

Bogdan Szlachta

Jesuit University Ignatianum in Krakow

<https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4841-589X>

<https://doi.org/10.35765/slowniki.181en>

# Challenges to multiculturalism

## Summary

**DEFINITION OF THE TERM:** There is a long history of culturally different groups coexisting within a society. However, today's acceptance of all cultures as equally valid has sparked debate regarding the conditions of coexistence of cultural groups within a liberal democracy.

**HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE TERM:** As a social phenomenon, multiculturalism has existed since antiquity. The intensification of studies on cultures in the 20<sup>th</sup> century and the process of decolonization have led to increased interest in the cultural grounding of citizens.

**DISCUSSION OF THE TERM:** The clash of the 'universalist' perspective, which is related to human rights, with the 'group' perspective, which is related to the rights of groups, raises questions about how individuals should be protected from the oppression of groups, and, conversely, how groups are to be protected from the levelling impact that the majority exerts on the cultures of minority groups.

**SYSTEMATIC REFLECTION WITH CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:** These questions lead to reflection on the identity of individuals and groups, including the majority group, and the relations between the laws imposed by the majority group and the rights and freedoms of individuals and groups.

**Keywords:** multiculturalism, liberal democracy, rights of individuals, rights of groups



## Definition of the term

From a descriptive perspective, multiculturalism is a social phenomenon usually associated with the presence in a society of a 'majority group' with its own culture – which is often perceived as homogeneous or 'culturally homogeneous' – and individuals or groups that belong to different cultures. As such, multiculturalism sometimes refers to an entire species that constitutes a unity that expresses itself through different cultures; however, multiculturalism is much more frequently found in numerous countries, such as the multicultural Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth, in which Protestants and Orthodox Christians, Armenians and Uniates, as well as Jews and Muslims lived alongside the dominant Catholic groups. This phenomenon, which is associated with majority groups' attitude of tolerance towards otherness, became particularly relevant in the last decades of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, when Western liberal-democratic societies (from Germany to Great Britain, the United States of America, Canada and Australia) began to advocate the need to recognize (almost?) every culture as 'equally valuable' and to think critically about the past. Today's proliferation of calls for the 'recognition of guilt' by the 'white man', who for centuries oppressed and colonized 'others' in order to 'civilize' them, are no longer a sign of a descriptive view of multiculturalism but of a normative one. The equality of cultures, not necessarily inherent only to ethnic groups, is a measure by which past violations justify the 'redemption of guilt' for the treatment of others as 'inferior' or 'less valuable', which is frequently accompanied by a call for reparations to their descendants. Debates on this issue are held at different levels, involving not only politicians but also scholars from various scientific disciplines. For example, humanists believe that every individual should be treated in an equally dignified manner; although their definitions of 'dignity' vary, they usually use this term to support the thesis of the rights and freedoms of individuals or persons, regardless of their cultural roots. Humanists believe in the unity of the species, in which humanity is expressed in various cultural forms. This touches on the problem of the common good, both species-related and national, which is to be co-determined by representatives of all cultures. Social researchers, sociologists, lawyers, and political scientists as well as economists and psychologists, complement these resolutions with reflections on the conditions necessary for

the coexistence in one state of citizens belonging to different cultures, in order to satisfy their expectations fuelled by past resentments or their current 'inferior' social position, and to assimilate them into the majority. Their reflections are sometimes concluded with demands to abolish all manifestations of the dominance of the majority culture and to build an inclusive multicultural society that would protect the subjectivity of each of its members. Regardless of their cultural grounding, these members should be treated as equal to others and possess the same rights and freedoms, guaranteed and protected by the legal system. This approach stems from the liberal ideas of John Locke and Thomas Hobbes (i.e., the 'neutrality' of the state, in which historically grounded differences between individuals are non-important) and Jean-Jacques Rousseau's theses on the homogeneity of a people that has the 'general legislative will', with which – in order to regain his freedom – a citizen should unite his particular will.

