September 2001, the escalation of terrorism in cyberspace, the killing of Osama bin Laden, the dismantling of the so-called Islamic State, or the withdrawal of NATO forces from Afghanistan in 2021.

Assessments of contemporary terrorism also vary. Samuel Huntington links it to religiously motivated violence and to the process of the 'clash of civilisations', while Gilles Kepela and Francis Fukuyama draw attention to the impact of modernisation and globalisation. Other authors focus on technological progress, including changes taking place in cyberspace, disparities between the 'rich North and poor South', asymmetrical threats, the role of the media, the spread of cyberspace, and the COVID-19 pandemic. Regardless of the position taken, the ongoing evolution of terrorist threats in terms of both the content and the form of operation should be emphasised. In some cases, however, even in relation to selected methods employed by terrorists (e.g., using

knives, spreading panic, intimidating, or kidnapping hostages) or their aims and motives (e.g., political, religious, economic), it is not so much about evolution but about the timeless nature of terrorism.

Discussion of the term

Terrorism is the sum of the various different elements and processes or mechanisms that shape it. In 1988, in an effort to capture its essence and specificity, Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman examined 22 elements present in 109 definitions of terrorism created between 1936 and 1981 (Schmid & Jongman, 1988); in 2002, another team of researchers (Leonard Weinberg, Ami Pedahzur, and Sivan Hirsch-Hoefler) examined 73 definitions formulated between 1977 and 2001 (Weinberg, Pedahzur & Hirsch-Hoefler, 2004). Their analyses took into account a wide range of characteristics or elements of terrorism, including those of a political, social, psychological, legal, cultural, economic, etc., nature. Both analyses demonstrated that it is difficult to produce a concise list of the components of terrorism. One of the main obstacles is the large number of factors they identified; therefore, in an elementary model of terrorism such a list is limited to seven key aspects:

1. Perpetrators – the actors responsible for initiating, organising, financing, or carrying out terrorist attacks.
2. Forms – the perpetrators' methods of operation, including how attacks are prepared, carried out, financed, etc.
3. The perpetrators' reasons and motives.
4. The targets of attacks.
5. Geography – where the attacks take place and their number/scale.
6. The diverse range of consequences of terrorist attacks.
7. Tactics and strategies for preventing and combating terrorism.

Diagram 1: Elementary model of terrorism

Source: own elaboration.

In order to understand the nature and specificity of terrorism, it is necessary to analyse these seven components as well as identify the interactions between them, as each of these can influence other aspects of terrorism. For example, a perpetrator-terrorist and his associates will influence, to a greater or lesser extent, the method of operation, the target or targets chosen, and the location of the attack. On the other hand, the method of attack can correspond to the aims, consequences, or motives of the operation. Moreover, the elements presented above do not exhaust the full spectrum of possibilities and their list can be extended to include further considerations such as when and under what circumstances an attack takes place.

The sources or causes of terrorism are particularly relevant and can be analysed in various ways, one of which is the concept of the extended triad of terrorist motivation, which is based on three main groups of determinants:

A. The first is the various ideas/ideologies of a political, ethnic, religious, or other nature with which a terrorist identifies. The origins of terrorism can be found not only in the existence or promotion of various often very extreme and destructive ideas or ideologies, but also in their confrontational nature. In this context, terrorism is seen as a very radical reflection of certain beliefs, attitudes, or convictions. It is also often the result of a conflict of political, religious, ethnic, or other interests, or an attempt to achieve certain objectives 'at any cost', regardless of losses – both human and material.

Different studies and analyses reveal that the role of religious deter-minants as the primary cause for terrorism is gradually increasing. For example, in the 1980s, only a small percentage of all terrorist attacks worldwide were religiously motivated; later, however, it rap-idly exceeded 50%. At present it varies regionally: it is very high in the Middle East and Asia but low in Latin America. It should be emphasised that terrorism can occur within different fundamentalist factions of religious communities. Moreover, it cannot be identified only with fundamentalist, separatist, far-right, or left-wing threats: terrorism can also take other forms linked to the antiglobalisation, alterglobalisation, environmental, and pacifist movements.

B. The second group includes economic and social determinants which are related to diverse and large-scale problems, including poverty, illiteracy, and the huge disparities between individuals, countries, or regions. These problems can trigger or exacerbate various social attitudes (e.g., discontent, frustration, protest, rebellion, or hostility) or radical activities, including terrorism. This does not mean, of course, that poverty or huge social dis-parities (sometimes called terrorist fuel) always lead to terrorism, but these factors can stimulate a range of extreme behaviours, including terrorism. Another aspect linked to economic determi-nants is the accumulation and spending of substantial financial resources by both terrorists and the actors they collaborate with. This money can come from a wide variety of sources, such as kidnapping for ransom, robbery, racketeering, theft, cybercrime, the production and trafficking of drugs, weapons, raw materials, works of art or people, but also smuggling, donations, and more. As a result, some terrorist organisations are capable of amassing huge financial resources which, in 2016 for example, were as fol-lows: (in US dollars) Al-Qaida, 15–50 million; Hamas, 70 million; Hezbollah, 200–500 million; the Taliban, over 500 million; and the so-called Islamic State (ISIS), 2000–4000 million.

C. The third category covers psychological aspects (Horgan, 2014) including a range of negative attitudes such as aggression, fear, hostility, and the desire for revenge. Increased levels of prejudice, hatred, a sense of threat, humiliation, or harm often make it easier to manipulate a person and make them more willing to engage in

extreme activities (e.g., suicide bombers). In such bombers' communities, these acts are frequently seen as heroic. This category also includes mental disorders, chauvinism, xenophobia, prejudice, and stereotypes, all of which, directly or indirectly, contribute to the occurrence or exacerbation of intolerance, hostility, violence, or terror.

Figure 2. The extended triad of terrorist motivations

ideas/ideologies

targets

psychological aspects

economic and social determinants

Source: own elaboration.

The aims that terrorists directly or indirectly want to achieve and which stimulate or intensify their activities are inscribed into these categories. These aims – which can be of an ideological, economic, social, or psychological nature – are manifested in, e.g., inducing fear, intimidation, or manipulation. These categories overlap, interact, and create a mechanism called the extended triad of terrorist motivation. They do not, of course, cover the entire spectrum of determinants concerning the causes or sources of terrorism and terrorists' motives. Understanding and countering the sources of terrorism is a very difficult, long-term, and complex challenge; however, it is the proverbial 'key' to reducing or eliminating terrorist threats, both locally and globally.

Systematic reflection with conclusions and recommendations

Terrorist attacks occur around the world every day. Terrorism is a timeless and global challenge. Information gathered by the Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP), which also uses TerrorismTracker data, reveals

that more than 60,000 terrorist incidents were reported worldwide between 2007 and 2021 alone, including more than 20,000 in the Middle East and North Africa. The number of attacks and their consequences vary in terms of, e.g., human or financial losses and depend, among other things, on the region under consideration. For years, the following four regions have suffered the greatest number of terrorist attacks: the Middle East, North Africa, South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa.

Despite the numerous and diverse problems the international community faces, it must not neglect the threat of terrorism, which is very much on the rise. In 2021, for example, the number of attacks worldwide increased by as much as 17% from the year before: from 4,458 in 2020 to 5,226 in 2021, which is the highest number of attacks since 2007. To a large extent, this escalation was caused by an increase in violence in the Sahel zone (e.g., Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso) and political instability in several other regions, including Afghanistan and Myanmar (Burma). In contrast, in the West (i.e., as assumed in the Report, Western Europe, North America, Australia, and New Zealand), the number of attacks is gradually decreasing. In 2021, only 59 were recorded, which is a decrease of as much as 68% compared to the record-breaking year 2018 (Global, 2022). However, this does not necessarily signal a permanent trend; it could change in future years. The reports issued by the U.S. Department of State's Bureau of Counterterrorism emphasise that terrorist threats are increasingly geographically dispersed and that some forms of terrorism are experiencing extremely rapid growth, as exemplified by far-right terrorism, which has escalated by as much as 320% globally in the last five years. Once again, the ISIS cells which operate in various parts of the world are gradually regaining lost influence and becoming an increasingly serious problem. Other terrorist networks, such as those created and recreated by al-Qaeda (Country, 2021) as well as attacks carried out in cyberspace, are also a significant challenge.

Both terrorism and the war on terror that was waged in response to it generate enormous costs. As calculated by experts from the Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs (which is a research centre at Brown University in Providence), from the time of the attacks on the World Trade Center towers in September 2001 until August 2021. when the Taliban seized power in Afghanistan, the total cost of the war on terror exceeded USD 8 trillion (in the case of Afghanistan alone, it amounted to

USD 2.26 trillion). In addition, it has resulted in the deaths of more than 800,000 people, including 335,000 civilians, and more than 37 million people have had to flee their places of residence (Watson, 2021).

Terrorism can be compared to old wine served from time to time in new bottles. It is a challenge that continues to evolve and entails many different aspects, including tactics or strategies employed by terrorists ranging from the ancient Assassins or Sicarii to modern cyberterrorists or lone wolves (Wejkszner, 2018). Among other things, this means terrorists' use of increasingly modern and sophisticated technologies, including artificial intelligence, which controls, e.g., armed robots, vehicles, or drones on the battlefield and carries out attacks in cyber-space. Drones are of particular interest here as they have already been used by various terrorist organisations (e.g., Hamas, ISIS or Hezbollah). The attraction of drones for terrorists includes features such as their relatively low cost, the ease of manufacturing or acquiring the equip-ment, their operational capacity over long distances, and the effect of surprise, distraction or creating an atmosphere of fear. Another example of the use of modern technological solutions by terrorists is the use of 3D printing, e.g., to produce weapons or other dangerous devices such as knives or expandable batons. Further threats relate to the use of deep fake technologies which are used to, e.g., manipulate broadcast content, blackmail individuals (including those who hold important public functions), or impersonate them in order to illegally obtain money or information. Cryptocurrencies are another increasingly popular tool with terrorists, e.g., to finance their activities. Autonomous vehicles can also be used in terrorist attacks, e.g., by directing them into a crowd. All this can result not only in an increase in the number of attacks and victims but also in terrorist acts being carried out anywhere in the world, which directly translates into a significant reduction in both the level and the sense of security experienced. Advanced technologies can be used by terrorists both offensively to carry out attacks, and defensively to be used in response to the measures taken by the services that fight them. This takes on a particularly dangerous dimension when the state uses terrorist methods (e.g., North Korea or Russia) or when state structures cooperate with terrorist groups (e.g., Iran).

In addition, other methods of terrorist operations are also still very dangerous, ranging from attacks using the simplest devices such as

knives or bombs, through hijackings or attacks in cyberspace, to the threat of using weapons of mass destruction, e.g., in the form of bio-terrorism. The latter threat has particularly intensified in the context of COVID-19 (Wojciechowski, 2022, pp. 9–18). The pandemic has also influenced the tactics and strategies used by terrorist groups and shifted a significant part of their activities to cyberspace, where the processes of radicalisation, recruitment, hate speech, and manipulation have fur-ther intensified (Global, 2022, pp. 14–15). Thus, it is necessary not only to constantly monitor and forecast terrorist threats but also to develop ever-new and more effective methods to combat them. This includes but is not limited to such areas as financing terrorism, eliminating the causes and links between terrorists and their supporters, socio-psychological profiling of potential or actual perpetrators of attacks, terrorists' use of technological innovations and different types of viruses or bacteria, as well as their activity in cyberspace.

Countering terrorist threats requires close, comprehensive, and, most importantly, effective cooperation between states, institutions, and international organisations, as well as a combination of offensive and defensive measures. The pentagonal model of countering terrorism is a good illustration here.

Figure 3. The pentagonal model for countering terrorism

Source: own elaboration.

The first component is prevention, understood primarily as the totality of measures aimed to dissuade individuals or groups from opting for any form of terrorist activity. The second component is combating, which means, among other things, identifying (finding information about terror-ists or terrorist group, including the number of people involved, the form of operation, links, etc.), disarming, punishing, and then preventing the re-establishment of the dismantled terrorist structure, its communication systems, sources of funding, etc. Another aspect involves protection,

whose aim is to maintain as fully and effectively as possible the security of the persons and/or the entire infrastructure threatened by terrorist attacks. This is a very complex task which must be carried out on a continuous basis, taking into account constantly emerging new threats. This not only increases the costs incurred but also makes the functioning of the security services more difficult. The penultimate aspect is response, which entails a range of activities aimed at minimising and dealing with the consequences of a possible terrorist attack as quickly as possible. The last dimension is forecasting, which includes analyses of actual and potential targets, methods of operation, and profiles of potential perpetrators. Forecasting is a link that unites the four previous elements and takes into account the interactions between them (Wojciechowski & Osiewicz, 2017). However, the practical implementation of this model is not a simple task as it is hampered not only by the multiplicity of other global problems and the scale of terrorist threats, but above all by the ever-changing nature of terrorism.

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Armed forces

Summary

DEFINITION OF THE TERM: Armed forces are armed and specialised formations with a monopoly on the use of force in external relations. They are an element of the political system of the state and an instrument for the exertion of international influence. They should be used exclusively for the realisation of the interests – created by society – of the state and should conduct military operations in accordance with the regulations of international law.

HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE TERM: The development of a state's armed forces is determined by the apparatus of power which exists in any given period. The armed forces as we know them today began in the modern era; however, in practice it happened in the post-modern era, which has resulted in the establishment of social control over the armed forces and is reflected in how the state creates its security policy.

DISCUSSION OF THE TERM: The article presents how armed forces function in the organisational structure of the state, taking into account historical processes and contemporary political and legal determinants. It is assumed that armed forces in a post-modern state play the role of an instrument for exerting international influence, which is why it is vital to properly match the concept of building their potential and plans for their use to the strategic objectives of the state. Of equal importance is the implementation of an effective system of control which ensures that their potential is used to achieve the interests of the state rather than the interests of those who are currently in power.

SYSTEMATIC REFLECTION WITH CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: Armed forces are an integral part of the political system

of the state: as well as co-creating its power and the extent of its sovereignty, they ensure the security of citizens and state institutions. The specificity of the tasks assigned to them means they should have specific military potential, which should correspond to the state's long-term policies in the area of exerting international influence and the defence of its territory.

Definition of the term

In the post-modern era, it is widely accepted that the armed forces guarantee the security of the state; this security is defined as ensuring the political and territorial sovereignty of the state and ensuring its functioning within the adopted political system. The armed forces constitute one of the basic elements of the state's political system, to which the political authorities, with society's approval, have granted the power to exercise force. Formally, this power is limited to external operations and responding to any attempt to overthrow its political system; this power is always conducted on behalf of the state. The instruments possessed by the armed forces in the form of their c o m b a t p o t e n t i a l are used to deter potential aggressors/opponents, to counteract armed aggression, and to conduct traditional military combat. Nowadays, the definition of armed forces is derived from the term 'army' rather than from the term 'troops', which indicates that this is a consequence of the emergence of armed formations other than ground forces (traditionally defined as an army). The emergence of the navy, followed by the military air force, as independent military formations was an important factor in the transformation of 'army'/'troops' into 'armed forces'. Of equal importance was the ruler's control over the operations of the army and the need for the ground forces and the navy to conduct coordinated operations during wars. The successively widening scope of joint military operations (which were prototypes of modern combined operations) and the political authorities' need to restrict the independence of army commanders led to diverse forms of consolidation of these formations. This consolidation was also used to weaken the political position of the army commander (army command) and to firmly subordinate military formations to the political authorities of the state. This was achieved by equating the status of independent armed formations (usually called branches of the military) and by creating a superstructure in the form of a commander in chief. This structure came to be called 'the armed forces of the state'. The branches that operate within this structure enjoy relative autonomy with respect to each other and have their own equivalent command structures (commands), which are subordinated to the political authorities of the state. This solution allows for civilian control over the army/armed forces, which can also include the separation of

command positions within the branches into training and organisational functions (an inspector of a branch), and a strict command function (the commander of military operations of a branch); both have a comparable status in the organisational system of armed forces.

The second reason for building multi-formation armed forces is that they can be used to demonstrate the strength and capabilities of the state's military potential. The expansion of particular branches of the armed forces (e.g., aircraft carriers in the navy) or the creation of a new forma-tion (e.g., space forces) are intended to indirectly demonstrate the power of the state. Regardless of the organisational structure of the command and the principles according to which the 'armed forces of the state' are subordinated to the political authorities, they embody three essential char-acteristics of an 'army': they determine the scope of the state's imperial aspirations and its aspirations to play a role in the sphere of international relations; they guarantee the sustainability of its functioning as a politi-cal player, and they are obliged to use their potential in the interests of the state (or the power apparatus in the case of non-democratic states). Guided by this premise, 'armed forces' should be defined as the armed formations of a state which are the only element that guarantees its sur-vival as a political entity and supports the pursuit of its interests in the international arena. Armed forces consist of different types of troops. In the opinion of the author of this article, the way in which armed forces are used by contemporary non-democratic regimes makes it legitimate to question this definition. The forms in which authoritarian regimes use armed formations for operations against civilians – frequently also against their own society – justifies asking whether they can be regarded as the armed forces of a modern state, which is a political entity whose sov-ereigns are the citizens that comprise its political system. This debate should focus on the ways in which military force is used in the politics of states and on the division of armed formations into:

- Forces that operate in accordance with the rules of international law and those that fail to do so;
- Forces that operate on behalf of a democratic state and are con-trolled by its citizens and those that only pursue the objectives of the political regime in power.

This approach, which also takes into account the principles of politi-cal subordination of military formations that have existed for centuries,

allows a new classification of armed formations of states to be developed. In the author's opinion, the term 'armed forces' should refer to armed formations of democratic states with strong civilian control over the military potential of the state, which is used in accordance with the regulations of international law. In contrast, armed formations of authoritarian states or regimes that are not recognised by the international community and those that do not apply the universal rules of warfare should be referred to using the terms 'troops' or 'army'.

Historical analysis of the term

The process of transformation of an army into armed forces follows the evolution of how military operations are conducted (the tactics of warfare) and the modification of the forms of control over its command. Historically, army formations from antiquity to modernity can be summed up as the creation and combat preparation of independent detachments and, later, armed formations. These were recruited from diverse backgrounds, but their distinguishing feature was their subordination to a ruler of a certain level. In principle, these armies can be divided into mercenary armies and unpaid slave and citizen armies, although this is a rather general division and some authors suggest making it more precise (the best-known divisions are those by M. Weber and P. Allum, and in Poland by J. Wiatr). In antiquity, the predominant forms of army organisation were slave armies and fyrds. In the Middle Ages, these solutions evolved, depending on the specific forms of ownership and governance; fyrds were gradually replaced by armies made up of the indentured servants of the ruler or of troops created by indentured servants themselves, usually with the help of a 'condottiero'. This limited the monarchs' ability to control such troops and led to their attempts to build their own armies. The predominant solution from the 16th century onwards was the creation of mercenary armies (e.g., the Varangian Guard, established as early as in the 10th century, the Swiss Guard, and the Landsknechts; today this role is taken over by private military companies (PMCs)). These troops were, however, capable of abandoning their principal and/or resorting to various forms of plunder. Another negative feature of the strict subordination of the army to the monarch

was the imposition of organisational arrangements that minimised the possibility of an army turning against its monarch. This amounted to limiting the efficiency and combat potential of an army, which indirectly led to weakening the state's defence capabilities and thus created the threat of aggression from a stronger political player. Attempts to solve this problem were undertaken in the modern era, resulting in the creation of various concepts of the functioning of national armies. The way in which armies functioned was usually based on Plato's and, to a lesser extent, Aristotle's reflections on how armies function within a community and in the state's structure. Plato's thesis that the transclass (mass) armies of *polis* guaranteed the survival of its system was particularly valuable. The following ideas taken from Plato's thought were applied: the creation of an army, the remuneration of soldiers, the right to use arms, and the issue of control over the army's attitude towards the state authorities. In addition to the placement of a strong army within the state's structure (including control over armed formations and the extent of the commanders' sovereignty), the integration of an army into the process of implementing the state's politics was also considered a vitally important issue. The concept of using a national army as an instrument for achieving the interests of the state was based on Niccolò Machiavelli's vision, which involved skilfully binding army officers with state structures, and some Greek philosophers' ideas (e.g., military training of citizens and equipping them with arms based on the assumption that they would use them against any external or internal enemy identified by a ruler). Rejecting the mercenary or fiefdom armies advocated by Machiavelli, who called these formations 'auxiliary', it was recognised that the strength of the state should be based on an army composed of its own citizens and equipped and funded by the monarch. Command functions were to be held by officers who were trained by the state and were faithful to it.