These references, which are often supported by Immanuel Kant's thesis on the tendency of individuals to co-create a universal moral law that takes into account the imperative to treat each individual as an end in himself and never as a means to ends pursued by others – even if they constitute the majority or the entire people – point to several fundamental problems. On the one hand, the entitlements/rights of individuals 'prior' to the legal order are mentioned; on the other hand, it is announced that the state or the people will create legal norms that have been agreed on as a conclusion of a conversation between (theoretically) everyone. Although the entitlements/rights of individuals are considered inalienable and belong to members of all cultures, they are derived from the 'decisions' or agreements of various 'institutions' which may be dominated by a majority, which is deeply rooted within one culture. After all, a theoretically 'neutral' state, whose task is to guarantee each citizen's bodily integrity, has never existed in human history: all states have consisted of multiple diverse groups for whom the state is a tool for the protection of their culture. In modern liberal democracies, especially those in which Rousseau's approach is sometimes quoted in constitutions granting political supremacy to a nation, the culturally homogeneous 'superior subject' is sometimes confronted with the claims of minorities to respect their supposedly inalienable rights and freedoms. Disputes held in these democracies since the 1970s are no longer confined to the

economic and social arenas, to the abolition of racial segregation, or to calls for improving the 'living conditions' of once disadvantaged groups; these disputes have entered the cultural arena, revealing the grounding of individuals in groups dominated by those who impose their cultural agenda onto those with different cultural identities.

Debates about identity are important for understanding the issues discussed in this volume. It suffices here to mention the approach in which an individual's identity is associated with his 'moral sovereignty' (making him the 'final authority' in defining 'values' and establishing their 'hierarchy') or 'autonomy' (allowing him to decide whether to accept or reject 'values' or patterns of behaviour indicated by the group to which he belongs). It is also worth taking into account a solution that emphasizes the relational context of the formation and consolidation of the identity of a human subject or a human person and highlights the importance of his ties with the community to which he belongs, even when that community is multicultural. Taking this context into account, which is important in the Aristotelian tradition, renders any approach that removes the individual from the community problematic, since his growth within the community accustoms him to diversity. In such a community, intercultural education is directed at strengthening the relations between members of the community with diverse identities rather than bringing out the uniqueness of an abstract subject. This makes it necessary to problematize the beliefs dominant in philosophical and political reflection about the existence of 'hard identities' of individuals and groups, including, above all, the majority group. Collective identities are, perhaps, not as defined and permanent as they are assumed to be, for they are constantly forming and changing, as are the identities of individuals. A dynamic rather than static approach makes it possible to see the subject not as an 'abstract individual' but as a person, for example, created by God and heading towards God, embedded in the collectivity in which it continues to transform its identity. Such an approach, which appears, for example, in Catholic Social Teaching and more broadly in the personalist approach, highlights the problem of continuous interactions between individuals, between individuals and the groups to which they belong, and between the social groups that they form, which are supported by different cultural solutions indicating different patterns of behaviour. The problems inherent in the static approach expose the tension linked with the identity

of the members of the majority group while it establishes legal norms in order to protect its own, stable cultural identity. This identity either acknowledges or does not acknowledge the entitlements and subjective rights of individuals to, for example, bodily integrity, thus either not allowing its violation or allowing its violation according to the requirements of the supposedly unchanging patterns respected by the minority group. Considering the dynamics of the changes that take place in a multicultural society under the influence of effectively conducted intercultural education, among other things, allows us to notice both the dissimilarity of cultural patterns within it as well as the opportunity for increasingly fuller human development within its framework and through the relationship with multicultural society as a complex and diverse whole.

A static approach underlies the search initiated by the political philosopher John Rawls in his book entitled *A Theory of Justice* (1971), in which he gave normative grounding to the liberal-democratic consensus, pointing to the 'principles of justice' that form 'the constitution of a well-ordered liberal-democratic society'. These principles were to be established in 'the original position' by individuals stuck behind a 'veil of ignorance', thus 'detached' from their cultural roots and ignorant of their social roles. The debate which followed this proposition led to the crystallization of several approaches: (1) the first denies the possibility of recognizing foreign cultures and requires their representatives to integrate into the dominant culture, e.g., one that exposes republican values, with the principle of secularism at the forefront (e.g., France, which is to some extent linked to Rousseau's expectations and is particularly interesting here); (2) the second compels tolerance for diversity as the most practical approach because it avoids the threat of violence in potential struggles between supporters of different cultures; (3) the third assumes recognition and acceptance of differences considered valuable in a given socio-cultural system, although it also requires recognition of certain political criteria limited to the search for conditions for external peace, without reaching deeper (moral) layers, which allow one to decide whether a given difference is to be recognized or not; (4) the fourth emphasises the oppressive character of any cultural element on which the majority wants to base its normative solutions, even those elements that are so important for 'liberal culture', such as secularism or the separation of a religious community from a neutral state