The process of building national armies was initiated in the 17th century, based on conscription and a caste of professional officers who were graduates of military academies, which led to a significant improvement in an army's combat potential. The introduction of uniform rules for the training of officers made it possible to implement tactical procedures, while training at the individual level sought to develop the ethos of a soldier who serves the state and is faithful to its ideals. This also broadened

the spectrum of an army's tasks that went beyond tactical or operational objectives (i.e., a victory in battle, a crushing defeat of the enemy army, or the capture of an entrepôt). Armies pursued strategic ventures to gain political dominance in a given region. This also led to their internal reconstruction, which can be defined as the creation of a nationally homogeneous military force designed to implement the state's policies. Armies were characterised by the variability of their headcount in peace and war and their ability to mobilise quickly. They were modelled on the French solutions from the era of Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte, particularly the compulsory military service of men between the ages of 18 and 25, which resulted in the establishment of army reserves, the application of a uniform process for combat training, and a rapid increase in the size of armed formations (Brun, 1956; Keegan, 1988). Some of the founding fathers in the US cast doubts on the role such an army should play in defending the state. J. Adams, S. Adams, and J. Madison, for example, advocated civilian militias for fear that a contract army might not only alienate itself from the young American community, but also, following the example of mercenary formations, turn against it or against the emerging system of government (S. Adams). The discussion that arose in 1776 led to the creation of the solutions still used in the US armed forces today: not only political but also social control over the armed forces, an emphasis on creating patriotic attitudes, recognition that service in the armed forces should be treated as a civic duty, and the creation of a specific formula of remuneration by the state in the form of bonuses (initially these were socio-political, i.e., related to political rights, but are now mostly socio-economic).

The modern 'national army', as an ethnically homogeneous formation created by the citizens of the state and subordinated to its authorities, can be treated as a forerunner of today's 'armed forces'. It was dedicated to the implementation of the state's politics and was part of the system of authority. Its evolution, which lasted until the second half of the 20th century, was the result of the rapid development of armaments and, consequently, of operational art. The widely recognised 'milestones' of this process were the Crimean War (1853–1856), the introduction of the spire rifle into the equipment of the Prussian army, the manner in which Helmut von Moltke defeated the army of Napoleon III (a skilfully executed and artfully commanded military operation), and the subsequent

equipping of the army with new types of weaponry. WW1 and WW2 played a significant role in the transformation of national armies. Since around 1916, military success has been determined by technologically advanced armaments, the use of mobile means of communication, and command skills linked to the proper coordination of operations of different combat formations. The importance of armed formations other than ground forces has also increased, as is evidenced by the reliance on submarines, naval aviation, and combat aviation. The ability gained through these means of combat to control shipping and to support land operations, reconnaissance, interception, strategic bombardment, and air defence has fundamentally changed the form of warfare and the meaning of the state's combat potential, which have become dependent on the economic power and technological advancement of the state. The legitimisation of irregular armed forces is a side effect of these determinants. These formations, mainly volunteer detachments, various militias, or guerrilla groups, operated in states with limited capacity to build their own strong army or in situations where their army has been destroyed on the battlefield. Nowadays, irregular formations also include armed groups which carry out operations against the existing state authorities and the society that supports them (or possibly external forces that support a given regime). Irregular formations focus on conducting indirect operations and avoiding direct confrontation with regular army forces; moreover, they sometimes also disregard the provisions of the international humanitarian law of armed conflict.

The operational tactics of irregular formations and the broadening of the spectrum of military operations resulted in a situation in which the greatest operational challenge faced by a regular army was to develop effective cooperation between its different formations – both those engaged in combat and those providing logistical support. The solutions that were developed in the inter-war period and applied during the Second World War sought to improve the art of operational activities and forms of conducting military operations. The division of an army into three branches – ground forces, the air force, and the navy – became a standard solution, and the various attempts at cooperation between these armed formations were quite a new experience in this period. Taking into account the role of particular military formations, the actual division of the commands of the different branches, and the operations

that were considered prototypes of combined operations, it can be assumed that since then, in organisational terms, states no longer had 'armies' but 'armed forces'. This was not tantamount to treating armed forces as a military formation controlled by a sovereign, as they were controlled by the power elites. This issue became extremely important during the 'Cold War'. Initially, during the period of development of nuclear capabilities, the form of political control over the command of armies that possessed weapons of mass destruction became a key issue. This was later extended to include control over the state authorities that were threatening to use them or to provoke a war in which these weapons could be used. In practice, throughout the entire period of two-bloc rivalry and the construction of the post-Cold War international security architecture, there were three dimensions to the functioning of a state's armed forces:

- the possibility of controlling the armed forces that were being used for military operations (e.g., various confidence-building measures in the international arena and social control over the political and military operations of the state);
- analyses of changing forms of military operations and the use of modern armaments;
- control over arms proliferation (for more details see Balcerowicz 2006, 2010).

These solutions have added new dimensions to the evolution of the role played by armed forces in the state. Analyses of military potential and the strategic and operational forms of its use were extended by analyses of the extent of control over political and military decision-making bodies and the position of armed forces in the political system. This last issue became a matter of concern for societies of democratic states and developed into widespread opposition to the participation of mass armies in proxy wars waged by rival political-military blocs. The anti-war attitude of societies and the technological advances that enabled the use of precision-guided munitions led to the abandonment of the concept of a mass army. In the post-modern world, which is called 'McWorld' or the 'Global Village' in the sphere of international relations, military operations aimed at stabilising the global situation became a necessity. During this period, armed forces began to function as professional armies supplemented by various solutions which increased their

human potential, including 'mixed' solutions, which combined a professional component and conscription (Moskos, Williams & Segal, 2007), and PMC formations. Contemporary armed forces are characterised by four features: a high level of professionalisation, the ability to exploit the characteristics of the environment to achieve an operational objective, the creation of operational forces from different military formations, and the shifting of the decision-making centre to the lowest possible level (Czupryński, 2009, pp. 199–207; Dandeker, 1994, pp. 637–654; Dandeker, 1995, pp. 23–38; Moskos et al, 2007, pp. 1–11, 265–275).

Discussion of the term

In order to properly embed armed forces in the organisational structure of the state, it is necessary to define the purpose of the creation of an armed formation and the role it is supposed to play. Armed forces are usually regarded as guaranteeing the exertion of external influence, as planned by the authorities. At the same time, they may play the role of a political force which has the potential to threaten established principals and take control of the state. For this reason, contemporary discussions on armed forces focus on the adjustment of their potential to the pursuit of the interests of the state, the scale of expenditure on their maintenance in the context of the rationality of the state budget, the implementation of social and development policies, and the convergence of the political authorities' decisions and social expectations regarding the forms in which they are used. As they are part of the organisational structure of the state apparatus, armed forces are subject to certain procedures and political supervision, usually exercised by the executive and legislative authorities, and sometimes also by society (e.g., via an Ombudsman).

The organisation of modern armed forces and the shaping of their capabilities. After the 'Cold War' period and based on Francis Fukuyama's 'end of history' thesis, there was an attempt to make armed forces defensive. It was assumed that offensive operations, which were equated with military aggression, were incompatible with international law and would not be undertaken. New political realities and the emergence of non-state and informal international players and non-democratic regimes that resort to force have modified

this assumption. In the 21st century, the traditional tasks of armed forces have been broadened to include means of countering 'non-traditional' threats and attempts to ensure security. Internationally, how the armed forces are used has been restricted by the principle that the maintenance of peace, stability, and international order must be achieved based on the provisions of the UN Charter. The use of force has been linked to specific political and military requirements. Nowadays, the latter include both the remarkable developments in science and knowledge that have enabled the implementation of new technologies, and the progressive computerisation of production and socio-economic life (Balcerowicz, 2010, pp. 217–218). This directly influenced the process of shaping the combat potential of armed forces and the specific conditions of their use; indirectly, it led to the expansion of their organisational structure. The traditional triad, i.e., the three branches of armed forces (ground forces, the navy, and the air force), was expanded with special forces, such as the naval infantry, space forces, the military police, and various forms of reserve or militia-type components (e.g., the national guard). The meaning of the term 'army branches' has also been modified, and nowadays it refers to the component parts of both ground and air forces. The multiplicity of armed formations that make up modern armed forces and the dependence in how they are organised on the concept of the state's international activity makes it difficult to classify their organisational structure, which is defined by the state authorities in various normative acts of law. For this reason, a general classification of armed forces is based on the conception of the use of individual formations in the state's political and military activities. A distinction is thus made between regular armed forces, sometimes called operational forces, and auxiliary and reserve armed forces. Operational forces conduct military operations and consist of an operational component and logistical support. Auxiliary forces are non-military but militarised formations whose technical and combat capabilities allow them to support operational forces. Reserve forces are volunteer formations and mobilised formations which strengthen the potential of regular forces. In this organisational system, the structure of the operational forces results from the tasks assigned by the state within the framework of its security policy and the determinants of interstate cooperation. In the 1990s, some states with medium potential, which nevertheless wanted to take

an active part in stabilising the international order, attempted to separate the defence component from the expeditionary component. However, this turned out to be a mistake and was replaced by modifying training programmes and technical equipment and, within a transnational dimension, by processes of standardisation and interoperability. In these solutions, regular armed forces are prepared to conduct operations on their own territory as well as outside it, and the combat resources and logistical facilities they have at their disposal allow them to move quickly to a designated area and take action in accordance with the adopted operational plan. The way in which armed forces are constructed is the direct result of the defence plan adopted by a state, which accounts for its defence capabilities (e.g., defensive self-reliance or the need for allied support), spatial determinants, the military potential of the aggressor, and the adopted formula for conducting defensive operations. However, the size of the military component is still the fundamental issue; in determining this, the scale of influence of four groups of factors should be taken into account:

- the potential and real capabilities for shaping the regional situation which are at the disposal of the state players interested in creating or co-creating the regional international order;
- the combat capabilities possessed by the regional players, including their military potential, economic base, and capacity to replenish reserves;
- the spatial layout of the region and the territory of the state in terms of the possibility of carrying out specific political, economic, and military operations based on political and military linkages, economic pressure (e.g., an economic blockade, an embargo, the withholding of supplies, etc.), and covert military action;
- socio-political integrity, including the level of societal approval for the obligation imposed on people to defend their state.

It is assumed that the potential of armed forces (i.e., the military might of the state) should be adapted to the state's political objectives and its international activity, and it should be coordinated with the state's political, economic, and informational potential. The mutual complementarity of these instruments for exerting international influence makes it possible to achieve the adopted strategic objectives. A state's use of military power alone sometimes leads to apparent military success but will ultimately

result in strategic failure, therefore the state should also take into account changes in the area of security which go beyond existing international regulations. The determinants of the use of military force include:

- the increasing role of preventive measures, political-military interventions and peace-making initiatives, and the recognition that these are forms of action that are equivalent to military deterrence, a show of force, or low-intensity conflict;
- acknowledging that the objective of any military operation is to bring about stable peace on one's terms (also using mediation) rather than to occupy the territory of an opponent;
- attempts to coerce the population of the attacked state to seek peace and, consequently, to exert pressure on its government to agree a peace deal based on the terms of the aggressor (achieved through, e.g., social engineering and the destruction of critical and social infrastructure);
- a modification of the formula for conducting military operations, which in the first stage is focused on thwarting the adversary's operations and then on neutralising its potential;
- the adversary's capacity to undertake asymmetric (hybrid) operations, which requires armed forces to employ police methods, including those aimed to combat crime, and to account for the political and social consequences of operations against civilians and critical infrastructure (Mickiewicz & Kasprzycki, 2021).

These processes have led to an increase in the importance of operational art and, indirectly, affected the way in which armed forces are organised. A contemporary requirement is to have a well-organised logistics facility (i.e., f o c u s e d   l o g i s t i c s – FL) in the structure of operational forces, and a 'flat' hierarchical structure of armed forces, especially when conducting military operations. Such a structure restricts the essence of the hierarchical nature of the organisational structure and the capacity of the operational-level commander to control the form of the tactical operations conducted. This phenomenon is countered by recommendations issued in the Rules of Engagement (ROE) formula, i.e., political and legal constraints on military operations, which are also formulated within the framework of civilian control over armed forces.

These processes have led to the increased role of operational art, which has indirectly influenced the way armed forces are organised. Their

potential is based on training specialists to operate highly technologically advanced weaponry and to implement solutions that synchronise the operations of different military formations (combined operations), which ensure the possibility of speedy operations and precise strikes.

Civil-military relations. The position of armed forces in the political system of the state and their relationship with society indirectly affects the level of democratisation of the state. The aim of a state's policies is to maintain the combat potential of its armed forces at a level that ensures the security of the state and the pursuit of its strategic interests, while also restricting their power in the political system, which usually means reducing it to the role of a body which co-implements the security policies adopted by the state. This is achieved by various methods, the most fundamental of which is civilian control based on the following principles:

- a precisely defined range of competences and relations between civilian and military authorities and administrative bodies, divided into basic forms of international relations (i.e., peace, crisis, and war);
- security and foreign policy that is transparent to society and the armed forces, including the justification of investments in military infrastructure and the use of the military component in situations other than war;
- transparent hierarchy of the command structure of armed forces which emphasises the dominant position of the civilian power apparatus (a civilian, apolitical Ministry of Defence and an armed forces leadership body integrated with it, e.g., the General Staff);
- effective forms of institutional control over armed forces and transparency of the state's defence and security policy (control powers of clearly defined institutions and state bodies, publicly available and complete information on the determinants of the security policy pursued by the state);
- full apoliticality of armed forces (Cottey, Edmonts & Foster, 2002, p. 7).

In practice, these activities can be described as the pursuit of real opportunities for civilian control over the military through the introduction of legal and organisational solutions. However, how these solutions are enforced depends on both the political system of the state and the

political culture of its society, its political elites, and its military elites. Researchers of civil-military relations have formulated several theoretical models of their enforcement based on case studies. In practice, these models assume either a strict division of competences between the political (civilian) and military spheres, or subject-based forms of cooperation between the two spheres in the process of creating and implementing security policy. They are based on the recognition that civilian authorities – as those responsible for the security of the state – create security policy based on the opinions and recommendations of independent analytical centres (experts) rather than military centres. Civilian authorities are decision-making structures, which is supposed to minimise the risk of armed forces exercising excessive influence on strictly political decisions. Whereas military authorities – within the adopted formal and legal framework – have autonomy in managing the substantive and administrative aspects of armed forces' operations (which is called the sphere of military command), their role is to carry out tasks assigned to armed forces using the instruments and resources at their disposal. This leads to a situation in which the command of the armed forces, when applying for funds to build up the necessary military potential, attempt to gain influence on the state's politic. The interdependence of civilian authorities and military authorities poses one of the most significant problems in the functioning of armed forces and their role in the state. Samuel Huntington is widely considered the creator of contemporary theories on this interdependence, and his concept of the controlled alienation of the armed forces has been critically analysed and modified by other scholars (notably Morris Janowitz, Charles C. Moskos, John Allen Williams, David R. Segal, Rebecca L. Schiff, Peter D. Feaver, Eric A. Nordlinger, Amos Perlmutter, and Eliot Cohen and Michael C. Desh). J.A.A. von Doorn's theory is also sometimes mentioned in this context: in his opinion, it is impossible for armed forces to be apolitical, thus their ideological model – defined by civilian authorities – should be based on close links to the state's politics (Van Doorn, 1969; Van Doorn, 1975, pp. 147–157). Without undertaking a detailed analysis of other academics' concepts, it is worth mentioning that they usually refer to Samuel Huntington's thesis that armed forces are characterised by professionalization, specifically created corporatism (Huntington, 1957, pp. 8–10; Huntington, 1995, pp. 9–10; Finer, 1962, p. 7; Janowitz, 1960, p. 36), and political

neutrality, and that their command accepts the political leadership of the state authorities. They also follow Huntington's division of civilian control over armed forces into two types: objective and subjective. It is also widely accepted that the necessary solution is to properly integrate armed forces into the political system of the state, which would allow them to be subordinated to the political apparatus (i.e., the state authorities). This solution does not rule out the alienation of armed forces or their command, which usually manifests in prioritising corporate interests over state interests, attempting to protect their position in the state, or demanding the continuous strengthening of combat potential, especially armaments. In extreme situations, this can lead to military intervention, which could be a traditional coup or some form of exerting pressure or manipulating public opinion. For this reason, the formula of institutional control over armed forces in the state should be complemented by both legal regulations concerning the scope of their autonomy and the proper organisation of the state security system. The state security system should not only unambiguously nominate the armed forces as its executive element subordinated to the central administrative structure but also specify their role in the context of relations with other subsystems (e.g., social safety, civil protection, and economic security). The task of armed forces should be restricted to the defence of the state against external threats. Ensuring internal security and order should be regarded as an additional task, albeit limited in various ways (depending on the state's political culture, the characteristics of the threat, and the organisation of the non-military subsystem). Internal security should be realised in cooperation with other security actors, and the armed forces should be treated as a service that supports or complements non-military potential. This solution will limit the natural tendency for armed forces to take over the role of the leading or most important module of the state security system. The parallel positioning of these modules and the proper correlation of their functioning in the process of building the defence and protection potential of the state and shaping security policy (taking into account the triad of: social expectations – defence needs – economic capacities) will make it possible to not only limit the corporatisation of armed forces but also enforce the pursuit of security policies that take into account social needs and expectations and are not influenced by the desire to achieve political success.

Systematic reflection with conclusions and recommendations

Armed forces are a specialised organ of the state which is prepared to carry out operations of a defensive and external nature (e.g., attacking, protecting state interests, and stabilising the international order). The overriding objective of their functioning is to maintain the capacity of the state to defend its territories and political sovereignty and to counter situations in which there is a real possibility of international armed violence. They can also be used to ensure the internal security of the state, preferably in cooperation with other services which make up interdisciplinary executive subsystems (informative, protective, and economic). In these arrangements, armed forces are most often used as a module that supports responding to the social and economic impact of security threats and challenges to security. The scope of these tasks affects the organisation of armed forces and their military potential. Their contemporary feature is the progressive process of professionalization accompanied by a concurrent process of military training for potential conscripts (reserve training). Military personnel are made up of contact specialists who are prepared to operate highly technologically advanced weaponry. The symbol of this phenomenon is the 'soldier of the future', and a vital feature of the contemporary armed forces is their readiness to respond to an adversary's operations (called 'asymmetric' or hybrid threats). In addition to non-traditional forms of force, this also requires further professionalisation of the armed forces and transferring the right to make decisions regarding the military response to lower levels of the chain of command. This response should be based on international law, although in practice formal and informal international players frequently fail to comply with its provisions, which calls for a debate on the legitimacy of applying the term 'armed forces' to universally describing military armed formations in all states. Perhaps this term should be reserved exclusively for the armed formations of states that adhere to the provisions of international law, in which control over armed forces is of a social nature, and the way in which armed forces are used in states' politics is driven by social interest rather than by the regime currently in power.

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Contemporary armed conflicts

Summary

DEFINITION OF THE TERM: The article discusses the armed conflicts that took place in the period between the end of the Cold War (1991) and the outbreak of the war in Ukraine (2022). The author builds a chronological framework for the term 'contemporary' and discusses the understanding of the concept of 'armed conflict' that is adopted for the purposes of this text.

HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE TERM: Two stages in the development of conflicts in the period under discussion are distinguished, with a particular focus on the international dynamics of the various processes of armed confrontation. The first involved continuation conflicts following the collapse of the two-bloc system, while the second involved conflicts over the new world order.

DISCUSSION OF THE TERM: The author summaries conflicts in terms of the ways in which opposing forces are organised, the technological dimension of struggles, and the impact of international law on their trajectory.

SYSTEMATIC REFLECTION WITH CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: The nature of armed conflicts will not change fundamentally in the future. Moderate and low-intensity but long-lasting operations will prevail (as the war in Ukraine seems to confirm). As a consequence of global competition, 'proxy wars' will take place and a technological race between the strongest states will continue, the most serious consequences of which will be the implementation of technological solutions linked to artificial intelligence.

Keywords: armed conflict, war, contemporary times, post-Cold War period

Definition of the term

Analyses of 'contemporary armed conflicts' require a few remarks to explain the time frames and basic concepts used in this article. The term 'contemporary' will refer to the period that followed the Cold War. Thus, the starting point is the exceptionally turbulent period between the 'Polish August', the fall of the Berlin Wall, and the formal dissolution of the Soviet Union as a result of the Belovezha Accords [*Porozumienie białowieskie*] (December 1991); the outbreak of the war in Ukraine (24 February 2022) is the end point. Although this war is still ongoing at the time this article is being written, its outbreak and trajectory to date provide a valuable contribution to the analyses presented here. The choice of this particular research end point is not devoid of risk, but the author assumes that the Russian aggression and, above all, the reaction of the United States to it mark the end of a specific historical period. The 'contemporary period' is unfolding before our eyes, while 'today' is becoming the past, and a longer perspective may negate the approach taken in this article.

Creating a concise outline of the concept of 'armed conflict' is a challenging task. It could even be argued that the sciences are saturated with various definitions, as a considerable number of disciplines in the humanities, social sciences, and even theology attempt to construct definitions in which the focus is placed on phenomena from within the orbit of their interests. This is accompanied by a tendency to reinterpret the network of meanings in the spirit of the various research approaches that are more or less in vogue in particular centres (or 'collectives').

In its broadest understanding, which is adopted in this text, 'armed conflict' is defined as action aimed to resolve contentious issues (problems) which exist between different actors (groups) through the organised and deliberate use of armed violence. Each conflict is a product of material resources, intellectual potential, and the social emotions embedded in the culture of the conflicting parties. The basic concept thus constructed includes both various internal conflicts (including clashes between state institutions and criminal structures) and inter-state conflicts. It must be emphasised that it is currently impossible to draw a definitive line between the terms 'armed conflict' and 'war', therefore the former will be used here as a more general term. Further refinement of this key term is

possible by applying the case study method, with the phenomena under study clearly set in historical, political, economic, cultural, geographical, and other contexts. In the author's opinion, the classification of armed conflicts is useful at the level of preliminary didactics, while it is completely useless or even harmful (as it pushes a concrete phenomenon into the framework of *a priori* adopted quantifiers) at the level of research and, most importantly, at analytical and predictive levels. Because most of their assumed features turn out to be either too general or too specific, it is impossible to fit wars and conflicts into a uniform classification grid. Attempts to divide wars into wars of national liberation, religious wars, ethnic wars, wars over territory or raw materials, or according to other criteria do not withstand confrontation with reality; they are merely an expression of a longing for the simple world of an academic textbook. Even armed conflicts within individual camps (e.g., the Soviet-Chinese clashes at the Ussuri River in 1969 and the Vietnamese-Chinese war in 1979) or institutionalised political-military organisations (the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974) make such efforts futile undertakings.

It is not the author's intention to produce an exhaustive compendium of the armed conflicts that have taken place since 1991. This is beyond the intellectual and physical capacity of a single researcher, or even a team of researchers. The aim behind writing this text was to demonstrate the diversity and complexity as well as the far-reaching unpredictability of contemporary armed conflicts. Indeed, each of these conflicts, even those that can most easily be classified, was significantly different from the others and requires a different approach.

Allowing for a degree of simplification, it can be assumed that in the entire analysed period there were two main processes, which generally occurred in chronological order:

- The collapse of the bipolar global world order which was formed as a result of the Second World War, and the United States gaining the status of the sole global power (armed conflicts in this period were *continuation conflicts*);
- The formation of a new global order which included, on the one hand, the efforts of the incumbent global power to maintain and consolidate its position and, on the other hand, the endeavours to change it undertaken on global, regional, and local levels (armed conflicts in this period were *conflicts for a new world order*).

These global trends were accompanied by the relatively widespread atrophy of weak state structures, which were linked through a cause-and-effect knot with tribalisation, the growth of social differences, an increased level of violence, and the development of criminal organisations, including those of a cross-border nature that are powerful enough to attempt to build territorial entities.

Historical analysis of the term

Continuation conflicts. After the end of the Cold War, with the collapse of the bipolar world order, the military threat of global or regional nuclear war declined sharply. On the other hand, a number of internal, regional, and local conflicts broke out that had been hitherto either suppressed by authoritarian state power structures or embedded in rivalries between the East and the West. Allowing for a certain lack of precision, it is possible to distinguish three main 'conflict circles' which were identical to the three 'imperial zones' over which the former ruler and hegemon was no longer able to exercise effective control:

- Conflicts within the borders of the former Soviet Union that were related to the regaining of independence by the nations violently incorporated into the 'Greater Soviet empire' and to the taking over of power in the new states and their new positioning in the international space;
- Conflicts within the borders of the states covered by the Soviet sphere of influence which were triggered by the acquisition of new dynamics by antagonisms previously frozen by either the Soviet Union directly or by the authorities who acted as Soviet intermediaries, clients, or allies; these conflicts were related to the regaining of sovereignty and the struggle for power and positioning in the international space (this was *de facto* the disintegration of the 'Soviet empire' and of Yugoslavia, which was closely linked to the Soviet sphere of influence).
- Conflicts within the Soviet client states (states that were friends with the Soviet empire) which intersected the interests of the 'communist empire' with those of the West, caused by the struggle for power as a result of the withdrawal of previous protectors and the

possibility and necessity of a new positioning in the international space (the first conflict of this type was the war over the liberation of Kuwait that was fought in the period between August 1990 and March 1991, during which Moscow withheld its support from Iraq).

During the Cold War, the leading states of both antagonistic blocs (along with their allies, supporters, and clients) supported local allies (states, guerrilla movements, and other anti-government groups), antagonised the parties in the conflicts and, on many occasions – for fear of their opponent gaining a dominant position – rekindled existing differences between them and torpedoed attempts to find agreement and solutions. Moreover, the two great blocs supplied various regions of the world with large quantities of modern weapons, which then found their way into the hands of local leaders who wanted to consolidate their position in a changed political situation. At the same time, however, the inclusion of the local or regional conflicts in the axis of global super-power rivalry (the Cold War) was a limiting factor for the participants regarding both the spatial extent and the methods and means of confrontations between them. The collapse of the 'communist empire' led to the withdrawal of the Soviet Union (and later Russia) from many areas. In the absence of a global opponent, the United States (or the West more broadly) also intentionally withdrew from some areas. One of the few factors that curbed the spillover of armed confrontations thus disappeared. This situation was perfectly captured by the Italian researcher Jean Carlo, who was interested in the relationship between geography and politics. Back in 1995, he wrote:

> With the end of the Cold War, the elegant simplicity of the bipolar world has disappeared. The Yalta order has led to the disorder of nations. Rules and regularities have disappeared. International institutions have suffered a crisis and are forced to adapt their roles to the new situation. The 'new world order' has disappeared, even before any attempt to create it has been undertaken. State fragmentation and the 'Balkanisation of the world' stands against globalisation and interdependence. History has begun anew (Carlo, 2003, p. 24).

However, this was not a widespread view; on the contrary, such predictions were considered exaggerated and even Cassandrian.

The best examples of conflicts that took place during this period were those in the post-Soviet area in the territory of the former Yugoslavia and in Central Africa. A total of 15 independent states emerged in the territory

that used to be part of the USSR. Their emergence was accompanied by clashes between the still-Soviet security forces (sometimes supported by loyalists) and supporters of independence; internal conflicts related to power struggles; international conflicts over borders, and other territorial issues. Some of these clashes failed to be resolved by settlement and became part of the later-formed axes of rivalry which continued to have serious destructive potential (e.g., the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia, and the separatist quasi-state calling itself the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic). The war in Chechnya plays a very important role in this scenario: its first phase (1994–1996) can be categorised as a post-Soviet succession conflict, while its second phase (1999–2009) can be categorised as the first manifestation of Russia's desire to rebuild its imperial territory.

The armed phase of the break-up of Yugoslavia began with the 'Ten-Day War', i.e., a confrontation between Slovenian formations and the federal army. This ended on 26 October 1991 with the departure of federal troops from Slovenia. At the same time, the Croatian War of Independence (1991–1995) broke out, and the rivalry between Serbian, Croatian, and Muslim elements in Bosnia (1992–1995) turned into a protracted conflict. This was accompanied by the conflict in Kosovo (armed phase 1995–1998), the NATO intervention against Serbia (March–June 1999), and clashes in the border areas of Serbia, Macedonia, and Kosovo. After a decade of wars, a new territorial order was formed in the Balkans which consisted of eight states (including Kosovo, which has the characteristics of a protectorate of the European Union and the United States). The situation was brought under control with considerable international support. The main burden of these efforts, which also included direct military intervention, was borne by the EU states and the USA.

One important reason for the conflict in the African Great Lakes region (the Great African War) was the post-Cold War collapse of regional balance. After the Soviet 'exit' from Africa, Western support (with the United States playing a leading role) for the long-serving dictator of what was then called Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo – the DRC), Mobutu Seke Seko, faded. This weakened dictator was unable to continue to effectively control internal tensions, including inter-tribal rivalries. This latter dimension has, since the decolonisation of Africa in the

1960s, taken on a significant international dimension. At the same time, the massacre of a Tutsi tribal group occurred in neighbouring Rwanda. This set off a domino effect. The region became the theatre for a series of conflicts involving a total of over 30 different Congolese factions (mainly tribal in nature) as well as troops from eight countries. Formally, at least in formal-international terms, the conflict ended in 2003 with the emergence of the Congolese provisional government. All foreign troops, with the exception of Rwandan troops, withdrew from the DRC at that time. In reality, continuous tribal conflicts are ongoing throughout the region, but these are officially given other names. The DRC has become a space for the widespread use of rape as a weapon and a testimony to domination, the scale which has no parallels in recorded history. International efforts to stabilise the situation have not yielded satisfactory results. A state of armed conflict has become the norm there.

Conflicts over a new world order. After the end of the Cold War and the relatively efficient resolution of the problem of post-Soviet nuclear weapons (by removing a total of about 3,200 warheads from the territory of the new post-Soviet states of Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Ukraine), the West achieved a state of security understood as freedom from immediate threats. Tensions in various areas of the world (the post-Soviet region, including the Caucasus and Central Asia, the Balkans, the Near and Middle East, and Africa) were considered either manageable with limited effort or of little importance. The concept of the 'end of history' was the rationalisation for this assessment. For the United States and the West more broadly, this strategic pause was interrupted by the attacks of 11 September 2001. These exemplified the fact that areas in which international interest had died out after the end of the Cold War had become spaces partly filled by states that claimed to be local or regional powers, and even by non-state organisations. Geographically, these grey security zones partially overlapped with the second and third 'circles of conflict' inherited from the Cold War.

At the same time, the United States was trying to deal with the consequences of its earlier abandonment of its active presence in many regions of the world. In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, it decided to attack Afghanistan and then Iraq. Behind this was a far broader intention (linked to the neo-conservative milieu centred around then Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld) to strengthen the United States' global

position by reconfiguring the security architecture in the Middle East and gaining a stable position in Central Asia. In the international space, this intention was operationalised as the 'war on terror'.

In the short-term military dimension, the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq were successful. In the first case, the combination of total US air dominance and the armed efforts of the Tajik-Uzbek opposition enabled the US to quickly overthrow the Taliban. The first phase of the campaign lasted from early October to early December 2001. During the second Gulf War, the US armed forces again confirmed their combat capabilities, which were based essentially on network-centric warfare. Iraqi troops were defeated in a matter of days: the campaign began on 12 March 2003, and by 9 April the Americans had entered Baghdad.

However, in both Iraq and Afghanistan, brilliant military successes were not converted into political stability. In both countries, the United States (along with the coalition partners it enlisted to give its operations the appearance of an international dimension) became embroiled in protracted conflicts with an irregular adversary (these conflicts were collectively called 'asymmetric conflicts'). These ended in US defeats, and its troops finally left Iraq in 2011 and Afghanistan in 2022. This had important international consequences as a dozen (or more) armed conflicts were thus created.

Regionally, the destruction of Saddam Hussein's state and the Taliban regime as well as the subsequent inability to stabilise the situation in Iraq and Afghanistan created a dangerous power vacuum, with Iran and the terrorist groups – collectively called the Islamic State – being the direct beneficiaries.

The Islamic State began to take control of areas in western Iraq in 2013, spectacularly defeating the Iraqi government army and spilling over into war-torn eastern Syria in the following months. Prior to this, this organisation had been a fragmented structure with no territorial ambitions. The US then stepped in and, by offering them air support, began to assemble a coalition of local groups that were threatened by the fundamentalists' activities. Ultimately, armed Syrian formations, Iraqi Kurdish formations, and Shia militias played the main role in containing and partially eliminating the Islamic State. One of the outcomes of the clash between the interests of the United States and its local allies and Tehran's ambitions was unrest throughout the 'Shia crescent', which Iran

considered to be its natural sphere of influence. This group of conflicts also includes the civil war in Yemen, which has been ongoing since 2014, and the Iranian involvement in the civil war that has devastated Syria since 2011.

The wars in Syria and Libya are arguably the result of the great wave of anti-government protests that swept through the Maghreb and the Middle East between 2010 and 2012, namely the 'Arab Spring'. These protests were totally spontaneous; the original causes were primarily social in nature, although they quickly took on all the features of typical political conflicts. In Libya, the social protests of January 2011 resulted in the outbreak of a tribal civil war. Western military intervention, with the United States leading the way with air power (a total of 161 days of operations, 26,000 combat flights), dramatically accelerated the over-throw of Muammar Gaddafi's dictatorship in October 2011. However, the situation in this country failed to settle down, resulting in a low-intensity civil war with widespread external involvement that smoulders to the present day. In Syria, too, a wave of civil unrest began in January 2011 and developed into civil war, which was later internationalised by the Turkish intervention. It has a very complex, multifaceted background. It must be emphasised that while military intervention in Libya was carried out by a coalition led by the United States, in Syria, the same adminis-tration (President Barack Obama) refused to engage in military action. The US air force only began flying over Syria in 2014 in connection with the fight against the Islamic State.

It can be assumed that there is a direct link between the military failures of the United States and the Russian actions taken in various regions, including Putin's general idea of rebuilding an empire resembling that of the Soviet Union in terms of size and borders. Russia was convinced that the 'colour revolutions', i.e., the series of spontaneous protests against the pro-Moscow governments in countries which were formerly part of the USSR (Georgia 2003, Ukraine 2004, Kyrgyzstan 2006, and Belarus 2006), were the result of US schemes. Coupled with its belief in the weakness of the adversary (the US), it decided to use direct military force to achieve its political goals. The turning point – and the symbolic crossing of a mental boundary – was the Georgian-Russian war in 2008. In this case, the immediate pretext was provided by the Georgians, who attacked a Russian battalion in the South Ossetian town of Tskhinvali

on 8 August 2008 (which was formally a peacekeeping subdivision of the Commonwealth of Independent States). The long-term international response was extremely restrained. The next step was Russia's seizure of Crimea in February and March 2014, followed by the rebellion in the Donbass in July 2014. Here too, the international community did not take decisive steps against Russia. Exploiting this state of affairs and the inconsistency of US policy towards Syria, Moscow launched a military intervention in Syria in September 2015, greatly increasing its capabilities in the Middle Eastern region. The conviction that the US was weak was strengthened by the events of the final stage of the US retreat from Afghanistan (August 2021). This conviction was based on both the level of the US's military capabilities and its willingness to use military force.

   In parallel, the economic development of the People's Republic of China – initially taking place at a rapid pace, now somewhat slower – continued. Here, developmental success quickly translated into increased regional ambitions and, over time, a desire to become a pole in a new bipolar system or even a world leader. In addition to the implementation of various economic and social instruments (e.g., the Belt and Road Initiative), the Middle Kingdom was intensively developing its military potential, including the expansion of its navy. The United States saw this as a direct infringement of its vital interests. Now, a new axis of global rivalry, initially not as clear-cut as during the Cold War, has taken shape. It has not yet acquired the dimension of direct military confrontation, but the possibility of a US-China clash cannot be ruled out.

Discussion of the term

Characteristics of warring parties. An event is classified as an armed conflict if it entails the mobilisation and deliberate use of armed violence. Thus, at this point it seems necessary to provide a general overview of the organisations that resorted to military force in the analysed period, i.e., between the end of the Cold War (1991) and the outbreak of the war in Ukraine (2022). These included, at one pole, armed gangs without any political affiliations that have an amorphous, ever-changing hierarchy built on direct physical violence; at the other pole there are regular armed forces of democratic states with the power

and backing of their institutions. The space between these 'poles' is filled with an enormous variety of different kinds of entities. In order to illustrate the complexity of the matter (and not with the intention of exhausting the catalogue of these entities), the following examples should be mentioned: armed groups that make a living from criminal activities (from ivory extraction to highly diverse forms of drug production and trafficking, maritime piracy, to human trafficking and the trafficking of organs for transplantation); neighbourhood and local self-defence groups; armed formations of religious groups and sects that do not recognise any political supremacy and do not have any (or only local) territorial ambitions; insurgent, liberation, and revolutionary formations that seek to seize and hold a territory; formally state forces that are controlled (at least verbally) by political structures and are organised along ethnic, ethno-religious (or both) lines; police and military forces of states that are weak, corrupt, failed, failing, or permanently in crisis.

Those entities that treat participation in armed conflict as a commodity or a service are also worthy of attention. Their emergence is an important but generally overlooked marker of the post-Cold War period. Following the disintegration of the bipolar global security architecture, such initiatives filled the power vacuum that appeared after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the West's abandonment of many regions. The demand for such services was first voiced by the abandoned ruling groups in the client states of both blocs. In the Western sphere, these services were treated as a kind of 'substitute' that was capable of influencing the situation without the need for official military involvement. Regarding the war in Ukraine, the largest entity of this kind in Russia (the 'Wagner group', in Russian: *Частная военная компания Вагнера*) has been transformed into a *de facto* quasi-state organisation which has enabled the expansion of military capabilities, mainly in terms of increasing the number of combatants while bypassing Russian domestic law.

In the vast majority of armed conflicts, at least one of the parties, but often both, do not represent any state or party that would enjoy international recognition. The breaking of links between a legitimate political authority and the use of armed violence is one of the most characteristic features of contemporary armed conflicts. This has given rise to these being referred to as 'wars between societies'. The Russian-Georgian war in 2008 and the Russian-Ukrainian war launched on 24 February

2022, during which the primary burden of action rested on regular state formations, was the exception rather than the rule here.

Technological aspect of conflicts. Intensive developments in technology took place during the analysed period, particularly in the areas of collecting, processing, and distributing information (including key satellite reconnaissance and navigation systems). The miniaturisation of computers (a result of the development and implementation of integrated circuits) increased their military applicability and coincided with the implementation and dissemination of HyperText Markup Language (HTML) in the early 1990s. This was the result of work initiated in the 1960s whose aim was to create a communications system capable of surviving the widespread destruction of a nuclear war. An important stage in the development of networks was the development in the late 1960s of a system called ARPANET, to which American civilian universities were soon connected. This resulted in the creation of computer networks, an extremely powerful communication tool which in a short time led to the creation of a new dimension of modern civilisation called virtual space.

In purely military terms, the implications of digitalisation were relatively quickly recognised in the West (with the United States leading the way and continuing to do so). The technological implementation of this process led to the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), a term that has now been somewhat forgotten. On a technological level, the RMA amounted to the use of information technologies to synergistically enhance the military's strike force and the armaments at its disposal. With some simplification, it can be said that the essence of the RMA was to increase the range and accuracy of reconnaissance, to increase the speed and accuracy of processing information obtained from reconnaissance, to increase the precision and breadth of distributing processed information, and thus to greatly increase the accuracy (and therefore the effectiveness) of fire. Regarding the means of destruction (weapons, effectors), there were no changes that could be described as ground-breaking.

The Revolution in Military Affairs has not evenly impacted all entities involved. Its greatest beneficiaries are the regular armed forces of the wealthiest states and those states that pursue a policy of developing their combat capabilities. The level of network-centricity (i.e., the scale of the implementation of new technologies) has become a determinant

of military capability. This process has led to a very strong qualitative differentiation in military capabilities. For the first time in large-scale operations, the fundamental superiority of network-centric armies over traditional armies became apparent in US operations during the active phase of the war to liberate Kuwait (Operation Desert Sabre, 24–28 February 1991). Within 100 hours, a strong Iraqi grouping of about 450,000 troops was shattered, with up to 35,000 dead and 150,000 prisoners of war. Coalition forces numbered around 400,000 soldiers, even though the grouping which performed the main task was only 90,000 strong. Fewer than 200 US soldiers were lost directly in combat operations. This was subsequently decisively confirmed by the second Gulf War, which ended with the Iraqi forces being dismantled again with an even more favourable quantitative ratio for the Americans. Furthermore, during Russia's aggression against Ukraine, the latter's troops, which hare significantly more networked and network-centric (mainly thanks to American support, primarily in the information dimension and through the civilian entity called SpaceX, i.e., the Starlink satellite constellation), proved significantly more effective than Russia's troops. It has become a rule that even weak irregular groups have access to state-of-the-art means of communication, including mobile and satellite telephony based on network solutions. Capabilities in this area are acquired commercially.