(it is not uncommon for uncritical acceptance of diversity to result in the rejection of any criteria or 'universal value' that can provide a basis for hierarchizing or evaluating cultures (Szahaj, 2004, p. 149)). These approaches have historical exemplifications and are widely discussed today when, as it is sometimes put, the 'ideology of multiculturalism' (associated with the fourth approach) is sometimes considered dangerous to the continuation of liberal democracy – for example, because of its consent to behaviours unacceptable to its participants (the killing or mutilation of an individual as an expression of the realization of the requirements set by the culture of his group) or because of the loss of the conditions for communication due to the absence of any common 'values'. The last possibility, related not only to the rise of the phenomenon of multiculturalism (which has various sources, including migration processes, decolonization, the demographic policies being pursued, the recurrence of past traditions and customs, and the defence of a civilization threatened by another civilization) but also to the postmodern hope of the peaceful 'coming together' of individuals pursuing 'their own life projects', leads to two fundamental questions. The first concerns the probability that an individual who liberates himself from the influence of the majority culture will adapt the requirements of his own life project, based on his own culture, to life projects pursued by members of other cultures. The second question concerns the attribution of rights to the group (contrary to the old liberal view) rather than to its members (in accordance with them), which raises the question of the purpose of the state: is it to protect the group against its members and other groups, including the majority group, or is it to protect an individual from the oppression of his own group?

## Historical analysis of the term

Multiculturalism is a social phenomenon with a very long history. In the Old Testament, there are stories about the Pharaohs' oppression of the people descended from Abraham, about their Exodus, the Covenant made with them by Yahweh, who revealed the Law to them, their struggles with 'others' in the Promised Land as well as the prophecies of the expected pursuit of God by the Chosen People, who should 'draw

other peoples after them'. After all, God, who created the human species, scattered mankind into many peoples and chose only one of them. The culturally refined ancient Greeks considered all 'others' barbarians; Romans added 'others' to their empire; and Christians, who are aware that there is no difference between a Jew and a Gentile who wishes to become a follower of the Son of God, seek to establish the 'content of orthodoxy', and – using it as a measure – also identify 'others' as 'foreign' to them. The encounters between Muslims and Christians, first in Western Europe, and then during the Crusades, and the encounters between European powers or refugees from the Old Continent with the indigenous peoples of both Americas, Africa and Asia, have led to the rationale behind the believed 'superiority of Western culture' of the colonists over the cultures of the subjugated 'others' being questioned, and to a re-evaluation of cultures as colonists discovered them.

Such questions were posed with increasing intensity by anthropologists of the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries, who slowly departed from evolutionist approaches that had assumed that various cultures changed to resemble the most highly developed culture. This was replaced by a more functionalist approach that valued the differences between cultures. Advocates of decolonization heralded the liberation of peoples from the domination of foreign cultures, referring more often to Marxism than to Edmund Burke, who was regarded as the 'father' of modern conservatism. Burke, in the second half of the 18<sup>th</sup> century, criticized the imposition of British solutions on the Indians and thus prepared the ground for a cult of nations proclaimed by the Romantics. The popularization of the idea of human rights and democracy (which offered protection against the state resorting to violence) strengthened the conviction that as many as possible should participate in co-creating the norms that bind them or in the process of selecting representatives who would create such norms. In this case, it was no longer a matter of liberation or abolishing the domination of a foreign or rather alien culture; it was a matter of including the voice of the liberated in the electorate of previously oppressive states; it was thus a matter of 'inclusion', of recognizing those who had moved from former colonies to such states or those who had lived in such states for a long time but were not treated in the same way as the dominant group. It was increasingly clear that – contrary to the view of 'early' liberals like Hobbes or Locke – citizens could not be treated as

individuals devoid of roots, as they are often guided by patterns inherent to and recommended by their groups.