In most conflicts between 1991 and 2022, however, armaments were still of the traditional type (at least on one side). These are uncomplicated small arms which require neither technological competence nor extensive technological and service facilities, as well as simple mines (including those constructed ad hoc on the spot, i.e., improvised explosive devices). Against this background of general technological development, it is a bitter paradox that the great massacre in Rwanda (April–July 1994), which claimed more than a million lives, was carried out with hand tools: sticks, stones, hoes, machetes, and axes. Without exception, it is difficult to overestimate the role played by mines in all conflicts fought by regular armies against an irregular opponent. Occasionally, however, high-tech weapons appeared, even in the actions of groups with a low level of internal cohesiveness and lacking elementary technical competence. These were either purchased on the international market (usually together with the skills necessary to use them) or are provided by states interested in the continuation of a conflict. The

proliferation of technically complex weapons systems (e.g., man-portable air-defence systems, anti-ship missiles, and unmanned vehicles known as 'drones') can create highly complex and challenging tactical situations, complicate a situation operationally, and even lead to the breakdown of strategic concepts.

Furthermore, in the analysed period, clashes between parties with fundamentally different combat capabilities and complexity in their internal structures (called 'asymmetric') revealed the phenomenon of the asymmetric adversary's lack of vulnerability to traditional military means. This is particularly visible in attempts to combat terrorist organisations, which due to their non-territorial nature do not have what is called 'critical infrastructure', i.e., technical facilities that allow them to continue their operations. For example, it proved possible to enforce the actual surrender of Serbia through aerial bombardment (28 March to 11 June 1999: 30,000 combat flights) but attempts to paralyse the Al-Qaida organisation with cruise missiles targeting camps in Afghanistan and objects in Sudan (20 August 1998) yielded virtually no results (or were even counter-productive).

Rapid technological progress has changed the military and technological dimensions of conflicts. The internet, combined with new media and big data technologies, has the potential to influence the social dimension of war. This mainly relates to influencing international opinion and conflict-affected societies' perception of war. However, this phenomenon is much easier to perceive and describe than to parameterise, which is why it is very difficult (maybe even impossible) to measure the real impact on people's attitudes and behaviours of struggles in the information space. The experiences of the war in Ukraine, however, demonstrate that open states and societies are more susceptible to the influences that ooze from the infosphere than authoritarian and autocratic regimes, as the latter possess effective instruments for limiting both their reach and their social influence (e.g., through the apparatus of control and repression, which is also based on the abilities of new technologies).

Contemporary armed conflicts and humanitarian law. After the end of the Cold War, international efforts were made to raise the profile of humanitarian law. Attempts were even undertaken to enforce respect for its provisions through the inevitability of punishment.

In 2002, the United Nations established the International Criminal Court (ICC), which was the first ever permanent international court for the trial of individuals accused of crimes against peace, crimes against humanity, genocide, and war crimes. It drew on the experience of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (established in 1993) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (established in 1994). Such efforts should be assessed in the most positive light; however, the everyday reality of war has little to do with the idealism of the creators of the aforementioned juridical institutions. In general, it must be assumed that the cultural embeddedness and the nature of the parties in contemporary armed conflicts shape their attitude to international humanitarian law (also called the law of armed conflict, or the law of war).

In the case of state formations (of troops or armies), the scope of application of these legal norms depends on the will of political authorities (motivated by international political considerations) and their current interests. In general, it can be assumed here that the regular armed forces of democratic states adhere to legal regulations (including observing restrictions on the means and instruments of warfare) in accordance with their spirit (although not always with the letter), and deviations from this rule are incidental. However, doubts can be voiced about the meaning of 'selective elimination' when applied to leaders of terrorist structures. One of the most spectacular examples of the practical use of this method was the shooting of Osama bin Laden by the US special forces soldiers (2 May 2011, Abbottabad, Pakistan). It can be hypothesised that general respect for legal regulations stems from a cultural grounding and the very nature of democratic systems. In the case of regular formations of autocratic and authoritarian states, what is evident is, on the one hand, the strong impact of political needs (primarily linked to their reputation externally and internally) and, on the other hand, the broadly understood military necessity. The political decision to reject all or some international legal regulations and violate them thus takes on an institutional and sometimes even institutional-structural character (as in the case of the Russian aggression against Ukraine). This also applies to sexual violence, such as when rape is used as an instrument of warfare. With regard to irregular groups with a weak internal structure, adherence to the elementary laws of war is basically driven by calculations regarding reciprocity.

Systematic reflection with conclusions and recommendations

Arguably, the nature of armed conflicts will not change fundamentally in the future. Low-intensity but long-lasting conflicts in which at least one party does not represent any state will continue to dominate. Relatively simple weapons will still be used, although advanced technological means (primarily for communication and navigation) will also be employed, being either commercially acquired or provided by supporting states. The probability of the latter will increase with the likely formation of new Cold War-like axes of global competition. The new spectrum of 'proxy wars', client states, and client groupings which accompany the major players will thus be reshaped, as will the race for technological capabilities and the abilities of the strongest states to implement them in practice. The undisputed leader in this game is the United States. The position of the People's Republic of China is very difficult to assess in real terms, while the Russian Federation has clearly ceased to be a significant player in this competition.

The implementation of artificial intelligence (AI) solutions will represent a profound change in armed forces that will lead to the fundamental differentiation of capabilities between the strongest state players and the remaining participants in armed conflicts. At present the scale of AI is limited, but it is predicted that its effects will be as extensive and far-reaching as the earlier miniaturisation of computers and the implementation of IT networks. Technological developments are also opening up opportunities for the direct military use of biomechanics and nanotechnological solutions, the combination of which will result in mature combat systems that are ready for use on the battlefield.

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Hybrid threats

Summary

DEFINITION OF THE TERM: The term 'hybrid threats' refers to coordinated and synchronised actions conducted by state or non-state actors that are below the threshold of a war. The aim of hybrid threats is to exploit vulnerabilities and cause harm to the target by influencing its decision-making processes at the local, regional, state, or institutional level.

HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE TERM: In the post-Cold War era, faced with the rising power of NATO and the United States, the revisionist superpowers developed a conceptual model of confrontation with the West which changed the forms and modes of international influence they exerted. Hybrid threats reflect how the nature of conflict and the role played by non-state actors has changed over time. These changes have been influenced by globalisation, international networking, the internet, new information technologies, social media, information space, and the new media landscape.

DISCUSSION OF THE TERM: Actors who employ hybrid threats seek to gain increasing international influence while minimising the costs incurred in doing so. They achieve their strategic objectives by synchronising the ways of exerting influence, by ambiguity and, above all, by results. The choice of tools depends on the actor (state actor or non-state actor) and the purpose of its action. Each tool can produce outcomes in one or more operational domains.

SYSTEMATIC REFLECTION WITH CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: Intentionally synchronised in time and space, hybrid threats provide a mechanism for long-term strategic rivalry in the grey

zone and achieving political objectives by exploiting vulnerabilities in the states and international organisations under attack, without the need for direct military combat.

Definition of the term

Over the past decade, the word 'hybrid' and its inflectional forms and connotations have dominated national and international security discourse. One of the main obstacles to clear thinking about hybrid threats is the problem of language and the terminology used when discussing it. The notion of hybridity is linked not only to hybrid threats, but also to hybrid warfare, hybrid activities, hybrid operations, warfare in the grey zone, and strategic competition. The term 'hybrid' has also entered the mainstream: we drive hybrid cars, teach hybrid classes, golfers hit balls with hybrid clubs, and homes are increasingly often equipped with hybrid heating systems. The term 'hybrid' is another way of talking about a combination of two elements that, despite their structural differences and although on the surface they have nothing in common, are meant to work together. This concept functions in, e.g., biology, philosophy, and mechanics. Applying it to security threats makes it possible, by analogy, to point to a conglomeration of specific challenges associated with the use of diverse actors in international relations, the instruments and tools assigned to them, and the forms and ways in which they are applied.

'Hybrid' is a buzzword that is often misused and misinterpreted; the phrase 'hybrid war' is the most controversial of its derivatives. Despite many efforts undertaken by the international community, there is currently no universally accepted definition of hybrid threats or actions. This is largely due to the fact that the term attempts to describe various dimensions of conflicts which involve multiple actors and multiple threats. These actors include armed anti-state subdivisions, peripheral states, regional corporations, and even superpowers, all of which can resort to a wide range of conventional and unconventional, military and non-military, kinetic and non-kinetic, lethal and non-lethal strategies. Their tactics may involve various types of sanctions, social, political, informational activities, and a variety of weapons, often employed in novel ways (Hoffman, 2009). International influence almost always entails pressure and aggression (not necessarily military) and is reinforced by disinformation and propaganda disseminated through mass media and the internet. Its characteristic feature is a wide range of activities which can be used in a coordinated manner while remaining below the threshold of formally declared warfare (Zandee, van der Meer

& Stoetman, 2021, p. 2). The need to coordinate the interactions of state and non-state actors that create military and non-military hybrid threats aimed to achieve international political objectives is recognised by the European External Action Service, which seems to be an attempt at a holistic definition of hybrid threats (EEAS, 2018).

Hybrid threats are difficult to detect. The ambiguities that arise as a result of their use hamper decision-making processes. Tools for diversion, coercion, and sabotage target the most critical vulnerable spots of the functional systems of the state under attack. The scope of hybrid threats includes cyberattacks on a state's critical infrastructure and its information systems; disruption of services critical for the functioning of a state and its citizens, such as transport and water and energy supplies; undermining public trust in government institutions and exacerbating social divisions (Gruszczak, 2011, pp. 13–15).

For NATO, hybrid threats are those that combine military, non-military, covert, and overt means, including disinformation, cyberattacks, economic pressure, the deployment of irregular armed groups, and the use of regular forces. In the European Union, hybrid threats also include disinformation campaigns and a range of attacks including terrorist, chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and cyber (EEAS, 2018). Hybrid threats are used to blur the lines between war and peace and to sow doubt in the minds of target populations. They aim to destabilise and undermine societies under attack. The European Centre of Excellence defines hybrid threats as coordinated and synchronised action that deliberately targets the systemic vulnerabilities of democratic states and their institutions. This action includes activities that exploit the thresholds of detection and attribution, as well as the fluidity of the boundaries between internal and external security, local and state security, and national and international security. Hybrid threats aim to influence different forms of decision-making at the local, regional, state, or institutional levels. They are designed to further and/or fulfil the strategic objectives of the influencing actor, while at the same time undermining and/or hurting the target (Zandee, van der Meer & Stoetman, 2021, p. 3). However, in the mainstream discourse on international competition and security, hybrid threats are discussed in a strategic context. Nowadays, they have become the main instrument of revisionist strategies using cyberattacks, propaganda, subversion, manipulation of international

law, economic blackmail, sabotage, sponsorship of proxy forces, and creeping military expansionism (Monaghan, 2019).

The aforementioned definitions are similar in certain aspects and differ in others. For example, they all emphasise the inseparability of the use of military and non-military means to undermine societies, although they do not agree on which actions can and cannot be included in the concept of hybrid threats. Second, hybrid threats are classified in terms of risks to national and international security. Third, it seems that the aim of these threats is consistent with the ancient wisdom of Sun Tzu, who advocated defeating adversaries without the use of direct military combat. Fourth, hybrid threats, in which violence is absent or limited in amplitude, are an instrument used for achieving political objectives in the international arena. By exploiting the targets' vulnerabilities, hybrid activities lead to long-term effects in society. Fifth, without the risk of serious escalation, they fit into the strategy of revisionist states and make it possible to gain advantage and exert influence, and, due to their ambiguity, prevent any immediate response. Sixth, hybrid threats, which ignore international law and operate in the grey zone, pose challenges in the context of strategic competition, especially when conducted below the threshold of armed conflict.

Historical analysis of the term

In hybrid threats, unlike conventional threats, it is difficult to identify the line between military and civilian activity; moreover, although they blur the boundaries between war and peace, virtually all elements of hybrid threats have some parallels with conflicts that took place before the adoption of the UN Charter. First, medieval non-state actors, including the Hanseatic League, had some military power at their disposal. Second, irregular forces and unconventional methods of warfare have always been used by insurgents, guerrillas, underground states that fought for independence, and special forces who resorted to sabotage. The story of the Trojan horse best demonstrates that deception is nothing new. Third, torture, mass murder, and repression have been used for centuries as methods for the subjugation of occupied territories. Also, suicide attacks were used long before the act of terrorism on the World Trade Centre in 2001. Fourth, precursory elements of cyber warfare

were used before 1945, e.g., in 1932 the Polish Cipher Bureau broke the German codes of the Enigma machine that protected classified information. Fifth, airborne leaflet propaganda during the Second World War is an example of an information operation that targeted domestic audiences. Sixth, legal means were used, e.g., when the USSR invaded Poland on 17 September 1939 despite the 1932 non-aggression pact, which was one of the reasons why Poland decided to reject Hitler's ultimatum and defend itself against the German aggression. Seventh, the threat of using force – issued by the US against Nicaragua in the 1980s, and by the Russian Federation against Ukraine in 2022 – was used before World War II by Nazi Germany against Czechoslovakia, Austria, and Poland (Balaban & Mielniczek, 2018).

In the post-Cold War era, the revisionist superpowers, faced with the rising might of NATO and the United States, developed a conceptual model of confrontation with the West which changed the forms and modes of exerting international influence (Mattis & Hoffman, 2005). This new concept derives from an assessment of the consequences of the 'revolution in military affairs' following Operation Desert Storm in 1991. Western military theorists concluded that US technological dominance on the battlefield could be challenged by the complexity of threats created by civilian actors. A second problem was the difficulty with defeating an unconventional adversary in any traditional military campaign that ends in a pitched battle (Murden, 2007). These arguments became even more important when US troops trapped in Iraq needed means other than high-tech weapons for air strikes to counter the ensuing rebellion; this led to rethinking the position of the centre of gravity in contemporary conflicts. It was recognised that future wars (which will be hybrid wars) will have to face complex problems caused by failed states losing control of, e.g., advanced weapons systems, biological or chemical weapons, or their means of delivery. At the same time, opponents will include ethnically motivated paramilitary forces, radical terrorist groups (Mattis & Hoffman, 2005), and the armies of states which use conventional weapons in very novel or non-traditional ways. Groups of non-state actors can attack critical infrastructure, communication, or transport networks in unconventional ways. Various forms of economic warfare or paralysing cyberattacks directed at military or civilian targets cannot be ruled out either (Mattis & Hoffman, 2005).

Today, this new mix of threats, which in part paints a picture of the challenges the US had to face in Iraq in 2003–2004, would, if fully materialised, be more lethal and destabilising than anything the West faced two decades ago. At that time, however, hybrid threats were merely a theoretical concept. The situation changed dramatically when a new terrorist organisation, Hezbollah, emerged in the international arena. This non-state actor was an indicator of the changes that were taking place in the way conflicts were conducted. Hezbollah, sponsored by Iran, was a key political force in Lebanon and had enough military capabilities to combat state actors. Hybrid threats materialised in practice during Israel's war against Hezbollah in August 2006. At the time, even the most prominent strategists were surprised by the sophisticated capabilities of this Lebanese non-state actor that confronted Israel. For the first time, an irregular actor possessed and employed both regular capabilities (air artillery, anti-tank missiles, drones, etc.) and irregular ones (elusive tactics, moral asymmetry, public support, etc.). Strategists and security experts referred to this combination of activities in the international arena as hybrid threats (Johnson, 2011). Hezbollah's success made its scheme a model for other terrorist groups (such as al-Qaeda) to follow. In 2010, the concept of hybrid threats appeared in both the US Strategic Review and preparatory materials for the new NATO Strategic Concept. Through evolution, the meaning of the term has also expanded. Hybrid threats are no longer limited to any specific part of the spectrum of activities that occur between irregular and conventional warfare but encompass virtually all activities made feasible by new capabilities, including cyber warfare, organised crime, propaganda, and economic warfare (Lasconjarias & Larsen, 2015, p. 97). Examples of the evolution of existing hybrid threats include the asymmetric, non-military, mixed, and unconventional Russian-Chechen confrontations, the war in Afghanistan, jihadist activities in the Sahel, and the activities of the Islamic State during its expansion in Iraq and Syria.

The annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation in 2014 meant that hybrid threats were no longer limited to regular or irregular means or methods of influence at the operational level of war. An earlier speech which predicted this phenomenon by the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, Valery Gerasimov, was interpreted as Russian hybrid warfare doctrine (wrongly, as it later

turned out). Non-military means used at the strategic level became the main source of hybrid threats. The combination of special forces called 'little green men' with local subdivisions of armed militia and proxy sub-divisions, together with widespread disinformation and economic pressure, allowed the Russians to take over considerable territory quickly but unlawfully, and the strategy of accomplished facts combined with nuclear blackmail which took the West by surprise has so far received virtually no response. Currently, aggressors who use hybrid threats benefit by blurring conflict so that it is difficult to distinguish the warring parties, identify the opponent's armed forces, the level of aggression, or the boundaries of the conflict, and thus respond to threats decisively. For example, in inter-state strategic competition, China exerts regional influence by using public opinion as well as psychological warfare and legal warfare in the South China Sea, while Iran uses non-military and proxy military means of influence in the Middle East (Monaghan, 2019).

Both the Russian and Chinese experiences of the last decade demonstrate that, due to the limited level of aggression and the difficulty with detecting hybrid threats, they can be used in protracted conflicts that are below the threshold of warfare, i.e., that take place in the grey zone (Monaghan, 2019). Moreover, it can be reasonably expected that in international competition, which is becoming increasingly aggressive, hybrid threats will be used to achieve strategic advantage and even to gain dominance. They can also be successfully employed as part of a broader coordinated strategy to achieve political objectives without escalating conflict.

Discussion of the term

In challenging the West, the revisionist actors employ a wide and diverse array of hybrid threats in all operational domains. The multiplicity of instruments employed to materialise these threats means that the portfolio of strategic options must take into account another layer of complexity with implications for international security. Actors who initiate hybrid threats cause the internal destabilisation (political, economic, legal, social, etc.) of states and seek to maximise the effects achieved by combining conventional and irregular (Giles, 2020, p. 161) as well as

military and non-military actions. Hybrid threats, which combine political, military, economic, social, kinetic, and non-kinetic aspects, create a space that does not recognise the boundaries between civilians and soldiers, covert and overt operations, or, ultimately, between war and peace. Almost all influential contemporary geopolitical players use covert non-military influence to achieve their goals by exploiting, among other things, uncertainty about the explicit identification of covert hybrid tools and their treatment in international law (Mazaraki, Kalyuzhna & Sarkisian, 2021, p. 136).

Hybrid threats occur on a permanent basis and their consequences, which are difficult to assess, are understood as being the effects of the use of instruments of influence. They alter the political, social, and economic systems of the target state. However, it should be remembered that linear cause-and-effect relationships do not apply to hybrid threats, as, e.g., a cyberattack on state institutions may trigger social unrest, while a terrorist attack on a target state may lead to an economic crisis. These non-linear cause-and-effect relationships make it difficult to pinpoint the causes behind the effects. Furthermore, an aggressor may lose control over events if it fails to anticipate the side-effects of its actions. Effects can be achieved in the physical and psychological dimensions of hybrid conflicts (Hoffman, 2007, p. 8). The aim of hybrid threats is not to seize and hold a territory, as with traditional threats, but to generate effects in the public's consciousness and shape its attitudes in line with the will of the attacker.

Effects in hybrid warfare are difficult to identify because, unlike direct threats posed to national sovereignty by military confrontation, they have their own logic of emergence and dynamics. The probability of hybrid threats is difficult to assess, while the damage resulting from their occurrence can be catastrophic. The maximum destructive potential of hybrid threats is ensured through the aggressor's implementation of a comprehensive impact strategy whose aim is to obtain negative multiplier effects in various areas of hybrid confrontation (Mazaraki, Kalyuzhna & Sarkisian, 2021, p. 137). The formation of an effective policy for countering hybrid threats requires comprehensive assessment of the impact on the state's political and economic systems of various interdependent threats which are manifested by systematised pressure and/or aggression.

Hybrid threats refer to the combined and simultaneous use of a wide range of ambiguous and often non-violent means. The most well-known and discussed examples of hybrid threats are the dissemination of disinformation, interference in elections, cyberattacks, the attacking of critical infrastructure, the use of special forces for unconventional warfare, supporting the opponent's extreme political parties to increase polarisation of the political scene, and the use of a wide range of economic instruments, e.g., the exploitation of dependencies on energy sources, the manipulation of energy prices, the use of economic sanctions, and many other destabilising actions practically attributed to the theory of unrestricted war. The theory of unrestricted war is based on the assumption that it entails multi-directional strikes in different domains and by a combination of means. This theory also describes capabilities that adapt to the environment and the balance of force, which is a key element of the adaptive nature of hybrid threats. Unrestricted war appears to be a partial continuation of the impact of fourth-generation warfare, which implies that states are losing their monopoly on violence and the effects of prolonged conflict. This is particularly useful in understanding the aim of hybrid threats, namely the cognitive exhaustion of an adversary's political will to continue the conflict, while simultaneously physically exhausting the combat capabilities of its armed forces. Finally, in existing theories of conflict, hybrid threats are linked to key ideas concerning the deliberate induction of synergistic effects, concepts and forms of conducting competition understood as a continuum, and they prompt organisational adaptation to the determinants of the strategic environment.

Revisionist actors resort to hybrid threats in order to remain below the threshold that would trigger a military response. This in turn blurs the traditional dichotomy between war and peace and is called conflict in the grey zone. Efforts in this space aim, in the first phase, to shape the conditions for conducting operations or campaigns of influence, in which the goal is achieved thanks to information gathered in the initial phase. The next phase is to conduct destabilisation operations supported by military blackmail or minor armed incidents (Giannopoulos & Smit, 2020, p. 15). As far as levels of aggression are concerned, the first level includes wide-ranging, low-intensity non-military actions that do not explicitly violate international norms and law. They are very difficult to attribute

to a perpetrator and are difficult to stop due to their persistence and low level of harm. The second level of aggression includes direct coercive actions by non-military actors which exploit legal loopholes. These are difficult to stop because they take place below the threshold of conventional action and can occur without prior warning. The third, and highest, level of aggression involves actions that directly threaten the targeted entity and are carried out by quasi-military or military units. These are generally carried out in violation of international norms and laws. Such threats allow revisionist states to inflict losses while avoiding a strong response from the international community. The relative reluctance of Western states to respond decisively to hybrid threats seems unexplainable but is often justified by pointing to the difficulties with attributing attacks to specific perpetrators with reasonable certainty.

Hybrid threats are non-linear and their aim is not to conquer or physically control an adversary's territory. They aim to create distrust towards politicians, polarise public debate, and undermine political unity. In the long run, they can lead to a gradual change in the status quo and the balance of power. Hybrid threats are undoubtedly an attractive supplement to conventional capabilities as they have a high benefit-cost ratio. Moreover, they are steadily increasing in reach, effectiveness, and potential to achieve significant effects. The expansion of the range of threats, both conventional and hybrid, forces the defender to make decisions regarding resource allocation to its different defence capabilities. Hybrid threats thus create a dilemma for the defender as to whether to escalate in response to minor incursions and security breaches or not.

Hybrid threats cannot be analysed in isolation from broader power dynamics. States that employ hybrid threats search for new forms of influence in an increasingly complex world. They exploit the complexity of the international security arena to effectively secure their interests while minimising costs. Hybrid threats employed by revisionist states are an instrument for achieving their strategic objectives by means of coordinated and synchronised ways of exerting influence, ambiguity and, above all, the effects achieved. The choice of tools depends on the actor (state actor or non-state actor) and the objective of its action. Each tool targets one or more domains in which specific effects are to be created by exploiting its vulnerabilities. Moreover, tools can create vulnerability in one or more domains, or they can exploit new opportunities to gain

advantage. The aims of influence can be achieved through the direct impact of tools on a specific domain or through cascading effects when an action in one domain also affects other domains. In other words, a series of synchronised, hardly observable or unobservable events usually become apparent only when their cumulative and non-linear effects begin to manifest. Actions directed at one domain may create effects in other operational domains (Giannopoulos & Smit, 2020, p. 27).

The most optimal strategic effects can be achieved by focusing on the most vulnerable functional elements of the system under attack. Hybrid threats, which are asymmetric, also combine multiple instruments of power and exploit creativity, ambiguity, and the cognitive elements of war. This distinguishes hybrid warfare from attrition warfare, in which one side matches the strength of the other, both quantitatively and qualitatively, and is focused on physically destroying the opponent's capabilities. Unlike conventional warfare, the centre of gravity of hybrid warfare is focused on society. It is based on the assumption that the human mind is the main battlespace, so all activity should be focused on informational and psychological activities. It is predicted that achieving political goals will be possible by influencing the behavioural sphere, at the core of which lies the ability to manipulate behavioural algorithms, habits, activities, and stereotypes, as well as to interfere in the cultural sphere.

Summing up, it can be concluded that evolution of the available tools of international influence is increasing the reach and effectiveness of hybrid threats in achieving at least some key and overarching strategic objectives, such as undermining public confidence in a state's democratic institutions, exacerbating unhealthy polarisation at both the national and international levels, undermining the core values of democratic societies, gaining geopolitical influence by undermining the competence of those in power, and influencing the decision-making capacity of political leaders.

Systematic reflection with conclusions and recommendations

Hybrid threats reflect a wide range of activities undertaken by state and non-state actors to gain advantages both in time and space and in the political, military, economic, social, informational, and infrastructural

spheres. The political objectives achieved in the international arena through hybrid threats (including coercion) are achieved by producing effects whose quantity and extent can be moderated through the use of vertical and horizontal escalation mechanisms. Hybrid threat management creates a flexible mechanism for exerting international influence (oriented towards society) that can be triggered according to the needs and interests of the influencing actors. The desired and simultaneous effects generated, especially those of a cumulative and synergistic nature, can easily break through the defensive lines of the state against which they are directed and provide an alternative to the use of military force in open combat. Combining and synchronising the impact of multiple instruments (e.g., power in the case of a state actor) multiplies the power of hybrid threats, allowing the same results to be achieved with a lower level of aggression. The low intensity of the impact of hybrid threats contributes to ambiguity as they are below the response limit set by the opponent. Moreover, by generating doubts about their intentionality, they impede the decision-making process regarding a response and negatively affect cognitive processes, leading to substantial disruption.

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Intelligence

Summary

DEFINITION OF THE TERM: In its broad understanding, the term 'intelligence' refers to all forms of intelligence, including foreign intelligence, domestic (counterintelligence), covert action, and other aspects of intelligence activities. In this context, due to the large number of definitions of this term, it is important to list several of the features that all definitions share. These can be narrowed down to four main groups: intelligence as information, as a process, as a mission, and as organisation.

HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE TERM: The beginning of intelligence studies dates back to the 1950s, since when discussions on a comprehensive definition of the concept of intelligence have been ongoing, but no single definition has been accepted by the majority of researchers. The legal definitions included in legal acts of various states that appear in official government documents are usually rather general and do not provide a definitive explanation of the concept.

DISCUSSION OF THE TERM: Intelligence should be understood as information or knowledge which is helpful in making strategic decisions. Intelligence information is a product of intelligence operations and must be properly processed in a process called the intelligence cycle before it reaches its recipients. Another component of intelligence is non-information activities, called missions, which include counterintelligence missions and covert action. The final element of the definition of intelligence is its organisation, i.e., the functioning of the intelligence services and their place in the structure of the state.

SYSTEMATIC REFLECTION WITH CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: In the search for a comprehensive definition of the term

'intelligence', scholars and practitioners have proposed a number of solutions, ranging from extremely broad to very narrow definitions; some have even suggested abandoning any attempts at formulating a definition and instead focusing on the practical aspects of intelligence activities. However, it seems that enumerating the features shared by most definitions is the most sensible solution and can best explain the essence of the concept under discussion.

Definition of the term

Narrow and broad approaches to the term 'intelligence'. In its broad understanding, the term 'intelligence' refers to all forms of intelligence, including foreign intelligence, domestic intelligence (counterintelligence), covert action, and other aspects of intelligence activities. Sometimes the term is used only in its narrow understanding to refer to foreign intelligence, without including its domestic counterpart, which is called counterintelligence, hence the term 'intelligence and counterintelligence services'. This is also the case in Poland, where, due to the existence of the statutory notion of special services, the term 'intelligence' is frequently used to refer only to the *Agencja Wywiadu* [Foreign Intelligence Agency] and the *Służby Wywiadu Wojskowego* [Military Intelligence Service], thereby excluding the *Agencja Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego* [Internal Security Agency] and the Służby Kontrwywiadu Wojskowego [Military Counterintelligence Service], which are covered by the term 'counterintelligence'. In this article, the term intelligence is used in its broad understanding, which is also the prevalent approach in American and British intelligence studies, in which the word intelligence is defined equally broadly.

The meaning of the term 'intelligence' can be analysed on three levels. The first involves legal definitions adopted in states' legal acts. Undoubtedly, the strength of these definitions lies is their high status, which is a result of them being positioned in statutory solutions. However, they are very general definitions, which is a characteristic feature of legal acts. The second level covers definitions of this term provided in official documents (strategies, reports, concepts, etc.) prepared by various governmental institutions, including intelligence agencies. Although these definitions are broader, they usually focus on the issues most pertinent for the activities undertaken by a specific institution (which results in, e.g., too much focus on foreign intelligence or counterintelligence). The third level covers the definitions prepared by researchers working within intelligence studies who formulate many comprehensive – albeit varying – definitions of the concept of intelligence.

Key elements of the definition. There is no consensus within intelligence studies on one comprehensive and universally accepted definition. Peter Gill and Mark Phythian, in describing this problem,

used a vivid comparison: "[o]once we attempt to define intelligence, it soon becomes apparent that, as a concept, it is as elusive as the daring fictional agents who have cemented it in the popular imagination" (Gill & Phythian, 2018, p. 1). Michael Warner observed that each researcher tries to come up with their own definition, which rarely refers or relates to the findings of other researchers. In his opinion, this is not a desirable outcome as a precise definition of intelligence could help to develop a coherent theory of intelligence and lead to a better understanding of it (Warner, 2002, p. 1).

With these objections in mind, it must be acknowledged that all definitions share certain features, which can be organised into four main groups:

- intelligence as information (knowledge);
- intelligence as a process (the intelligence cycle);
- intelligence as a mission (counterintelligence and covert action);
- intelligence as organisation (the functioning of intelligence services and their place in the structure of the state) (Johnson, 2010, p. 6; Lowenthal, 2017, pp. 10–11).

This approach integrates many of the shared elements developed by intelligence studies scholars over the past six decades. Each of these aspects (information, process, mission, organisation) necessitates a separate discussion, but let us start with the history of intelligence.

Historical analysis of the term

The beginnings of intelligence studies date back to the 1950s, when the first discussions on the definition of the term 'intelligence' began. The American and the British schools have developed over time as the two variants of these studies. Academics and practitioners from these two countries approach the definition of intelligence from different points of view and emphasise different aspects. In general, representatives of the American school prefer elaborate definitions and focus mainly on the process of information gathering and analysis, and on intelligence as a product of this process. Researchers from the UK formulate narrow definitions and emphasise the special role of secret information, which is impossible to obtain in the same way as other forms of intelligence.

The pioneer of American intelligence analysis, Sherman Kent, in his book *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy* (1965), characterised intelligence as knowledge, organisation, and activity. In his opinion, a state must possess a particular type of intelligence (which he called high-level foreign positive intelligence) in order to ensure that its interests are not jeopardised as a result of the ignorance of politicians and the military, and that operations undertaken in this area are not doomed to failure. Intelligence is also a form of organisational structure that gathers, processes, and presents specific information and delivers it to those who need it most in exactly the form they demand. Kent also treats intelligence as a specific range of activities performed by the intelligence structures of the state that are intended to support the states' plans to the greatest extent possible (Kent, 1965, p. XXIII).

The British scholar Michael Herman agreed with Kent's definition but also emphasised that of the three parts of this definition (i.e., knowledge, organisation, and activity), the organisational aspect is the most important, since intelligence is specialised government intelligence services (called government intelligence), including everything they do and the knowledge they produce (Herman, 1998, p. 1). He observed that intelligence activities in government structures are usually performed by specific state structures, institutions, or (sometimes) intelligence complexes in order to collect data and information and prepare materials on a given topic.

Of recent definitions of intelligence, one that is especially popular and often quoted is that of Mark Lowenthal, an experienced intelligence analyst and author of *Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy*. According to him, intelligence should be considered as:

- the process by which specific types of information important to national security are requested, collected, analysed, and provided to policy makers;
- the products of that process;
- the safeguarding of these processes and this information by counterintelligence activities;
- the carrying out of operations as requested by lawful authorities (Lowenthal, 2017, pp. 10–11).

However, not all scholars of intelligence studies agree with this definition. For example, Michael Warner found Lowenthal's definition to be

generally quite accurate but also too broad. In his opinion, the phrase 'information important to national security' can accommodate too much diverse military or diplomatic information that is not intelligence information (e.g., weather conditions in Asia or the age of a politburo member). He also argued that Lowenthal's definition is, to an extent, tautological in its claim that intelligence is what counterintelligence safeguards. Warner observed that a comprehensive definition must include several main elements, thanks to which it can be unambiguously stated that intelligence:

- is linked to the production and dissemination of information;
- is performed by officers of the state for state purposes (officers receive directions from the state's civilian and military leaders);
- is focused on foreigners – usually other states, but also foreign subjects, corporations, or and groups;
- is involved in influencing foreign entities by means that are unattributable to the acting government (if the activities of the government are open and declared, they are the province of diplomacy, if they utilise uniformed members of the armed forces, they belong to the military);
- dependent upon confidential sources and methods for full effectiveness.

Warner thus provided his own definition of intelligence as "secret, state activity to understand or influence foreign entities" (Warner, 2002, p. 10).

Representatives of the British school of intelligence studies, Peter Gill and Mark Phythian, were highly sceptical about Warner's definition. In their opinion, it is frustratingly incomplete and very American in nature as it focuses mainly on foreign actors and thus reflects the political debates held in the United States in 1947 during the creation of the CIA. For these researchers, a proper definition should take into account the fact that intelligence, among other things: is more than merely information collection, covers a range of linked activities; is security-based; aims to provide advance warning; it involves covert actions; and secrecy is essential to it. Therefore, combining these elements, Gill and Phythian defined intelligence as mainly secret activities – targeting, collection, analysis, dissemination and action – intended to enhance security and/ or maintain power relative to competitors by forewarning of threats and opportunities. They also observed that the need for counterintelligence arises out of this logic (Gill & Phythian, 2018, p. 4).

When analysing definitions of intelligence, it is also worth mentioning the achievements of the Polish doctrine of security studies. However, it should be remembered that in Poland the English term 'intelligence' refers to 'special services', while the term *'wywiad'* is usually used to denote foreign intelligence. This is clearly seen, for example, in the definitions provided in *Słownik terminów z zakresu bezpieczeństwa narodowego* [*Glossary of National Security Terms*], where *wywiad* [*intelligence*] is defined as activities which aim to collect – legally and illegally – and compile information on foreign states, particularly regarding their economic condition and security measures. The authors of the *Dictionary* thus defined this term only in the context of foreign intelligence. They defined special services as "a general term for civilian and military services which organise and conduct intelligence and counterintelligence activities" (Kaczmarek, Łepkowski & Zdrodowski, 2008, pp. 123–124, 172). This definition is broader and is more in line with the notion of intelligence, even though the focus is primarily on organisational issues.

The definition proposed by Sławomir Zalewski is far more comprehensive and, although it also concerns the term 'special services', it fits well with the British understanding of intelligence. In his opinion, special services are "structures, usually organised by the state, aimed at the secret acquisition of information relevant to the security of the organiser of this activity (the state) or to counteracting its acquisition by equivalent foreign structures" (Zalewski, 2005, p. 34). This researcher referred to the concept of special services as both foreign intelligence and counterintelligence, but with the reservation that their place in the state security system should nowadays be considered in relation to other services and organs performing tasks in this system (Zalewski, 2005, p. 34).

In his monograph *Sztuka wywiadu w państwie współczesnym* [*The Art of Intelligence in the Modern State*], Mirosław Minkina aligns his concept of intelligence with the British understanding and does not use the term 'special services'. In his opinion, intelligence can be treated as an art form as it is a creative process with special skills in which success is achieved thanks to intuition and instinct, combined with knowledge and experience based on intuition. The author also listed seven characteristic features of intelligence as an institution of the state:

- despite its secret nature, intelligence is sometimes subject to political influence, which makes it possible to subject it to public evaluation;

- the object of intelligence is information about threats to the state;
- the purpose of intelligence is to gain an information advantage, to support decision-making processes, and sometimes to influence events in other states;
- the essence of intelligence methodology is secrecy;
- intelligence can undertake (when required) covert action not linked to collecting information in other states;
- the specific nature of intelligence justifies the identification of threats to the existence of the state (military) and non-state actors;
- intelligence operates under conditions of instability in the international environment, which reinforces the need for cooperation between intelligence services in the transnational dimension (Minkina, 2014, pp. 16–17).

The large number of definitions is not just characteristic of the literature on the subject; it is also evident when analysing the basic legislative acts in different countries (legal definitions), official government documents, as well as glossaries of terms or other publications issued by intelligence services and institutions linked to state security. A good example is the United States, whose legislation and various official documents employ a range of definitions of intelligence which emphasise its different aspects. There are two main reasons for this. First, in the American system, the intelligence services that make up the Intelligence Community have different missions and tasks, i.e., they define their work in different ways. The Central Intelligence Agency focuses, among other things, on international issues, whereas the Federal Bureau of Investigation mainly focuses on national security issues, therefore both interpret the concept of intelligence differently. In this context, R.A. Random (an author who writes under a pseudonym in the "Studies in Intelligence" journal, which was classified as confidential in 1958) made the interesting observation that when he asked some of his colleagues from the intelligence services what they understood by the term 'intelligence', they all gave him different definitions which tended to be so detailed that they covered little more than their own professional specialisation. He also observed that they often acknowledged that there were other service officers who perform similar activities but that what those others do is not intelligence activity in the strictest sense. The legal definitions used in legal acts are very

narrow (which is their characteristic feature) and do not fully explain the essence of intelligence. This also applies (to a lesser extent) to official definitions (e.g., glossaries of terms) issued by intelligence entities and other government institutions.

Discussion of the term

Intelligence as information (knowledge). The basic element present in most definitions is the perception of intelligence as information (also understood as knowledge). This is clearly emphasised in a 1999 Central Intelligence Agency document, which focuses only on this aspect and defines intelligence as knowledge and foreknowledge of the world around us, which is the prelude to decision and action by US policymakers (CIA, 1999, p. VII).

Thus, one of the main purposes of intelligence is to provide policymakers with information that can help them make strategic decisions. This information can, depending on the needs, be provided in the form of briefings, memoranda, or more formal reports (the size and detail of which depends on the requirements of the recipient). Each time, however, their purpose is to provide knowledge with a sufficient degree of specificity to provide policymakers with an ability to take action and make the right decisions (Johnson, 2010, pp. 21–22).

A number of intelligence studies scholars point out that while all intelligence is information, not all information is intelligence. Mark Lowenthal, for example, observed that although to many people intelligence seems little different from information (except that it is secret), it is very important to distinguish between the two concepts. Information is anything that can be known, regardless of how it is discovered. Intelligence refers to information that meets the specific (explicitly stated or understood) needs of policymakers and has been collected, processed, and narrowed to properly meet those needs. Intelligence is thus a subset of the broader category of information (Lowenthal, 2017, p. 2).

Intelligence as a process (the intelligence cycle). Before intelligence information (which is a product of the work of intelligence) reaches its recipients, it must be processed appropriately, which is part of the intelligence cycle.

In their day-to-day work, intelligence actors acquire vast amounts of information from a wide variety of sources. Over the years of this practice, a process made up of the interconnected and recurring activities of intelligence agencies – called the intelligence cycle – has taken shape. The most popular definition of the intelligence cycle indicates that it is the process of transforming raw data into a finished intelligence product that is disseminated to be used by key policymakers, military commanders, and consumers in decision-making processes (ODNI, 2011, p. 10)

As highlighted by Artur Gruszczak, as a sequential operation model the intelligence cycle allows intelligence data to be systematically, comprehensively, and logically gathered and processed. This cycle reinforces certain attitudes and behaviours of intelligence officers, which has a direct impact on the quality and quantity of intelligence products. It also introduces a certain order to the methods and techniques used by them (Gruszczak, 2016, p. 44)

Several versions of the intelligence cycle can be found in the intelligence studies literature and among practitioners that differ primarily in terms of the number of steps involved in the process. One of the most popular is the concept presented in a 2011 document issued by the US Office of the Director of National Intelligence, which consists of six consecutive steps:

- planning and direction;
- collection of raw data from various intelligence sources;
- processing and exploitation of information;
- analysis and production of the intelligence product;
- dissemination of the finished intelligence product to the consumer;
- evaluation of the entire process (ODNI, 2011, p. 10).

It should be emphasised that collection intelligence plays a key role in the concept of the intelligence cycle. A traditional classification of intelligence sources includes the following:

- human intelligence (HUMINT) sources;
- geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) sources;
- signals intelligence (SIGINT);
- measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT);
- open-source intelligence (OSINT).

Intelligence as a mission (counterintelligence and covert action). When considering intelligence as a mission, the most common division is into counterintelligence missions and covert actions.

According to the *NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions*, counter-intelligence is "activities which are concerned with identifying and counteracting the threat to security posed by hostile intelligence services or organizations or by individuals engaged in espionage, sabotage, subversion or terrorism" (NATO Standards Agency, 2014, p. 133). This definition identifies at least four main types of counterintelligence activities: counter-espionage, counter-sabotage, counter-subversion, and counter-terrorism.