The debate on the understanding of 'primordality', i.e., whether a society is organized or rather develops its ethnicity, which has been continuing since the 1950s (Shils, 1957; Nisbet, 1967; Geertz, 1973; Glazer and Moynihan, 1975; Nagata, 1981; Eller and Coughlan, 1993), has been entangled with the debate on the issue of migration. In this broadened argument, the American melting pot option was criticised for forcing the assimilation of 'others' into the dominant group, especially into their culture, and this option was juxtaposed with the salad bowl option; in this metaphor, a 'bowl' is filled with various fruits, which do not 'melt' into one mixture but co-exist side by side. The second metaphor reflected the situation in, for example, Canada, the fatherland of two authors frequently mentioned on the pages of this volume, Charles Taylor and Will Kymlicka, who represent two different camps (communitarian and liberal) but who address a similar issue: in their country, French-speaking Catholics live in one province and are surrounded by English-speaking Protestants who live in neighbouring provinces. This is a situation of multiculturalism caused by past, not present, migration, i.e., 'settled' citizens of the same country belonging to different cultures. When the present migration process – e.g., when increasingly numerous and decreasingly similar groups arrive in the 'metropolises' from former colonies – is added to this, the situation becomes greatly complicated. This situation was not predicted by the liberal project based on the concept of an 'acultural' or 'pre-cultural' individual; nor was it predicted by the democratic project, which exposes the homogeneity of free and equal citizens. On the contrary, neither project views the situation positively because it either requires binding individuals to a 'group identity' or it shatters homogeneity – or at least problematizes it.

This links the multiculturalism discussed in Western liberal democracies to tensions between the optimistic prediction of the end of history despite cultural diversity and – in view of the spread of the Western political project ('globalization') – pessimistic warnings about the 'clash of civilizations' or even a 'culture war'. The tension between Francis Fukuyama's prediction and Samuel L. Huntington's warning (Feliks Koneczny should also be mentioned here) is the backdrop for researchers' deliberations; it is also the context faced not only by law-makers

who develop public policies towards a multicultural society, but also by courts, which should disregard citizens' cultural diversity. This tension is sometimes presented as the result of a clash of universalist or 'neutral' (i.e., not treating any culture as the basis of possible regulations) expectations with the reality in which this basis is still established by a dominant culture. The universalism of the Enlightenment clashed with the particularism of Romanticism: the Romantics viewed classes and nations as groups with different interests and at the same time as groups that determine the identity and choices of their members. This universalism, however, has either a liberal face (in connection with human rights) or a democratic face, which no longer possesses such a comprehensive scope and no longer appeals to a species but to a given people, whose members – despite their roots in different cultures – should be citizens who are the same as this people. Liberalism has many 'faces' and embraces positions critical of the universalism of inherent entitlements or human rights as voiced not only by Charles de Montesquieu, but also Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, and the founders of the 'new', more socially oriented approach developed in the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Yet, liberalism still appeals to the rights possessed by each individual and juxtaposes them with a vision derived from the democratic or even republican-democratic tradition regarding the 'collective interest', which expresses the will of a group and, at the same time, the will of its members. Today, however, many authors argue about the validity of treating collective identities as clearly defined, stable and able to influence, to a greater or lesser extent, the choices of those individuals that either benefit by or are subject to them. Arguments also refer to the autonomy and even moral 'sovereignty' of individuals, to whether they merely realize and submit to the natural inclinations mentioned by the Aristotelians and the patterns carried by their own culture, or whether they create and establish their own hierarchy of values. After all, 'Western culture', which is considered liberal and concerned with justifying the freedom of the individual, emphasizes his ability to create 'values' as an expression of his originality and – as is often said – with sincerity and authenticity. If its representatives treat all individuals in a similar way whilst regarding the participants of non-Western (or other 'clearly defined') cultures as 'creators' of their own 'values', capable of expressing their originality or authenticity in this way, they may notice an

unusual problem associated with either the 'fusion of horizons' (which is expected by many or even all) or with a conclusive conversation (in which many or even all will participate). Can such expectations be associated with individuals existing in different cultures who draw their behavioural patterns from them? Or should it be considered, following communitarians (Taylor, 2001; Walzer, 1999), that such expectations are unfounded because people are rooted in nations, religious communities, neighbourhoods, and social communities? Attempts to view members of today's multicultural societies as if they were employees of global corporations are problematic because they lead to the conclusion that the vast majority of individuals have already shed their cultures and infiltrated a global culture that justifies the collective pursuit of profit and the individual pursuit of a career.