Miroslaw Minkina emphasised that the aim of counterintelligence is

> to detect the activities of foreign intelligence services, to prevent them from operating, and to destroy or neutralise the results of foreign intelligence work. This aim is achieved by preventing the infiltration of the state by agents located within it, as well as by conducting an operational game of manipulation and by controlling intelligence operations directed against one's state (Minkina, 2014, p. 367).

Intelligence studies literature distinguishes at least three types of counterintelligence activity:
- collection of information – obtaining information about the capabilities of foreign intelligence services to penetrate state secrets;
- defensive activities – thwarting the efforts of hostile intelligence services to penetrate state secrets;
- offensive activities – once the operations of hostile services have been identified, an attempt is made to manipulate these attacks, including by recruiting the opponent's agents and turning them into double agents or by giving them false information to report (Lowenthal, 2017, p. 222).

The second element of the intelligence mission is covert action. This is the most controversial element due to, among other things, its forms (e.g., targeted assassinations, coups, paramilitary operations, sabotage, or black propaganda). Covert action interferes in the internal affairs of foreign states, while the role played by intelligence (i.e., the organiser of these operations) is hidden. This is why critics of covert action often refer to it as 'dirty tricks'. However, they have their own official terminology in different countries, including *tajne operacje* (Poland), covert action (US), special political action or disruptive action (UK), and *aktivnye mieroprijatiya* (Russia).

In the United States, covert action was defined in legal terms in the National Security Act of 1947. Under Section 503e, covert action means "an activity or activities of the United States Government to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly". At the same time, under this definition covert action does not include activities the primary purpose of which is to acquire intelligence, traditional diplomatic or military activities, nor traditional law enforcement activities. Section 503f of the Act stipulates that "no covert action may be conducted which is intended to influence United States political processes, public opinion, policies, or media".

Such a precise statutory definition of covert action is rare. In most countries, legislation merely indicates which intelligence actors are authorised to conduct covert operations or, more frequently, includes a more general statement about 'other activities' carried out as directed by the relevant authorities.

The variety of covert operations is very broad. Jeffrey T. Richelson has described several distinct types of covert action, which include:
- black and grey propaganda;
- paramilitary or political actions designed to overthrow, undermine, or support a particular regime;
- paramilitary or political actions designed to counteract a state's attempts to procure or develop advanced weaponry;
- support (through aid, arms, or training) of individuals or organisations (government components, opposition forces and political parties, and labour unions);
- economic operations;
- deception;
- targeted killings (Richelson, 2018, p. 518).

Covert action is used as an important tool in implementing strategic state policies. Its advantage lies in the fact that covert operations are more influential than traditional diplomacy, while being less drastic than the conventional use of military force. It should be noted, however, that while covert action is regulated by legislation at the national level, it is contrary to international law.

Intelligence as organisation. The final element of the definition of intelligence is its organisation, i.e., the structures in which

it operates in a given state. Each state has its own specificities of intelligence organisation, depending on different factors. These include:

- the organisational forms in which intelligence operates (e.g., independent agencies, departments within ministries, or directorates of general staff);
- legal aspects of intelligence operations;
- tasks and competences of particular intelligence services;
- the place of intelligence services in the structure of state bodies;
- system of coordination of intelligence operations and sharing of intelligence information (e.g., at governmental or intelligence community levels);
- the system of supervision and control (in democratic states by the executive, legislative and judicial branches; in non-democratic states by the ruling party or ruling elite) (Kamiński, 2021, p. 102).

The organisation of intelligence is also associated with its division into categories, the most basic and common of which is the division into foreign intelligence and domestic intelligence. This model operates in many countries, where different agencies are responsible for these two types, e.g., in the UK it is the Security Service (MI5) for domestic intelligence and the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) for foreign intelligence.

The second traditional typology of intelligence distinguishes between civilian and military intelligence. The separation of civilian intelligence services from military structures is now characteristic of most countries in the world, although it is a relatively recent phenomenon: the formation of the first civilian intelligence services did not begin until the early 20th century during the process of the institutionalisation of intelligence and its integration into state structures. Prior to this, such activities were mainly carried out by military organisations.

According to another criterion, intelligence is divided into strategic intelligence, operational intelligence, and tactical intelligence. There is also criminal intelligence, which is also known as law enforcement intelligence. Following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 and the changes to the US security system that followed, homeland security intelligence – also known as all-hazards intelligence – was established, which was a more capacious concept than domestic intelligence.

These categories of intelligence are not a closed catalogue. Other typologies can also be found in the literature, e.g., the division of foreign

intelligence into geographical categories (countries or regions) or the thematic division according to intelligence interests, including political intelligence and economic intelligence.

Systematic reflection with conclusions and recommendations

The aforementioned definitions of intelligence formulated by the representatives of both the American and British schools of intelligence studies, as well as the Polish security sciences, reveal that the discussion on the definition of the concept in question is very lively and is multidimensional, which is why scholars are looking for different solutions.

One example is the approach of David Kahn, who adopted an extremely broad perspective in his publication *An historical theory of intelligence*. He emphasised that because none of the definitions he knew were appropriate, he decided that for the purposes of his theory he would define intelligence in the broadest possible sense, i.e., as information. In his opinion, this is analogous to the term 'news'; although it is almost impossible to define, every journalist knows exactly what it is (Kahn, 2009, p. 4).

Stephen Marrin questioned the sense behind seeking consensus on definitional issues at all. In his opinion, if there is no unanimity regarding fundamental concepts in other disciplines of science, then perhaps it is not necessary in intelligence studies either. He believes that instead of arguing about what words to use in a definition, it would be more effective to focus on the different aims of intelligence and to develop different schools of thought around them, which would lead to constructive debate between them (Marrin, 2016, p. 5).

Yet another solution was proposed by Mark Stout and Michael Warner, according to whom there is no such thing as the essence of intelligence, understood as intelligence per se. Therefore, when considering the concept of intelligence, they focused on its functions: both its core functions and peripheral functions. After analysing various definitions, they concluded that the commonly accepted core functions of intelligence can include, among other aspects, the collection and analysis of intelligence information and its dissemination to policymakers as a finished

intelligence product, as well as counterintelligence and covert action. While the core functions are common functions, they are not universal and different states around the world may use them or not use them. In addition, Stout and Warner stressed that while the core functions of intelligence are enduring, they may be augmented in the future by further components, potentially emerging from, e.g., clandestine diplomacy and cyber operations, which are confrontations at the intersection of peace and war, and shadow wars. Moreover, the core functions do not exhaust the variety of activities in which the intelligence services are actually involved. To prove this, these researchers presented numerous often very specific and unique (in terms of time and place) historical examples of peripheral intelligence functions, including conducting diplomatic operations, maintaining prisons, protecting borders, or designing the atomic bomb. According to these two researchers, the relationship between core and peripheral functions provides a better understanding of what intelligence is and what it can be. This led them to conclude that, in the state, 'intelligence is what intelligence does', which in turn is shaped by the decisions of state leaders ('intelligence is what the boss says it is'), as well as by relationships between agencies within governmental structures and by strategic culture (Stout & Warner, 2018, pp. 517–523).

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Counterintelligence

Summary

DEFINITION OF THE TERM: Counterintelligence is conducted either as part of a state's security structures or in independent institutions. It refers to activities whose aim is to neutralise the actions of foreign intelligence services and combat diversion, sabotage, and terrorism. Its task is to protect the state's secrets and provide counterintelligence cover for various state institutions, bodies, and selected private entities.

HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE TERM: The origins of counterintelligence can be traced back to the Old Testament and ancient India and China, i.e., to many hundreds or even thousands of years ago. Modern counterintelligence research, however, dates back to the emergence of modern societies in the industrial era, i.e., the 19th century and the first two decades of the 20th century.

DISCUSSION OF THE TERM: The aspects of counterintelligence analysed in this article will cover its definition, functions, tasks, and mission. The counterintelligence activities of several European countries will also be discussed.

SYSTEMATIC REFLECTION WITH CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: The systemic approach to counterintelligence demonstrates that it is becoming a subject of research and scientific study despite problems linked with the covert nature of its activities. However, a more comprehensive review and multidisciplinary analyses of the subject under discussion are recommended.

Keywords: counterintelligence, counterintelligence tasks, counterintelligence functions, counterintelligence mission

Definition of the term

In an institutional and functional sense, counterintelligence is conducted either as part of a state's security structures or in independent institutions. It refers to activities whose aim is to neutralise the actions of foreign intelligence services and combat diversion, sabotage, and terrorism. It protects the state's secrets (classified information) and provides counterintelligence cover for various state institutions, bodies, and, when necessary, companies and private organisations. The basic task of counterintelligence activities is to combat foreign intelligence agents: some seek to gather intelligence whilst working legally (e.g., as diplomats, journalists, and traders); some work covertly as illegals; and some only enter the territory of a state for a short period of time for the sole purpose of conducting intelligence or liaison tasks. In their work, counterintelligence services use broadly profiled operational activities based on human sources of information and the observation of foreign agents (spies) in order to identify and establish their contacts and the issues that are of interest to enemy intelligence services. Counterintelligence employs operational skills and equipment (including wiretapping, surveillance, reading of personal documents such as mail, and secret searches) and implements disinformation activities. It also undertakes attempts to recruit spies and, after proper preparation, turns them into double agents. The aforementioned activities are defensive in nature, but counterintelligence also undertakes offensive activities. These include reconnaissance of foreign intelligence services (including their organisational structures, officers, action plans, and areas of interest), and activities to penetrate foreign intelligence services by introducing agents (moles) into their organisation; counterintelligence also controls its own agents abroad. Counterintelligence is divided into civilian and military operations. Thus, today, one of the most important tasks of counterintelligence is the identification of terrorist threats, although some services also deal with organised crime and corruption.

Historical analysis of the term

The number of research issues related to counterintelligence is very broad, and researchers are most often forced to view these issues from an interdisciplinary or even multidisciplinary perspective. However, the question of how far back one needs to go into the genesis, prehistory, and roots of counterintelligence to study it deeply enough presents a methodological problem. Some experts, both practitioners and theoreticians, begin their considerations in the times of the Old Testament and ancient India and China, i.e., many hundreds, even thousands of years ago (Słoń & Wójcik, 2020). This is cognitively interesting but does not add any knowledge that would deepen the understanding of the problems engrained in contemporary counterintelligence, because, as an institution, mode, and method of operation, it is closely linked to the social environment and political realities in which it operates. Thus, studying counterintelligence requires exploring its immediate environment. Using the language of counterintelligence, every researcher performs a "counterintelligence description of the terrain" (Wrońsky, 2016). History should not be ignored, but from a methodological point of view it seems most sensible to begin analyses with the period in which the modern societies of the industrial era were formed, i.e., the entire 19th century and the first two decades of the 20th century (Piasecki, 2021; Formicki, 2020).

In Europe, the first modern counterintelligence was established in Prussia. It was a special service which functioned as an independent structure integrated into the systems of the state to conduct external intelligence operations and ensure internal security. The Prussian political police was established in 1809 and was called the *Sicherheitsbüro* (Security Bureau). It focused on intelligence operations against France but also, on a more general level, it dealt with operational activities against groups and individuals considered suspicious. The subordination of the service to the chancellor, its powers over the population, and its clandestine forms of work meant that the *Sicherheitsbüro* shared some characteristics with civilian counterintelligence. From 1850, the main organ of the Prussian political police was the *Sicherheitsabteilung des Königlichen Polizeipräsidium von Berlin* (*Security Department of the Royal Police Headquarters in Berlin*) (Formicki, 2020; Słoń & Wójcik, 2020).

A few years after France's defeat in the war against Prussia (1870–1871), a Ministry of War was established in this country, which consisted of six offices. One of them (No. 2), under the official name of the Bureau of Statistics and Historical Research, dealt with intelligence issues, but it did not conduct operational activities. Intelligence activities were dealt with by a bureau called the *Service de Renseignements* (Information Service) under the *Deuxiéme Bureau* (Bureau No. 2). Counterintelligence was the domain of the police service *Sûreté Générale* (General Security), while military counterintelligence was incorporated into the *Sûreté*, which formed the *Surveillne de Territoire* (Territorial Protection Service) (Larecki, 2017).

In the UK, the Office of the Secret Service was created in 1909, which was the beginning of the future counterintelligence and intelligence services, better known by the acronyms MI5 and MI6. Earlier cells responsible for internal security and combating espionage included the Special Branch Metropolitan Police, established in 1883 (Piasecki, 2021).

The Russian security and counterintelligence services can be traced back to the oprichnina from the reign of Tsar Ivan the Terrible in the 16th century. Today's solution was introduced in 1880, when the departments of the Okhrana (Departments of Order and Social Security) took over the functions of the Third Section of His Imperial Majesty's Own Chancellery and the Police Department of the Interior Ministry (Larecki, 2017).

Pre-partition Poland had similar services, but intelligence and counterintelligence in the modern sense appeared in the period of the Second Republic of Poland. At that time, Division II of the Polish General Staff was established, within which Department II b (created in 1930) operated and performed the function of carrying out counterintelligence operations (Misiuk, 1998; Pepłoński, 2002).

Today, the counterintelligence services of the aforementioned countries consist of extensive structures and are generally divided into civilian and military services. Several counterintelligence services (structures) operate in Germany, including the *Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz* (BfV) [The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution] and the *Bundeskriminalamt-Sicherungsgruppe* (BKA-SiGru) [Security Department of the Federal Criminal Police Office]. The BfV and the BKA-SiGru have their counterparts in the German states (Länder) and in the Criminal

Offices of the individual states, respectively. Military counterintelligence is provided by the *Militärischer Abschirmdienst* [Military Counterintelligence Service] (Larecki, 2017; Bielak, 1985).

In France, counterintelligence is represented by the *Direction de la Protection et de la Sécurité de la Defence* [Directorate for Defence Protection and Security], which is subordinated to the *Direction du Renseignement Militaire* [Directorate of Military Intelligence]. The other two services are the *Direction de la Protection et de Securit de la Défence* [Directorate for Defense Protection and Security] and the *Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire* [Directorate of Territorial Surveillance] (Larecki, 2017).

In the UK, counterintelligence is associated with the acronym MI5, which represents the Security Service. At its core, MI5 is primarily a counterintelligence service that does not have any investigative powers (Piasecki, 2021).

The Russian Federation has just one counterintelligence service, the *Федеральная сужба безопасности* [Federal Security Service], which has both civilian counterintelligence and military counterintelligence in its structures. Technical counterintelligence is additionally the responsibility of the *Федеральная служба по техническому и экспортному контролю* [Federal Service for Technical and Export Control] (Kraj, 2017).

Polish counterintelligence is represented by two services: the civilian service *Agencja Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego* [Internal Security Agency] and the military service *Służba Kontrwywiadu Wojskowego* [Military Counterintelligence Service] (Swoboda, 2016).

Discussion of the term

The 20th century witnessed two world wars and the Cold War and led to the expansion of state structures responsible for intelligence and counterintelligence activities. The bipolar world of the Cold War period meant that the intelligence and counterintelligence services needed to cover a broad sphere of interests, which resulted in the gathering of enormous amounts of information. Of particular importance was the collection of information regarding the production of weapons of mass destruction

and their systems of delivery, and the identification of attack targets and combat readiness procedures. The broad sphere of the interests of the intelligence and counterintelligence services meant that the range of their tasks was constantly expanding. The services also began to deal with subversive activities, including political and economic subversion and organised state coups, provocations, and political murders.

Counterintelligence activities in the bipolar world were directed at collecting and analysing information and acquiring documents concerning the enemy's operations. These aimed to change, damage, or destroy the political systems of competitor states and influence the legally defined principles of state offices held by persons appointed within the framework of the constitutional order. The focus was placed on identifying projects undertaken within state territories that undermined the state's security, including espionage on behalf of a foreign state. Information was also collected on the activities of foreigners who could threaten the internal security of the state, its interests, and its external security (Żebrowski, 2010).

The duties of counterintelligence included protecting classified information from being accessed by unauthorised persons, collecting information on foreign intelligence (special) services with the aim of thwarting access to state secrets, as well as information on the intelligence structures of hostile states (organisations or non-state groups) in order to prevent those structures from influencing (thwarting, disrupting) the state's operations. In other words, these duties included preventing the penetration of their structures, identifying disinformation activities, and preventing the use of other modus operandi. Counterintelligence was also supposed to detect and recruit agents of other special services in order to provide false information to the enemy (competitor) (Minkina, 2014). These tasks also covered conducting counterintelligence activities, surveillance, and identifying non-nationals who reside in the territory of the state, including members of ethnic minorities, combating right-wing and left-wing extremism, detecting and identifying political opponents, protecting state order and state secrets, infiltrating international democratic (!) organisations, and carrying out intelligence activities (Bielak, 1985). These tasks of counterintelligence are still relevant and valid today, despite the fact that more than 30 years have passed since the Cold War.

Reflections devoted to counterintelligence would be incomplete without questioning the motives behind its creation. The emergence of counterintelligence is linked with the birth and existence of states. Today, transnational corporations and international criminal and terrorist organisations create cells within their structures to deal with their security; they have huge budgets at their disposal with which to organise professional intelligence and counterintelligence services. Unlike state counterintelligence, their activities are not regulated by law. It is worth remembering that the state does not operate in a vacuum. In order to function and develop, it needs to acquire the information necessary to make the right decisions, and access to such information is provided by the intelligence services. Whether or not the intelligence services have their own foreign counterintelligence cells, they are protected by internal counterintelligence activities, which focus, among other things, on identifying areas of interest of hostile states as well as allied states. The establishment, existence, and operation of counterintelligence is also dictated by limited trust in people and the desire for the state to develop and gain the most favourable position in the international order. Well-functioning counterintelligence is one way of achieving this (Minkina, 2014; Żebrowski, 2010).

In the globalising world and its turbulent international environment, counterintelligence needs to broaden its areas of interest in order to keep up with the evolving space of the state's operations. The international environment witnessed enormous changes in the first quarter of the 21st century, which included the increased complexity of political, social, economic, and military processes; the progressive internationalisation of economic activities, information exchange, and circulation of financial resources, goods and services of all kinds; the increasing scale of migration and movements of people, especially in uncontrolled forms; expanding international crime, which is increasingly more difficult to identify and thus combat; and the proliferation of diverse, often very different cultural patterns, traditions, and religions, which poses security risks and raises the degree of difficulty in the effective operation of counterintelligence.

In the area of counterintelligence activity, a comprehensive approach to the security of the state (nation) should be considered. Problems should be solved in such a way as to maintain, as far as possible, a favourable

but also sustainable position of the state in the international arena. Counterintelligence must use such ways, forms of action, and methods that are effective not only at a given moment but also in the future. This is undoubtedly a difficult challenge. An important element in the efficiency and effectiveness of counterintelligence is its creativity, which is based, among other things, on its human and information resources as well as on its experience and technical equipment. Counterintelligence services should take advantage of every opportunity to enhance the state's security. Since more and more threats of an international nature are emerging, counterintelligence should seek partners among the services of other states, which is another major challenge, particularly when potential partners do not trust one another (Żebrowski, 2010).

One very important factor that determines the effective functioning of counterintelligence is being familiar with the operational situation of the terrain, also called the operational description of the terrain. In the case of counterintelligence, this is called the counterintelligence situation of the terrain or the counterintelligence description of the terrain. As counterintelligence services also conduct operations abroad, they also need to familiarise themselves with the intelligence situation of the terrain in whichever country they are operating. A counterintelligence description of the terrain includes components such as changes in the law, methods, and the forms of operation of the special services which might lead to a tightening of the counterintelligence regime locally or nationwide as well as better identification of the range (areas) covered by video surveillance, such as cameras operated by the police or municipal services, or cameras in public places, such as hotels, petrol stations, shopping malls, railway stations, bus stations, and subways, all of which facilitate effective observation. Other elements of counterintelligence description of the terrain include the frequency of situations and events which lead to increased controls by the police and counterintelligence services; assessment of the intensity of external surveillance; the threat of an outbreak of armed conflict, terrorism, or assassinations of state dignitaries; assessment of the number, quantity, and effectiveness of the local counterintelligence and police services; and heightened fear of espionage activity in the local population after the detection (and dismantling) of an intelligence network or the arrest of a spy. Likewise, of importance are the regulations in force regarding ID checks, movement

control of persons, reporting of places of residence, securing buildings, identifying employees, security door passes, control at border crossings (means of identification, e.g., retina scans), preventing the use of different documents to legalise a person's stay in a state, the impact of public sentiment, the activity of extremist or other organisations, and large-scale military exercises and drills. The counterintelligence situation of the terrain is also affected by leakage scandals and a number of events that may force the intensification of preventive operational controls of counterintelligence or police services, against both nationals and non-nationals, which might translate into increased hotel checks, document checks, vehicle checks, increased surveillance of diplomats, or restrictions on movement in a particular area (Larecki, 2017). Changes in the environment, in the perception of security, and emerging new threats as well as opportunities are reflected in counterintelligence structures and tasks (Żebrowski, 2010).