## Discussion of the term

The response to challenges posed by various liberal projects was interest in ownership in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, interest in equal opportunities in the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, and interest in a vision of a society that supports the efforts of individuals to realize their goals or their particular 'life projects' as fully as possible, in the final decades of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. If these individual subjective 'life projects' were to be realised in a liberal democracy, equal opportunity would simply be a prerequisite which needed to be complemented by a critique of those elements of communal culture that hindered their realization. In this regard, the transformations taking place in the liberal tradition were adapting to the increasingly far-reaching expectations of social groups and consolidated critical reflection on – and possibly even the erosion of – the patterns of behaviour carried by the dominant culture. The demands of the 'working class' to improve the position of its members were made as group pretensions, as were the demands of the 'racially' or 'gender' excluded. Increasing attacks on the 'dominant culture', propositions regarding the relationship between knowledge (including education) and authority, which objectifies individuals and deprives them of their subjectivity, are further signs of the old approaches usually associated with the outdated 'sovereignty narrative'. Criticisms undermining these approaches emerged during the

period of decolonization, when the entire 'Western culture' was attacked from another angle as oppressive and even 'imperialist' (Young, 1990). There were significant pronouncements for the eradication of all future violence, for removing exclusion and for building collectivity (even on a species-wide scale, which resembles old messianic approaches), in which everyone respects everyone else's 'otherness' and remains 'sincere' in their pursuit of their own non-conflicting 'life project'. Their authors drew attention to the emancipatory power of the critiques of modernity, the need to identify and disarm all mechanisms of subjugation, or to use them in a way that serves not to objectify but to recover and strengthen the subjectivity of the individual.

However, proponents of the 'ideology of multiculturalism' steer less towards this individualistic and subjectivist emancipatory tendency, but more towards emphasising the significance of still-existing groups (which are not always based on ethnicity or religion), which are important for their members. Following Kymlicka (the founder of 'liberal culturalism'), these proponents argue that it is necessary to remove external influences on groups, just as, in the past, external influences on individuals were removed in order to protect their 'privacy' and their 'negatively perceived areas of freedom', thus enabling them to freely exercise their inalienable entitlements. However, today, it is groups, not individuals, that they deem worthy of having 'privacy' or 'spheres of independence' (Kymlicka, 1995). However, they also add, again following the Canadian author, that groups cannot apply internal restrictions to their members. 'Neutrality', or even equality before the law, thus refers not so much to citizens (as Hobbes wanted) but to groups, announcing, however, that within them citizens will enjoy equal rights and freedoms. This solution brings with it a number of problems: the issue is no longer about consolidating the neutrality of the whole but is also now about consolidating the neutrality of the parts, providing they respect the rights and freedoms of their members and do not impose internal restrictions on them. It problematizes the 'territorial principle', the validity of the same law for every citizen, because it announces the introduction of different solutions, inherent in different cultural traditions, for different groups of citizens. These problems reveal a key issue, which used to arise in the past more often than today but is still relevant: in the jurisprudence of Western courts, people are protected but their cultures are criticized, which is

related to the demand to introduce differing laws regarding marriage, inheritance, and even criminal responsibility into a country with different cultures. In this case, the humanistic issue of individuals building their identities out of 'shattered' group identities according to their own taste (perhaps shaped by the media), which could lead to a world of like-minded people who lose their distinctiveness despite the announced efforts to the contrary (as observed by, for example, Walzer, 1999, p. 76), is irrelevant. It is about announcing the reformulation of previously existing legal systems in states that are no longer necessarily 'national' and establishing in their place 'conglomerates' of legal systems derived from many group identities, sometimes associated with cultures or subcultures that radically contest the established oppressive order as traditional (Benhabib, 1999). This raises an increasingly resounding question: will it be possible to defend the normative order shared by citizens, or will the 'territorial principle' that has been in force in the West since the Peace of Westphalia be broken (finally?; in the name of respect for citizens' cultural diversity?) so that an amalgam of 'normative projects' respected in a given territory and binding citizens belonging to different groups can emerge? Will a set of common norms be preserved, if only to disqualify certain acts that, although justified by 'reasons of cultural identity', will be believed to negate the prevailing pattern and lead to punishing offenders? If the 'territorial principle' is abolished, how will it be possible to defend the position of 'equality before the law' for a citizen belonging to a state, if his deeds will be measured by different yardsticks?

For proponents of multiculturalism (usually associated in this regard with the 'ideology of multiculturalism'), the preservation of rules that disqualify certain behaviours based on particularistic community traditions is a sign of the dominance of a culture protected by the law containing such rules; a sign that cannot be respected if the law is to be 'legitimized' by all citizens through their common recognition of it; a sign, even, of 'symbolic violence' which is the foundation of the dominant majority culture imposed onto the minority. Although the demand for the abolition of the 'territorial principle' is not included in 'moderate multicultural projects', it sometimes appears in connection with the claim to respect cultural practices: for example, Shariah law for Muslim citizens, or the introduction of regulations protecting, for example, the practice of

polygamy into family law or inheritance law. We find traces of demands in court rulings that take into account the cultural determinants of criminals from minority cultures who are treated differently than criminals from the 'dominant culture'; we also find such traces in the proliferation of affirmative actions in favour of members of groups considered culturally 'underprivileged', economically and socially disadvantaged. These problems are not generally taken into account within 'liberal culturalism', which assumes a gradual change of legal systems based on equality before the law and the equal treatment of citizens. However, these problems are mentioned in, for example, the 'Parekh Report', which called for both non-discrimination (taking into account the equal position of all cultures) and discrimination (thus differentiating them by reconstruction of the 'traditional' way of thinking about the Britishness inherent in 'white Britons') (Parekh, 2000). Researchers analysing these problems are preoccupied with the solutions adopted not only in particular countries but also in supranational acts, such as the 2001 Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, and the 2005 UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions. It is in these that they find theses on diversity as 'the common heritage of humanity and cultural diversity as a source of creativity and an essential element for the dynamic development of societies, and a call for the protection of cultural diversity as an integral part of human rights, which should be seen as an ethical imperative'. 'Actual cultural diversity' is to be protected by granting rights to minorities, thus not to individuals but to groups (Szlachta, 2016, pp. 9–12).

## Systematic reflection with conclusions and recommendations

Delight in the multiculturalism of modern democratic-liberal societies, sometimes intensified by media actions and public measures, must not obscure the serious problems inherent in both the 'ideology of multiculturalism' and its realities. This is not about decreasing tolerance for 'others' nor implementing xenophobic policies that assign citizens to national and ethnic minorities and fuel the majority's opposition against minorities (e.g., against favouring minorities in the labour market); it is about

rethinking the implications of multicultural projects that are formulated. Such an appeal is by all means justified; it can be carried out taking into account old approaches, such as those formulated at the beginning of the 15<sup>th</sup> century by the rector of Krakow Academy, Paweł Włodkowic, and new approaches, expressed in the statements of contemporary representatives of cultures other than 'Western', who are less familiar with (and perhaps not at all familiar with or do not accept) the fundamentally individualistic thinking of the creators of 'Western multicultural projects'. The problems inherent in multiculturalism include the possible granting of entitlements to groups instead of individuals; treating these entitlements as grounds for claims; affirmative actions; and the dismemberment (if only to an extent) of a single legal system which is binding for all citizens in order to establish different rules for their culturally diverse groups. To the above, one more issue, namely secularization, should be added, as it seems equally crucial for the builders of liberal democracy. Secularization should not be viewed through the prism of 'abandoning religion' by the participants of the Western experience, who are increasingly subject to the influence of 'science', which displaces old religious justifications. Secularism should be viewed in a manner close to Rawls, who warned against the dangers carried by various 'vast doctrines', including 'secular reason'. This issue is raised by Muslims, who join liberal democracies built on 'radical secularism' or 'radical separation', associated with the prohibition of formulating arguments based on religious convictions in the public sphere or the 'confinement of faith to the private sphere'. This is no longer an issue viewed in the context of a 'monological' culture that allows the establishment of conditions for peaceful coexistence between representatives of different faiths and requires shifting their key elements to the private sphere and guaranteeing its inviolability (analogous to other types of entitlements). This is an issue viewed in a 'multilogical' context, with many 'incommensurable' cultures, including those that refer to religious convictions. 'Tolerating otherness', after all, requires recognizing it, assigning a 'moral value' to it so as to justify its inclusion in the debate conducted in the public sphere even if it refers to religious arguments. Tariq Modood, a Muslim author, observes that while secularization and separatism are considered features of liberal democracy going back to the roots of the disputes of the 16<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> centuries, they are understood differently: in America, the head of state invokes God