The definition of counterintelligence has never been precisely formulated. When its history is charted – both over time and in different geographical areas – what is clear is that its essence and tasks are variously conceived. The same applies to its organisational framework, i.e., the structures of the counterintelligence services. History, social and political phenomena, culture, and the way of perceiving security problems have always influenced the directions of counterintelligence development, the model of its functioning, and its understanding. Counterintelligence and intelligence are institutions, ways, or methods of operation that reflect practice; they are a specialised craft that requires not just a great deal of general knowledge in many fields but also practical experience that facilitates the acquisition of knowledge and skills passed on by more-experienced colleagues. Theoretical considerations devoted to the art and science of counterintelligence must be reflected in practice. Because counterintelligence operates in a particular environment, its embeddedness in the structures of the state – and its subordination to the state – are a reflection of the approach of a supervisor to the tasks, modes, and methods of operation, the scope of its formal powers, and the type of threats and adversaries it has to deal with. Over time, states became engaged in armed conflicts, supporting national liberation movements and terrorist organisations, and in organising political upheavals (US, UK, and USSR). Thus, the tasks and range of

the intelligence services changed significantly, with a similar process taking place in counterintelligence.

Counterintelligence can be understood in at least three ways: functional, institutional, and informational (Piasecki, 2021). It is a specific type of organised effort, the purpose of which is to establish facts, acquire information important for the interests of the state, as well as protect state institutions (persons holding state positions) and the information possessed by them which is important for the security of the country. Additional tasks may include the identification of adversaries' areas of interest, the infiltration and dismantling of spy networks, and combating other threats, including terrorism.

When counterintelligence is analysed from a functional perspective, the focus is on the tasks it performs and the information it gathers. From the functional perspective, the focus is on its place in the state's security system and in the structures of public authority bodies, which is reflected in the specificity of the tasks and functions that a particular counterintelligence service performs. Bolesław Piasecki would appear to be right in speaking highly of the functional method from the point of view of both scientific and practical values. From this perspective, counterintelligence is a universal institution that is directed at everyone. In other words, it is a set of activities of the state and its organs rather than a specialised institution. According to this interpretation, counter-intelligence should be carried out by the entire public administration, private actors, and also citizens (Piasecki, 2021). It would be unwise to disagree with such a statement, especially given the fact that intel-ligence is interested in obtaining information from all areas of activity of the state under investigation, including its society and its organisa-tion. Such a broad spectrum of reconnaissance is linked to increasingly sophisticated ways and techniques of conducting operations against other states, which include not only classic warfare operations but also those below the threshold of war, i.e., psychological, deceptive, and disinformation activities and covert action.

The institutional approach has a narrower dimension which is lim-ited to the institution that conducts counterintelligence activities in the territory of a given state; the essence of operations undertaken by counterintelligence is reduced to the differences between the structures of security systems within the political regime to which a particular

state belongs, i.e., whether they are democratic or non-democratic (authoritarian). A strictly institutional approach, on the one hand, makes the creation of an effective counterintelligence system difficult or even impossible; on the other hand, it can be useful when it is necessary to define departmental counterintelligence services (assigned to specific institutions, ministries, or those with a narrow specialisation), such as military counterintelligence, radio counterintelligence, services responsible for communications security or for information systems security, and foreign counterintelligence.

The third perspective of analysing counterintelligence concerns information (Piasecki, 2021); it is specific to the United States and is undoubtedly related to the great variety and number of counterintelligence structures operating in the US. In this context, counterintelligence is defined as "the collection of information and the conduct of activities designed to identify, deceive, exploit, prevent, and protect against espionage, other intelligence activity, sabotage, or assassination carried out by or on behalf of foreign countries, organisations, individuals, or their agents, or international terrorist organisations" (Piasecki, 2021). This definition leads to the conclusion that counterintelligence should not only be passive but should carry out active operations by, e.g., by invalidating the enemy's activities. The dynamic changes that are taking place in the operating environment (security environment) lead to a broadening of the scope of the concept of counterintelligence, making it open to activities undertaken beyond state borders and to its increasing involvement in fighting terrorism.

The above considerations take the perspective of practitioners and researchers of counterintelligence who come from states with democratic political regimes. However, analyses of counterintelligence should be extended to cover the political police services, namely security police. Secret political police (political police)

> is often called the security police (service). It can be either an independent state institution or a secret part of the police, and its primary task is to maintain public order and the internal security of the state (Kraj, 2017).

Secret political police (often called the security service) are tasked with identifying threats to the existing socio-political system or political regime. In carrying out their tasks, officers analyse organisations and

the potentially suspicious activities of individuals and assess threats to the security of political and state leaders. Their activities partly overlap with the competences of counterintelligence. A good example is the Polish People's Republic (*Polska Rzeczpospolita Ludowa, PRL*), in which the Security Service fought with enemy intelligence services and their agents. Secret political police most often function in non-democratic political regimes because their state organs, which may not have full political and legal legitimacy to exercise power but seek to do so anyway, must rely heavily on repressive organs.

The transition from a traditional counterintelligence service (fighting espionage, terrorism, or even corruption) to acting as secret political police is relatively easy and can happen because of internal regulations and guidelines which specify the political objectives of counterintelligence operations. A classic example is the action of the French SDCE (*Service de documentation extérieure et de contre-espionnage*) against the Greenpeace ship in New Zealand in the 1980s (Kraj, 2017).

Counterintelligence is a complex structure and at the same time a cognitive process which deals with specific issues and requires a great deal of theoretical knowledge and practical skills (the art of counterintelligence); as indicated above, it can also be defined in various ways. The scope of its meaning is determined not only from the position of its tasks and functions but also from the perspective of gauging the reliability of the intelligence sources, their current and future usefulness, and the possibility of analysing and assessing the activities, nature, and effectiveness of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence services (special services). The last function is an important factor in countering disinformation, deception and, more broadly, information warfare. It also constitutes one of the essential components of the information warfare system (Formicki, 2020; Piasecki, 2021).

Defensive intelligence is also a concept worth discussing. Counterintelligence and intelligence are two sides of the same coin, although they are not absolutely symmetrical because one side is crucial and thus more important than the other, which plays a merely supportive and complementary role. However, the very operational techniques employed by both services are the same, therefore the tools, methods, techniques, and craftsmanship of both fields are indistinguishable. Both services operate both abroad and in their home country. Depending on

the law in a given country, intelligence can conduct domestic operations directly or indirectly through counterintelligence. In other words, sometimes it can be difficult to distinguish between and precisely classify what is an intelligence operation and what is a counterintelligence operation.

Contrary to its name, defensive intelligence does not entail passive action by the intelligence service but is intended to protect the state from external interference (which is one of the tasks of counterintelligence). In a simplified notation, $K - Z = K^1$, where K is the material, technological, and operational capability to penetrate the ranks of the adversary with the aim of obtaining information about its plans and successfully communicating them back to the home state in order to prevent the realisation of these plans. The end result is the protection of the interests (political, economic and others) of the state. Z stands for abroad and K^1 represents the home state. This equation can be applied to both intelligence and counterintelligence operations. This example reveals that it is possible to look at both types of services in a holistic manner, even if in practice they are two separate state structures (Bronisławski, 1974).

There are three aspects to a counterintelligence mission: offensive, defensive, and informational (Piasecki, 2021). From the offensive perspective, a mission aims to create a situation in which it is possible to influence the adversary's decisions; this is usually done by appropriately manipulating the information he possesses (or acquires) and by appropriately manipulating all kinds of assessments and analyses. Activities of this type require great mastery in using intelligence (and counterintelligence) tools. Difficulties increase with the development of the game itself, and the level of its complexity depends on the adopted paradigm of operations: tactical, operational, or strategic. An offensive operation forces an adversary to play the game on their opponents' terms, even though in practice it takes place on home territory. By conducting offensive operations, counterintelligence can bring about a favourable outcome at the political level, which is not possible with a defensive approach, in which tasks are limited to searching for and spotting the opponent's mistakes. In other words, it is the identification and understanding of an adversary by penetrating his structures that allows his operations to be frustrated and these opportunities to be used to the home advantage. The concept of defensive intelligence can be used interchangeably with that of offensive counterintelligence.

Defensive counterintelligence must not be underestimated or restricted, even if the traditions and skills in conducting offensive counterintelligence are particularly strong in a given state. Defensive counterintelligence does not merely denote protective measures; rather, it is preventive in nature and is intended to prevent the effective penetration of state institutions, companies, and private organisations that are important for state security. Raising awareness, education, the provision of necessary passive security knowledge, the support of effective security policies, and the proper application of protective measures and other counterintelligence activities can be beneficial to institutions that are unable to carry out offensive activities.

The last element of the counterintelligence mission is its informational aspect. The provision of information can have a significant impact on the state's security policy and strategy. It forms a part of the data acquisition system and ensures the security of the information and decision-making process. Information relates not only to threats but also to the details of the information one possesses or the means used by opponents. By acquiring and analysing information, knowledge which goes beyond the specific field of interest is frequently obtained. Information can be useful for identifying the aims of an operation or for understanding the opponent. Tasks or objectives that a state assigns to its foreign intelligence relatively accurately reflect its true intentions, which it understandably does not disclose openly.

All the aspects of counterintelligence missions outlined above, i.e., the combination of offensive and defensive methods and tools and the proper use of information, allow a mission to be completed effectively (Formicki, 2020; Piasecki 2021).

Bolesław Piasecki argues that the tasks of counterintelligence are universal, regardless of the era and political system in which they operate. Three basic areas of such activity can be distinguished: 1) the protection of the state against foreign intelligence activities, with the primary objective of obtaining information and gaining an advantage in this area; 2) the offensive nature of counterintelligence when it is responsible for passive protection of the state against hostile activities and maintaining the cohesion and impermeableness of the state's security system; 3) providing decision-makers with the necessary data to protect the vital interests of the state, which can also be regarded as the realisation of

the informational aspect of the counterintelligence mission (Piasecki, 2021).

Counterintelligence also performs a number of specific functions, such as operational, investigative, analytical, data collection, and supportive roles. The operational function can be defined as activities directed at obstructing, confusing (conducting manipulation activities), deceiving, sabotaging, and, where possible, monitoring or controlling intelligence operations conducted by foreign intelligence services. Operational activities aim to identify and combat threats and exploit intelligence activities, i.e., deterring the enemy's intelligence. Reconnaissance and intelligence activities, which include neutralising the enemy's influence, necessitate the recruitment of agents, the creation of double agents, and the use of provocation and inspiration for desired action. This makes it possible to identify the modus operandi of the enemy, to identify intelligence officers and their ways of communicating with agents, and to assess other limitations and strengths of the foreign intelligence service. The investigative function consists in searching for information about crimes related to breaches of the security system and providing evidence that can be used in court. Another very important function is the collection of data, which should take place in a structured and continuous manner. In performing the operational function, agents collect information that is useful to counterintelligence and which should be as broad as possible, and the collecting activity itself must be conducted through all operational channels and with the use of the widest possible range of open sources. On this basis, a general database is created, which makes it possible to assess and understand what has happened in the past, what is happening now, and what will happen in the future.

The successful implementation of the mission and tasks of counterintelligence is not possible without the analytical function. In a sense, intelligence activity is a specific and also scientific analytical discipline (Mania, 2017). Without this element, the counterintelligence formula would be poor as it would not be possible to understand the adversary's position and thus undertake effective defence. Nowadays, huge amounts of information are acquired, from which it is necessary to extract what is relevant and important. Quantity must be turned into quality. Analysts should be broad-minded and represent different scientific disciplines (Kraj, 2020; Mania, 2017; Piasecki, 2021).

Systematic reflection with conclusions and recommendations

Research dedicated to special services and counterintelligence is becoming increasingly popular and is being conducted by a growing number of scholars. In my opinion, Bolesław Piasecki is the first Polish researcher to undertake a forward-looking study of contemporary counterintelligence. His book, entitled *Kontrwywiad. Atak i obrona* [*Counterintelligence. Attack and defence*], should be a starting point for researchers and for the process of anchoring counterintelligence issues (its functions, tasks, and activities) in the system of the state authorities. The considerations undertaken in this article lead to the following conclusions:

1. Counterintelligence is a key area of the state's activities in the field of ensuring security.
2. Counterintelligence activities should include a strong offensive component but should not neglect the defensive element.
3. Efficient counterintelligence must have a strong analytical and informational division and must collect and properly segregate all information that could be useful and could enhance the effectiveness of operations of home services as well as the efficiency of the state.
4. Counterintelligence analysts must be highly competent and cover all areas of science.
5. The Polish scientific community, with particular emphasis on the political and security sciences, should create and undertake multidisciplinary studies devoted to counterintelligence.
6. A system of knowledge exchange between scientific centres, individual scientists, and counterintelligence should be created in order to raise the level of qualifications of all its participants. Scientific and popular science publications based on sound counterintelligence knowledge will help to create a favourable, conducive, and useful counterintelligence description of the terrain.

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Security in Catholic social teaching

Summary

DEFINITION OF THE TERM: The article presents the stance taken in Catholic social teaching regarding security issues such as war (including the concept of a just war and Pope Francis's attitude to the war in Ukraine), peace, migration, poverty, terrorism, and environmental security.

HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE TERM: The historical analysis of the security-related issues presented here, including the concept of a just war, begins with the thought of ancient (e.g., St. Augustine of Hippo) and medieval (St. Thomas Aquinas) writers. However, the main focus of the article is the ideas presented by the Catholic Church in the post-Second Vatican Council era of the 20th century.

DISCUSSION OF THE TERM: Although Catholic social teaching's general principles of avoiding war and pursuing peace have remained unchanged, the permissibility in this doctrine of using war as a means of protecting human security has evolved over time, as has the nature of war in different periods of history. In this context, the Second World War and the development of weapons of mass destruction have played a very important role which has led the Church to abandon the use of the term 'a just war'.

SYSTEMATIC REFLECTION WITH CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: The views formulated within Catholic social teaching regarding security issues are of a normative nature. It recommends, among other things, grounding man's search for security in the spiritual sphere, extensive and profound international cooperation, and addressing the material and social needs of disadvantaged individuals and groups, i.e., interreligious and intercultural dialogue.

Keywords: Catholic social teaching, just war, peace, security

Definition of the term

In this article, Catholic social teaching will be understood more broadly than through the prism of the statements of popes and Councils from the time of Pope Leo XIII, and his encyclical *Rerum novarum* (1891), which was dedicated to social issues. It will also include the considerations of Catholic philosophers and hierarchs since Christian antiquity (i.e., 2nd/3rd century AD onwards), when they began to reflect on certain social issues related to security. Thus, the article will outline selected ideas of St. Augustine, St. Thomas Aquinas, Pius XII, John XXIII, the Second Vatican Council, Paul VI, John Paul II, Benedict XVI, and Francis. The security issues under consideration from the perspective of Catholic social teaching will concern matters related to war and peace, focusing on not just the conditions for a just war and later Catholic alternatives to this concept, but also the conditions for peace in the world and contemporary problems linked to the war in Ukraine, migration, poverty, fundamentalist terrorism, and environmental security. Catholic social teaching covers the social, political, and individual aspects of human life; its reflections on security that are outlined in this article also address these aspects, with particular emphasis on recommendations regarding individuals' attitudes and behaviours. Although these reflections are normative in nature, they are accompanied and preceded by in-depth social and anthropological analyses.

Historical analysis of the term

St. Augustine and St. Thomas: the concept of a just w a r. Until the time of St. Augustine of Hippo (4th to 5th century AD), no clear position had been developed within the Catholic doctrine on the question of whether war can ever be just and whether the participation of Christians in war can ever be justified. Clement of Alexandria (2nd to 3rd century AD) treated being a soldier – including being a Christian soldier – as a profession like any other; Origen (2nd to 3rd century AD) recognised the existence of morally justifiable wars but did not allow Christians to participate in them; Lactantius (3rd to 4th century AD) did not provide for exceptions to the fifth commandment and unequivocally called war moral degeneracy.

The need to define a more unambiguous attitude in the Catholic doctrine towards war became necessary when the Catholic faith gained the status of the official religion of the Roman Empire (381 AD). The prospect of the active participation of Christians in the public (including military) life of the political community did not favour the Church's total rejection of war. Based on the Roman reflection on what constituted a just war (*bellum iustum*) or an unjust war – including Cicero's distinction between just and unjust causes for initiating wars – Augustine developed the first broader Christian stance on the issue. In his opinion, it was permissible only as a last resort after all possible peaceful methods had been exhausted, and the purpose of war could only be to repair harm and to bring about peace. Examples of harm included the breaching of peace, being wronged, the unjust seizure of property, and violation of the moral order. The actions taken had to be commensurate with the harm, although this did not exclude the possibility of depriving others of their lives and destroying their property. What was crucial was the intention of the retaliatory measures. For Augustine, a just war excluded such motives as cruelty, revenge, or greed; moreover, it had to be declared by a political ruler with the proper legitimacy to rule. Thus, *bellum iustum* could only be of a restitutory nature, whereas a predatory war was never anything more than robbery (Augustine, 2003).

Augustine's thought on just war was picked up and developed by St. Thomas Aquinas in the 13th century. First, unlike his predecessor, he defined war thus: "war is, properly speaking, carried on against external foes, being as it were between one people and another"; he also distinguished it from strife, which was "between one individual and another, or between few people on one side and few on the other side" (Thomas Aquinas, 2017, II–II, q. 42). Second, he reiterated Augustine's argument that a war can be just and that Christians can participate in it, pointing out that Christ did not instruct soldiers to abandon their profession but only forbade murder, which is supposed to support the idea that not every instance of taking the life of an enemy during war is murder. Third, he listed three conditions for a just war: the authority of the prince (*auctoritas principis*), a just cause (*iusta causa*), and the right intention (*intentio recta*). Such a war can only be waged by a sovereign authority (i.e., a 'public' person, not private persons) who has sole authority to call to arms and to punish enemies (e.g., to give the order to kill). A just

cause of war is as a response to harm (which does not exclude offensive action) and to bring heretics and those who have rejected the Christian faith back onto the right path (by requiring them to abide by the oath that they took when they professed their Christian faith). However, it was wrong to use force to convert pagans; this could only be used against them for the sake of enabling Christians to practise their faith or if Christians were being harmed by them (in the 15th century, the Polish jurist Paweł Włodkowic elaborated on this concept during his polemics with the Teutonic Knights – who freely used violence against pagans – by adding to this the obligation to provide proof of any harm and the obligation to notify the party and the 'international community' of the intention to attack in advance of any action being taken). The use of force must always be accompanied by the right intentions: the advancement of good and the avoidance of evil. Otherwise, war cannot be called just but is merely common robbery or cruelty. Interestingly, during a just war (and only a just war) it was possible to take possession of material goods and slaves. St. Thomas only forbade murdering captives, women, and children, and destroying farmlands (Thomas Aquinas, 2017, I–II, q. 105).

Pius XII: a just war? The ideas of St. Augustine and St. Thomas remained the basis of the Catholic Church's interpretation of war until the middle of the 20th century, when – influenced by the experiences of the First and Second World Wars, including the use of the atomic bomb – Pope Pius XII (1939–1958) seemed to limit the cases in which warfare is permissible. Furthermore, he abandoned the use of the term 'a just war'. During the pontificate of Pius XII, Cardinal Ottaviani, Secretary of the Congregation of the Holy Office, declared that there is no just war today which would allow a state to attack another in order to enforce its rights; thus, in practice, a declaration of war would never be permitted (Minois, 1998, p. 411). For Pius XII, however, the restriction of the scope of a just war did not mean abandoning the use of force in the pursuit of peace or recognising that all war was reprehensible; instead, it meant abandoning the legitimisation of offensive retaliatory measures in order to restore peace (which was approved in the medieval doctrine of a just war). The only justification for resorting to military means (excluding nuclear weapons) was thus a country's necessary defence against an external aggressor (Pius XII, 1944). For this reason, Pius's XII's concept came to be known as the 'legitimate necessity defence'.

John XXIII: Peace and security in the world. The fact that the Church moved further away from treating war as a legitimate element of state security is linked with the speeches of St. John XXIII, especially with his encyclical *Pacem in terris* (1963), which is directly dedicated to the issues of peace. It is worth emphasising that although this message was formulated by the head of the Catholic Church, it was addressed not only to its members but also to all people of good will; this was an invitation – actively continued by John XXIII's successors – to treat Catholic social teaching as a universal message. This invitation can be accepted and applied regardless of religion and (to some extent) worldview.