and prays in public; in the UK, faith is a private matter for those in power; in France, as in the US, there is no 'state church' (unlike in the UK), and the state actively promotes the privatization of religion by removing symbols and expressions of religious affiliations from the public sphere. The solutions vary, but in view of giving equal 'value' to each culture, Muslims should also be included in the institutional framework of liberal democracy and allowed to participate in the debate, in which they will raise arguments derived from religion. 'Moderate secularism' should replace its extreme formulation, which is based, especially in France, on 'corporatist top-down inclusion' that subordinates religious groups to the 'secular state'.

If what Kymlicka and many other advocates of multiculturalism (not just communitarians) have been advocating is to be fulfilled – if the equality of cultures is to be taken seriously – it is necessary to abandon the 'neutral' approach assumed by Hobbes (and, with reservations, also Locke). It is also necessary to allow those who use religious arguments to become participants of the public sphere. Religious arguments are sometimes negated by those who unjustifiably 'essentialize' particular groups and treat them as if they were based on 'hard' 'identities' that should be excluded from public debate. In this view, multiculturalism is no longer an 'abstract ideology' but a project that presupposes the realization of 'intuitions' found in a world in need of reform, which is full of minorities, with their inherent resentments and distinct discourses, ways of protesting and mobilizing. Its proponents do not call for the fulfilment of an abstract demand for levelling but for noticing diversity and recognizing it. Attempts to treat citizens as members of a homogeneous collectivity or to shape them to be such, which resembles nationalist and totalitarian ideologies, should finally be abandoned, as should the proliferation of the theses of the 'clash of civilizations' that reinforces the conviction that citizens who belong to different cultures are in conflict. 'Populism' on the one hand and 'agonism' on the other, as two opposing approaches, should be overcome: 'citizenship' and 'inter-civilizational understanding' are key terms for the creators of Taylor's or even Parekh's 'political multiculturalism' projects; projects that are based on the thesis of 'worldwide philosophical humanism' that liberates minds (including, or perhaps especially, 'Western minds') from the 'fetters of westernization', from the hitherto dominant 'ethnocentrism'.

These new categories are signs of a departure from the 'sovereignty narrative' (typical of modernity), which was opposed by, for example, Michel Foucault and his followers; they are also signs of a departure from 'nation-states' as structures, which consolidated the belief in the permanence of citizen's links with their states. The normative order, then, cannot be established by aggregation (a 'quantitative' voting power) or deliberation (foreshadowing a conclusive conversation about what is to bind individuals) based on a single culture in the face of the multiplicity and diversity of citizens' cultural backgrounds, since there is no longer any 'monistic identity' behind citizenship once citizens base their choices on different cultures by participating in public debate in the form of multilogue (Modood, 2014, pp. 95–99 and 131–135).