The third chapter of *Pacem in terris* is of particular importance in analyses of security. It is directly dedicated to relations between states (nations). It advocates founding these relations – like relations between people – on the inalienable dignity of the human person, on natural law, and, more specifically, on the principles of truth, justice, active spiritual solidarity, and freedom. According to John XXIII, peace – in both the interpersonal and international spheres – can exist and can last only by implementing these four principles in the changing conditions of social and political life (John XXIII, 1963).

The requirement of truth entails the rejection of all racial discrimination in relations between states, the rejection of the subjugation of one country by another, and the recognition of the inherently equal dignity of all subjects; in particular, this means the recognition of the right to exist and develop and to freely choose how to realise these rights. The requirement of justice implies all states' reciprocal respect for rights and the prohibition of being guided by self-interest without taking moral considerations into account. This means that countries that seek prosperity by harming or oppressing other nations are committing a crime; without justice they become, as St. Augustine used to say, "mighty bands of robbers" (John XXIII, 1963, point 92). Justice, moreover, does not mean the automatic acquisition of state sovereignty by nations without it. It means that these nations should not be discriminated against and that their situation should be improved upon by states with sovereignty. Active spiritual solidarity is an incentive not only to not harm other nations but also to actively cooperate internationally for the common good and for the pursuit of nations' own interests. It also entails the need for openness and assistance with refugees on the part of public authorities as

well as society as a whole; hence, those who migrate for political rea-
sons as well as those who migrate for employment etc. The principle of
freedom implies the prohibition of not only oppression and harm to other
nations but also of interference in their internal affairs, and, furthermore,
the obligation to assist other nations in their development, with spe-
cial responsibility resting on states with higher levels of development
(John XXIII, 1963).

Expanding on the thought of Pius XII, John XXIII stated unequivocally
during the Cold War that the guarantor of lasting peace between nations
is not the balance of armed forces (including the expansion of nuclear
arsenals) but the realisation of the principles listed above, which are not
the requirements of a particular religion but are derived from reason and
therefore have a universal dimension. The Pope recommended disar-
mament; however, any real disarmament must first take place "in the
hearts of men", which would mean, according to him, the cooperation of
"everyone" in order to "banish fear and anxious expectation of war from
men's minds", which would lead to mutual trust – the ultimate antidote
to war (John XXIII, 1963, point 113).

In his reflection on peace and security, John XXIII addressed the
need to overcome fear on the personal, interpersonal, and international
levels. He also had great hopes for the United Nations, an organisa-
tion established to protect the dignity of the human person and to
promote peace. The UN was established to be an international body
for the settlement of conflicts in relations between states when a bilat-
eral settlement could not be reached. According to the Pope, conflicts
between states should generally be resolved not by force but by both
sides analysing their arguments and the given situation in the light of the
truth (John XXIII, 1963, point 93).

Second Vatican Council: maintaining peace. The conci-
liar Constitution explicitly elaborates on John XXIII's remarks on equality
and justice in relations between nations in the context of maintaining
world security, while also emphasising the material dimension – the need
for richer nations to share material goods with poorer nations – which
stems from the legitimate aspiration of people and nations to live full,
free, and dignified lives (Vatican II, 1965). The last, and shortest, chapter
of the Constitution is directly dedicated to peace and contains a warning
against wars and against the use of modern technologies in warfare,

since this leads to increased cruelty and to barbarism. Appealing to the conscience of mankind and the natural law of nations, the Church calls for the observance of international agreements, including conventions on the treatment of prisoners of war and wounded soldiers; for efforts to build an international community and for governments to avoid war; and – although not directly – for soldiers to disobey those orders of their leaders that would lead to war crimes. The Church affirms in the Constitution the right to use force, but only for defence and after all other possible peaceful solutions (not specified in the document, however) have been exhausted. It also sanctions and appreciates military service and calls soldiers who work for their country "agents of security" who contribute to the establishment of peace (Vatican II, 1965, point 79), which apparently means that the Second Vatican Council does not rule out a strong army as a defence and deterrence measure.

Referring to the message of Pius XII, the Council categorically rejects total war or the use of nuclear weapons, which it calls "scientific weapons"; the Council emphasises the responsibility of those in power before God and all humanity, and calls using these weapons a crime against God and man. It also explicitly rejects the balance of power as ineffective. Therefore, the correct path to security is to satisfy the basic needs of those who cannot do so for themselves (instead of allocating large sums of money to the expansion of arsenals), which would reduce the great economic inequalities which, according to the Council, are one of the causes of war. This does not, however, invalidate the recommendation for grounding international action in the spiritual realm, which should allow people to move away from fear and build mutual trust between nations. The Constitution also calls for efforts to – through the international community – work out solutions that would prohibit all war.

Paul VI: working towards peace. The teaching of the Second Vatican Council was elaborated on by Pope Paul VI (1963–1978) in his encyclical on the development of peoples *Populorum progressio* (1967). In it, he reiterated the message of John XXIII expressed in *Pacem in terris* that peace

> is not simply the absence of warfare, based on a precarious balance of power; it is fashioned by efforts directed day after day toward the establishment of the ordered universe willed by God, with a more perfect form of justice among men (Paul VI, 1967, point 76).

In a speech at the United Nations, Paul VI highlighted the need to continue working towards the establishment of a world authority that would be capable of taking effective action in guarding international security both judicially and politically (Paul VI, 1967, point 78). He also reiterated the importance of economic and cultural factors in the pursuit of peace, trying again to sensitise more prosperous nations and individuals to the needs of the poor and those without access to cultural goods. Moreover (and this was his own novel proposal, although it followed from his predecessors' thought), he directly linked peace with development in the broadest sense, explicitly stating that "development means peace" (Paul VI, 1967, point 87).

On the question of limiting the use of force, Paul VI, who did not ultimately accept pacifism, claimed that "the sword, in the concert of historical and concrete life in society, [has] its own raison d'être, for justice and for peace" (Paul VI, 1976). The Pontifical Council Iustitia et Pax went even further in the 1976 document *The Holy See and Disarmament*. This states that in a situation of unjust aggression, in the name of the defence of human dignity and in order not to violate the values that one wants to save, one must resist, but without using violence. This statement, however, has not become the official position of the Church.

John Paul II: "humanitarian intervention". The conditions for the use of force to restore peace and security were detailed – referring to the concept of a just war, although without directly using this term – by St. John Paul II (1978–2005). The concept of 'humanitarian intervention' which was discussed in his messages for the World Day of Peace allowed the use of military force to oppose the attacks of an unjust aggressor when political efforts and non-violent means of conflict resolution (linked to dialogue and negotiation) have failed. The legitimacy of 'humanitarian intervention' is also linked to the fulfilment of other conditions: it must be a defensive action aimed to protect the population, provide humanitarian assistance, and disarm the aggressor if necessary. It is therefore possible, and even desirable, for the intervention not to be of a military nature. However, if it is an armed intervention, the means used in it must be proportionate and must absolutely not cause greater evil than that which is being experienced. The intervention must be carried out with full respect for international law and guaranteed by an authority that is internationally recognised

(John Paul II, 2000). The last condition implies placing the essential responsibility for 'humanitarian intervention', including armed intervention, on the international community, which is undoubtedly the objective of the evolving conciliar and post-conciliar Catholic thought on security and peace; this condition also leads John Paul II to treat cooperation between states for the goal of peace as a moral obligation (John Paul II, 1987, point 23).

The concept of a just war (sometimes treated as a synonym of the term 'legitimate defence by military force') is included in the Catechism of the Catholic Church, which was written and approved during the pontificate of John Paul II in 1992. The conditions for such a war resemble the conditions for the 'humanitarian intervention' outlined above and include the requirement that the damage inflicted by the aggressor be lasting, grave, and certain; that all other means of putting an end to it must have been shown to be impractical or ineffective; that the use of arms must not produce evils and disorders graver than the evil to be eliminated; and – a new element that is absent in the notion of 'humanitarian intervention' – that there must be serious prospects of success (CCC, 1994, point 2309).

F r a n c i s : N o m o r e w a r. The Catholic reflection on war was next taken up by Pope Francis, who, rather than start with the concept of 'humanitarian intervention' or the search for conditions for the legitimate use of military force, started with the post-conciliar message of the need to persevere towards peace through the establishment of justice between people, which foreshadows the direction in Catholic thought towards a further reduction of the use of military force. Looking at war from this perspective, Francis's comment on Paragraph 2309 of the Catechism emphasised that it cannot be used to justify preventive attacks nor warfare that brings more evil than good – the latter being particularly feared today. In view of the existence of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons (Francis explicitly mentioned the need to preserve the memory of the victims of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in the encyclical), he stated, in a similar vein as John XXIII that

> We can no longer think of war as a solution, because its risks will probably always be greater than its supposed benefits. In view of this, it is very difficult nowadays to invoke the rational criteria elaborated in earlier centuries to speak of the possibility of a "just war" (Francis, 2020, point 258).

The Pope also mentions this idea explicitly, stating that the concept of "a just war" is one "that we no longer uphold in our own day" (Francis, 2020, point 258). However, the Pope's call of "Never again war!" should not be interpreted as an absolute renunciation of the use of military force for defence, since Francis also states that it is not right to permit some to violate the human dignity of others and to cause harm, and he encourages people to actively defend their rights when they are violated. In doing so, he emphasises that defence should not involve a desire for revenge, hatred, or hostility. The obligation is to forgive the aggressor, without forgetting the wrongs he has suffered. This does not change the fact that, according to Francis, every war – apparently a 'just' one too – leaves our world worse than it was before (Francis, 2020, point 261). The antidote to war, according to the post-conciliar direction of Catholic thought, is social friendship and fraternity understood not as abstract declarations but as a result of the discovery of the value and dignity of man, the result of conscious inner work and the nurturing of interpersonal and international relationships (Francis, 2020, points 103–104).

Discussion of the term

Francis's stance on the war in Ukraine (2022–). It is worth applying Pope Francis's calls for the strengthening of peace through the building of fraternity and justice and for abandoning the treatment of war as 'just' under certain conditions to the specific situation of the military aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine which began during his pontificate on 24 February 2022. In his encyclicals and many other statements, Francis openly condemns this aggression, perpetrated by the Russian state through "soldiers, mercenaries" and not, he emphasises, the Russian people. His failure to name the Russian president as the person responsible for this aggression (Francis eventually named Putin specifically in this context in November 2022 in an interview with the Jesuit magazine "America") resulted from the traditional principle of Catholic teaching to condemn deeds rather than people, and to the efforts of the pope and Vatican diplomacy to play the role of a mediator in ending the war. These efforts, undertaken by Francis personally on the very first day of the war, failed to have

the desired effect due to reluctance of the Russian side to stop. Similarly disappointing was the hope placed by Francis and his predecessors on the efforts of international organisations established to prevent war and/or restore peace. This did not change the Pope's fundamental rhetoric, which was directed at exposing the suffering and death of specific people and groups as a result of war and the trampling of the dignity of the human person rather than towards commenting on specific political and international actions. His mention of the suffering of the Russians in this context also sometimes provoked accusations in the mass media that he favours the Russian side; yet, in fact, this stemmed not only from the Vatican's political neutrality but also – even more so – from the application of the pre-political principle of Catholic teaching on the protection of human dignity regardless of nationality, which is discussed in, for example, *Fratelli tutti*.

Although political categories are not of primary importance for Francis, it is his (relatively few) statements on this topic that allow us to grasp and clarify his position on the issue of war. The statement in June 2022 about "NATO barking at Russia's door", together with its subsequent clarification, helped to emphasise Francis's reluctance to treat the warring parties in unambiguous categories of good and evil, as is a popular rhetoric in Ukraine, the US, and the European Union, being reminiscent of Ronald Reagan's Cold War rhetoric (the evil empire versus the free world). Pope Francis thus points to the complexity of the situation and interests and apparently suggests that the use of this American and European moral classification obscures other aspects of the conflict which are related, for example, to US political and economic interests. By no means does this mean attributing responsibility for the outbreak of war to the United States or justifying the aggression of the Russian state.

Refraining from applying an unequivocal moral classification to each of the parties in a given war is related to another aspect of Catholic social teaching that is emphasised by Francis: the rejection of militarisation as a means to deter an adversary and bring about peace. If the division into good and bad were accepted, militarisation by the former would be positive or at least acceptable, yet this reasoning has been rejected by the Church since Pius XII.

Nevertheless, in Francis's opinion, the provision of arms to Ukraine and the very fact that Ukraine is defending itself by militarily means is

not an example of militarisation but represents Ukrainians' love for their country and their legitimate right to self-defence, which are mentioned in *Fratelli tutti* (point 261). Although (in April 2022) Francis and Cardinal Pietro Parolin initially merely affirmed Ukraine's right to self-defence and warned Western countries against supplying weapons to Ukraine because of the risk of an escalation of Russia's aggression, by September Francis had called these supplies "morally legitimate" as long as they are used by Ukraine for self-defence and not for the escalation of war or profit. Apparently, in assessing the morality of this action, the Pope was considering the current political context and attempting to anticipate its consequences, ultimately approving the arms supplies when he became convinced that the risk of escalating the war through such supplies was not significant. These considerations did not include an assessment of the motivation of the Ukrainian side, i.e., he did not analyse whether its defence – as required by *Fratelli tutti* – was undertaken out of a desire for revenge, and whether it was accompanied by forgiveness. However, his approval of the defence of Ukraine and to the supply of weapons does not imply that dialogue with the aggressor is considered impossible; Francis hopes for such dialogue, which – as a path to peace – he often mentions.

Migration. It is worth noting that Pope Francis has also addressed other issues related to contemporary security, including migration. Although this issue was also discussed in earlier Catholic social teaching (e.g., in his 1981 encyclical *Laborem exercens*, John Paul II advocated treating migrants in search of decent working conditions as being equal to other people in a given society, although he generally treated this type of migration as a necessary evil), Francis addressed the increasing waves of migration in many parts of the world at the beginning of the 21st century quite extensively, especially in his encyclical *Fratelli tutti*. Following John Paul II and Benedict XVI, he emphasised that the desirable (ideal) state is to find adequate, dignified living conditions in one's country without having to leave it, and that migration entails great difficulties and harm both for migrants and for their countries of origin (Francis, 2020). He strongly encourages openness and hospitality – on interpersonal, social, and political levels. However, this openness, contrary to some popular superficial interpretations of his message, is not unconditional since it must be balanced by the obligation to protect the

rights of a country's citizens; Francis understands that reticence towards migrants is part of the natural human instinct of self-defence (Francis, 2020, points 40, 41). Nevertheless, it is a fact that Francis's main message on migration boils down to a call to citizens (not just Christians) and those in power to treat all migrants as brothers – whatever the reason for their leaving their home country. This means encouraging citizens of the countries to which migrants travel to be guided by "fraternal love" towards them and to respect their dignity, which includes having a sense of responsibility towards them, ensuring they enjoy equal rights, overcoming their fear and mistrust of 'others', and supporting them on a personal level. On the political level, Francis's call implies, among other things, the proposal to increase and simplify the granting of visas; guaranteeing personal security and access to basic services; opening humanitarian corridors for the most vulnerable refugees; and providing suitable and dignified housing (Francis, 2020, point 130). In his opinion, welcoming and caring for migrants is an essential way to build universal fraternity and thus peace in the world.

P o v e r t y. According to Francis, another important condition of world peace is the reduction of poverty. Francis continues the position of the Second Vatican Council which acknowledges that it is often the great wealth inequalities between countries that are the cause of conflicts, including wars. Francis emphasises the following paradox: although the level of consumption in the most developed countries is extremely high, this is not accompanied by a perceptible reduction in the level of poverty in the world (Francis, 2015). In order to eradicate poverty, he also invokes one of the fundamental principles of Catholic social teaching, i.e., the principle of solidarity, which, in addition to combating the structural causes of poverty, "means thinking and acting in terms of community, […] means that the lives of all are prior to the appropriation of goods by a few" (Francis, 2020, point 116). He also refers to the social function of property, reminding people that – according to Catholic social teaching, including John Paul II's *Laborem exercens* – the right to property is secondary to the principle of the common destination of created goods, as illustrated by the words of John Chrysostom: "Not to share our wealth with the poor is to rob them and take away their livelihood. The riches we possess are not our own, but theirs as well" (Francis, 2020, point 119).

Fundamentalism-based terrorism. John Paul II, Benedict XVI, and Francis also addressed the issue of terrorism as a great threat to contemporary peace. Francis elaborated on John Paul II's and Benedict XVI's reflections on the role played by religious fundamentalism in terrorism, which is a phenomenon that has been increasing in the world in recent decades. He emphasised that God has nothing to do with violence and that God cannot be invoked in an attempt to justify any violent action. Both fundamentalism and terrorism instrumentally exploit religion and human dignity – and consequently individuals and communities – in order to achieve inhuman, selfish ends. Benedict XVI pointed to religious fundamentalism as inherently being a threat to peace. Francis, who objects to equating religious fundamentalism with Islam, presented this religion as essentially peaceful and regarded the violence practised by some of its adherents as an aberration. He hopes that threats linked to terrorism based on religious fundamentalism can be minimised thanks to inter-religious dialogue, including dialogue with Islam. Such dialogue would result in a greater mutual understanding of religions and cultures and in finding in them commonly shared principles of respect for human beings, their lives, and religious freedom (Francis, 2015b).

Environmental security. Since the time of Paul VI, Catholic social teaching has also reflected on environmental security. In his address to the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (1970), Paul VI warned against the prospect of an ecological catastrophe that could follow unbridled development of industrial civilisation and the detachment of scientific and technological progress from moral categories. A year later, in his apostolic letter *Octogesima adveniens*, he pointed to the destruction of the natural environment and warned that man himself will also fall victim to this destruction if his contemporary attitude towards nature continues and he fails to realise the need to protect it or limit its exploitation. In his first encyclical, John Paul II lamented that today people often seem incapable of looking at the natural environment in any other way than through the prism of exploiting it for their immediate use and consumption (John Paul II, 1979). This exploitation is a serious matter because it demonstrates that man does not approach the world entrusted to him by God responsibly and does not protect the gift of human life from degradation (Pope Francis added that this is one of the causes of contemporary conflicts and wars [Francis, 2015,

point 57]). Man has been entrusted with the task of transforming real-
ity, but this should be done following moral principles and should serve
for the good of man, in accordance with God's original design. These
considerations led John Paul II to call for "ecological conversion", while
Benedict XVI diagnosed man's degradation of the environment as origi-
nating from a misconceived idea of freedom as unlimited freedom, in the
recognition of man as the ultimate authority of all actions and norms,
and in the rejection of unshakeable truths about nature and human life.
Francis gathered and expanded his predecessors' reflections in the first
encyclical in the history of the Catholic Church that is directly dedicated
to ecological issues (*On Care for our Common Home*) – *Laudato si'*
(2015). In it, he described in detail the ecological areas of concern, par-
ticularly the degradation of nature and human health, including air pol-
lution, non-biodegradable waste, the extinction of fauna and flora due
to the exploitation of forests for production (especially in the Amazon
and the Congo Basin), global warming due to the great concentration of
greenhouse gases released as a result of human activity, the depletion
of natural resources due to overexploitation, inadequate access to and
quality of drinking water (especially in some parts of Africa), and uncon-
trolled urban sprawl which degrades the environment. In doing so, he
openly highlights the weakness of political leadership and international
politics in the protection of global environmental security. He also diag-
noses that remedying these and other problems will only be possible in
the long term, since

> we still lack the culture needed to confront this crisis. We lack leadership capable
> of striking out on new paths and meeting the needs of the present with concern
> for all and without prejudice towards coming generations. The establishment of
> a legal framework which can set clear boundaries and ensure the protection of
> ecosystems has become indispensable (Francis, 2015, point 53).

Systematic reflection with conclusions and recommendations

The Church does not aspire to promote concrete and detailed solutions
to security problems but rather encourages and calls – by appealing
to moral and spiritual values – for such solutions to be worked out

internationally through dialogue (Francis, 2015, points 61, 164). This applies to all the security issues discussed in this article: war, peace, migration, poverty, and terrorist and environmental threats. For this reason, the reflection of Catholic social teaching is rather general and refers to principles that could be helpful in formulating concrete solutions which will be developed and implemented by other actors, especially states and international organisations. This does not exclude the Vatican's participation in mediation and in attempts to bring peace between warring parties along these lines – something the popes have sought and continue to seek, despite the conflicting parties' frequent unwillingness to engage in mediation, especially official mediation. It is also worth noting that not all the principles of Catholic teaching remain unchanged throughout history: changes occur – as in the case of the concept of a just war – due to current socio-political contexts and military factors (e.g., the existence of nuclear weapons). The question of the application of these general principles to specific cases is the subject of separate analyses (except in the case of Ukraine, which has been addressed here).

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