*Multilogue* does not exclude reaching consensus, but it requires the abolition of totalizing dichotomies (e.g., into the West – Islam/Muslims). These dichotomies are evidence of domination rather than of the 'neutrality' expected by Hobbes or Rawls, which would justify the production of liberal individuals and the promotion of a liberal lifestyle at the expense of minority cultures. Contrary to assertions, 'liberality' does not lead to the expected inclusion, since it questions the multiplicity of beliefs built on religious or national content, appealing to transcendence and traditions that differentiate citizens. The individual rights associated with it do not consolidate either the presence of Muslims in the public sphere, or even the issues of women and homosexuality, which should be addressed in their political context, inscribed in the framework of a socio-political-intellectual culture directed at affirming positive differences and identities that are not so much individual but collective (Modood, 2014, pp. 195–199; Mouffe, 2008). This is the cultural framework for the future of democracy – a democracy still conceived of as liberal but no longer referring to the rights of individuals as a negatively understood sphere of independence of every individual, nor to a 'culture of privacy', but instead directed at affirming group differences and identities. Inclusiveness requires removing all projects that consolidate homogeneity or similarity, analogies within a species or within a given 'us', critically juxtaposed with a similar 'us' based on their 'traditional' cultures; it requires the defence of 'positive differences' and heralds the emergence of ever new 'identities'. Law, if it is

not to be an 'objectifying machine', cannot set criteria which disqualify differences.

## REFERENCES

- Banting, K., & Kymlicka, W. (2008). *Multiculturalism and the Welfare State. Recognition and Redistribution in Contemporary Democracies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Barry, B. (2001). *Culture Equality*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Benhabib, S. (1999). "Nous" et "les Autres". The Politics of Complex Cultural Dialogue in a Global Civilisation. In: C. Joppke, & S. Lukes (ed.), *Multicultural Questions* (pp. 44–64). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Beyersdörfer, F. (2004). *Multikulturelle Gesellschaft. Begriffe, Phänomene, Verhaltensregeln*. Münster: LIT Verlag.
- Butler, J. (1990). *Gender Trouble. Feminism and the Subversion of Identity*. New York: Routledge.
- Eller, J.D., & Coughlan, R.M. (1993). The poverty of primordialism. The demystification of ethnic attachments. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 16(2), 185–202.
- Fenton, S. (2010). *Ethnicity*, Cambridge: Polity Press Ltd.
- Geertz, C. (1973/2005). *Interpretacje kultur. Wybrane eseje*, trans. M.M. Piechaczek, Kraków: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego.
- Glazer N., Moynihan D.P. (1963). *Beyond the Melting Pot*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Glazer, N., & Moynihan, D.P. (ed.) (1975). *Ethnicity. Theory and Experience*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Kymlicka, W. (1995). *Multicultural Citizenship. A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Kymlicka, W. (2001). *Politics in the Vernacular. Nationalism, Multiculturalism, and Citizenship*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kymlicka, W. (2002). *Contemporary Political Philosophy. Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Modood, T. (2013). *Multiculturalism*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Mouffe, Ch. (2005). *On the Political*. New York: Routledge.
- Nagata, J.A. (1981). In defence of ethnic boundaries. The changing myths and characters of Malay identity. In: C. Keyes (ed.), *Ethnic Change*. (pp. 87–116). Seattle: University of Washington Press.
- Nisbet, R.A. (1967). *The Sociological Tradition*. London: Heinemann Educational.

- Olechnicki, K., & Załęcki, P. (1997). *Słownik socjologiczny*. Toruń: Grafitti BC.
- Parekh, B. (2000). *The Future of Multi-ethnic Britain. The Parekh Report*. Commission on the Future of Multi-ethnic Britain, London: Profile Books.
- Shils, E. (1957), Primordial, personal, sacred and civil lies. *British Journal of Sociology*, 8(2), 130–145.
- Szahaj, A. (2004). *E pluribus unum? Dylematy wielokulturowości i politycznej poprawności*. Kraków: Universitas.
- Szlachta, B. (2006). *Brytyjska wielokulturowość?* In: K. Golemo, T. Paleczny, & E. Wiącek (ed.), *Wzory wielokulturowości we współczesnym świecie* (pp. 65–78). Kraków: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego.
- Szlachta B. (2016), Problems of cultural rights, *Politeja*, 5(44), 7–16.
- Szlachta, B. (2012). *Faktyczność, normatywność, wielokulturowość. Szkice filozoficzno-polityczne*. Kraków: Ośrodek Myśli Politycznej.
- Taylor, C. (2006). *Sources of the Self. The Making of the Modern Identity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Taylor, C. (2004). *Modern Social Imaginaries*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Walzer, M. (1997), *On Toleration*. New Haven, Yale University Press.
- Young, I.M. (1990). *Justice and the Politics of Difference*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.